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resumo 
Ensino Superior Português, Ensino Superior Finlandês, Mudança Insitutucional,  
Implementação política, Governação, Nova Gestão Pública, Processo de Bolonha.  
 
 
Esta dissertação compara as mudanças governamentais e políticas nos 
sistemas de ensino superior (ES) português e finlandês, que emergem de 
pressões externas similares. Exemplos destas pressões externas são o 
processo de Bolonha e as manifestações legislativas mais recentes da Nova 
Gestão Pública (NGP), nomeadamente o novo regime jurídico das instituições 
de ensino superior (IES) portuguesas (RJIES) e finlandesas (Novo Acto 
Universitário), visando alterar não só as estruturas de governação institucional, 
como também as práticas de tomada de decisão.O estudo fornece uma 
descrição histórica e cultural abrangente dos sistemas de ES português e 
finlandês, a fim de dar a conhecer a forma como os governos destes países e 
as suas IES reagem a movimentos de mudança similares. Embora Portugal e 
Finlândia difiram significativamente em termos geográficos, históricos, culturais 
e económicos, ambos os países empreenderam recentemente reformas 
legislativas semelhantes nos seus sistemas de ES, tornando esta comparação 
relevante no âmbito das políticas de ES. Além disso, apesar de divergirem na 
sua natureza, carácter, objectivos e nível de aplicação, estas políticas foram 
implementadas simultaneamente, com o objectivo de melhorar a eficiência e 
qualidade do desempenho institucional, bem como a visibilidade e competição 
nacional. Argumenta-se que a crescente internacionalização do ES, a política 
de soft law da União Europeia (UE) bem como a ideologia managerialista – 
também disseminada por relatórios e discursos de organizações internacionais 
como a Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Económico 
(OCDE) e a UE oferecem explicações para semelhanças em contextos 
nacionais. No entanto, as especificidades históricas e culturais, e as 
características estruturais destes sistemas político-administrativos explicam as 
diferenças nos processos de implementação de políticas e, consequentemente, 
nos resultados obtidos a nível nacional. 
Juntamente com uma vasta análise documental, o estudo é baseado na análise 
qualitativa estratégica e é suportado empiricamente por 61 entrevistas 
semiestruturadas a actores-chave, a nível sistémico e institucional, em ambos 
os países, e em ambos os tipos de instituições de ES realizadas durante os anos 
de 2011e 2012. Estes actores foram escolhidos devido às suas funções e grau 
de envolvimento no objecto de estudo: as últimas reformas de governação das 
IES impulsionadas pela Yliopistolaki 558/2009, pela Lei 62/2007 e pelo processo 
de Bolonha. Assim, os resultados aqui apresentados espelham as vozes dos 
praticantes que se envolveram nessas reformas, tanto ao nível do sistema 
quanto ao nível institucional. Resumidamente, é possível observar que, 
frequentemente, a aplicação da legislação nacional em IES é alcançada através 
de processos top-down (principalmente no caso Português) e um misto de 
estratégias bottom-up e top-down (mais na Finlândia). Estas estratégias visam 
alterar a estrutura organizacional das instituições, os órgãos de governação, os 
processos de tomada de decisão e as condições de trabalho dos profissionais 
académicos. O estudo revela que actores dentro do mesmo grupo de funções 
tendem a ter opiniões semelhantes em Portugal e na Finlândia, o que significa 
que independentemente da nacionalidade, as percepções convergem de acordo 
com os papéis dos entrevistados. 
 
keywords 
 
Portuguese higher education, Finnish higher education, Institutional change, 
Policy implementation, Governance, New Public Management, Bologna 
process. 
abstract 
 
This research compares governmental and political changes in Portuguese and 
Finnish higher education (HE) systems, emerging from similar external 
pressures. Examples of these external pressures are the Bologna process and 
the recent legislative expressions of New Public Management (NPM), including 
the new legal framework for Portuguese (RJIES) and Finnish (New University 
Act) higher education institutions (HEIs) which aims at changing not only 
institutional governance structures but also institutions’ management and 
decision-making practices. The study provides a comprehensive historical and 
cultural description of the Portuguese and Finnish HE systems in order to build 
a framework for the advancement of knowledge on how Finnish and Portuguese 
governments and their HEIs react towards similar movements of change.  
Although Portugal and Finland differ significantly in their geography, history, 
culture, and economic status, both countries undertook similar HE legislative 
reforms, making the comparison focused and relevant for the study field of HE 
policy. Moreover, albeit different in character, goals and enforcement level, the 
policies were implemented concurrently, and both intend to improve efficiency 
and quality of institutional performance and to enhance national visibility and 
competition. It is argued that the incremental internationalisation of HE, the 
European Union (EU) soft law, as well as the NPM ideology – also disseminated 
by reviews and discourses of international organisations like the Organisation for 
Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD) and the EU offer an 
explanation for similarities in national contexts.  Nevertheless, historical and 
cultural specifics and structural characteristics of political-administrative systems 
are considered explanatory factors for differences in policy implementation 
processes and therefore in national outcomes. 
Together with document analysis, the study is based on qualitative analysis and 
finds empirical evidence on 61 semi-structured interviews to key actors of system 
and institutional levels in both countries and in both types of HEIs conducted 
during the years 2011 and 2012. These actors were chosen due to their roles 
and degree of involvement in the study object: the latest institutional governance 
reforms driven by the Yliopistolaki 558/2009 and the Law 62/2007. Thus, the 
findings presented here rely much on the voices of the practioners who engaged 
in these reforms, both at the system and institutional levels.  
Briefly, it is possible to observe that frequently, the application of national 
legislation in HEIs is achieved through top-down processes (mainly in the 
Portuguese case) and a mix between top-down and bottom-up strategies (more 
in Finland). These strategies aim at changing institutions’ organisational 
structure, their governance bodies, decision-making processes and 
professionals working conditions. This study shows that the same group of 
actors tend to have similar opinions both in Portugal and in Finland, which means 
that regardless nationality, perceptions converge according interviewees’ roles.  
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abstrakti 
 
Tässä tutkimuksessa verrataan hallinnollisia ja poliittisia muutoksia Portugalin ja 
Suomen korkeakoulujärjestelmissä, joihin molempiin on kohdistunut 
samankaltaisia ulkoisia paineita. Esimerkkejä näistä ulkoisista paineista ovat 
Bolognan prosessi ja viimeaikaiset New Public Managementin (NPM, uuden 
julkishallinnon) inspiroimat lakitekstit. Näitä ovat Portugalissa säädetty 
korkeakoulujen uusi juridinen viitekehys (RJIES) ja Suomessa vuoden 2009 
yliopistolaki, joilla kummallakin pyritään muutamaan sekä yliopistojen hallinnon 
rakenteita että johtamisen ja päätöksenteon käytänteitä. Tutkimuksessa luodaan 
kokonaisvaltainen historiallis-kulttuurinen kuvaus Portugalin ja Suomen 
korkeakoulujärjestelmistä, jotta voitaisiin rakentaa viitekehys, jolla edistetään 
tietoa siitä, miten Suomen ja Portugalin hallitukset ja maiden korkeakoulut 
reagoivat samanlaisiin muutoksen suuntiin. 
Siitä huolimatta, että Portugali ja Suomi eroavat merkittävästi toisistaan sekä 
maantieteen, historian, kulttuurin että taloudellisen asemansa suhteen, 
molemmissa maissa tehtiin samankaltaisia korkeakoululainsäädännön 
muutoksia. Tämä auttaa vertailuaseman fokusointia ja tekee tutkimuksesta 
relevantin  korkeakoulupolitiikan tutkimuksen kentällä. Tämän lisäksi politiikat 
toimeenpantiin samaan aikaan, vaikkakin ne olivat erilaisia luonteeltaan, 
päämääriltään ja toimeenpanon voimakkuudeltaan. Molemmissa maissa pyrittiin 
kuitenkin parantamaan korkeakoulujen suorityskyvyn laatua ja tehoa sekä 
edistämään kansallista näkyvyyttä ja kansainvälistä kilpailukykyä. Kansallisten 
kontekstien samankaltaisuutta on selitetty lisääntyvällä korkeakolutuksen 
kansainvälistymisellä, Euroopan unionin (EU) pehmeällä lailla (soft law) sekä 
NPM:n ideologialla, jota ovat levittäneet sekä arvioinnit että kansainvälisten 
organisaatioiden kuten OECD:n ja EU:n diskurssit. Tästä huolimatta historiallisia 
ja kulttuurisia erityispiirteitä sekä poliittis-hallinnollisten järjestelmien 
rakenteellisia ominaisuuksia voi käyttää eroja selittävinä tekijöinä politiikan 
toimeenpanossa ja siksi kansallisissa tuloksissa. 
Tutkimus perustuu dokumenttien analyysin ohella strategiseen laadulliseen 
analyysiin ja se tukeutuu empiirisiseen tutkimusaineistoon, joka koostuu 61:stä 
puolistrukturoidusta teemahaastattelusta, joissa haastateltiin järjestelmä- ja 
korkeakoulutason keskeisiä toimijoita sekä yliopistoissa että 
ammattikorkeakouluissa molemmissa maissa vuosina 2011 ja 2012. 
Haastateltavat henkilöt valittiin ottaen huomioon sekä heidän roolinsa että 
sitoutumisensa tutkimuskohteeseen, eli Suomessa yliopistolain (558/2009) ja 
Portugalissa (lain 62/2007) tuomiin korkeakoulujen hallinnon ja johtamisen 
muutoksiin. Tästä syystä tutkimuksessa saadut tulokset perustuvat paljolti näihin 
lakiuudistuksiin järjestelmän ja korkeakoulujen tasolla sitoutuneiden käytännön 
toimijoiden käsityksiin. 
Tiivistetysti sanoen voidaan havaita, että usein kansallisten lakimuutosten 
soveltaminen korkeakouluissa pannaan toimeen ylhäältä alaspäin 
suuntautuvana prosessina (pääasiassa Portugalin tapauksessa) ja ylhäältä-
alaspäin ja alhaalta-ylöspäin toimeenpanostrategian yhdistelmänä (enemmän 
Suomen tapauksessa). Näiden strategioiden tavoitteena on muuttaa 
korkeakoulujen organisaatiorakenteita, niiden hallinto- ja 
päätöksentekotoimielimiä, päätöksenteon prosesseja ja korkeakoulun 
työntekijöiden työehtoja. Tutkimus osoittaa, että samoilla toimijaryhmillä on 
taipumus jakaa samankaltaiset mielipiteet sekä Portugalissa että Suomessa. 
Tämä tarkoittaa sitä, että käsitykset riippuvat enemmänkin haastateltavien 
ihmisten rooleista kuin kansallisuudesta. 
 x 
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Introduction 
Over the last decades, it has been widely acknowledged the growing importance of Higher 
Education (HE) on political agendas. Perhaps because no area of public policy has been subjected 
to such radical changes as HE (M. Kogan & Hanney, 2000). This needs to be understood bearing 
in mind not only social transformations resulting from the massification of HE, but also from new 
economic, regulatory and social pressures at the global level that have dictated a new era for HE 
systems, where policy design and implementation processes are no longer exclusively under nation-
states’ responsibility. Generally speaking, one can say that governments have been losing their 
exclusivity in the design of educational policies, providing the redefinition of powers and 
responsibilities of different actors, and also due to the emergence of new levels of governance in 
this field.  
Gradually, the dispersion of authority from the central government combined with a greater 
awareness of the need to interact with other societal actors (J.  Kooiman, 2003) resulted in a 
reallocation of powers. Consequently, the old social contract between society and HEIs evolved to 
a redefinition of responsibilities and to the development of the notion of multi-level governance in 
the HE sector, a movement that cannot be separated from a general rebalancing of Europe’s 
political and economic institutional order (Olsen, 2005). This process is accompanied by an 
increasing awareness of the importance of knowledge in order to pursue economic development 
and competitiveness, as well as to improve populations’ wellbeing through social cohesion, cultural 
richness, critical reflection and technological progress. In this way, the integration of educational 
policies on the social and economic structures of modern societies and vice-versa raised the well-
known buzzword of the knowledge society. 
At the same time, European HEIs face pressures for reform in order to more efficiently and 
rapidly answer to the challenges posed by the environments surrounding them and to a better 
integration and interaction with society. The message entailed in the political and academic 
discourses is straightforward, especially for universities: 
“Europe has to prioritize university modernization because her universities are lagging behind 
the best universities in the USA and because upcoming China and India will make competition 
among universities and economies even stiffer” (Olsen and Maassen 2007: 3). 
 
Nevertheless, the solutions, visions and methods proposed to enhance European universities’ 
competitiveness and attraction vary according to the multiplicity of actors involved and the 
ideologies and interests they represent. In this sense, the “Europe of knowledge” idea, raised during 
the Lisbon Process in the year 2000 needs a new pact (Figel, 2006) or, as Olsen (2005a) refers, a 
deeper reflection upon the question “what kind of University for what kind of society” is needed. 
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The problem with such a seemingly simplistic approach lies on the fact that universities seem to be 
experiencing a loss of their cultural, ideological and political distinctiveness as exemplified in their 
rapidly changing codes of governance and management structures (Reed, Meek and Jones 2002: xx).  
Although the HE sector has been undergoing reforms over the past fifty years, it is since the 
late 1990s that European HE changed significantly (Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 2008), largely 
driven by the Bologna Declaration (1999), the European Union’s (EU) Lisbon Strategy (2000), and 
changes created by the Lisbonisation of Bologna (Harmsen 2013), namely the emergence of the 
knowledge society and increased competitive pressures from globalisation and internationalisation 
of HE. In parallel, changes in HE should be contextualised with public sector reforms framed by 
neoliberalism. After all, both follow similar administrative practices, sponsored by the NPM 
ideology (Pollitt, Thiel and Homburg 2007). The ultimate objective is “(…) to reform the continent’s 
still fragmented HE systems into a more powerful and more integrated, knowledge-based economy” 
(CHEPS 2006: 9). 
As societies grow in complexity – due to the growing fragmentation of political power, the 
preoccupation with efficiency as the major criteria for public action and concerns regarding financial 
constraints, etc. (Salamon 2002: 37) – governments have been “reinvented” and elaborated tools to 
deal with a multiplicity of scenarios. Thus, new governance approaches aim at governing problems 
of complex societies, in which attention has shifted “from hierarchic agencies to organisational 
networks” (ibid: 11). This shift makes necessary to study the (relative) and sometimes conflicting 
influence of NPM and network governance and their interplay in order to understand recent 
national HE reforms (Bleiklie and Michelsen 2012: 116).  
Politically, the Bologna process represents the most far-reaching reform of HE and it traduces 
the growing geographical and political expansion of the EU. This is probably one of the main 
reasons explaining why the process has been given so much attention and importance. By involving 
48 countries (plus the European Commission), willing to undertake a series of institutional reforms 
in the common ambition of increasing the competitiveness of their HE systems, the Bologna 
process also reflects the growing internationalisation of this sector.  
In order to accomplish international, national, and institutional targets, soft law was used to 
implement national policies’ goals. The Bologna process cannot therefore be separated from the 
new European methodology of policy implementation based on soft law, namely the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC). However, although promoting change, it does not guarantee complete 
convergence, at least at the lowest levels of implementation due to a lack of coordination emerging 
from different national agendas (Alberto Amaral & Neave, 2009; G. Neave & Maassen, 2007). 
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Portugal and Finland provide a natural “laboratory” for a case study to analyse recent changes 
in HE policies. Despite clear historical, geographical, cultural and economic contrasts, they recently 
implemented similar HE legislative reforms and received similar feedback from the OECD review 
teams (Kauko and Diogo 2011). Additionally, both HE systems are similar enough being binary 
systems – universities and polytechnics – to allow comparisons, and where the Humboldtian model 
of HE organisation still prevails. Furthermore, both are relatively small and peripheral European 
countries, albeit with different economic structures and international status (ibidem). Portugal and 
Finland have embarked on changes supported by an international context, e.g. assessments from 
international organisations, e.g. OECD, European Network of Quality Assurance in HE (ENQA,) 
reports and discourses of the EU, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) and the World Bank (WB). These international organisations have been 
powerful agents in the diffusion and convergence of national policies for HE (Martens et al. 2004).  
After the implementation of the Bologna process, Portugal and Finland have been introducing 
relevant changes of the governance bodies of their HEIs. In Portugal, implementing the Bologna 
process coincided with HEIs’ governance and management reform enacted by Law 62/2007 
(RJIES) of 10th September, which stipulates the new legal framework for HEIs. In Finland it is easier 
to separate these events, at least chronologically. The Bologna process was officially implemented 
during the academic year of 2005/2006 (OKM 2005), and the New Universities Act (Uusi Ylipistolaki 
558/2009) was enforced in January 2010. Briefly, these changes seek to increase HEIs autonomy, 
to change HEIs’ organisational structures, to change the way funds are allocated and to change the 
decision-making processes, as well as policies concerning working conditions and human resources’ 
practices.  
Despite clear differences of goal ambition and nature, contexts and rationales of both policies, 
there are overlapping elements that deserve attention, namely the influence of managerialism in 
these reforms. As Bleiklie et al. (2011: 168) claim, “While the reforms aimed by the Bologna agenda 
as such have little to do with NPM, its goals of efficiency (and student mobility) are easily associated 
with NPM”. Also Dobbins, Knill, and Vögtle (2011: 665) point to the Bologna process and the 
spread of NPM as “convergence-promoting processes” which increasingly subject HEIs to 
competing visions of how university systems and HEIs should be governed. A strong tendency has 
in fact emerged in which ‘Bologna’ is equated with predominantly neoliberal or NPM inspired 
programmes of university reform (Harmsen 2013). Indeed, as Meek (2003: 7) referred, any 
discussion of HE management needs to be set within the broader context of NPM. Such shift owes 
much to the financial and logistical resources that the European Commission (EC) has been using 
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to gain legitimacy, sympathy and freedom of maneuvre to introduce a “neoliberal modernisation” 
agenda in HE systems (Hermsen 2013). 
In the signatory countries of the Bologna declaration, the process has played a key role in 
stoking national reforms of HE (Amaral and Neave 2009; Štech 2011) and there are strong reasons 
to believe that Bologna is likely to foster changes in national governance structures (Dobbins et al. 
2011: 666). In turn, these changes are much due to the EC’s ideas on the modernisation (i.e. 
professionalisation of governance) of European universities by means of increased performance, 
efficiency and profitability, diversification of funding sources, intensification of ties between 
universities and industries and a closer match between the supply of qualifications and labour market 
demands (COM 2011).  
It was this context that instigated curiosity in a comparative analysis of both Portuguese and 
Finnish HE systems, assuming that both the Bologna process and governance (and management) 
reforms are mediated by different national realities. Bearing this in mind, the general research 
question driving this study aims at understanding how different HE systems and HEIs implement 
similar political changes as the Bologna process and governance reforms. And why there have been 
similar HE reforms in Portugal and in Finland? What does explain convergence and divergence in 
(Portuguese and Finnish) HE? 
It should be mentioned that the study does not intend to assess the impact of reforms in the 
HE sector. Reform processes correspond to a long and intensive learning cycle. Implementation 
takes several years before one can truly assess its impact, if ever this is completely possible (Carvalho 
2009: 20). And, as Carvalho refers, it is not always theoretically and empirically viable to separate 
this impact from other changes, which occur simultaneously in the same political, institutional and 
organisational environment. 
  
Background and Research Interest 
Driven by the ambition of  transforming Europe in the knowledge economy through the 
promotion of  the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) first, and later through the European 
Research Area (ERA), the Bologna process has been successful at the international and national 
levels, although implementation is so far incomplete at the institutional level (Trends Report V 2007; 
Eurydice 2010). However, it can also be argued that since 2010, other themes have been focused on 
the Bologna agenda and with the latest Communiqué adopted in Yerevan (2015), the scope has 
included the basic processes of  HE: teaching, learning and research. Furthermore, both the 
common learning spaces of  the EHEA and ERA continue to miss a connection between them, 
being this presented as one of  the challenges for the following decade (Froment 2010). In this 
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context, and as HE became increasingly recognised as the main driver for the creation of  knowledge 
societies, the Bologna process is seen as a kind of  “flag”, an essential vehicle of  HEIs modernisation, 
i.e. professionalisation, once institutions do not live insulated from outside influence, and 
consequently Bologna works as a lever for national reforms (Veiga & Amaral, 2009). 
In order to achieve the objectives agreed in the Bologna declaration, the process uses soft law 
mechanisms aimed at converging the EHEA, making it a more competitive, comparable and 
consistent learning and research space, not only for citizens of the signatory countries, but also for 
those who wish to study and/or work in this space. Nevertheless, the different forces that shape 
the Bologna process, harmonisation vs. diversity, and convergence vs. divergence, can create 
tensions in governance arrangements of the signatory HE systems, given the changes and purposes 
the process requires. Furthermore, in terms of (political and social) organisation, European 
universities are divided between the British and the Continental models. The latter includes the 
Napoleonic and the Humboldt models, which despite their differences, both converge in the 
positioning of the state as the guarantor of citizens’ education as well as the main entity providing 
the necessary resources to achieve this. However, at the system level, one observes a greater 
reluctance to use public money for financing public services (Deem, 2001), a fact that changes HEIs’ 
management practices and the way institutions deliver their mission. This shift is also understood 
in the light of the NPM normative principles of promoting private-sector practices within HEIs, i.e. 
management and contractualisation upon objectives, value-for-money, efficiency, customer-
orientation service, quality management, steering at a distance, etc. (S Diogo, 2014). 
In addition to the international influence on policy design and implementation of HE systems’, 
and the increasing Europeanisation of HE, other drivers of change, namely national and ideological 
aspects, are also identified in the literature. In Portugal, changes in HEIs governance structures and 
management practices have been enforced and legitimised by the RJIES, Law 62/2007 of 10th 
September, which defines the new legal framework for HEIs.  
Also the Finnish HE system went through important legislative changes in 2008-2009, 
culminating in the New Universities Act (Uusi Yliopistolaki 558/2009), which entered into force in 
August 2009. The New Universities Act replaced the Universities Act of 1997, further extending 
the autonomy of universities. Other changes brought by this Law concern to the status of academia 
staff who no longer are civil servants and became employed by the HEI where they work (Law 
558/2009). Both documents, the Portuguese RJIEs and Finnish Universities Act, allow the 
transformation of HEIs into public foundations operating under private law or as independent legal 
personalities. 
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The integration of these arrangements in the HE sector, not only as a result of the Bologna 
process, but also due to an ideology borrowed from the corporate sector (Santiago, et al. 2006), 
reflects the new HE dynamics where business terms such as customers, markets, mergers, efficiency, 
etc. are assuming increasing importance in contemporary professional organisations, such as 
universities and polytechnics. At the same time, the Bologna process has had more focus on the 
structural aspects of HE systems, somehow shifting the Bologna agenda direction, which some 
argue is necessary to create new enthusiasm for the process. 
 
Through a comparative study of  both countries and both HE systems, and bearing in mind 
that the impact of  the Bologna process and governance reforms enacted by these pieces of  national 
legislation may be mediated by other variables, this dissertation sheds some light on the process of  
systemic and institutional change. More specifically, this dissertation compares changes in 
governance and policy dynamics in Portuguese and Finnish HE by analysing the formulation and 
implementation processes and instruments shaped by similar external pressures in both countries. 
Albeit different in character, goals and enforcement level, the policies of this study were 
implemented concurrently, and both intended to improve efficiency and quality of institutional 
performance and to enhance national visibility and competition. It is argued that the incremental 
internationalisation of HE, the EU soft law as well as the NPM ideology – also disseminated by 
reviews and discourses of international organisations offer an explanation for similarities in national 
contexts. Nevertheless, historical and cultural specifics and structural characteristics of politico-
administrative systems (Bleiklie and Michelsen 2012) are considered powerful factors in explaining 
differences in policy design and implementation processes, as well as national outcomes. While 
searching for the main drivers of  convergence and divergence in both Portuguese and Finnish HE 
systems, it is expected to understand whether HE reforms in these countries can be labelled as part 
of  the NPM framework, or whether they overlap with other change movements, directly or 
indirectly linked to international developments and/or globalisation, multi-level governance, etc. 
 
Research Problem and Research Questions 
This research aims at building up a comparative model, based in in-depth case studies that explore 
both Portuguese and Finnish HE policy design and implementation processes at the system and 
institutional levels. It takes as examples the Bologna process and the latest legislative expressions of  
NPM in said countries. This is achieved by analysing the contexts that allow change to happen, as 
well as the instruments and mechanisms used to implement and cope with change. The dissertation 
follows with the institutional level of  analysis in order to understand changes in HEIs organisational 
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structure and in the work organisation of  academic communities, which means analysing change in 
a multidisciplinary environment such as HEIs.  
In order to limit “(…) the range in which the researcher must work without rendering his work 
less comparative” and considering that “the problem approach is more modest than the total 
approach; it is nonetheless comparative” (Välimaa 2008: 142, quoting Bereday 1957: 14), the 
following research problem was elaborated: 
How do different national HE systems and HEIs implement similar political changes as the Bologna 
process and governance reforms?  
 
In order to explore the research problem, the following research questions (RQ) have been 
designed to better guide the research process and analysis:  
 
R. Q. 1 - How did different national HE systems and HEIs in Portugal and in Finland cope 
with similar external pressures as the Bologna process and the NPM? How both policy processes 
have been designed and implemented in both countries? 
 
R. Q. 2 - Which major changes happened within the organisational structure of HEIs? How 
did HEIs change their governance and management practices to cope with external pressures?  
 
R. Q. 3 - Is it possible to evidence changes in the way work is organised within HEIs? And in 
the way decision-making processes are made? How these external pressures/processes influence the 
way academic work is carried out and in the way academics participate in decision-making practices? 
 
In sum, by operationalising the concept of  governance and convergence, the study understands and 
interprets how changes introduced by the NPM and the Bologna process interfere with the 
organisational dynamics that shape the organisation and management processes of  HE and the 
performance of  the professionals/staff  working within these institutions. Furthermore, this 
interpretation is enriched by the visions that actors in both countries have on the impact of  these 
reforms in their HE systems and HEIs. 
 
Briefly, change is understood here as the result of the policy design and implementation 
processes of the Bologna process and both Laws redefining the legal framework of Portuguese and 
Finnish HEIs, i.e. Law 62/2007 and Law 558/2009 respectively. Change is thus being intrinsic to 
policy making (Saarinen and Välimaa 2012).  
Research Approach – Why to Compare? 
Due to the nature of this study, a comparative approach as a method of inquiry and as a frame 
of analysis is used. It shares Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal’s opinion (2003: 426) who explain that the 
recent popularity of comparative education must be seen in the light of increasing 
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internationalisation of educational policies which leads to the diffusion of global patterns. As such, 
national governments seek “international educational indicators” in order to build educational 
plans that are legitimised by a kind of “comparative global enterprise” which helps to justify their 
decisions (2003: 425). 
A qualitative case(s)-study is being used to understand how such different countries have 
developed their paths of policy implementation in HE, bearing in mind their specific cultural and 
time-space contexts. It is acknowledged the importance to leave sufficient leeway for each country 
specific characteristics. Additionally, the greatest richness and complexity in trying to grasp the 
Bologna process and its (hypothetical) impact in any of the signatory countries’ governance 
structures and procedures is its multiplicity of levels and actors as well as their inseparability of a 
global context in which HE systems operate. 
At the present moment, several political entities and organisations define and implement 
educational policies at global, European, national, regional and local levels, conferring special 
interest and complexity to the study of HE systems, where the interaction between HEIs, national 
governments and intermediary institutions play a crucial role within these dynamics. The value of 
a multi-level and multi-actor analysis is simultaneously a challenge and an asset to this comparative 
study. Indeed, providing the complex nature of the Bologna process, methodologically, comparison 
appears naturally as the most appropriate approach to this type of research: a comparative design 
with case studies covering the evolution of governance structures of both Portuguese and Finnish 
HEIs. As can be read in Goedegebuure and Van Vught (1996: 371), quoting Swanson (1971: 145): 
“Thinking without comparison is unthinkable. And in absence of comparison, so is all scientific 
thought and scientific research”. Nevertheless, although many authors believe in the relevance of 
comparison as the ideal methodological approach for the advancement of knowledge in several 
fields of study, namely in social sciences, it is important to specify what is meant by comparative 
studies and comparative approach. Based on the previous work of Goedegebuure and Van Vught (1996), 
comparative studies are defined as “… studies using comparable data from at least two societies 
(Armer 1973, p.49) or as a form of multilevel research (implying comparative analysis both within 
and across systems) (Przeworski and Teune 1970, pp.50-51) (1996: 371)”.  
Following Goedegebuure and Van Vught (1996), and looking at the comparison approach 
within the education field, Välimaa (2008) considers another classification able to give causal 
explanations to educational phenomena. This is provided by Rossello (1960), who distinguished 
between descriptive comparative education (documents’ collection, observation, and comparison of 
facts in order to describe differences and similarities), and explanatory comparative education, which 
involves investigation of the causes of the comparative phenomena and, if possible, prediction as 
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to their future development. As mentioned before, it is our aim to pursue an explanatory study, 
which according to Rossello, and as explained by Välimaa (2008), is academically more demanding 
and also more useful, once causal explanations can be used by decision-makers (2008: 153). 
Complementing these ideas, and also focused on the nature of the object of the study and 
aims of the research, Mark Bray (2005) wrote more recently that comparative education research 
relates to cross-national analyses, encouraging its participants to be outward-looking, responding 
to changes at a global level. Furthermore, as defended by several authors (Rothblatt and Wittrock 
1993; Teichler 1996; Bray 2005), one of the greatest benefits of comparative studies is that they 
allow us to define and even prioritise different dimensions to be studied, making it easier to 
understand their social dynamics (Välimaa 2008).  
That being said, and after analysing each country’s historical and social background, especially 
focusing on their HE paths, as well as their political-administrative structure to better grasp the 
role of the state in the public sector, two main dimensions of analysis will be contrasted. These 
dimensions cover both the system and institutional level of analysis: i) the organisation and 
implementation processes of the Bologna declaration and the legislative framework aiming at 
changing HEIs’ governance at the national level, and ii) the translation of theses processes at the 
institutional level (i.e. changes in the way HEIs are steered and in their organisational structure; 
governance instruments; changes in decision-making practices and in the academia working 
conditions). The study of these aspects confirm the idea highlighted by Bray (2005: 37) that 
comparative education is, by nature, an interdisciplinary field, providing simultaneously a valuable 
meeting point for disciplinary perspectives (Bray 2005: 37). 
Following recent developments in the EHEA architecture, promoted through the Bologna 
process and governance reforms, a comparative methodology provides a method of  analysis which 
allows to evidence similarities and contrasts in relation to a specific issue or several objects of study 
(Rothblatt and Wittrock 1993). “(…) by merely posing the question does focus attention on 
comparison, and this in turn leads us toward new questions, new puzzles, new sequences, and 
perhaps new data” (ibidem: 7).  
Within the sphere of  comparison studies, and of  particular importance for this research, one 
finds comparative policy studies. These aim at understanding the rationale and the procedures that 
different governments use to steer and simultaneously to legitimise their actions, e.g. they aim at 
clarifying the (possible) consequences and ambitions of  governments taking particular measures of 
action (or inaction) (Goedegebuure and Van Vught 1996). According to Goedegebuure and Van 
Vught (1996), comparative policy studies have been of  most importance since mid 1970s and knew 
great development in those sectors where governments play a key role in terms of  decision making 
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concerning areas such as education, health and housing (ibidem: 377). This is certainly the case of  
HE, in which comparative policy analysis has only been developed quite recently – from the mid 
1970s. The analysis of  both dimensions of  action will then allow for building up a comparative 
framework, where each country’s differences and similarities will be mapped.   
 
Relevance to Research and Practice 
This study seeks to make a relevant contribution to comparative HE research, both 
theoretically and empirically. It aims to put forward a framework for the study of (policy) change in 
the HE sector and to advance knowledge on how Finnish and Portuguese governments and their 
HEIs react towards similar pressures and movements of change. As Amaral, Jones and Karseth (2002) 
refer, “there is much that can be learned by stepping outside national boundaries in order to look at 
common issues and contrasting experiences through cross-national analyses” (2002: 279). 
Through comprehensive historical and cultural descriptions of the Portuguese and Finnish HE 
systems (solid grounded in an extensive literature review) and four HEIs, this comparative study 
intends to look across specific national perspectives in order to identify convergent and divergent 
factors capable of explaining why such different countries implemented reforms in an apparent 
similar way. What does explain similarities and differences in different HE governance and 
management settings? Thus, both theoretically and empirically, this research provides a conceptual 
map to explore common issues and unique phenomena, as well as to find causal relationships.  
The Bologna process and both the Law 62/2007 and Law 558/2009 are used as examples of 
policy changes, originated from different sources and levels of action, but that ultimately had to be 
implemented and institutionalised at the different hierarchies of HEIs. To focus on both levels of 
analysis – systemic and institutional – allows us to better understand and ground the conditions of 
policy (in)effectiveness that are common to other countries (Enders 2004: 372), as well as to identify 
differences and best practices of both countries. Thus, following Bleiklie and Michelsen’s (2012: 113) 
argument that there is a study gap on “questions about policy making, such as how and by whom 
HE policies are designed”, this study contributes to the field of HE research by interlinking two 
reform processes apparently very distinct, although the researcher considers both of them as NPM 
expressions. Concurrently, by analysing policy trends in Portuguese and Finnish HE systems, this 
research is also relevant due to the relationship it establishes among different layers of institutional 
governance.  
Focusing on the institutional level after a system level analysis, and bearing in mind that HEIs 
are organisations with deeply embedded values, cultures and traditions, allows grasping institutions’ 
behaviour and actions when national policy-making meets the multidimensionality of HEIs (Enders 
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2004; Stensaker et al. 2008). In this case, a ground study is provided on how Portuguese and Finnish 
HE systems and HEIs change under internationalisation pressures and convergent movements. 
Ultimately, there are personal motivations and hopes with this dissertation. In the last decades, 
Finland has became a model in educational policies. It was a privilege to have had the possibility of 
living, studying and analyse the Finnish HE system. It is an ambition to be able to contribute to 
discussion on HE policies of the researcher’s home country. 
 
Structure of the Study 
The study is organised around seven chapters structured as follows: after a general introduction 
to the research topic, motivations and rationale for this research, the first chapter approaches the 
macro context where HEIs and HE systems act: global, international and Europeani. Chapter two 
continues with the analysis of  change contexts, although the focus is on the operationalisation of  
the governance concept and governance theory. These two chapters portray the evolution of  the 
role of  the State in HE and they are essential to make sense of  organisational change and HEIs’ 
behaviour. Institutionalism is then presented in the third chapter and serves as an analytical tool, i.e. 
as spectacles to interpret the behaviour and visions of  system level and institutional level actors 
about the processes of  change analysed here. In chapter 4 both Portuguese and Finnish HE realities 
and traditions are described in order to contextualise the reader on the cases selected and on the 
findings extracted and presented in this manuscript. Chapter 5 outlines the methodological approach 
and discusses the research process travelled to obtain answers for the research questions. After this 
journey, chapter VI presents the data obtained and treated and discusses the findings retrieved as well 
as the national and intuitional contexts where change was accommodated. An international 
comparative analysis is then presented. The last chapter of  the study presents the conclusions and 
reflections about the study while it suggests topics and questions for further research.  
The appendices present the empirical background material essential for a “complete vision” of  
the change processes discussed here. 
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Part I  
Steps towards a Conceptual and 
Theoretical Framework: 
interconnectedness of  concepts and 
ideologies 
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I 
Globalisation, Internationalisation and Europeanisation of HE 
 
Globalisation and internationalisation have become two key concepts widely used in academic 
and policy discourses describing European HE, especially since the 1990s. As part of this 
development, the concept of Europeanisation has been extensively applied, denoting a change in 
HE dynamics, and the geographical expansion of the EU. European boundaries are increasingly 
wider, and with the Bologna declaration the definition of the EHEA is even larger (Olsen 2002: 
927). As with all three concepts, globalisation, internationalisation and Europeanisation, the general 
problem seems to be that the interpretation in use is left unclear. Indeed, as the process of 
internationalisation of HE became clearer over the past decades, both in response to and in 
conjunction with the broader process of globalisation (Santiago et al. 2008), the confusion in the 
terminology of both concepts also started to be evident.  
Although their meaning is often unclear and there are several interpretations and dimensions 
for them, it is of relevance to understand how they impact on international, national and regional 
coordination and policy convergence. HE policy design increasingly takes into account the global, 
international and the European levels as fields of action and, internationalisation policies have been 
studied and discussed from several perspectives, according to the different objectives they aim at. It 
is thus intended to give a focused view on these concepts based on a comparison between Finnish 
and Portuguese HE legal reforms in order to build theoretical leverage and focus. It seems thus 
more complex to draw a distinction line between globalisation and internationalisation, once there 
are not ideal forms of these processes and the distinction between them is “... a dualistic over-
simplification, that obscures from view both the differences between the two processes and the 
manner in which they feed each other (Marginson and Wende 2007: 11). 
With respect to “globalisation”, Enders (2004) frames this process after the 1970s, by referring 
to the main changes that happened since then: 
“(…) advances in information technology, greater capital flow across borders, international 
mobility of labour or of students, new public management and the weakening power of nation 
states, credit transfer in HE and international recognition of degrees” (2004: 367). 
 
Nevertheless, as Marginson and Wende (2007) point out, although this process apparently refers to 
a broader concept than “internationalisation”, the “globalisation” phenomenon is not universal, 
once it acts differently according to the region, language and academic culture in question (2007: 5). 
In this sense, globalisation can be explained as a more “active”, a more “transformative” process 
than internationalisation once it interferes directly with the economic, culture and political core of 
nations (2007: 11). Also Enders (2004) takes into account the redefinition of economic relationships 
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around the world. He explains that the process of globalisation is related with a restructuring of the 
nation state, “… through the deregulation of legal and financial controls, the opening of markets or 
quasi-markets (including in HE), and the increasing primacy of notions of competition, efficiency 
and managerialism” (2004: 367). However, as Marginson and Wende (2007: 12) advert, the meaning 
of globalisation should never be regarded as a higher form of internationalisation.  
 Sharing a similar point of view, Beck (1999) criticises the concept of mcdonaldisation to explain 
that although the symbols seem global (e.g. McDonalds franchise), there are numerous local 
practises to use them (1999: 93-99). In fact, there is a common trend to employ the term “global” 
to depict supranational trends and policies related to marketisation (Teichler 2005), often neglecting 
the importance of local factors and actors (Deem 2001; Santos 2004), a fact which, in the opinion 
of the sociologist Boaventura Sousa Santos contradicts the true meaning of the globalisation 
process:  
“… there is no genuinely global condition; what we call globalisation is always the successful 
globalisation of a particular localism. In other words, there are no global conditions for which we 
cannot find global roots, either real or imagined, as a specific cultural insertion. (…) globalisation 
presupposes localisation (…). In fact, we live as much in a world of localisation as in a world of 
globalisation” (Santos in interview to Dale and Robertson 2004: 148).  
 
Although more specifically referring to the US reality, also Douglass (2005) defends that 
globalisation relates much to local conditions and therefore all globalisation is, first of all, local. 
Thus, political convergence in HE is not only an outcome of the growing internationalisation of the 
sector, which neglects the importance of local factors and actors (Santos 2004). Also Deem (2001) 
points to the importance of localised factors in explaining changing management practices and the 
institutionalisation of a managerial ethos. These localisms are cultural factors (new ideas about 
knowledge), social factors (new and more diverse student groups), as well as economic factors 
(declining of public funding) at work in universities (2001: 11).  
 In the same line, Altbach (2004) explains that since the beginning of their existence, HEIs 
faced “... tensions between national realties and international trends” (2004: 5). As an example, the 
author compares the importance that English assumes nowadays in the academic world, with the 
predominance that once Latin, and later on German, assumed. Thus, according to Altbach (2004), 
academic systems may accommodate these developments in different ways, but they cannot be 
ignored. Not even the idea that innovation and knowledge transformations circulate easily nowadays 
due to modern technology. In this sense, and returning to the starting point of the globalisation 
concept analysis (there is no single form of globalisation and this is not a universal phenomenon), 
one can easily recognise that “... the world of globalised HE is highly unequal” (Altbach 2004: 6).  
 Parallel to this inequality, one finds the emerging role of international agreements and 
frameworks related to education, as for example the WTO (World Trade Organisation), the GATS 
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(General Agreement on Trade and Services) and their impact on national HE systems. As the WTO 
seeks to establish education as one of twelve internationally traded services and to reduce national 
controls over its regulation (including accreditation, Douglass 2005: 451), under the argument that 
knowledge is a commodity like any other, WTO argues that it should be freely traded around the 
world. Towards this view, one might perceive a negative influence of GATS in (some) HE systems. 
As such, Altbach (2004) warns to the fact that:  
“Since developing countries typically import rather than export their educational products or 
institutions, it is unlikely that GATS would promote their exports. Developing countries represent 
the markets that sellers from the industrialised world are eager to target. Most developing 
countries, having few educational “products” to export, would be at the mercy of the 
multinational providers (2004: 23). 
 
This goes much in line with what Maassen and Cloete (2002) also highlighted concerning to 
the challenges that globalisation poses for the nation-state. Whether, on the one hand they are 
expected to create the conditions for economic and social development, predominantly by 
producing more and better-educated citizens and increasing knowledge production, on the other 
hand, globalisation introduces pressures to reduce the role and contribution of governments in 
education. Therefore, “... the double-edged challenge is to produce more graduates with high-level 
knowledge skills, but with less direct government support per graduate” (2002: 30). Bologna seems 
thus a good recipe for this “plan” of producing more graduates with less government support. At 
least in Portugal, and although many degrees have incorporated the master programme, the fact that 
the 1st cycle of studies was reduced from 4/5 years to 3 years implies that the government saves 
some money with student support. In turn, Finland (as well as Denmark and Norway) is clearly an 
exception, once it has the privilege of having one of the most publicly funded HE systems in the 
world (Cai and Kivistö 2011), where 1,6% of Finland’s GDP is spent on HE, both on institutions 
and subsidies to households (OECD Finland 2007) and where there are no tuition fees. 
An interesting view is introduced by Santos (2004) who argues that there is in fact a certain 
contradiction in the influence of globalisation in the role of the nation-state. Santos (2004) explains 
that while, on one hand, the state seems to have been losing power and strength in its capacity to 
organise and regulate social life, on the other hand the State continues to be the central political 
entity, mainly because the institutionalisation of globalisation itself is created by the core nation-
states (Dale and Robertson 2004: 148-149). Complementary perspectives are discussed by other 
authors who, mainly referring to the Nordic countries, have argued that HEIs  
“(...) have been at the crossroads of many aspects of the processes of globalization because, for 
centuries, universities have argued for continuing disciplinary-based, international traditions. 
Simultaneously, however, universities have been national cultural institutions taking care of the 
education of the national elites (...). Furthermore, universities have provided a cultural and an 
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academic basis for disciplines (...) supporting the existence of a nation state as a social entity 
(Välimaa 2010: 1).    
 
Again, one of the main distinguishing factors when analysing both globalisation and 
internationalisation issues can be observed: the impossibility to remain immune to globalisation trends 
and effects.  
Contrary to the meaning of globalisation, which, in the words of Scott (1998) encourages the 
homogenisation of cultures, “internationalisation” differs from the concept of globalisation 
considering that it relates more to the role of the nation-state. Scott (1998) argued that although 
HEIs often see themselves as objects of globalisation, they are also its agents. Also Huisman and 
van Vught (2009: 17-18) add that the European university has been international since its existence 
– many universities provided temporary academic homes for European scholars. As a European 
institution, the university reflected European values of intellectual freedom and of a borderless 
academic community (ibidem). Nevertheless, Huisman and van Vught (2009) also draw attention to 
the increasing relevance of the “nationalisation” of science and (higher) education, a sign which 
might indicate a new phase of academic “Europeanness” (2009: 18).  
As national institutions, universities worked as symbols of the sovereign state and, especially in 
Finland and in Norway, they have been strong institutions in the creation of national identities 
(Wittrock 1997; Beerkens 2004; Välimaa 2010). Furthermore, as recently Stensaker et al. (2008) 
concluded in a study of some Nordic institutions, internationalisation is perceived as an inherent 
dimension of scholarship. Stensaker et al. (2008: 6) explain that this finding reflects not only an 
ambition that Nordic HEIs try to achieve, but also their long history of internationalisation activities 
within this region, such as the Nordplus-exchange programme that exists since 1988. 
Through similar pathways, it can be said that the main rationale for internationalise Portuguese 
HE is the idea that “it is not possible to vindicate the quality of the education system isolated from 
the international, and in particular the European context” (OECD 2006: 178). In this sense, several 
initiatives (e.g. creating special regimes for students from the ex-colonies to access HE, both in 
public and private HEIs in both subsystems) were carried out in countries where Portuguese is the 
official language (Angola, Mozambique, Cabo Verde, Guiné Bissau, S. Tomé e Príncipe – the 
African Countries with Portuguese as official language, PALOPs – East Timor and Brazil) (OECD 
2006: 179). All these steps correspond to the definition provided by Altbach (2004) on the topic. 
According to the author, internationalisation “… includes specific policies and programmes 
undertaken by governments, academic systems and institutions and even individual departments or 
institutions to cope with or exploit globalisation” (2004: 6). Altbach explains that there is a certain 
freedom for institutions and governments to decide on how to react, how to respond and to what 
extent they want to be involved in an increasingly globalised knowledge economy. When institutions 
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decide they want to perform at the international level, it is a voluntary decision and they have much 
room for initiative. Thus, “(...) while the forces of globalisation cannot be held completely at bay, it 
is not inevitable that countries or institutions will necessarily be overwhelmed by them or that the 
terms of the encounter must be dictated from afar” (Altbach 2004: 6).  
Examples of “international” initiatives and strategies to meet the globalisation challenges and 
remain competitive in the EHEA are provided by the case studies analysed here. As other signatory 
countries of the Bologna process, Portugal and Finland aim at increasing the percentage of foreign 
students in their countries. In this sense, the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture (OKM) 
developed in 2001 a new internationalisation strategy for Finnish HEIs (Korkeakoulutuksen 
kansainvälisen toiminnan strategia), which requires Finnish institutions to teach more programmes in 
English and to establish more cooperation initiatives with Russia, Central and East European and 
Asian countries (OKM 2012).  
On its part, and in addition to the example referred above, Portugal has been promoting 
international partnerships and programmes with worldwide reference institutions (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Carnegie Mellon University, University of Texas at Austin, the Fraunhofer 
Society and the Erasmus Mundus Master and Doctoral programmes, for example, which are 
considered a Europe’s flagship programme for worldwide academic cooperation), as well as offering 
dual degrees with foreign partners and promoting the attractiveness of the country to students from 
other countries (MCTES 2008). As such, following Altbach arguments, Marginson and Wende 
(2007: 11) explain that internationalisation should be understood in its literal sense, as inter-national, 
once the term itself “(...) refers to any relationship across borders between nations, or between single 
institutions situated within different national systems”. As a matter of fact, the idea that within the 
internationalisation sphere, the importance of the nation-state still plays a determinant role is very 
consensual in the literature. Faced with this political reality, as Enders (2004) calls it, the policy 
emphasis should be “(...) on the building of strategic international relationships, based on mutual 
co-operation and also on mutual observation” (2004: 367). In this way, the OMC represents a kind 
of alliance among national governments to steer HEIs  
Another important point that stands out from the literature concerning the debate 
“internationalisation vs. globalisation” is the evolution in the definition and meaning of the word 
internationalisation. The range of internationalisation activities that HEIs are willing to do today goes 
far beyond students’ and academics’ mobility. Stensaker et al. (2008) explain that the reasons leading 
HEIs to engage in international activities relate to academic, social/cultural, political and economic 
aspects. While academic and social reasons are usually considered ‘old’ forms of internationalisation, 
which are intrinsic to institutions, political and economic reasons are generally associated with ‘new’ 
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forms of internationalisation that require institutions’ adaptation to external forces (2008: 4). The 
same institutions usually accommodate both ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of internationalisation and it is 
probably difficult to analyse which one prevails. As examples of both forms of internationalisation, 
one can see the developments and mixture in the number of programmes taught in English; research 
cooperation activities; the internationalisation of the curricula, the multinationalisation1 of HE (joint 
programmes and curricula); improvements in the ways of HE delivery (blended learning 
programmes due to the technological “revolution”); scholarship programmes (ERASMUS, 
SOCRATES, TEMPUS) and new international agreements (Altbach 2004), as the Bologna and the 
Copenhagen processes. It is thus commonly argued that HE is becoming increasingly international, 
at least in terms of university alliance, international research consortia (Deem, Mok and Lucas 2008) 
and even institutional mergers. Teichler (2004) questions such an idea as universities have long been 
considered one of society’s most international institutions:  
“The knowledge stored, generated and transmitted is often universal (i.e. not systematically bound 
by borders). It was viewed desirable in higher education since a long time to gather information 
from all over the world and to generate innovation on world scale. Most academics hold 
cosmopolitan values in high esteem. Border-crossing communication and border-crossing 
reputation seem to be viewed as almost identical with ‘quality’, the most positive thing in academia 
(Teichler 2004: 8)”.  
 
In fact, from the perspective of the nation-state, the internationalisation process is still the one that 
prevails. It is also acknowledged that both Portuguese and Finnish institutions and governments 
have been using these different approaches to internationalise their HE systems in order to respond 
to “... the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness” (Held et al. 1999: 
2). As both concepts encompass multiple meanings, and “(...) the process of internationalisation in 
HE cannot be interpreted independently of the parallel process of globalisation in the economic 
and social sphere” (Santiago et al. 2008: 236), it is actually easier to distinguish them through the 
identification of their similarities and differences. As Knight (2001) describes, “one can think of 
globalisation as the catalyst, but of internationalisation as the response, albeit a proactive response”. 
A good example for this metaphor is the Bologna process as an international political agreement 
superseded the European region, and it is based on a shared view of globalisation’s new challenges 
for HE and of the way institutions are called to respond to them (Vaira 2004). 
Apart from definitions and divergent views on the debate “globalisation vs. 
internationalisation” and their influence in the nation-state’s preponderance, the main interest is to 
understand how these phenomena affect the object of study, whether global forces do or do not 
shape patterns within particular countries and institutions (Bray 2005: 45-46). In this sense, one 
                                                 
1 Altbach (2004: 16) explains that the multinationalisation of HE emerged from a global education market place in 
the form of a variety of multinational HE initiatives. 
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cannot forget that the literature has also highlighted the relation between globalisation and 
neoliberalism (Vaira 2004; Santos 2004; Mayo 2009), an ideology that over the last decades has been 
constantly present in public policy and governance, therefore underlining hegemonic and neoliberal 
globalisation (Santos 2004: 150; Mayo 2009: 95). As Santos (2004) refers, “Neoliberalism is the 
political form of globalization resulting from US type of capitalism” (2004: 151). And this is a natural 
connection if one remembers the principles defended by neoliberal governments and which led to a 
shift from government to governance: open markets, free trade, decreased state intervention in the 
economy, as well as reduction of public spending in the public sector in general, deregulation of 
markets, and a strong emphasis on the use of private sector mechanisms to regulate public 
institutions, which are considered inefficient, unproductive, and socially wasteful, accompanied with 
control and evaluation mechanisms to access institutions and actors’ performance and outcomes 
(Vaira 2004; Pollitt et al. 2007; Torres 2010). 
As the process of globalisation cannot be dissociated from ICT and technological 
developments, also the knowledge production for competitive purposes is now a reality of 
knowledge societies. According to the literature (Knight 2003, 2007; Vaira 2004; Altbach 2004; 
Enders 2004; Marginson and Wende 2007; Wit 2007) this change in social relations and interactions 
in the knowledge economy was possible due to the faster flow of communications, the shift in the 
occupational structures from manual workers to highly educated and flexible knowledge workers; 
and, consequently, on the role of educational institutions to form the human capital fitted to these 
developments. Nevertheless, as referred by Amaral and Teixeira (2000), Vaira (2004) and Santos 
(2004), all these shifts do not occur mechanically, they are much supported worldwide by some 
supra-national financial agencies, such as UNESCO, the WB, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and OCDE (stronger proponents of the neoliberal credo) that disseminate this ideology 
worldwide. Referring to the OECD influence on HE reforms, Amaral and Neave (2009b) claim that 
“the OECD contributes directly to disseminating neo-liberalism not only by showing that the 
doctrine works, but that it is an appropriate framework within which plausible solutions may be 
sought, identified and acted upon” (2009b: 94). “Thus, they contribute to construct, present, 
represent and objectify these rationalized myths and the new related challenges, ends and means as 
an ‘objective reality’” (Vaira 2004: 488). Nevertheless, and as highlighted by Martens and Wolf 
(2009), the fact that national governments are increasingly using such organisations as 
“internationalisation sponsors” of their HE systems, may contribute to a general weakening of the 
state’s role in education policy. Martens and Wolf (2009) explain that if, on one hand, the 
“instrumentalisation” of international orgnisations gave more manoeuvre to the nation-states in 
terms of education policy by enlarging the national executives’ area of competence, on the other 
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hand, it also reduced its power by allowing that other actors introduced “new norms and forms of 
governance that have reduced steering functions of the state in general at both the national and the 
sub-national level” (2009: 84). This is possible due to what Johanna Kallo (2009) has called “other 
effective forms of soft laws”, as for example, peer reviews, recommendations, and indicator studies 
combined with EU’s methods, which aim at steering the national level decision-making, HE agendas 
and future legislative reforms (Kallo 2009). In fact, pressures for institutional efficiency, 
accountability and quality control have also been legitimised by the OECD normative discourse on 
national HE policies, as the OECD has been contributing actively to the development of 
international benchmarks and good practices (Ferlie et al. 2008: 333). Gornitzka (2007: 161) goes 
further and states that the OECD must be seen as a core international site where the idea of the 
knowledge economy has been pushed.  
That being said, the researcher believes that internationalisation embeds a more state-centred 
actor perspective where globalisation emphasises global actors and trans-national networks. The 
essential distinction between both concepts is mainly in the level of agency. The word 
internationalisation stands for the international activities through nation-to-nation collaboration and 
engagement. It involves multilateral cooperation agreements among institutions and their 
governments (Teichler 2004: 6). The term globalisation refers to a much more complex and dynamic 
process of interconnectedness of HE on a planetary scale. Here international organisations have a 
more important role, as the level of agency is global. A good example of a regional-scale (or a local 
model, as Santos would call it) globalisation is Europeanisation, where the level of agency is European 
(c.f. Held et al. 1999; Santos 2004).  
The agency role of these supranational organisations is important to understand how global 
forces shape and influence national and institutional decisions. This happens through a twofold 
process, as Vaira (2004) explains. On one hand (and here the focus is mostly on the OECD and the 
WB and, to a certain extent, to the EC, although these last two international organisations differ 
greatly in their legal binding nature), by incorporating, translating, legitimating and disseminating 
the wider rationalised myths, these organisations develop a general and common framework 
defining the new context and imperatives in which HEIs have to operate nowadays. On the other 
hand, by acting as dissemination agencies on a global scale, “(...) they contribute to construct and 
structure a de-localized and global organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) that both 
national HE policies and institutions have to face and in which they operate” (Vaira 2004: 488). 
Thus, as both the Finnish and Portuguese cases exemplify, since the moment these organisations 
define the counters of HE at the global level (as the EC and the OECD specifically do), it seems 
that similar policies (recommendations) are applied to different local contexts (cf. chapter IV). This, 
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in turn, provides national governments with large room of manoeuvre to legitimate reforms and to 
install new regulatory frameworks for their HE systems.  
This relationship between national governments and international organisations can also be 
seen in the light of the principal-agent theory, considering that the governments (principals) delegate 
implied authority to international organisations (agents), even when the principals know that their 
agents may have interests of their own (Martens and Wolf 2009). In the classic explanation, agency 
relationships are created when one party, the principal, enters into a contractual agreement with a 
second party, the agent, and delegates to the latter responsibility for carrying out a function or a set 
of tasks on the principal’s behalf (Kassim and Menon 2002: 2). Kassim and Menon (2002: 2) explain 
that the aim of establishing a contractual relationship in principal-agent terms is to evidence the 
difficulties that arise due to an asymmetric distribution of information that favours the agent. This 
asymmetry of information might allow the agent to engage in opportunistic behaviour (shirking) that 
is costly to the principal, but difficult to detect (ibidem). 
 
 
1.1 Europeanisation and European Integration 
The debate about Europeanisation summarises most of the topics touched upon above. This 
fashionable but contested term (Johan P. Olsen, 2002) started to emerge when shifts in relation of 
domination became a reality. Olsen (2002) explains that in the same way that the concept of 
Americanisation gained relevance, the term Europeanisation has been assuming prominence as changes 
in an established hegemony have been taking place, and Europe is playing a more central role at the 
global scene (2002: 926). Additionally, the author refers that historically, Europeanisation has been 
understood as the spread of European patterns of living and culture, including eating, drinking and 
religious habits which are unknown to countries outside the European boundaries. Thus, what has 
changed in this conceptualisation, and what does this mean for HE? 
As a relatively new concept within the HE field, the term Europeanisation is extremely 
connected to the expression knowledge economy and also to international cooperation and mobility 
agreements. Very often it is also used to refer to European integration and political convergence. 
Integration in the sense or as a synonymous of building a common market, sharing decision-making 
powers, and getting closer in terms of cultural identity, e.g. integrate a common system of European 
governance (Kohler-Koch 2005: 92).  
With respect to HE, the term Europeanisation originates in the explicit commitment to a 
common European HE zone in order to facilitate such international activities within Europe 
(Marginson and Wende 2007: 12), a kind of reordering of inter-national powers and diversities. Thus, 
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one can say that the Bologna process is the visible face of Europeanisation, and consequently of 
European integration, once it has been enacted by an intergovernmental initiative of several nation-
states aiming, among other objectives, to construct and converge a common space of HE. In this 
sense, one should understand the Europeanisation process as a phenomenon also extensible to 
those countries from other continents wishing to integrate the EHEA and/or that simply wish to 
modify their HEs systems, resembling them to the “European context”. Nevertheless, one of the 
implications of this process is that Europeanisation implies a greater de-nationalisation and 
integration of certain regulatory systems (Beerkens 2004; Gornitzka 2007), despite all the barriers 
inherent to national political sensitivity and systemic diversity. These transformations of national 
legal frameworks clearly have a European dimension, as it is required by the national implementation 
of the Bologna process (Gornitzka et al. 2007). Thus, in the same way that HEIs choose different 
international strategies to play in a global environment, so the nation-states do in order to enhance 
their attractiveness in the Bologna space and to cope with European integration. An example of 
changes in national regulatory frameworks brought about by Europeanisation is the case of joint 
Erasmus Mundus master degree programmes (other examples could be the TUNING project and 
the Tempus and Asia-link) selected by the EC: 
“These programs operate in a grey zone between national legal frameworks and European level 
integration ambitions. National participation in the establishment of a joint Master degree 
program and the issuing of joint diplomas have de facto implied regulation changes at national 
level and changes in local rules. This is a consequence of an indirect pressure on national 
regulations from the institutions that are participating in this scheme. Pressure on national 
regulations and policies stems from the European Commission, but also from transnational 
actors, notably the European University Association (EUA) that actively promotes the 
development of joint degree programs, amongst other things, as part of its participation in the 
Bologna process (Gornitzka et al. 2007: 200).  
 
A too optimistic view of this integration might be seen in the creation (nth attempt) of an 
institution of HE in the same pattern described by Walter Rüegg in 1992: “the university is widely 
regarded as ‘the European institution par excellence’ in terms of its origins and characteristics”. By 
other words, European integration could mean the efforts to re-create a truly excellent area where 
the primary functions of the university would do justice to the origins of European universities, 
maintaining the diversity and uniqueness of each HE system, considered once one of the most 
valuable European assets. Nevertheless, in practical terms, Europeanisation does not work as a 
linear process and it raises contentious and complex debates about whether HE should remain 
completely and exclusively under the nation-state responsibility, under European/international 
orientations or in a somehow hybrid process between both levels. Simultaneously, one should not 
forget that the environments where HEIs operate nowadays are different than they were some 
decades ago: they are now more demanding, complex, and diverse and they change faster. This is 
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also why, when referring to the implementation of policies derived from the Bologna process, it is 
not (completely) accurate to talk about a separation of levels, or “fields of social action” (Bleiklie, 
Høstaker and Vabø 2000: 16) where change occurs (cf. chapter IV). By other words, we are now 
acquainted with the fact that European HE policy formulation does not happen either exclusively 
or unidirectional at the nation-state level.  
With respect to the dynamics of change created under the umbrella of the Bologna process, it 
is visible that after policies being formulated as top-down processes, they are then translated into 
law by national governments and ultimately applied to the institutions. This is why decisions in the 
different contexts of HE are highly interwoven in a number of different ways making unsuitable to 
separate the different levels of action (Bleiklie et al. 2000: 15).  
In order to better understand how the term can be fruitfully used when analysing institutional 
dynamics occurring among HE systems, it is essential to clarify what is changing at the European 
level, how this process takes place, and why it happens in such a way. Then, it is possible to 
understand how the process of European integration affects Finnish and Portuguese HEIs within 
their national contexts. This analysis is based on Olsen’s framework (2002), which identifies five 
possible answers for the questions: what is Europeanisation? and what is changing? (2002: 923-924).  
As mentioned in the introduction section of this chapter, one of the main (visible) changes 
relates to external boundaries, namely the geographical expansion of the EU. European boundaries 
are increasingly wider and, with the Bologna declaration that now involves 49 countries, the 
definition of Europe is even larger. Indeed, the enlargement of the European space has been a 
recurrent process (Olsen 2002: 927), as the number of the Bologna signatory countries increased. 
In 1999, when 29 ministers of HE signed the Bologna declaration, 15 countries belonged to the 
EU2. Today, in 2015 and after several stages of enlargements, there are 28 member states 
constituting the EU and 49 countries that joined the Bologna reform. The EU is more diverse than 
ever (Oosterwijk 2008: 61). In turn, the Bologna process philosophy seems that of continuous 
extensions of goals to attain (usually in a decade), transmitting the impression that HE is in 
permanent reform, which is not completely right, due to the bottom-heavy character of HEIs and 
other specificities of these institutions. 
A second factor signalling change in the European HE landscape is the process of developing 
institutions at the European level, with some degree of coordination and coherence among them. 
Examples of these institutions are the quality agencies that have been created alongside the 
                                                 
2 In addition to the six founding members (Belgium, France, Italy, East Germany, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands), joined in 1973 to the so-called European Economic Community, Denmark, Ireland and the UK. 
Greece joined in 1981, then Portugal and Spain in 1986 and in 1995 Finland, Austria and Sweden. Only in May 
2004, with the biggest accession ever, more 10 countries joined the EU. 
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consolidation of the EHEA, as well as other administrative networks. These institutions, as Olsen 
(2002) explains, share some constitutive principles, structures and practices that not only 
institutionalise binding decision-making processes, but also have the power to install sanctions in 
case of non-compliance procedures. In Portugal, the Agency for Assessment and Accreditation of 
Higher Education (A3ES) aims at promoting and ensuring the quality of national HE. Its Finnish 
counterpart is the Finnish Higher Education Evaluation Council (FINHEEC). 
Europeanisation is also explained by “the central penetration of national and sub-national systems 
of governance”, e.g., the division of responsibilities and powers between different levels of 
governance (Olsen 2002: 932). This is today the most common use of the term Europeanisation, 
mostly due to the changes in HE governance dynamics, considering that all levels of governance 
need to find a balance between unity and diversity, central coordination and local autonomy (ibid). 
This distribution of power, which has significantly moved to a more supranational level, contributes 
to the convergence of European HE systems, in the sense that it obliges national systems to adopt 
European (political) norms and public administration structures and procedures – a situation which 
was also stimulated by the deregulation of national legal and by regulatory structures and the 
decentralisation of decision-making authorities (Martens and Wolf 2009). In fact, the literature on 
Europeanisation examines how the EU impacts national systems and how member-states shape 
European rules and institutions according to their own preferences and practices (Nicolaides 2010: 
114). As the national implementation of the Bologna process required a revision of national legal 
frameworks, the HE systems of signatory countries have now become closer to European guidelines 
and to OECD recommendations. This is why Nicolaides (2010: 114) believes that convergence of 
national policies occurs; however, it does not lead to harmonisation. 
Gornitzka et al. (2007) also argue that the European level of governance has become more 
important, however it is far from replacing other levels of governance (and this tended to happen 
mainly due to the considerable funding provided by the EC, especially with regards to student and 
staff mobility and research projects)3. The authors believe that the nation-state cannot be assumed 
to be static in face of European-level dynamics because it has repositioned itself, rather than 
abdicated of its governance role (2007: 191). Therefore, as argued by Olsen (2002), all multilevel 
systems of governance need to find a balance between unity and diversity, central co-ordination and 
local autonomy (2002: 924).  
Intimately linked with these aspects, Olsen puts forward another conceptualisation of 
Europeanisation as exporting forms of political organisation and governance that are typical and 
                                                 
3 Huisman and der Wende (2004: 352) state that in terms of policy instruments, the EC used strong financial 
incentives to gain leverage in the HE arena, with hardly any strings attached. 
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distinct for Europe beyond the European territory. The Bologna process, together with all the policy 
tools and frameworks attached to it, e.g. the OMC; the European Qualifications Framework (EQF); 
and more recently the European Credit System for Vocational Education and Training (ECVET); 
etc., are clear expressions of this positive European exporting to locations such as Latin America, 
Australia, Africa, Asia and US (van der Wende 2009). Olsen explains that in this case, 
Europeanisation means a more positive export/import balance as non-European countries import 
more from Europe than vv. and European solutions exert more influence in international settings 
(2002: 924). 
The last possible use for the concept Europeanisation summarises the aspects touched above, 
and suggest the idea, at least theoretically, of a more stronger and unified Europe, once it positions 
the old continent as a project of political unification which involves institutions’ adaptation; 
“Europeanization as a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe” (Olsen 
2002: 924). Nevertheless, as Olsen (2002: 924) also highlights there is not necessarily a positive 
correlation between the types of Europeanisation mentioned here, and between each of them and 
a political stronger Europe. And, as a matter of fact, it is this absence of a stronger Europe that 
explains much of the rationale and motivations behind the birth of the Bologna process if one looks 
at Bologna as a strategic (national) response to a context of global change.  
To understand institutional change and continuity within the European context (how 
Europeanisation takes place) requires an understanding of the structure and dynamics of each 
change process. In this sense, it is important to remember the various dynamics of the Bologna 
process, e.g., how it has evolved from being just an intergovernmental pledge aiming to enhance the 
attractiveness of the signatory countries’ HE systems, to an instrument capable of changing long 
rooted governance and management procedures within HEIs. The researcher believes that none of 
these processes – globalisation, internationalisation and/or Europeanisation – isolated offer any 
exploratory power. Instead, these dynamics describe the same process from different angles and 
each of them can offer a fruitful way of making a comparative analysis when combined or studied 
in parallel with other phenomena. As Veiga and Amaral (2006) put it “… the reactions of HEIs to 
internationalisation, Europeanisation and globalisation could be understood as organisational 
performance and environmental responses in the sense that HEIs can influence their institutional 
behaviour” (2006: 288). This is why, in order to fully understand the research, one needs to remind 
the interrelation of the three levels of action, and to position global phenomena applied to specific 
national realities. In this way, and bearing in mind the contours and the major actors of the research 
topic, the conceptual and theoretical parts sustaining the exploratory analysis relate to governance 
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theory, namely changes in governance modes and levels of governance in order to understand 
governance and management changes at the institutional level.  
The next section attempts to underpin the policy processes behind the Bologna process, its 
context, and the tools used to create and steer the EHEA. In other words, the researcher puts 
forward how the Bologna declaration, as a visible manifestation of the Europeanisation process 
influences the formulation and design of national HE policies and therefore impacts institutional 
practices. In this scenario one should not forget the functioning of the EU as a governance system, 
considering the creeping competence of the EC in educational matters and its increasing involvement in 
the process. 
 
1.2 Convergence in Higher Education Policy   
The concept of convergence is about measuring the extent of similarities between countries 
and/or social systems (Lane and Ersson 1996). In terms of policy convergence is thus the process 
of becoming more similar, of having increasing similarity of processes and practices, of objectives 
and instruments. Torben Heinze and Christoph Knill (2008) quote Kerr (1983: 3) and state that 
cross-national policy convergence can be defined as ‘‘the tendency of societies to grow more alike, 
to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances’’. 
Heinze and Knill (2008) distinguished two different types of policy convergence to better 
understand the national impact of the Bologna process and the convergence effects caused by the 
underlying mechanisms of the process. These are the sigma (horizontal) and delta (vertical) 
convergence and can be used as conceptual tools for analysing other processes of change in HE 
policy. Also the study of Nagel, Martens and Windzio (2010) on the convergence models of 
education policies suggested by international organisations identifies those two forms of policy 
convergence and adds another one: beta-convergence. Briefly, sigma convergence comes closest to 
the conventional understanding of convergence as the decrease in variation of domestic policies 
over time. An example of sigma convergence is the increase of tuition fees in some European HE 
systems, although international organisations cannot be seen as the source of convergence (Heinze 
and Knill 2008; cf. Heichel et al. 2005).  
In turn, and taking the Bologna process as an example, delta convergence refers to the adoption 
of European guidelines that have been elaborated alongside the Bologna framework, especially 
concerning degree structures, accreditation and quality assurance systems (Bergen-Communiqué 
2005). Delta-convergence implies that countries are moving towards a common model, for example 
with respect to the internal organisation of HEIs and revision of their statutes (Heinze and Knill 
2008; Nagel, et al. 2010).  
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A further concept of policy convergence introduced by Nagel, et al. (2010) is beta-convergence, 
which denotes a process of “catching-up” of countries as regards education performance. 
“Countries that are already close to a certain standard or international goal might show slower 
change rates than countries that are still far away from this goal” (2010: 9). Thus, implicitly or 
explicitly, and although the term convergence does not appear in the Bologna declaration, the 
process aims at the convergence of degree structures and quality assurance frameworks to promote 
the mobility of students and graduates as well as “greater compatibility and comparability of the 
systems of HE” (Bologna Declaration 1999).  
It is nowadays a fact that the Bologna process is explicitly designed to introduce change in the 
HE systems of the participating countries, as declared by the four Ministers of Education in the 
Sorbonne declaration (1998), as well as in the following documents related with the process (e.g. at 
least in the Communiqués of Prague, Berlin, Bergen and London and in the EC documents). Also 
the reforms initiated in the scope of NPM aimed at changing public administration processes in 
general, and consequently HE practices. Those attempts for reforming HEIs’ status quo are 
evidenced by the diverse legislation proposed and implemented in both Finnish and Portuguese HE 
systems, namely through the RJIES and New Universities Act. Therefore, the convergence theme 
is relevant from several perspectives, as highlighted by Lane and Ersson (1996: 1). There is first the 
socio-economic side, which allows us to assess the catch-up development level of both Portugal and 
Finland and whether their HE policies and reforms have been successful. Second, from a political 
perspective, one can explore how party systems are organised; what is the role of the government 
in HE in these both countries, as well as the relationship between HEIs and the state. Then, from 
a cultural perspective, one can analyse “the extent to which political attitudes and social belief-
systems tend to become more similar between the countries in Europe” (1996: 1). To “measure” 
convergence it is important to define “what converges”, i.e. “what is the substance or topic under 
investigation” (Unger and Waarden 1995: 4). With respect to the Bologna process, Witte (2006: 15) 
points that the common endpoint of the process is not defined. As such, convergence cannot be 
measured against a “common standard”, but only with respect to similarities between different 
systems. At this stage, the researcher is concerned with explaining what drives convergence (and 
divergence) of HE policies and change movements in both Portugal and Finland.  
Another account explaining convergence towards a common model or processes of ‘catching-
up’ of countries regarding educational performance lays in the combination of path dependency and 
historical institutionalism with sociological institutionalism (cf. chapter III). Whereas legislation 
passed by governments compels ‘laggard’ national HE systems to ‘catch-up with more developed 
ones (Nagel et al. 2010), both at the national and institutional level is possible to observe increasing 
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similarities in terms of policies, structures and modes of functioning (e.g. the Bologna process, 
changes in governance and management structures, etc.). These diffusion processes happen due to, 
among other reasons, normative pressures passed to and by professionals, definition of common 
goals and adoption of similar practices and routines. 
As it will be analysed later on in this section, the OMC gave the EC a significant extension of 
its capacity for policy making, as it offers “a political space of ideational convergence”, at least in 
terms of setting the agenda and the development of quantitative indicators that compare 
performance (Gornitzka 2007: 177). It is argued that policy coordination (and integration) without 
the use of hard law is possible through the expected coordinating capacity of the convergence and 
travelling of ideas (Radaelli 2004; Ramirez 2012). In this way, it is important to examine shifts in 
governance modes in order to understand why some educational trends and reforms diffuse and 
others not, i.e. how do they travel, assuming that they do. As Gornitzka et al. (2007: 201) state 
“Ideational shifts are important to examine also because of their implications for the national 
sensitivity of policy areas and thus the propensity for transfer of legal competencies to the 
supranational level and the implications for types of governance across levels”.  
 
1.3 Higher Education Policy in Europe  
One of the manifestations of the changing role of the state towards HE, often labelled as “the 
hollowing out of the state”, concerns the delegation of its powers to different levels: upwards, 
downwards and outwards (Rhodes 1994; 1996; Ferlie et al. 2000; Pierre and Peters 2000; Bovens, ‘t 
Hart and Peters 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  
With respect to upwards shifts of the changing role of the state in HE, it is argued that 
increasingly more, policy agendas are determined at the supranational level and, looking from a top-
down perspective, this level now represents the first “regulatory level” (if we can use this expression) 
of the Bologna process. Furthermore, when analysing shifts in European HE in general, the 
“introduction” of a supranational level, e.g. the increasing relevance that the EC, which traditionally 
had no competence in education issues is assuming in the process, represents one major change in 
HE policy formulation, especially whether one takes into consideration one of the two leading 
principles in EU decision-making processes, the principle of subsidiary and the principle of 
proportionality4.  
                                                 
4 The principle of proportionality regulates the exercise of powers by the EU by setting actions 
taken by the institutions of the Union within specified bounds. Under this rule, the involvement 
of the institutions must be limited to what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties 
(Europa website 2012).  
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HE has historically been a national affair (Scott 1998). As such, there is much diversity within 
HE systems that signed the Bologna agreement. In terms of European integration, this would 
therefore pose a problem when converging so many different HE systems, especially because, 
according to the principle of subsidiarity, education is still the responsibility of individual 
governments. The EC only became gradually involved in education issues via links to more general 
economic issues for which it had direct competence, namely with vocational training, in order to 
enhance the free movement of labour in the common market (Martens and Wolf 2009: 86). The 
principle of subsidiarity was established in 1992, in the EU law by the Treaty of Maastricht (which 
entered into force in 1993, the year when the EU was formally created) as a response to the fear of 
member-states of a (further) centralisation of political power at the European level (Corbett 2003; 
Maassen and Musselin 2009: 6). This principle ensures that in areas that are not within its exclusive 
powers and/or competence, e.g. (higher) education, the EU shall only take action where objectives 
can be best attained by action at Community rather than at national level (article 3b of the Maastricht 
Treaty 1992: 3-4). 
The principle of subsidiarity is, in this way, closely bound up with the principle of 
proportionality, which requires that any action by the Union should not go beyond what is necessary 
to achieve the objectives of the Treaties (Europa website 2012). As such, subsidiarity did not leave 
much leeway for the EC to harmonise national systems of education. Moreover, the fear that member-
states felt after the treaty was signed is visible in the tension between the Commission and the 
member states – a situation that is illustrated by the exclusion of the EC from the first phase of the 
Sorbonne/Bologna process (Maassen and Musselin 2009: 6). According to Eberlein and Kewler 
(2004: 122) this fear and reluctance of the member-states to grant regulatory powers to the EU is 
also explained by the discrepancy between what the EU is expected to manage and the increasing 
level of legitimacy enjoyed by the EU institutions. In addition, it is also argued that the inclusion of 
non-EU members in the process was a strategic decision to protect the signatory countries against 
too much Commission leverage (Martens and Wolf 2009: 89). 
The principle of subsidiarity somewhat preserves this exclusivity of nation-states in educational 
domains, but at the same time, and as several authors argue (de Witte 1993; Pollack 2000; Corbett 
2003; Gornitzka 2007; Maassen and Musselin 2009; Veiga and Amaral 2009; Amaral and Neave 
2009a), since subsidiarity is a vague word without a precise meaning, it did not assure that HE policy 
would be exclusively a responsibility of nation-states. Furthermore, as observed later on, the 
methodology used by the EC in the implementation of both the Bologna process and the Lisbon 
strategy (soft law) fully respects the principle of subsidiarity (Rodrigues 2002; Gornitzka et al. 2007). 
Thus, one can say that following the creation of the ERASMUS programme in 1987, this was the 
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continuation of the EU’s (successful) meddling (intromission) in issues related with HE and research. 
Consequently, the main functions of the university have come higher in the European agenda, 
especially after the 2000 Lisbon summit, and, as HE stakeholders have not been ignorant of these 
developments, a considerable amount of the Community budget is nowadays devoted to these areas 
(Gornitzka 2007: 189; Wit 2007). Attention and resources have shifted from the national to the 
European level (Kohler-Koch 1999: 102), as the numerous Commissions’ communiqués and reports 
evidence (COM 2005; 2006; 2007; 2011). Simultaneously, for the HE sector, this marked the 
emphasis on multi-level and multi-actor governance arrangements, creating networks of 
interdependent relationships, which influence agenda setting, decision-making and policy 
implementation (Enders 2004a). Indeed, a crucial aspect of Europeanisation has been the 
dissemination of a network mode of governance based on complex interactions between levels, 
sectors and actors in a multi-level multi-actor policy (Kohler-Koch 1999; Olsen 2002; Neave and 
Maassen 2007). Thus, institutionalisation of the European level and international actors in national 
and institutional governance arrangements that constitute one of the major changes of HEIs 
governance and management and which therefore challenges the analysis of individual levels of 
action.  
The Bologna process is the prime example of this multi-level and multi-actor governance, 
considering that there is an interaction of multiple (political) actors guiding policy design and 
implementation at the European, national and institutional levels. In addition, one should not forget 
that some EU structures bring an intergovernmental dynamic, through the Council of Ministers and 
the Council of Europe, adding complexity to the interconnection among European (and national) 
intermediary institutions, national governments and HEIs. Such complexity is also increased by 
several interest groups operating on the European level, as the EUA and the European Students’ 
Union which, in the words of Elken and Vukasovic (2014: 132) “add a transnational flavour” to the 
dynamics of European HE governance and HE policy formulation and implementation processes. 
With respect to this network mode of governance, Gortnitzka et al. (2007) argue that the 
Directorates General of Education and Research have become a platform for networking 
administrations across Europe, which connect the supranational level to the other levels of 
governance: “These are networks for European policy making, for affecting national policies, for 
information exchange and for the implementation of European policies and programs at the sub-
national level” (2007: 196). The EU has been so actively involved in HE policy making that, over 
the past decade, there has been a shift from analysing the process of European integration to 
analysing the EU as a system of governance (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996; Eberlein and Kerwer 
2004; Kohler-Koch 2005). Thus, in the same way that each nation-state has its own coordination 
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means to steer its HE sector, so does the EU have also its structured means of “steering 
cooperation” among member states. Within the political framework of the EU, the EC assumes 
especial relevance (for the purpose of this study), once it is seen as the engine of European 
integration (Gornitzka 2008). 
The EU uses a mixed, or what is called a hybrid mode of governance to deal with different 
sectors of policy areas. Thus, and as aforementioned, one can find intergovernmental cooperation 
which works together with supranational institutions, like the EU Council and the EU Parliament. 
These institutions, as Gornitzka (2008) refers, position the nation-state as its core-centre of activity, 
but they also cope with the EU as a whole entity.  Indeed, as argued by the author, what makes the 
EU such an important and especial organisation is “(…) its strong legal focus that one will not find 
in any international cooperation organisation in the world”. In turn, Kohler-Koch (2005) refers that:  
“(…) when compared to other systems of regional co-operation, the EU stands out because it is 
a Community based on the rule of law. It has created its own legal system that is operating 
independently but penetrates into the legal order of Member States and takes precedence based 
on the doctrine of direct effect and supremacy” (2005: 97-98).  
 
Nevertheless, for a long time, one of the major headaches of the EU was its limited decision-making 
capacity in a restricted number of policy fields, mainly due to member states’ wide-ranging veto 
powers, collective action problems for private interest groups and the regulatory competition 
triggered by the single market programme (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004: 122). As such, even prior to 
the Maastricht Treaty there were several attempts of the EC to gain ground in educational issues 
(Blitz 2003; Corbett 2005; West 2012), of which the Memorandum on HE in the European Community, 
published by the Commission in 1991, is a good example of this “creeping competence”, letting 
already guess what would happen throughout the Bologna process developments. Pollack (2000) 
refers to the EU “creeping competence” as a dramatic expansion of its activities, “(…) so that by 
the early 1990s, the policies of the Union had spread from the core economic activities of the 
common market to embrace almost every conceivable area of political, economic and social life” 
(2000: 520).  
Although the activity of the EC in education can be traced back before 19915, this Memorandum 
already refers to the necessary policies to change HE systems to meet the needs of the 21st century 
(COM 1991). Among others, critical areas discussed in this report (written more than two decades 
                                                 
5 Earlier action programmes in education began around 1976. Huisman and der Wende (2004: 349) refer that in 
1976, the education ministers of the then EC set up an information network in order to better understand national 
policies and system structures. From the work of this network, the Action Programme in the Field of Education 
was launched (also in 1976) and the Joint Study Programme – the predecessor of Erasmus – was also created. 
Cooperation initiatives and interest between HEIs and the EC increased significantly due to the various mobility 
and partnerships programmes launched in 1987, namely Erasmus, Delta and Lingua. Due to the principle of  
subsidiarity and the sovereignty of  member states, the national structures were not in danger (Huisman and der 
Wende 2004). 
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ago but which has paved the way for the Sorbonne meeting, the Bologna process and the 
Copenhagen process) include the need for strategic management at institutional level, the need to 
increase partnerships with economic life, the European dimension of HE as well as issues of HEIs 
quality and finance (COM 1991). In this sense, and considering that for a long time HE policy was 
not part of the European agenda and European cooperation was restricted to mobility programmes 
(Heinze and Knill 2008), the developments concerning the monitoring and implementation of the 
Bologna process represent a great achievement for the Commission and its efforts towards growing 
Europeanisation (Veiga and Amaral 2006). It should be mentioned that such extension of powers 
was also achieved with the help of the European Court of Justice, even if these attempts were in 
some occasions countered by initiatives of the member states (Alberto Amaral & Neave, 2009). On 
this, also Schäfer (2004) acknowledges that “the Community Method delegates considerable power 
to the Commission and the European Court of Justice and offers ample opportunity to act 
independently of their principals”6 (2004: 3). Additionally, one should remember that the growth of 
mobility evidenced the diversity of HE systems. Consequently, a number of domestic issues related 
to the quality of provision, the transfer of credits, the language of instruction and even the structural 
features of national systems became central to the internationalisation policy agenda as mobility (and 
the bureaucracy attached to it) increased (Huisman and der Wende 2004: 351). Furthermore, bearing 
in mind the interconnectedness of levels and actors, and after some analysis of the European 
recommendations and papers prepared by the EC, it is visible that the main aims of the Lisbon 
strategy – strengthening economic competitiveness and stimulating social cohesion – have become 
central to the Bologna process as well (Neave and Maassen 2007: 143). 
Since the moment the EC started to be involved with the development of the Bologna process, 
the Lisbon agenda (although through a different emphasis) was also committed to enhance the 
EHEA objectives; a position which was clearly expressed in the Commission’s paper for the 2003 
Berlin meeting of “Bologna Ministers of Education” (Gornitzka et al. 2007: 163). Nevertheless, 
although traditionally teaching and research are subject to different criteria and legal regimes, the 
influence of the EU in national HE and research systems has come in the shape of legal integration. 
As such, the authors refer that it is plausible to assume that the implementation of the ERA is thus 
less dependent on changes in the national legal framework than the implementation of the EHEA. 
However, it is important to highlight that despite this growing importance of the EU in domestic 
policy agendas, and despite the fact that the EC sets constraints and gives directions, the reforms of 
the welfare states are still a national affair.  
“(…) The system is still dominated by home-bound actors extending their realm of activities. 
They are the prime movers in the multi-level system of the EU and are equally constrained by 
                                                 
6 Schäfer (2004) takes the principal-agent theory as model of analysis. 
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national and supra-national institutions. Even when social groups engage in European wide co-
ordinated action, they are not subject to trans-national structuration (…). European governance 
is changing structures within the Member States but it does not re-structure the nation-bound 
European societies” (Kohler-Koch 1999: 96). 
 
Building the EHEA and the ERA encompassed thus the European ambition of transforming 
Europe in the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by the year 
2010, where each EU member country would contribute 3% of GDP for R&D. In this way a 
stronger emphasis on research and in the role of universities in the process of knowledge creation 
and knowledge dissemination gained a new breath (and hope) with the Lisbon Strategy.  
Underlying the aims of the Lisbon Strategy was the idea and efforts of growing Europeanisation 
and integration of national policies. As Veiga and Amaral (2006) explain, “(…) This proposal allows 
the EU to promote the European dimension of education and training policies (2006: 283). In this 
renewed Europeanisation context, and as the Lisbon strategy so repeatedly has been emphasising, 
knowledge assumes paramount importance in order to attain economic growth and global 
competitiveness. Knowledge is the legitimate concern of the European common efforts, and 
therefore is the basis of the overall aims of the Lisbon Strategy: economic and the social aspects. 
These both dimensions aim to translate the political definition of the knowledge-based economy, so 
important for the construction of the new Europe, and, as referred by the authors “... to some 
extent, institutional policies of Europeanisation have been strongly driven by the intrinsic 
internationalisation character of scientific knowledge, which might have contributed to balance the 
influence of the academic rationale over the economic rationale” (2006: 290). The emphasis on the 
acquisition of competences and the strong emphasis on employability as the engines of the 
knowledge-based economy have an impact on the way HEIs are governed and steered.  
The following section explores certain specificities of the Bologna process and the Lisbon 
strategy, namely the policy process behind the idea of the coordination of these two stories. 
 
1.4 The Bologna Process: origins and developments  
This section aims to contextualise the Bologna process within the Europeanisation dynamics 
of HE, as well as to understand the directions and means it has been using in its development, and 
to understand such an emphasis in reforming European HE systems, resembling them to the 
undergraduate and graduate Anglo-American model under the rationale of enhanced competition, 
transparency and flexibility – NPM rhetoric and practice per excellence. This contextualisation, both 
political and historical, is crucial to understand reform processes (Neave 2003; Gornitzka et al. 2007; 
Välimaa 2005).  
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It is fascinating to observe how the European HE environment has evolved since the Magna 
Charta Universitatum was signed on the 18th September of 1988 to the latest Conference and Bologna 
policy forum held in Yerevan, Armenia. Curiously, the 2018 Conference will take place in Paris, 
where everything started: at the Sorbonne University.  
Politically, the Bologna process is one of the most far-reaching significant reforms that has 
took place in the 900 odd years of the history of the University in Europe (Neave and Maassen 
2007: 138). In this sense, it also represents one of the best expressions of the European integration 
process, as well as the growing geographical and political expansion of the EU (Olsen 2002), as we 
have seen above. This is why the researcher believes that any study aiming at understanding 
institutional change in HE would naturally imply a reference to the Bologna framework. 
Almost thirty years passed since 388 Rectors of worldwide universities signed the Magna Charta 
Universitatum to mark the 900 years of the founding of the University of Bologna. This document 
formally stated the importance of universities in a changing and increasingly international society 
(Magna Charta Universitatum 1998: 1) and introduced some principles for the process of far-reaching 
co-operation among all European nations (ibid). It mainly refers to the notions of freedom and 
intellectual independence and inseparability of research and teaching in the day-to-day activities of 
universities, as “… fundamental principles which must, now and always, support the vocation of 
universities” (ibid). The document has become the reference for the fundamental values and 
principles of the university and since it was signed in 1988 the signatory countries had increased 
tremendously. To date, it has been signed by 721 universities from 79 countries in Europe, Asia, 
Africa, Australia and America (Magna Charta Observatory website).  
Following this document, the Sorbonne declaration (1998) introduced the ideas of what latter 
would be the Bologna declaration, and therefore the ideals for the construction of “... an open 
European area for higher learning, in which we must strengthen and build upon the intellectual, 
cultural, social and technical dimensions of our continent” (Sorbonne Declaration 1998). In this 
sense, the Sorbonne Declaration (together with the Magna Charta Universitatum) can be seen as the 
(informal) beginning of the Bologna process. Indeed, as it is stated in this document, it is a declaration 
on the “... harmonisation of the architecture of the European HE system” (ibid), and it was signed 
by the four ministers in charge of HE in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom7. The 
Sorbonne declaration is concluded with the four ministers calling on other EU members to join 
them in achieving those objectives. The novelty, as Veiga (2011) remembers, was that it was an 
initiative explicitly taken without the involvement of European institutions and avoiding the 
                                                 
7 In 1998 these ministers were: Claude Allegre (France); Luigi Berlinguer (Italy); Tessa Blackstone (United 
Kingdom) and Jürgen Rüttgers (Germany). 
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intervention of the European Court of Justice, by inviting other non-EU countries to join the 
initiative (2011: 51). Nevertheless, despite the invitation was enthusiastically received by some 
European counterparts, other countries saw it as raising the danger of a Europe of two speeds 
(Veiga 2011: 51), benefiting countries that are close to the “technological frontier” while 
discriminating the member states that are lagging behind in terms of innovation (Amaral 2004).  
Before its signature on the 19th June 1999, the Bologna declaration was previously prepared at 
a meeting of the EU Directors-Generals of Higher Education (Witte 2006: 131). The preparatory 
documents (Project Report – Trends in Learning Structures in Higher Education) provided overall 
information about the structure of the national systems of HE. It was intended to be a tool for the 
29 ministers to compare differences concerning the organisation of each HE system.  
It is also interesting to mention that one day before the signature of the Bologna declaration, 
the President of the Confederation of European Union’s Rectors’ Conferences, Hans-Uwe Erichsen 
(1999), draw attention for the importance that more ministers, “(…) not only from EU member 
states but also from non member states in central and Eastern Europe, as well as from Norway and 
Switzerland” (1999: 1) would sign the declaration. Erichsen highlighted that the “… shaping and 
structuring of the future European HE space is also a, if not the most important, responsibility of 
the universities and other institutions of HE” (1999: 2), in order that students and academics could 
freely circulate and disseminate knowledge throughout the continent (ibid).  
What the signatory ministers did not foresee was that the EU would play a much larger role in 
HE policy that they envisioned. As Martens and Wolf (2009: 92) explain, at the Sorbonne 
declaration, Ministers insisted that the Commission should not have any stronger role and it should 
be only an observer member of the process. The process, in turn, should not be more than an 
intergovernmental agreement with a clear division of responsibilities between the EU and the 
member-states. As such, despite the invitation in Sorbonne being eagerly accepted by the 29 
members of the EU, the conference in Bologna made clear the difficulty in achieving consensus 
among the signatory countries, especially with respect to the details of the implementation of the 
two main studies cycles. This explains why the text of the declaration, as a statement of exclusively 
political nature, had to be carefully analysed (Veiga 2011: 51-52). Based on her research, Amélia 
Veiga refers that according to Marçal Grilo and Pedro Lourtie (two Portuguese political forces 
behind the Bologna process, both nationally and internationally), the text was meticulously revised 
and changed in order to prevent fears about a possible homogenisation of European HE systems. 
This was so because words such as “harmonisation” tended to be interpreted as curricular 
“standardisation” within the signatory countries8 (Witte 2006: 127). As such, in the subsequent 
                                                 
8 Other interpretations of the document suggest that the fact that only four of the biggest European countries 
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documents related with the Bologna process, the term harmonisation was replaced by convergence9, 
making possible for an enlarged group of HE ministers to sign the Bologna declaration. 
Nevertheless, the EU Rectors’ Conferences and the Association of European Universities (CRE 
2000) were very clear in this respect. They stated that “The Bologna process aims at creating 
convergence and thus it is not a path towards the ‘standardisation’ or ‘uniformisation’ of European 
HE: the fundamental principles of autonomy and diversity are respected” (2000: 3). Moreover, in 
the previous document written by Erichsen (1999), it is mentioned that the way to cope with the 
increasing demand for continuing education from enterprises and graduates, and from contributions 
to HEIs to lifelong learning, is diversification by promoting variety and flexibility. The call also 
refers that both the Bologna and the Sorbonne Declarations stimulate diversification in order to 
improve international recognition and the attractiveness of HE systems. 
From a more ideological perspective it can be said that the Bologna process was not that new, 
but rather a continuation of educational policy aims that have been at the heart of the EC wishes 
for some time (Corbett 2001, 2005; Neave 2009).  
On the other hand, the notion of competition – as a label for the cultural appeal each country 
has when compared to other nations, has also been present on national agendas for a long time and 
on their negotiations with the “superordinate level” (Neave 2009). What seems to be consensual is 
that the process represents major cultural shifts that will take more time to be fully integrated into 
societal reality then the initial estimated year of 2010, e.g., the idea that the role of HE is fundamental 
for social innovation (Trends Report V 2005). As Neave (2009: 49) refers, “(…) Bologna is 
effectively part of an ongoing venture and thus an example of that most interesting of all conditions 
– continuity in the midst of change”. Thus, after the “blessing of the appropriate authorities” (ibid) 
and despite all the turmoil that the process created, changes were largely carried forward by 
university leadership, academics and administrative staff (technostructure). As such, in this sense, 
“… Bologna marked a watershed in the relations between national and superordinate communities” 
(ibid: 157).  
The Magna Charta Universitatum also mentioned the importance of universities in a changing 
society. In this sense, and in order to continue change, the construction of the common area of HE 
in which students would be able to choose from a wide range of European quality courses and 
benefit from smooth recognition procedures was supposed10 to be achieved trough several measures 
                                                 
signed the Sorbonne declaration created a certain kind of “marginalisation” idea concerning the other countries 
that were not previously consulted about these ideas (Witte 2006; Lourtie 2008). 
9 It is, however, interesting to note that the majority of  the interviewees both in Portugal and in Finland still used 
the word “harmonisation” to describe/refer to the convergence of  the degrees’ system. 
10 The word “supposed” was deliberately written once it is now acknowledged that the year 2010 
was an unrealistic target and there is still a long way to go in order to have a truly EHEA, without 
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until 2010: emphasis on increased mobility; the existence of a common two cycle degree structure 
(“graduate” and “undergraduate”), which should be internationally recognisable and easily 
comparable; incentives and supports for those who wish to access HE at any time in their lives (e.g. 
lifelong learning initiatives, which have been included in both OECD and the EU policy documents 
since 1995) and the use of an European Credit Transfer System (ECTS – which was launched by a 
pilot project of the EC and thus was already in use with ERASMUS and SOCRATES programmes) 
for the easy recognition of periods of study.  
As Neave (2003) summarises, by simplifying the duration of degrees and introducing an 
“European template”, the member-states aimed at boosting “… cross-national student traffic, 
enhance the employability of students because the comparability of qualifications across different 
systems would now no longer be a sore puzzle to prospective employers, and offer some degree of 
“customer protection” through the transparency of both degree structures and credit accumulation” 
(2003: 156) However, it should also be mentioned that, with respect to the two-cycles’ degree 
structure, collateral lectures of the Sorbonne declaration put forward the French structure as the model 
of organisation. Nevertheless, the ministers did not mention any numbers concerning the length of 
the degrees, only the expression cycles, as the French HE system is organised in three cycles.  
Despite the Bologna declaration clearly stating that the objectives entailed in the declaration 
should be pursued “... within the framework of national competences and taking full respect of the 
diversity of cultures, languages, national education systems and of university autonomy” (Bologna 
Declaration 1999), in practice, this demands a change in the way HEIs relate with their national 
governments. The ministries of education tried to adapt their national structures to the Bologna 
reality, which means new forms “... of intergovernmental co-operation, together with those of 
nongovernmental European organisations with competence on HE” (ibid). As such, it is not 
surprising that 17 years after the Bologna declaration has been signed, there are still fears concerning 
the loss of diversity and identity among HE systems of the signatory countries. Following Martens 
and Wolf (2009), one of the reasons for these fears is the increasing interference of international 
organisations in the national definition and implementations of HE policies. As Cachapuz (2010: 6) 
argues, the desirable convergence of HE systems should not be confused with the uniformity of 
those systems aiming at satisfying the exchange of HE “services” advocated by the WTO.  
Additionally, one should also refer that both the Bologna Declaration and the EU Rectors 
Conferences documents started to highly emphasise employability, namely the need of graduates to 
get suitable skills and training for the job market, rather than the transmission and acquisition of 
                                                 
obstacles of any type (e.g. transparency, recognition of prior studies and/or academic 
qualifications), both for students and staff.  
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general knowledge. Such emphasis goes much in line with what happened after the Lisbon 2000 
summit, namely the fact that the EC conceived the University merely in terms of vocational training 
(Neave and Maassen 2007: 140). The authors argue that although the declaration put aside some 
“economic vocabulary”, the notion of competition is present in the text by means of the expression 
of “cultural viability”, “… which from a perspective external to Europe was presented in terms of 
the cultural attractiveness of “European” HE on a world market” (ibidem: 140). In fact, this goes 
much in line with what Amaral and Neave (2009a) explained on the use of “weasel words” to 
describe the supranational role of the European Court of Justice on European HE politics. “Weasel 
words” seek to deprive a statement of its force or to turn a direct commitment aside, allowing for 
diverse interpretations of the treaties, and for enhancing the supranational role of the European 
Court of Justice, and consequently to increase the EC competencies, a development that member 
states viewed as increasingly undermining their sovereignty (Amaral and Neave 2009a: 272).  
Following this, Martens and Wolf (2009: 91) refer that the Bologna declaration showed its first 
economic considerations when referred that a common European HE system would be “… helpful 
‘in order to promote European citizens’ employability’ and ‘is relevant to the European labour 
market’”. Also in 2004, Alberto Amaral has warned for the “hidden agenda of the Bologna process: 
the economy”. The background for the forthcoming changes in European universities and 
polytechnics is the “economic competitiveness in a global system”. Emphasis is placed on the 
concept of “employability”, which confers the individual full responsibility to get a job. Another 
consequence of such emphasis in employability is the professional drift in universities, as they try to 
respond to societal pressures to become more ‘relevant’ and consequently to increasing demands 
for employability of their graduates (Amaral 2003a).  
After Bologna, a series of Ministerial follow-up meetings took place in several European cities 
(Prague in 2001; Berlin in 2003; Bergen in 2005; London in 2007; Leuven in 2009, Budapest and 
Vienna in 2010; Bucharest in 2012 and Yerevan in 2015), adding more objectives to the initial 
declaration, as well as including strategies and instruments for their practical implementation and 
evaluation of the implementation of the steps taken so far (Martens and Wolf 2009: 87). In March 
2000, before the first Ministerial meeting in Prague, the EU promoted one of the most significant 
events in this journey, which was held in Portugal and which would become extremely linked with 
the Bologna process: the Lisbon Process, which would be known as the Lisbon strategy, and where 
the heads of state of the EU established the well-known aim of transforming Europe, within a 
decade, in the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. 
In 2001, when the EC was already a full member of the Bologna process, the Prague 
Communiqué reaffirmed this emphasis on competition and employability by expressing the need of 
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Lifelong Learning (LLL) programmes in order to meet the challenges of competitiveness, and that 
study programmes should be taught combining academic quality with relevance to lasting 
employability (Prague Communiqué 2001; Martens and Wolf 2009: 92). The Communiqué also 
recognised that “programmes leading to a degree may, and indeed should, have different 
orientations and various profiles in order to accommodate a diversity of individual, academic and 
labour market needs (...)” (Prague Communiqué 2001: 2). One year later, in 2002, the European 
Council of Barcelona expressed the need to improve quality and effectiveness of education and 
training systems through the endorsement of a detailed work programme on the follow-up of the 
objectives of the education and training systems which aimed at making European education and 
training a world quality reference by 2010 (Veiga and Amaral 2008: 250; Hartmann 2008).  
The choice of Prague to hold the first follow-up conference is stated as a symbol of the 
European Ministers’ will to involve the whole of Europe in the process in the light of the 
enlargement of the EU. As such, the access criteria were broadened to include those countries 
participating in EU programmes and therefore, the number of signatory countries increased from 
29 to 33 with the entrance of Croatia, Cyprus, Liechtenstein and Turkey. Russia would join the 
process in the following Bologna Ministerial Conference in 2003 (Berlin), which made the 
proponents of a more independent EU participation in the process satisfied. However, these 
countries were not willing to adopt the access criteria of the Lisbon Recognition Convention, the 
major legal framework and tool of the Bologna process to create the EHEA (Hartmann 2008)11, 
which shows a clear opposition to a greater interference from the Commission and therefore to 
harmonisation procedures.  
Martens and Wolf (2009) showed also that the British part was not satisfied with the 
Commission’s presence, reminding other participants that it was agreed in Bologna to accomplish 
the process without the EC interference. However, despite the discontentment of some of the 
signatory countries, and as referred by Martens and Wolf (2009), the role of the Commission in the 
process has constantly increased. The European education ministers explicitly linked the Bologna 
process to the Lisbon Strategy (and to the 2002 Barcelona European Council) during the Berlin 
follow-up conference in 2003 (Berlin Communiqué 2003: 2), and in 2005, the Bergen Communiqué 
underlined the complementarity between the overarching framework of the EHEA and the 
framework for LLL qualifications (which encompass general and vocational education, and training) 
                                                 
11 The Lisbon Recognition Convention is an intergovernmental convention elaborated by the Council of  Europe 
together with UNESCO. As the name itself  suggests, it was signed in Lisbon in 1997 but only entered into force 
in 1999. The Convention stipulates that degrees and periods of  study must be recognised unless substantial 
differences can be proved by the institution that is charged with recognition. The Lisbon Convention is an 
important tool in the EHEA creation by making academic degrees and quality assurance standards more 
comparable and compatible throughout Europe (Lisbon convention website). 
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as it was being developed within the EU and among participating countries. In the Bergen 
Communiqué it was also asked the EC “fully to consult all parties to the Bologna Process as work 
progresses” (Bergen Communiqué 2005: 2). 
After a decade of reforms, at the Leuven summit in April 2009, HE ministers reaffirmed their 
commitment with the process and expressed the need to consolidate the reforms in the period 
towards 2020. In this way, with the Vienna Declaration in 2010, the EHEA was officially launched 
and it was emphasised the role of the EHEA in a broader global perspective (EUA website 2011). 
The governance dynamics of the Bologna declaration are thus quite complex and the process 
is ruled by way of a complex governance structure, which assures its operation through what is also 
known as soft governance (Heinze and Knill 2008; Veiga, Amaral and Mendes 2008; Croché 2009). As 
Heinze and Knill (2008) explain, this governance structure is shared by the representatives of the 
Bologna signatory countries and the EU, and is advised by Europe-wide organisations, such as the 
EUA – one of the main driving forces of the process; business entities (e.g. Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederations of Europe and BUSINESSEUROPE), the Council of Europe, 
UNESCO/CEPES, and topic-orientated network organisations, e.g. ENQA, the European 
Association of Institutions in HE (EURASHE), the European Students’ Union (ESU) and 
Education International (Heinze and Knill 2008: 497; EUA 2011 website). From these 
organisations, the EUA is perhaps one of the most important consultative members in the process 
and the declarations launched by this consultative body on the eve of the ministerial conferences 
are considered essential for the realisation of the Ministerial Communiqués that define how Europe 
proceeds with the Bologna reforms (EUA website 2011). Then, in addition to the biannual 
ministerial meetings in which coordination and monitoring of the national implementation process 
is carried out and where new objectives have been added, the process finds consistency by means 
of the follow-up structure at the European level, i.e., through the Bologna Follow-Up Group 
(BFUG). The group consists of a smaller group of representatives of the signatory countries, the 
EC and the participating stakeholder organisations. The main responsibility of the group is the 
overall steering of the process and the preparation of the Ministerial Meetings (e.g. draft the 
Communiqués; adoption of working programmes; informing and reporting to other HE ministers 
and to develop criteria for stocktaking (Heinze and Knill 2008: 498). It should also be remembered 
that all this has happened without any central driving force or monitoring system or even any legally 
binding steering mechanisms (Trends Report V 2007). Nevertheless, although the process started 
outside the institutional frame of the EC, it has become strongly associated with the EU and today 
the Commission is the main driving force behind the establishment of the EHEA and the ERA, it 
coordinates all the actors involved in the process and it represents one of the main funding sources 
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for keeping the process alive (Martens and Wolf 2009), as it finances the follow-up of the process. 
For Witte (2006), the role of the EU in the Bologna process was further strengthened by the 
establishment in March 2000 of the ENQA, funded initially by the EC through the SOCRATES 
programme (2006: 134).  
It is not easy to give a clear and straightforward picture of the Bologna process developments, 
mainly due to the complexity of actors, levels, objectives and tools it uses. What was explained 
previously is just a simple overview of its “historical” evolution and main actors behind the process, 
while simultaneously trying to look more deeply at governance and management issues. A note 
should be left to refer that many of the people who work at these (international) working groups 
also belong to the implementation working groups of the Bologna process of their own countries, 
and some of them even work at the implementation process in the HEIs where they work).  
 
 1.4.1 The Bologna Process and the Lisbon Educational Strategy 
 Any study on the Bologna process developments could not let aside the Lisbon 2000 process, 
namely the way the EU has been using it to gain increasing competence and power within the HE 
and research policy fields. The way the Lisbon agenda has became gradually intertwined with the 
Bologna process, and consequently with institutions’ “academic life” is explained by the path that 
European HEIs have taken on research policy cooperation (Gornitzka et al. 2007: 192) after the 
Lisbon European Council held in 2000 has put into practice the European strategy for the 
knowledge economy. Universities have become essential agents to achieve the agenda aims. 
Therefore, the Lisbon summit has marked the political dynamics of the Bologna process 
development, which has, until then, devoted more attention to academic issues and gained later a 
new breath with the University’s central role in connecting the triangle of education, research and 
innovation (Maassen and Olsen 2006: xi). Indeed, those changes in HE, such as the massification 
of the sector, internationalisation, increased global competition and the emphasis on knowledge 
economies, led first to the drafting of the Bologna process and then to the Lisbon Strategy, including 
the Modernisation Agenda for Universities (a document which later would be known as the 
Education and Training 2010 Programme) (COM 2005; 2006; 2009; Gornitzka 2007; EUA 2010: 4). 
In this sense, both the Bologna process and the Lisbon Strategy can be seen as the main frameworks 
guiding the European response to globalisation in HE (Marginson and Wende 2007: 46). The 
Lisbon’s message to this sector is to increase the investment in research and to improve the quality 
and effectiveness of education and training systems (Veiga and Amaral 2008: 250). 
This has consequences for policy design at all levels of action where the process operates, 
especially at a time when the number of participatory countries increases, providing the process with 
a high degree of complexity, “... which does not fit into the idea of clear, rational and linear policy 
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implementation of the EU” (Veiga and Amaral 2006: 286). Therefore, as referred by the authors, to 
study the Bologna process might be quite problematic if one aims at analysing any of these 
phenomena in isolation. With this in mind, it has been argued here that HE policy design and 
implementation in Europe has become increasingly intertwined in terms of levels and actors 
involved, with some of them having more preponderance than others. Additionally, it should be 
mentioned that 
“Although they emerged in very different ways (bottom-up versus top-down) and could be 
characterised as intergovernmental (Bologna) versus supranational (Lisbon), they seemed to 
converge slowly into one over-arching approach” (Marginson and Wende 2007: 46). 
 
But the Lisbon Strategy works differently from the Bologna process: it was designed by the EC at 
supra-national level and though its implementation considers multi-actors’ interests, it uses a more 
top-down perspective. However, since the formal competences of the EC in the area of education 
policy have not been enlarged, the Bologna process cannot be completely characterised as a top-
down initiative, but rather as bottom-up, due to the limited competences of the Commission in the 
field of HE policy (Amaral and Neave 2009a). Moreover, the instruments it uses are not EU 
directives, but take the form of recommendations, communications, consultations, or other working 
documents (Marginson and Wende 2007: 49). In fact, the EU’s discourse with respect to HE has 
been consolidated through a similar way: in a series of communiqués and related documents which 
deal with a variety of inter-related areas, which range from LLL, mobility, cooperation with third 
countries, brainpower mobilisation, knowledge society, internationalisation, modernisation and 
quality assurance, innovation and creativity, HE governance and university-business cooperation, 
among others (Mayo 2007: 87-88). It can thus be said that in the same way that different 
governments used the OECD reports and the Bologna process as a means of legitimising their 
decisions, so the EU does, by using the Lisbon strategy for political legitimacy and the funds from 
the European Framework programmes for Research and Technological Development as a 
convincing lever (Amaral 2008: 85). 
This vision helps us to understand how the main aims of the Lisbon strategy have become 
central to the Bologna process as well (Neave and Maassen 2007: 143) and vice-versa: the Lisbon 
agenda was explicitly linked to the accomplishments towards the EHEA, namely concerning the 
structural organisation of HE systems and the establishment of quality assurance mechanisms. As 
Gornitzka (2007: 166) referred, “The Lisbon process in education both feeds and feeds on the 
Bologna process”. The temporal proximity in which both events occurred strongly explains their 
interconnectedness, considering that just prior to the Lisbon 2000 summit the same ministers had 
been signing the agreement to establish a EHEA until 2010, which was an unprecedented 
experiment in European integration outside the EU (Å. Gornitzka, 2007). In addition to the Lisbon 
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European Summit, from the strategic point of view of the EU, the Bologna process was also framed 
within (and by) the Barcelona Summit in 2002, considering that both the European Councils in 
Lisbon (March 2000) and in Barcelona (March 2002) agreed to set a strategic goal for the EU to 
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010, to 
make the education and training systems of the EU a world quality reference also by 2010 and to 
create a European Research and Innovation Area (Council of the EU 2007). In this way, and as 
Veiga and Amaral (2008) noted, the Lisbon strategy has the EU hallmark that was initially absent 
from the Bologna process. The following excerpt attests this amalgamation of interests and recalls 
the common concerns shared by the Bologna framework and the EU: increased employability and 
modernisation of social welfare and educational systems 
 “The Lisbon strategy builds on the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact and on the need to coordinate 
the Cologne process (macro-economic policies); the Cardiff process (structural reforms) and the 
Luxembourg process (employment policies). The application of the Amsterdam treaty in 1999 
acknowledged employment as a matter of common concern for European member states and one 
of the Union’s goals. The Lisbon strategy included European employment policy. It brought 
together measures for building further knowledge infrastructures, enhancing innovation and 
economic reform, and modernising social welfare and education systems” (European Council, 
2000).” 
 
For Gornitzka, in terms of educational and research policy, not only did the Lisbon strategy 
reasserted (or restored) the role of R&D for economic competitiveness and growth, but it has also 
underlined the role of education as a core labour market factor and a central agent in social cohesion. 
Additionally, it allowed the establishment of common concerns and priorities (2007: 160). In this way, 
the Lisbon strategy, as “… a practical-political expression of the way in which education and 
research as policy areas are defined and framed within the knowledge economy discourse” 
(Gornitzka 2007: 160), is embedded in a neo-liberal ideology or in a “common model of socio-
economic development” where science-base innovation is seen as the engine of economic 
development (ibid). Additionally, the author also argues that it represents an attempt of horizontal 
integration by means of linking the social and economic aspects of European integration. 
Nevertheless, the European integration debate continues to raise discussions on its fully and truly 
extent, on the different ways the nation-states use these processes (Bologna and Lisbon) to achieve 
other objectives and even on the real benefits of it. As Rodrigues (2002: 21) explains, the actual 
implementation of any strategy requires a political engine, or a governance centre at the European 
level with the power to coordinate policies and to adapt them to each national context. In this way, 
the Lisbon decisions made this governance centre stronger considering that the European Council 
plays a sturdy role as a coordinator since the moment it adopted an OMC among member-states, as 
we shall see in the following section.  
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It is interesting to note that as it has happened with the Bologna declaration, the Lisbon summit 
represents more an agenda than a truly commitment for competitiveness and social cohesion, and 
therefore it was also written with a certain degree of vagueness, a necessary condition for reaching 
consensus on the common goals for the member states (Gornitzka 2007: 161). This new way of 
governing goes beyond the “visible hand of the public authority” (Enders 2004), which means, 
beyond the nation-sate, and at the same time, without relying on the traditional EU control means.  
Briefly, it can be said that in a global competition environment, and whether one looks at the 
Bologna process as the (re-)start of a reform cycle which has been strongly supported by the Lisbon 
strategy, this agenda emerges from the old “feeling” of some actors and desires of the EC to adapt 
universities to the knowledge society. For this to happen several changes were put in practice, 
namely a strong emphasis on research, stressing the production of useful knowledge and relevant 
technology (Mode 2 knowledge production) and the creation of synergies between HEIs and non-
traditional actors. All this would not be possible without changing institutional governance and 
management, which become significantly easier since the moment the EC was increasingly linked 
with the Bologna process, and later on with the adoption of the OMC, a central tool for 
implementing the EHEA. The Lisbon Strategy paved the way for the EU to set the method that 
would be used to coordinate the Bologna process and this is how the OMC was for the first time 
applied in the education field. Both the Bologna process and the Lisbon Strategy share the common 
use of soft law tools rather than the traditional hard law methodology of European legislation.  
 
 
1.5 The Open Method of Coordination as a Governance Tool 
The common process of European integration has been carried out through the “Community 
method”, a kind of working tool which consists in the transfer of powers from the member-states 
to the EU, namely to the EC. The Commission then arranges communitarian policies and controls 
the adoption of mandatory standards, and hence the designation of hard law. With the enlargement 
of EU policies that go beyond the economic domain, nation-states felt their powers have been 
reduced and therefore they started to call into question the traditional integration model. 
Nevertheless, in areas such as (higher) education, the EU could not use the traditional “Community 
method”. It is mainly due to this factor that a soft law type of methodology is believed to be the most 
appropriate to coordinate the various levels of interaction under which the Bologna process operates 
and needs to be implemented. This allows member-states to fully respect the principle of 
subsidiarity, while fostering convergence on common interests and common priorities (Rodrigues 
2002: 22). 
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Maria João Rodrigues (2002), one of the main responsible people for the “articulation” of 
the OMC, reassures, however, that the method does not seek full harmonisation, but rather the 
development of each member-state and its coordination. Nevertheless, one of the problems of this 
method, or at least with its name, is its ambiguity: both ‘coordination’ and ‘open’ were not defined 
in Lisbon, where the word ‘convergence’ was used, presupposing more political determination than 
simple coordination (Radaelli 2003: 14-15). Furthermore, it works in a twofold parallel way. Not 
only it has offered the member-states and the EU institutions “(…) a template for coordinating 
public policies within the EU that in principle would not upset the balance between the nation states 
and the supranational level” (Gornitzka 2007: 155), but it has also the advantage of allowing some 
governments to shift the blame of unpopular domestic agendas to the OMC process or the EU 
(Mosher 2000; Schäfer 2002; Zeitlin 2005). Additionally, the fact that both the Bologna process and 
the Lisbon strategy objectives (despite different in their nature) are intentionally broad and with a 
non-binding character as a means of achieving consensus among so many countries also explains 
the rationale behind the use of soft law. Indeed, with respect to the Bologna process, Amaral and 
Neave (2009a) refer that: 
“Bologna was to be carried forward by using ‘soft law’ procedures, which allowed each country 
to decide how to fulfil the agreed objectives. Each country would draw up a new legal framework 
that both provided for the implementation of Bologna and at the same time took account of 
national agendas and the unique characteristics of each HE system” (2009: 290).  
This different paradigm of governance “style” has allowed the EC to enter in areas that were 
previously much more difficult to access (e.g. HE) because they were protected by the treaties of 
the Union, i.e. they were reserved for the sole political action of individual member states (Veiga 
and Amaral 2009). Moreover, a different kind of coordination that does not completely rely on 
harmonisation would allow for a more respectful attitude towards national system diversity, which 
is seen as a problem when one wants to implement convergence policies. Nevertheless, it is also 
important to distinguish here that the policy process to implement the EHEA is substantially 
different from the process of implementing the ERA, or by other words, the establishment of these 
spaces are subject to different legal regimes (Gornitzka et al. 2007). In principle, the implementation 
of ERA is less dependent on changes in national legal frameworks and therefore less dependent on 
European integration, seeing that the later is a process more rooted in legal integration (2007: 201). 
Complementary to these perspectives, Radaelli (2003) argues that the OMC is, above all, an 
eminently legitimising discourse. As such,  
“(…) open coordination enables policy-makers to deal with new tasks in policy areas that are 
either politically sensitive or in any case not amenable to the classic Community method. The 
result is that practices that up until a few years ago would have been simply labelled ‘soft law’, 
new policy instruments, and benchmarking are now presented as ‘applications’ if not ‘prototypes’ 
of ‘the’ method” (2003: 7). 
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Therefore, the author claims that one should not refer to the OMC as “the method”, but rather as 
“several” methods or practices, considering that their use varies depending on different policy areas. 
As an inclusive method for deepening European construction, the OMC’s main source of 
inspiration is the Luxembourg process regarding European employment strategy (Rodrigues 2002: 
22). Thus, its origins go back to the year of 1994 when, in connection with the development of the 
Monetary Union, the European Council decided to monitor national developments (by analysing 
indicators as growth, competitiveness and employment), leading to the establishment of common 
objectives and surveillance by the EC and member states (Schäfer 2004). Later on, following the 
Lisbon European Council conclusions (2000), it was decided to apply the OMC to other (eleven) 
policy fields, namely “... information society, R&D, enterprises, economic reforms, education and 
social inclusion” (Rodrigues 2002: 22). Following this, Gornitzka (2007) refers that when both the 
Bologna process and the Copenhagen process were included in the European Commission 
Education and Training Programme 2010, it was clear “… how much the OMC process had became 
a magnet for policy initiatives that the Commission had been working on prior to the Lisbon process 
as well as those that were spurred by it” (2007: 167). Thus, one could ask what are the implications 
of using this method in the HE field, its real advantages and the actors who (eventually) benefit from 
it. 
Although the method is not unprecedented12, the OMC offers a new approach to governance 
of the EU. It has some innovative “features”, “properties” and “instruments”, of which the 
following should be highlighted: flexibility, routine procedures, multi-lateral surveillance, indicators 
and guidelines, benchmarking and sharing of best practices and lack of formal restrictions. It is thus 
a “decentred and dynamic process” (Hodson and Maher 2001: 719). More specifically, and mainly 
based on the analysis of Régent (2002), Raedelli (2003) and Maria João Rodrigues (2006), the 
researcher will focus on those properties of the OMC implementation process that she believes have 
a close connection to the object of study and consequently with the NPM ideology. 
The OMC goes through several steps, being implemented by stages. The first one is the 
identification and definition of common objectives, by the European Council, to guide national 
policy. Then, it is necessary to fix guidelines and set timetables in order to achieve the goals 
previously established (short, medium, and long-term goals). A third stage when implementing this 
tool, and which has been widely criticised, is the establishment of indicators and benchmarks as 
means of comparing best practices (Gornitzka 2008), namely to compare the performance of the 
member states, something which is done under the supervision of the EC. Nevertheless, in a political 
                                                 
12 Hodson and Maher (2001) explain that coordination has been in the Treaty since 1958 when member states 
promised to coordinate their economic policies, and since the 1970s employment issues were also object of 
coordination. 
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context, benchmarking may act as an obstacle to the learning process because it might reduce 
diversity and heterogeneity, which are two essential properties of evolutionary learning systems. 
Additionally, by focusing on success, benchmarking may not reflect enough on the lessons provided 
by failures (Radaelli 2003: 41). 
Finally, the outcomes achieved are periodically monitored and evaluated. Periodic assessment, 
the last stage underlying this process, consists essentially in a set of joint techniques such as statistics, 
indicators and peer review organised as a mutual learning process. The aim is to monitor and 
evaluate the process periodically through other member states in order to learn from each other 
(Gornitzka 2008), as for example the BFUG is supposed to do. However, Raedelli (2003: 41) draws 
attention to the fact that successful competitive strategies are based more on distinctive and unique 
aspects than on the imitation that benchmarking tends to create. Interesting enough is the fact that 
the sanctions for those countries which performed poorly, relies on a kind of peer pressure, by 
“naming and shaming” those who did not attain the goals (Veiga and Amaral 2008). 
Rodrigues (2006) explains that this methodology does not aim to rank the member states. It 
rather works as a kind of guideline, which encourages states to create a European dimension and to 
adapt them to national diversity. Not much different from this view, Régent (2002) argues that 
“Lisbon strengthened the logic of mutual learning, benchmarking, best practice and peer pressure 
to achieve objectives” (2002: 5). 
Gornitzka (2007) criticises this type of law for not being effective, considering it too 
cumbersome and legalistic. The same view is shared by Veiga and Amaral (2006), who draw 
attention to the fact that “... policy implementation in HE is non-linear, and therefore, the use of 
soft law mechanisms such as the OMC is not effective when national governments have their own 
polices” (2006: 292). Indeed, one of the OMC problems relates (curiously and ironically) with this 
lack of coordination emerging from different national agendas, a situation particularly evident in the 
case of the Bologna process and which is quite understandable when one thinks that educational 
policies have not experienced any form of real coordination until this trial (Radaelli 2003: 17).  
With respect to HE, the OMC tends to represent, in its ideal form, a new paradigm of 
governance, which found fertile soil in the EU’s “lack of democratic legitimacy” environment, 
favouring in this way the emergence of EU network governance (Eising and Kohler-Koch 2000). 
The method was not entirely based on a top-down perspective. It is rather a “... middle way between 
intergovernmental negotiations and mutual adjustment (...), a coordination mechanism without 
economic sanction” (Gornitzka 2008), being thus more flexible and, at least ideally, more respectful 
towards system diversity. Nevertheless, and despite its interesting theoretical approaches, it is 
common to find in the literature several critics concerning its use in general and its real degree of 
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convergence. More specifically, doubts are raised regarding its implementation in the HE field. Veiga 
and Amaral (2009) refer to the 2007 stocktaking report where the national governments were asked 
to produce national actions plans for recognition as an example of an OMC tool. It seems that, by 
means of all these instruments (peer pressure, constant comparison using indicators, regular 
ministerial meetings, naming and shamming logic), the aim of using this type of methodology in the 
implementation of the Bologna process is that other countries feel stimulated to keep the 
implementation pace. Thus, for countries performing worse than their counterparts, the OMC uses 
a peer-review system and “naming and shaming” mechanisms to promote change, based on 
qualitative and quantitative performance indicators. This logic of “numerical information” compels 
low performers (‘laggards’) to reshape efforts, conforming to common goals due to reputational 
reasons (Veiga and Amaral 2009). Or, as Oosterwijk (2008: 62) puts it, in a more positive view, the 
Lisbon process has created a certain mindset where nation states are willing to learn and to inspire 
each other towards the challenges that European reforms pose. Thus, it can be said that the OMC 
incites to permanent movement among the signatory countries, but it is unclear how far and how it 
produces effective coordination, considering different contexts, agendas, traditions and history and 
type of welfare state and/or political-administrative system each nation has. Amaral and Neave 
(2009) believe that due to a lack of coordination emerging from different national agendas, the OMC 
does not guarantee complete convergence, at least at the lowest levels of implementation (Amaral 
and Neave 2009). Simultaneously, the “movement” in the process is also achieved through the 
constant adding of objectives to the process. Veiga and Amaral (2009) refer that these have been 
increasing in quantity and refinement, aiming “… at keeping the impression of progress, of 
successful implementation (like riding a bicycle, if you stop you fall)” (2009: 135). 
The fact that EU leaders, heads of state and HE ministers differ in their definitions of “main 
goals” and priorities, and even such factors as “domestic opportunity structure and socialisation 
effects” (Radaelli 2003: 54) explains why coordination is so difficult to achieve. Furthermore, 
according to the author, the overall level of coordination remains low because there is a certain 
degree of political inconsistency and incoherence, which becomes more visible considering that 
there is not enough involvement at all levels of action among all participants (e.g. national 
parliaments; social partners and citizens) in the process and not all of them share the same goals. 
And even at the national level, there is a multitude of different actors (e.g. HEIs and their staff; 
governments; trade unions; private entities; etc.) with diverse strategies, ideas and interests. This was 
also the conclusion achieved by the group commissioned by the European Council to carry an 
independent critical review to assess the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy. From this review, 
Kok (2004, cited in Veiga and Amaral 2009) acknowledged that “the progress of the Lisbon strategy 
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has suffered from incoherence and inconsistency, both between participants and between policies” 
(2009: 135). A more recent example of paradoxical situation or inconsistency is provided by the 
latest Bologna process Communiqué (2015) adopted in Yerevan, and where Belarus was approved 
as a member in the process, an aggregation that has been linked to recent geopolitical developments, 
despite frequent concerns regarding academic freedom in the country (Corbett 2015). 
Radaelli (2003: 12) also criticises the overemphasis on benchmarking and performance 
indicators by stating that they are not the only show in town. Similarly to Radaelli’s opinion, 
Gornitzka (2008) refers that one of the main problems with the OMC is the excessive number of 
performance indicators to translate very broad goals. This, in turn, will lead to an ambiguous 
procedure of policy design and subsequent implementation. Moreover, the author also argues that 
the objectives are much more directed at other levels of education than HE. There are thus possible 
areas of tension when developing this kind of cooperation policies. And that is why the literature 
on this new mode of governance has triggered debates about the legitimacy of the method, i.e., towards 
the extent of how policy coordination among 49 countries can be in fact achieved without hard law.  
In sum, it is difficult to explore the boundaries between cooperation and competition and 
between divergence and convergence. To what extent is it possible to have coordination among 
different levels of action? Until when does cooperation cease to give rise to competition? In fact, 
Kohler-Koch (2005) states that the OMC is a soft way of de-bordering government and that the 
European monitoring links with internal political competition. Other questions are to what extent 
convergence policies should be reinforced and in which cases should be implemented? And to what 
extent does the OMC allow national governments to pursue reforms that otherwise would not have 
been undertaken? And how it contributes to the diffusion of NPM practice by treating HE as 
something that can be traded in the global market, which is only worth because it creates economic 
growth and which see students as consumers? And what happens with those areas of knowledge, 
which are seen as “non-economic growth fields/contributors”? And how all this way of thinking 
implies on Finnish and Portuguese HE systems and institutions?  
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II  
Governing in a Governance Change Environment 
 
“Whether the old powers of the professoriate will ever be restored is much to 
be doubted. In the days when Poland was under Communist rule, there were 
dissidents who conducted night classes in their homes, running seminars on 
writers and philosophers excluded from the official canon (for example, Plato). 
No money changed hands, although there may have been other forms of 
payment” (Coetzee 2007: 35-36). 
 
 
2. The Meaningfulness of the Governance Concept 
The term governance has become a core concept in several academic fields, such as public 
administration, political science, sociology, law, economics, etc. It is a key issue when studying policy 
processes, since it defines the normative framework within which these processes take place. 
Therefore, it is usual to find a handful of definitions of the term in question according to the field 
of study. 
Etymologically, the word governance derives from the Greek verb κυβερνάω [kubernáo], which 
means to steer and it was used for the first time in a metaphorical sense by Plato to describe the act 
of governing people. It then passed on to Latin, gubernare, and then on to many other languages13 
(Suu 2007: 1). 
Roderick Rhodes (1996), a political science scholar, refers that the term governance as a popular 
concept is quite imprecise, having several meanings and not all of them being entirely useful and/or 
clear. He identifies, at least, six different uses for the word, corresponding to different forms of 
governing societies: the minimal state, corporate governance, new public management, good 
governance, social-cybernetic systems and self-organisational networks (1996: 652). Some of these 
perspectives will be explored later on throughout this chapter.  
Rhodes (1996) states that the concept of governance embraces two parallel meanings, which 
often overlap and vary according to the topic of study. In the same line, also Adrian Leftwich (1993) 
refers that the first meaning is usually connected with administrative and managerial terms, whilst 
the second connotation, which is associated with Western governments, is more political (1993: 
604). In this way, the author considers that interpretations provided by the WB and by the OECD 
fall more into the managerial field, often reduced to efficiency and accountability, as can be noted by 
                                                 
13 In Portuguese, the term “governance” is translated to “… governar, governo, governação, governança” (Suu 
2007, emphasis in document itself). It is also common to find the word steering associated with the concept of  
governance. Though there is some literature distinguishing between “steering” and “governance”, here both words 
will be used indiscriminately.  
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the following definition of governance: “(…) the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (WB 1991: i). On the 
other hand, through a political perspective, Guy Peters (2001) defines governance arrangements 
“(…) as the set of institutions which governments use to exercise collective control and influence 
over the societies for which they have been given responsibility” (2001: 1). In fact, it is this political 
meaning of the word governance that largely explains the recent popularity of the governance 
concept, i.e. “its capacity to cover a whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the 
process of governing” (Pierre and Peters 2000: 1). Governance is seen as a “change in the meaning 
of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or 
the new method by which society is governed” (Rhodes 1996: 652-653). 
A complementary perspective is provided by Leftwich (1993) who associates the concept of 
democracy to the idea of good governance. Based on the common assumption that both these 
aspects are essential conditions for development in all societies, the author mentions that “… 
democratic good governance refers generally to a political regime based on the model of a liberal-
democratic polity, which protects human and civil rights, combined with a competent, non-corrupt 
and accountable public administration”14 (1993: 605). Subsequently, in its political sense, and like 
most Western governments interpret it, ‘good governance’ builds on the traditional liberal notion 
of a clear separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers (1993: 611). From a more 
administrative point of view, and similar to the WB view, the author highlights the characteristics 
of good governance as “… an efficient, open, accountable and audited public service which has the 
bureaucratic competence to help design and implement appropriate policies (…)” (1993: 611). 
Following these views, the work of Jane V. Denhardt and Robert Denhardt (2000; 2007) points 
in the direction of a New Public Service (NPS) movement (or even Public Value Management, Stoker 
2006) which calls for the reaffirmation of democratic values, citizenship and service in the public 
interest as the normative foundations for the field of public administration (2007: 11). According to 
Denhardt and Denhardt, and similarly to Leftwich (1993), democratic citizenship demands that 
citizens are more actively engaged in governance. Individuals should thus look beyond self-interest 
to the larger public interest, adopting a broader and longer-term perspective that requires knowledge 
of public affairs, a sense of belonging, and a concern for the whole (2007: 30). Briefly, the NPS 
represents a mode of governance which (aims at) places citizens at the centre and it is based in some 
distinctive guidelines and/or lessons which are mutually reinforcing. The most compelling are: i) 
                                                 
14 Leftwich (1993) develops an interesting discussion in his paper. He opposes to the idea, developed in the 1960s, 
that “… democracy was a concomitant of  ‘modernity’ and hence an outcome of  socioeconomic development, not 
a condition of  it” (1993: 612). An interesting discussion about the concept of  democracy beyond the idea of  a 
political regime (as a governance model), but rather as a general way of  society is provided by Chauí (1999; 2000). 
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serve, rather than steer; ii) the public interest is the aim, not the by-product; iii) think strategically, 
act democratically; iv) serve citizens, not customers; v) accountability is not simple; vi) value people 
not just only productivity, and vii) value citizenship and public service above entrepreneurship 
(Denhardt and Denhardt 2000: 553-557). 
One should remember that these definitions, as well as others related with the term governance, 
need to be interpreted bearing in mind cultural differences, once these concepts mean different 
things to different cultures and depend on specific national circumstances and policies. 
Taking Portugal and Finland as examples, it seems that the whole NPS package or even the 
good democratic governance model explained by Leftwich (1993) does not apply, at least entirely, 
to the Portuguese case. Furthermore, the scope of the concept of democratic good governance is 
wide and, as the author refers, it has three main components, or levels. Ranging from the most to 
the least inclusive, these are: systemic, political and administrative. From the systemic point of view, 
the concept of governance is wider than the concept of government. While the concept of 
government refers to the formal institutional structure and location of authoritative decision-making 
in the states, governance refers to a looser and wider distribution of both internal and external 
political and economic power (Leftwich 1993: 611). In this sense, and as the author puts it, by 
intersecting political and economic relationships and structures of power, governance denotes a 
system of political and socioeconomic relations. From the political level, the concept of good 
governance suggests or “(…) implies a state enjoying both legitimacy and authority, derived from a 
democratic mandate (…)” (1993: 611). Finally, at the administrative level, good governance remits 
us for an open, accountable and audited public service, which works efficiently when supported by 
the virtues of bureaucracy (ibid). 
Following Leftwich (1993), James Rosenau (2000) draws our attention to the importance and 
correlation of these various levels of action when defining the concept: “… it seems a mistake to 
adhere to a narrow definition [of governance] in which only formal institutions at the national and 
international levels are considered relevant”. Therefore, “the concept of governance should not be 
restricted to the national and international systems but should be used in relation to regional, 
provincial and local governments as well as to others social systems such as education (…)” (2000: 
121-122). 
In fact, the object of study demands us to take into account the governance concept beyond 
the local level, given the increasing influence of the European level in the definition of educational 
policies in each nation-state. Thus, it is added to the these perspectives the definition provided by 
the EC of “European governance”, which defines it as “(…) the rules, processes and behaviour that 
affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, particularly in what openness, 
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participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence is concerned. These are considered the 
‘principles of good governance’, which are reinforced by those of subsidiarity and proportionality 
(cf. previous chapter) and apply to all levels of government – global, European, national, regional 
and local” (EC 2001: 10). Bearing this in mind, throughout this study the interconnectedness of 
these components will be visible, conferring great peculiarity and complexity to the process of 
governance within the HE field.  
The term governance is frequently associated with other complementary concepts. It is usual 
to find in the literature clarifications on the distinction between governance and government. 
Despite the term government being frequently used more abstractly and sometimes even as a 
synonym of governance, the former differs from the later in the sense that government is the 
instrument through which governance is exercised. As Leftwich (1993: 611) puts it, “(…) 
government conventionally refers to the formal institutional structure and location of authoritative 
decision making in the modern state”, being therefore a much more restricted concept than that of 
governance. Another helpful insight in this distinction is provided by António Magalhães and Rui 
Santiago (2011), who clarify that the meaning of governance is associated with policy instruments, 
their development, management and assessment. Magalhães and Santiago (2011) also suggest that 
by using these instruments to deal with political issues, governance is assuming the form of 
governing, i.e. traditional ways of governing society, politics and economy have changed. 
Consequently, the development of this separation had important impacts on policy making.  
Rhodes (1996) uses Sammy Finer (1970) definition on government, which states that 
government is: “‘the activity or process of governing’ or ‘governance’; ‘a condition of ordered rule’; 
‘those people charged with the duty of governing or governors’ and the ‘manner, method or system 
by which a particular society is governed’” (Sammy Finer in Rhodes 1996: 652). Although these set 
of ideas seem to provide a distinction between governance and government, Rhodes (1996) also 
points to the fact that governance refers to a “… new process of governing; or a changed condition 
of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed” (1996: 653), as Magalhães and 
Santiago (2011) have also highlighted. And this idea, the emergence of a new method or process 
through which society is governed, a complex set of institutions and actors that go beyond 
government (Stoker 1998), is essential for this analysis in order to understand how traditional ways 
of governing the public sector, namely HE systems have been changing.  
At this stage, it should be mentioned that Guy Peters and Rod Rhodes share different positions 
on the concept of governance and about the role governments have in steering societies. While 
Rhodes (1997) supports the idea that governments lost the power and capacity to steer increasing 
complex societies, and there has been a movement of power towards multi-level and network modes 
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of governance, Guy Peters (2005: 3) acknowledges that although there have been shifts in the 
“conventional” way of governing, there are some components of governance for which government 
is even more essential, than in the past. A common point in the literature is that as societies grow in 
complexity – due to the growing fragmentation of political power, the preoccupation with efficiency 
as the major criteria for public action and concerns regarding financial constraints, etc. (Salamon 
2002: 37) – governments have been “reinvented” and elaborated on tools to cope with a multiplicity 
of scenarios. Thus, new governance approaches strive at governing problems of complex societies, 
in which attention has shifted “from hierarchic agencies to organisational networks” (Salamon 2002: 
11)15. This shift makes necessary to study the (relative) and sometimes conflicting influence of NPM 
in order to understand recent national HE reforms (Bleiklie and Michelsen 2012: 116).  
In sum, the process of governance combines four classic activities. According to Peters (2005: 
3-5), these four activities in governance are:  
i) Articulating a common set of priorities for society, as this set of priorities (goals) represents 
the principal place for government in governance; 
ii) Coherence, as the goals defined for good governance need to be consistent and coordinated. 
It is acknowledged that, in some nation-states, governments govern in an incoherent and 
uncoordinated way (as the case of Portugal), but this is an inefficient and excessively costly 
process, as referred by the author. 
iii) Steering: once a set of goals is established there is the need to find ways of achieving those 
goals and steering the society to attain those goals. 
iv) Accountability: the final requirement in the governance process is to make those who 
govern accountable for their steering. Accountability has been gaining importance in the 
governance and management agendas in public institutions. Nevertheless, in some cases 
these same pressures for increasing accountability have been exacerbated to a point where 
democracy and performance assessment exercises in HEIs have been perverted. 
                                                 
15 The concept of new governance tends to overlap and/or to be confused with the term 
metagovernance, as this last one is an umbrella concept that describes the role of the state and its 
characteristic policy instruments in the new governance (Bevir 2009: 1). This is so because 
metagovernance relates with the complexity of the state’s role and actions in securing coordination 
in the new governance, i.e. the mission the state has in coordinating actors and organisations 
that perform governance (ibid). Bevir (2009) also refers that the main debates about new 
governance mirror those about multilevel governance and metagovernance, namely the doubts 
whether the state is being hollowed out, whether the new patterns of governance are more 
efficient than the old ones, and what implications these new models of governance pose for 
democracy. 
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These dimensions translate the nature of state-society relationships in the pursuit of collective 
interests and allow us to examine governing in a variety of settings (Peters 2005: 6). Additionally, 
they will guide the researcher through the data analysis and the discussion of findings parts.  
Understanding the governance context under which relationships between HEIs and 
governments occur (and how they happen) allows depicting institutional responses to this 
interaction. Furthermore, this analysis will account for conflict/mismatch relations regarding 
objectives, policies and means to achieve desired outcomes in both Portuguese and Finnish HE 
systems.  
In the HE arena, governance encompasses a complex coordination of legislative frameworks, 
which needs to be drafted according to the system and its institutions’ characteristics. Additionally, 
Cloete, Maassen and Muller (2005) explain that governance in HE relates to the way in which the 
management functions and decision-making structures in the sector are arranged (2005: 208), 
meaning this that governance at system level can be seen as “(…) a relational concept that includes 
leadership, management and administration, and, somewhat more implicitly, a sense of purpose and 
direction (…). In other words, governance is about both structures and behaviour” (Goedegebuure, 
Hayden and Meek 2008: 146). Magalhães and Santiago (2012: 227) add that governance is associated 
with political instrumentality, its elaboration and assessment.  
Maassen (2003: 32) defines institutional governance as “(…) the frameworks in which 
universities and colleges manage themselves and about the processes and structures used to achieve 
the intended outcomes (how HE institutions operate)”. A complementary element of the 
governance process is legitimacy: “‘Who is in charge, and what are the sources of legitimacy for 
executive decision-making by different actors?’” (Eurydice 2008: 12). 
There is, indeed, an extensive literature on governance, covering several areas and connecting 
different academic fields, as well as different perspectives, according to its authors. From what has 
been exposed, one should understand how this key concept evolved, allowing us to better 
understand how change happens in HE. Among other factors, this change is inseparable from the 
idea that governance is assuming the form of governing (Magalhães and Santiago 2009). Broadly 
speaking, it can be said that governance in HE refers to the way HEIs operate, the way they are 
formally organised and managed at various operational levels, so that actions and policies are 
coherently organised. It requires and uses different instruments and modes of interaction between 
the actors and environments involved, namely the State and society and, within society, the different 
groups, actors and stakeholders composing it.  
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When defining and referring to the concept of governance, and as can be read throughout its 
several interpretations, the term management16 is frequently used in the definitions, and sometimes, 
both concepts are used indiscriminately. Maassen (2003: 32) clarifies this distinction, stating that: 
“(…) management is about outcomes achievement and the monitoring of institutional effectiveness 
and efficiency in the distribution of resources (…)”. Within HE institutional dynamics, management 
“(…) must transact in an increasingly complex environment that contains not only government and 
business agents, but also an escalating range of ‘stakeholders’” (Muller, Maassen and Cloete 2006: 
297).  
AntónioM Magalhães and Santiago (2012) draw our attention to the intersection between 
governance and management and institutional autonomy, namely to the challenges in steering 
different HE systems. This process cannot be isolated from national political contexts, as HEIs, 
which although being relatively autonomous institutions, they depend on national and international 
powers and decision-making dynamics to successfully implement reforms.  
The following section intends to explore the journey of the role of the state in the public sector, 
paying especial attention to the significance of the “Welfare State” (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002) 
and how it has gradually been challenged to the adoption of a new ideology, the “New Public 
Management” (Rhodes 1996; Pollitt 2003). By doing this, it is possible to identify the major lines 
guiding governance and policy-making in both Portuguese and Finnish HE systems, as well as to 
understand their dynamics. 
 
2.1 The Traditional Role of the State in the Public Sector 
Defining chronological periods in the evolution of public management systems can be a very 
delicate task. According to Dunleavy et al. (2006: 468), new developments emerge and accumulate 
while older trends still exist and are apparently flourishing17. This brings us to the sedimentation 
concept (cf. pages 115, 124, 136). Thus, although considered to be into force throughout the second 
half of the 20th century, from 1945 to 1980 (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002: 8), it is believed that 
the welfare state emerged as a direct consequence of the 1929 Great Depression crisis and expanded 
                                                 
16 The words “administration” and “management” are only one word in Finnish language: hallinto, “... which refers 
to both administrative practices and the management of  universities” (Välimaa 2011).  
17 In their study about the historical development of  public administration and management in the UK, Osborne 
and McLaughlin (2002) identify four different stages of  development of  public services’ nature, starting from the 
late 19th century onwards (2002: 7). These models of  organisation and state intervention are chronologically 
presented by the authors as: the Minimal State, the Unequal Partnership, the Welfare state and the Plural state. Despite slight 
differences, and considering different regions’ specificities, these models can be compared to Olsen’s (1988) models 
of  governance and even to some of  Rhodes’ (1996) six forms of  governing (which are also descriptive of  the UK 
context).  
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with the end of the totalitarian regimes in Western Europe and with the hegemony of social-
democratic governments, which defended a series of social rights essential for the well-being of 
every citizen. 
The Portuguese sociologist Boaventura Sousa Santos (1991: 33) argues that the welfare state 
was the dominant political form of the state in central countries in the phase of “organised 
capitalism” period, and as such is part of the fordist mode of regulation. This stage is characterised 
by four main elements:  
“First, a social pact between capital and labor under the aegis of the state, a pact whose ultimate 
goal is to make capitalism and democracy compatible; second, a sustained, even tense, relation 
between accumulation and legitimation, third a high level of expenses in social consumption 
(welfare services); fourth an administrative structure that has internalized the social rights as rights 
(not as state benevolence)” (Santos 1991: 33). 
 
Santos (1991) also draws attention to the fact that although welfare policies have predominantly an 
economic and market character, they go far beyond the economic sphere once they also would 
strength the community principle and the (citizen-citizen) horizontal relationships between citizens. 
Santos (2000) refers that the distributive character of social policies lays on a solidarity notion that 
resembles the horizontal political obligation, from citizen-to-citizen, which he considers to be the 
essence of the community principle (2000: 148). Nevertheless, when worldwide financial conditions 
started to be unfavourable, these relations would eventually switch to a state-citizen vertical 
relationship, where citizens would be excessively dependent on the state:  
“In fact, with the Welfare state, the horizontal political obligation was transformed in a double 
vertical obligation between taxpayers and the State, and between the beneficiaries of social policies 
and the State. In this way, the exercise of autonomy that the community principle presupposed, 
shift from an exercise of dependency towards the State” (2000: 148). 
 
Nevertheless, although today many European countries face evident difficulties to maintain a social 
welfare state, this political social organisation was in force throughout the second half of the 20th 
century. According to Osborne and McLaughlin (2002: 8), in the UK (the earliest example of 
industrial capitalism) this third stage of public management development lasted until the 1980s.  
According to the Danish sociologist Esping-Andersen (1990), welfare states are represented by 
three basic models, which correspond to variations in the historical development of different 
Western countries. These are: the Institutional welfare state (also called the Nordic/Scandinavian 
model or social-democratic model), the Continental European welfare state (typical of conservative 
regimes such as Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Portugal) and the Liberal welfare state 
(Australia, Canada and the US). During this study, particular attention will be paid to the Institutional 
and Continental European models, once these refer to the countries belonging to the object of 
study. Nevertheless, there are aspects and circumstances that are transversal to the three models and 
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which need to be taken into account in order to understand the evolution of governance models in 
the public sector.  
Although the use of the term welfare is associated, at least in Continental Europe, with the 
comprehensive measures of social insurance adopted in 1948 by Great Britain on the basis of the 
report on Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942) by Sir William (later Lord) Beveridge, it is 
commonly argued that the Welfare model has been applied more intensively in the Nordic countries, 
inspired by the Swedish economist and sociologist Karl Gunnar Myrdal, from the Stockholm School 
and later on a Nobel Prize laureate (Esping-Andersen 1990). Myrdal argued that modern social 
policies were not only related to income distribution, but they also performed an essential role 
concerning the economic development itself, having as primary goal the gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth. As such, social policies should be seen as investments instead of costs as they are a 
precondition for economic efficiency (Myrdal and Myrdal 1936 in Esping-Andersen 1990: 12). This 
peculiar way to look at societies’ economic organisation has its roots in the Keynesian thought, i.e. 
the existence of a mixed economy of macroeconomic planning: private, and simultaneously with 
active policy responses by the government and the public sector (ibid 1990: 162). The dominant 
ideology was based on the assumption that public expenditure should be interpreted as a collective 
investment, through constant collaborations and partnerships between the state, trade unions and 
private companies. As the community principle entails (Santos 2000), the state should be the main 
guarantor of all needs of its citizens, promoting their economic and social well-being ‘from the cradle 
to the crave’ (Beveridge 1942; Osborne and McLaughlin 2002: 8). Thus, under the welfare principles, 
any individual should be granted a set of goods and services directly provided by the state, or 
indirectly, through its regulatory powers and/or delegation, such as: education, health care, housing, 
unemployment assistance, minimum income guarantee which was mainly provided by social 
insurance schemes), etc. In the UK, “(…) this was certainly the high point of the hegemony of 
public administration upon the provision of public services” (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002: 8). 
However, from the late 20th century onwards, the welfare state started to be heavily criticised for 
being inefficiently and ineffectively managed and by only focusing upon the provision of a minimum 
standard of services to its citizens (2002: 8). 
Clarke and Newman (1997) explain that the notion of public service  – as a set of values, a code 
of behaviours and forms of practice – became institutionalised through the settlement between two 
modes of coordination, which constitute the organisational construction of the (British) welfare 
state: bureaucratic administration and professionalism (1997: 4). Professionalism, one of the main 
hallmarks of the welfare state, means that public services needed the intervention of different 
knowledge experts to deal with the “indeterminacy of the social world” (1997: 6). These experts 
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were professionals who organised themselves within traditional professions and were subjected to 
the state dependency. They had the mission to promote public good and social development 
through their professional expertise18. This expertise was essential to define the scope and nature of 
public service provision. As Ackroyd (1995) states, public service professionals were gradually 
allowed to control the definition and mode of delivery themselves and to have great manoeuvre in 
the control of day-to-day decision-making processes, and even to gain a lot of day-to-day control 
from local politicians (1995: 27). According to the author, this is called the producers’ cooperative 
mode of delivery, once there were the services’ producers who defined and controlled what public 
services were given. In Ackroyd’s view, this “was the foundation for the success of the early years 
of the Welfare State” (1995: 27). Thus, professionalism developed simultaneously as an occupational 
strategy – by defining entry and negotiating rewards according to expertise and as an organisational 
strategy – and by setting the archetypes of power around which organisations are coordinated 
(Clarke and Newman 1997: 7). For Mintzberg (1983), the central role of professionals represents 
the most structuring element in the functioning of some institutions, designated as professional 
bureaucracies. In fact, during this period, the role of professionals has been pivotal and highly 
motivated groups emerged, characterised by their advanced training as public services’ experts 
(Carvalho 2009). 
The second coordination element architecting welfare models, bureaucratic administration, is 
based on the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy, as well as on the principles constituting good 
governance and acceptable public administration (Weber 2007). The old model of public 
administration, also called “The Old-Time Religion” (Peters 2001: 4), is usually characterised as 
being a hierarchical and rule-bounded system, composed of permanent and stable civil servants with 
full-time and “lifetime commitment” paid employment. Indeed, joining a public organisation was 
very often compared to joining a Japanese corporation (Peters 2001: 9). However, this was one of 
the most criticised aspects of this model, under the argument that permanence tends to difficult 
coordination policies, creating the fear that “a future dinosaur was being created” (Kaufman 1956: 
10).  
Additionally to these characteristics, and based on the concept of legal-rational authority, the 
Weberian model of public administration is characterised by an apolitical and institutionalised civil 
service (typically found in Anglo-Saxon countries), with servants committed to their services and 
duties, governed under internal regulation and with equality of outcomes, meaning this the existence 
of equal payment and conditions of employment for similarly qualified employees across the civil 
                                                 
18 Clarke and Newman (1997: 7) refer that the way professionals were recruited was influenced by the Fabian 
ideology “(…) in which knowledge and expertise are positively valued as the means for promoting rational social 
development through the machinery of  the state”.  
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service (Peters 2001: 12). By an “apolitical civil service” it is meant that civil servants should not 
have known political allegiances of their own, being able to serve any government. In this way, 
within this apolitical framework, qualifications and competences weight more than any political 
issues (Peters 2001).  
In Weber’s view, bureaucracy was the most efficient, rational and inevitable response of 
modern state institutions towards the problems created by the development of the capitalist system. 
Bureaucracy was thus a consequence of this development, representing simultaneously its efficient 
organisational support (Weber 2007). In the UK, Rhodes (1996) states that “Bureaucracy remains 
the prime example of hierarchy or co-ordination by administrative order and (…), it is still the major 
way of delivering services in British government (…)” (1996: 653). In the same line, Leftwich (1993) 
suggested that the Welfare State was a distinctive combination of democracy, welfare and capitalism. 
According to Clarke and Newman (1997), bureaucracy existed in an administrative system, based 
on the execution of continuous and specialised activities and tasks carried out by formally qualified 
and certified professionals able to perform specific public functions.  
The exercise of these principles leads to the rise of an impersonal and rational organisational 
model, which ensures that, faced with similar situations, the outcomes will be the same (Ackroyd, 
Hughes and Soothill 1989; Ackroyd 1995). In this way, equality on the way individuals were treated 
was guaranteed. The great attractiveness of bureaucracy for the welfare state laid precisely in the 
promise of being socially, politically and personally neutral (Clarke and Newman 1997: 5). 
Together with representativeness and executive leadership, neutral competence represented 
one of the three core values of administrative institutions. In his article about the doctrines of public 
administration, Kaufman (1956) refers that the quest for neutral competence in governmental 
officials was based on their “(…) ability to do the work of government expertly, and to do it 
accordingly to explicit, objective standards rather than to personal or party or other obligations and 
loyalties. The slogan of the neutral competence school became thus ‘Take administration out of 
politics’” (1956: 1060). Indeed, it is believed that it was this clear distinction between policy and 
administration, highly supported by Woodrow Wilson (1887) that invested public administration 
with the possibility to be studied as an autonomous field of study (Carvalho 2009). Wilson (1887) 
defended that administration should only refer to the coordination and implementation of political 
programmes. While political issues should be approached only by politicians, administrative matters 
would be carried out by professionals who were part of the institution, and should not be linked to 
political decisions or politicians. Through this, the welfare state was based on an overall shared 
confidence resulting from the pursuit of a common objective for all: the improvement of social 
wellbeing. In this way, “while administrators could be trusted because their purpose was merely to 
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implement rules, professionals could be trusted because their neutrality was guaranteed by an ethos 
of service” (Clark and Newman 1997: 7). 
These characteristics, as referred by the aforementioned authors, combine differently and with 
different balances of power in specific institutional arrangements.  Moreover, they evolved over 
time and they represent responses to problems that existed in the public service by that period 
(Peters 2001). This does not exclude the possibility of these “paths” having been adopted latter on, 
in different situations or at different stages, according to each nation’s context and type of 
government. For instance, according to Esping-Andersen (1990), whereas in the welfare model 
dominant in conservative regimes “(…) the state took on a central role both in accepting the 
legitimacy of social rights and in retaining differences associated with class and status” and therefore 
the effect on distribution was minimal, the aim of Nordic countries was “… to promote equality of 
the highest standards through universal provision and decommodification of social rights19”.  
As a matter of fact, one of the images of the Finnish welfare model in Europe, in addition to 
such characteristics as democracy and parliamentarianism, remains a mixture of highly taxed public 
services and social benefits available for the entire population (Salminen 2008: 1243). Due to its 
history (Finland conquered its independency from Russia in 1917), the administrative system and 
the foundations for a Finnish civil service were created at the end of the 19th century and by that 
time the majority of civil servants in the government were lawyers (2008: 1245). It is frequently 
argued that the mixture of traditional core values, socialist principles and Christian charity with 
principles of justice and equality were essential for the development of the Finnish welfare state. 
Indeed, such ideals as compassion, and trust in politicians, in public organisations, and in local 
authorities are considered to be traditional Nordic values (Salminen 2008: 1253). In the same line 
of thought, Esping-Andersen (2002) states that in Scandinavia, the welfare states favoured social 
democracy, universalism, egalitarianism and comprehensive social citizenship (2002: 1). 
Although in a peripheral position, Portugal could not escape to the European context which 
welcomed the Welfare model (the end of totalitarian governments and consequently the hegemony 
of the social democratic ones). Nevertheless, its nuances deserve further reflection, seeing that it is 
the result of three important stages of development and consolidation. According to Pereirinha and 
Carolo (2006), the first moment covers the Estado Novo period (1926-1974). During this period, the 
                                                 
19 By decommodification the author means that “citizens are freely, and without potential loss of  job, income, or general 
welfare, opt out of  work when they themselves consider it necessary” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 23). These 
characteristics refer to academics, civil servants and higher-echelon white-collar employees. Interesting enough is 
the fact that, recognising the difficulty in maintaining a universal decommodifying welfare system, Esping-Andersen 
(1990) states that this is best accomplished “with most people working” and “with the fewest possible” existing on 
social transfers. Nordic countries tend to be the most decommodified countries, whereas Anglo-Saxon societies 
tend to be the less decommodified. 
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construction of the Portuguese welfare state occurred in a political and social context of corporatism 
and under demographic and economic changes. This is the organised capitalism period (Santos 1989; 
1991), a time characterised by the achievement of social and economic rights and by the definition 
of the state’s political form, which would be thus translated into the welfare state (ibid). It is a period 
marked by the creation of Previdência Social (social insurance) in 1935 and its subsequent reforms and 
adjustments that have taken place during the Estado Novo period. These reforms encompassed the 
coverage of classic social risks (income replacement in case of retirement and disability) in a social 
insurance and intra-professional solidarity logic, based on a corporative nature, ensuring the social 
rights associated with the labour world (Pereirinha and Carolo 2006). Thus, as Santos (1989) 
confirms, the “dominant democratic value” in the organised capitalism period was equality.  
The second stage occurred after the 25th April Revolution of 197420, when the restoration of 
the democratic regime resulted in the consolidation of citizenship rights, and lately with the universal 
character of some of them, as it opened new, immense opportunities for social, political and cultural 
experimentation in all fields of social practice (Santos 1991: 15). This culminated in a huge increase 
of public social spending, obliging to the reinforcement of fiscal solidarity in order to achieve such 
“social modernisation”. During this period, however, the establishment of social rights was not 
perfectly achieved. This would be consolidated in the third moment of the Portuguese welfare state 
development after Portugal joined the EU in 1986 (the European Economic Community – EEC – 
by then). Undoubtedly this was the kick off to the Europeanisation process of the Portuguese state, 
and it consisted in the change of the social policy context, from the national to the supranational 
level (Pereirinha and Carolo 2006: 1-2). Nevertheless, despite these achievements, the sociologist 
Santos believes that the Portuguese state is not a welfare state in the technical sense, though in some 
aspects it approximates this political form. What happens is that these “(…) deficits in state welfare 
are partially compensated for by the social welfare that can be produced in a society which is 
relatively rich in relation of community, inter-knowledge, and mutual help” (Santos 1991: 33), a 
phenomenon which he designates as welfare society. Thus, considering the four main attributes of 
welfare states mentioned above, Portugal had a quasi- or lumped-welfare state in a strong welfare 
society21. By welfare society, the author means “… the networks of relationships of inter-knowledge, 
mutual recognition, and mutual help based on kinship and community ties, through which small 
social groups exchange good and services on a nonmarket basis and with a logic of reciprocity (…)” 
(Santos 1991: 37). 
                                                 
20 The importance of  this event for the Portuguese society and therefore for the Portuguese HE system will be 
referred on chapter IV. 
21 Santos also explains that due to the strength of  the small holding agriculture and the prevalence of  rural areas, 
the forms of  the welfare society are dominated by patterns of  sociability, by class habituses, cognitive maps and 
symbolic universe that are usually attributes of  rural life (ibid: 37).   
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In general, welfare states are described as regulatory and control regimes, based on a 
‘professional bureaucracy’ (Mintzberg 1983; 2000), and on the Keynesian school of interventionist 
public economic policy, where the state has a central role in correcting market failures.22 This 
resembles much the Van Vught rational planning and state control model, which demanded a 
governmental strategy of detailed planning. According to Amaral and Magalhães (2001), this model 
“(…) was based on confidence in the capabilities of governmental actors and agencies to acquire 
comprehensive and true knowledge of problems, and to examine all alternatives for action and their 
consequences, before taking the best decisions” (2001: 10).  
Although there is common agreement concerning the success of this governance model, the 
advancement of the Welfare State did not occur without strong criticism. Interesting enough (and 
as it would be expected when one believes that history is cyclical), critics mainly come from neo-
liberal strains and refer to the principles extolled in the past, namely the excessive democracy and 
excessive control over public enterprises. As Ackroyd (1995) explains referring to the British system, 
the welfare model success is the real source of many contemporary problems (1995: 19).  
The next section presents the scenario that led to the instability of the comprehensive 
traditional model. 
 
2.2 The Rise of a New Ideology  
In addition to the critics to the Welfare state, as well as to its bureaucratic organisation, and to 
the increasing internationalisation of the HE sector, the scientific theoretical context that supports 
the restructuring of public sector governance models, both at the system and organisational levels, 
lays on a set of economic theories derived from economic institutionalism, as the public choice 
theory, the principal-agent theory and the cost transaction theory. Very briefly, these theories share 
the following principle: less state and more market. 
“The Old-Time Religion” system was, on the whole, extremely successful, persisting for several 
decades (Peters 2001). However, as the Portuguese poet Camões wrote long time ago (16th century), 
“times change, desires change”23. By the late 20th century, the perceived needs of citizens had moved 
on, away from a collective benefit sense towards a more individual level, i.e. consumers became 
increasingly exigent, demanding services tailored for each person instead of the “general package” 
for everyone (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002: 8). 
                                                 
22 Market failure refers to a situation where the forces of  demand and supply do not, for some reason, allocate 
resources efficiently. This happens “… when markets operating without government intervention, fail to deliver 
an efficient or optimal allocation of  resources (Riley 2006, authors’ emphasis). Therefore – economic and social 
welfare may not be maximised – leading to a loss of  allocative and productive efficiency (i.e. welfare losses for 
society)” (Riley 2006). 
23 English translation by Richard Zenith (2009). 
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 The rethinking of governance in the majority of industrialised democracies cannot be 
explained through a linear answer, rather through an intersection of events, which, as referred by 
Carvalho (2009: 33), can be classified as both cause and consequence. Attempts to move the 
traditional administration away from its roots have been based on a perceived “crisis of the welfare 
state”, carrying with it issues about the proper role of the state (Ackroyd 1995; Clarke and Newman 
1997). Thus, demands for reform are usually connected with intricate economic and political 
changes (Clarke and Newman 1997; Neave 1998; Peters 2001; Pollitt 2003). 
Starting by setting the social, economic and political contexts for the decline of the welfare 
state, it is widely accepted that in most developed countries these attempts arose at a time when 
public spending was growing faster than economic growth. This was triggered by the oil crisis of 
October 1973, when the extraordinary increase in the oil price led inevitably to an economic 
recession and strict restrictions on public spending, which most countries experienced during the 
1970s and 1980s. Combined with this crisis, and while service users became progressively 
demanding with respect to the design, delivery and array of public services’ choices (Osborne and 
McLaughlin 2002; Pollitt 2003), governments became unable to count with fiscal dividends to fund 
increasing costs, mainly due to the rising unemployment among young people and negative 
demographic changes, with its consequences on budgetary balances and political and economic 
decisions (Eurydice 2000: 314).  
Demographic changes, namely population’s aging in almost all industrialised democracies is 
also pointed as an explanatory factor for changes in governance modes, providing that, a smaller 
number of working-age people would have to share the costs of social expenditure, such as 
pensions, medical care, etc. (Peters 2001: 14). The confluence of these events is usually referred to 
as the State’s fiscal crisis (O’Conner 1973), based on the idea that the state consumes excessive 
resources and it is involved in several activities for which it is possible to envisage less expensive 
alternative forms of service delivery (Carvalho 2009). It is argued that services provided by the state 
are more expensive and less efficient than if they were provided by the private sector (Pollitt 2003). 
However, with respect to the assumption that the public sector is less efficient than the private 
sector, Pollitt (2003) draws our attention to the difficulty in proving scientifically such inefficiency. 
One would have to find similar functions provided by both sectors, public and private, to compare 
efficiency gains and this does not happen so easily. Moreover, the image of governmental 
inefficiency varies significantly from countries like the US and UK where it was more widely 
accepted, to Nordic countries and continental Europe (Pollitt 2003: 8). By being thought as an 
‘administrative vehicle’, the organisational form for the delivery of public services, was mainly 
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controlled by qualified experts and administrators who see themselves as the ‘custodians’ of professional 
standards (Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd 2003: 512).  
Over time, and from all political angles, there were requests for changing the way governments 
steer public services and the restructuration of the welfare state seems to be inevitable. It was claimed 
that governments have become “(…) increasingly divorced from the people it serves and its dominated 
by the affluent, the educated, and the powerful” (Peters 2001: 15). These arguments led to a state 
legitimacy crisis, especially evident during the 1980s, under the idea that governments were not capable 
of doing anything right so they should do as little as possible. As Peters and Pierre (1998) explain, this 
loss of legitimacy lays, on the one hand, on the assumption that state actors are excessively clumsy, 
bureaucratic, and path dependent24 and, on the other hand, due to the control of information and 
implementation structures by private actors, as the private sector is considered to be more effective 
(1998: 225). Indeed, it is quite interesting to understand how political legitimacy influences the state of 
governance. As Bovens, Hart and Peters (2001) declare, some of the perceived crises of governance in 
Western democracies are not crises in performance, but crises of judgment, especially noticeable after 
the moment the media became increasingly critical and the public opinion more demanding or more 
watchful (2001: 10). Thus, it seems relevant to understand whether the dissatisfactions with government 
performance, in our case with respect to HE policies, reflect a decrease in trust or a change in political 
styles and governance approaches. 
This scenario paved the way for a wave of privatisations in developed countries, “sponsored” 
through a more political right vision. Such political movement against taxation, public spending and 
regulation imposed on private business found particular affection in the UK, where it was highly 
supported by Margaret Thatcher. Thatcherism was a New Right ideology style (therefore committed to 
the neoliberalism credo), strongly influenced by the work of Friedrich Hayek, and labelled as a socially 
conservative movement. The welfare state crisis was thus shaped and constructed through the 
ideological reference terms established by the New Right (Clarke and Newman 1997). The authors 
explain that by that time, there was the generalised idea that the welfare state has produced a 
generation of dependents – the scroungers (1997: 15) – who, instead of working, relied solely upon 
the state for support.  
According to several authors (Clarke and Newman 1997; Peters 2001; Pollitt 2003), the 
criticism of traditional bureaucracy is that it does not provide sufficient incentive for individuals to 
perform their jobs as efficiently as they should. This situation paved the ground for Thatcher’s 
political desire of shrinking the size and power of the public sector. Thatcherism strongly criticised 
                                                 
24 According to Peters and Pierre (1998), “path-dependency refers to the range of  policy choice available for 
administrative reformers; reform strategies are embedded in systems of  norms and administrative practices and 
therefore reform strategies are shaped more by what already exists than by the desired model of  public 
administration” (1998: 225). Chapter IV approaches deeper this process. 
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the professional cadres who had provided public services for a long time and were now inefficient 
and ineffective, being more concerned with their own needs than those of their service users 
(Osborne and McLaughlin 2002: 8). Furthermore, “Instead of neutrality, both the formal and 
informal rules of bureaucracies and the practices of professionalism were revealed as contributing 
to the production and reproduction of power and inequality” (1997: 11). In this way, under 
Thatcher’s political and economic philosophy of reduced state intervention and the existence of free 
markets and more entrepreneurialism, laws which previously granted some privileges to unions were 
revoked by the government.  
It is within this ideological context that professional bureaucratic organisations start to loose 
their legitimacy. For this, it much contributed the triangle of notions in which the welfare state 
rested: Family, Nation and Work (Clarke and Newman 1997: 3).  
In addition to the environment of disbelief and distrust concerning welfare state actions and 
professionals, it could be observed “… the decline of stable organizations as the focus of 
government interventions as well as for the source of inputs into governing” (Peters 2001: 16). 
Peters explains that during the post war period, corporatism was one of the most effective means of 
addressing economic policy issues. However, as the unions represented by corporations started to 
loose power, they became less reliable in the 1970s and 1980s when they were no longer able to 
protect the professionals represented by them (Peters 2001: 16). Thus, faced with their loss of 
influence and workforce, and subsequently with difficulty in achieving consensual negotiations with 
the corporations’ bargaining partners, the work and governing process of the unions became more 
challenging. 
The rethinking and restructuring of the welfare state and its bureaucratic administrative support 
depended upon developments in knowledge and research from the 1930s (Olssen and Peters 2005: 
316; Hood 1991). These included an increasing emphasis attributed to a set of economic theories 
integrated into the new economic institutionalism (the economic theory by Milton Friedman; the 
public choice theory developed by James Buchanan in 1996, and principal agent and cost-transaction 
theories explained by Oliver Williamson works) (Ferlie 1992: 82; Olssen and Peters 2005: 320). For 
the proponents of a more liberal economic regime, state intervention in society would be the main 
obstacle to economic growth and achievement of social efficiency. It was argued that it should not 
be the state to enforce certain behaviours; these should be rather induced by individual free choice 
provided by markets. The motto of neoliberalism was thus “less state and more market”. Combined 
with this, the Keynesian model of economy regulation was pointed as one of the main responsible 
factors for the crisis that welfare states faced by that time. Inspired by a laissez-faire type of 
economy, Friedman (from the Chicago School) defended that inflation resulted from the increasing 
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money supply provided by central banks. He blamed high taxes and excessive regulation of 
economic activities as the main culprits for the rising inflation. Thus, a gradual decrease of state’s 
interference concerning prices fixation and approval, combined with reduced taxes and privatisation 
of state companies, were the essential solutions presented by neoliberals to bring to an end the 
economic crisis (Pollitt 2003). In sum, and as Leftwich (1993) summarised it: 
“Emphasis on 'the market', deregulation, privatisation, supply-side economics and encouragement 
of individualism and the 'enterprise' culture were all part of the official Western theoretical and 
ideological profile of the 1980s. This was reflected too in both the language and forms of economic 
conditionality associated with the adjustment programmes world-wide” (1993: 605). 
 
Leftwich (1993) explains that more than an economic theory, neoliberalism embraces political 
dimensions, which involve both normative and functionalist theories of politics and the state. With 
respect to its normative component, neoliberalism advocates economic and political freedom as 
essential conditions for a social welfare. Nevertheless, as referred by the author, this market-driven 
approach to economic and social policy may be seen as a radical ideology in some aspects, in the 
sense that it promotes a minimal intervention of the sate, even in ensuring individual rights. 
Neoliberals believe that “… political and social discrimination imposes constraints on the rights and 
liberties of individuals, interferes with freedom of choice, distorts the free play of markets and hence 
harms economic development” (Leftwich 1993: 608-609). At the functional level, neoliberalism 
establishes a link between economic growth and democracy, considering that democratic politics is 
fundamental for a thriving free market economy (ibid: 609).  
It is interesting to notice that just as the economic ideology introduced by Keynes supported the 
development of the welfare state, all these economic ideologies and theories conferred intellectual 
coherence to the programme of reducing public services by restructuring the traditional model of 
public management (Carvalho 2009). Nevertheless, as referred by Leftwich (1993), these ideals are 
not completely new. They reflect upon aspects of the modernisation theory of the 1960s, which 
proclaimed that Western economic and political liberalism represented ‘the good society itself' 
(1993: 605). This ‘good society’ should be based on ‘good governance’, which, in the days of the 
New World Order, implies a democratic capitalist regime, presided over by a minimal state (Leftwich 
1993: 611). 
Within the economic-political context, there is another factor intrinsically linked with 
neoliberalism and which also contributed to the crisis of the welfare state: globalisation – usually 
defined as the existence of a free worldwide trade. Indeed, discussions on neoliberalism appear 
frequently connected with the globalisation phenomenon. Olssen and Peters (2005) explain this link 
by stating that “(…) neoliberalism is a particular element of globalisation in that it constitutes the 
form through which domestic and global economic relations are structured” (2005: 313). In a more 
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apocalyptic accent, Vaira (2004) complements this idea by referring that “Neoliberalism is not only a 
political rhetoric, or ideology but a wide project to change the institutional structure of societies at 
a global level (2004: 487)”. Indeed, due to modern technology, innovation and knowledge 
transformations circulate easily, assuming an increasing importance concerning the identification 
and action planning taken by governments in order to overcome situations of crisis. The role of ICT 
in the process of governance has been assuming such relevance that several authors point out to the 
emergence of a new governance model, a NPM successor. Dunleavy, Margetts, Baston, and Tinkler 
(2006) for example, denominated the reforms introduced by these technological advances in the 
organisation of public services as ‘‘digital-era governance’’ (DEG), to contrast with business 
processes of service’s delivery. Thus, it seems undeniable that pressures for change also derived 
from the establishment of a global social and economic policy. In turn, it is argued that this 
contributes for the weakening power of the nation-states and consequently, for the adoption, almost 
instinctively, of national competitiveness measures able to improve efficiency and reduce public 
expenditure. 
Associated with this cycle, and also related with the globalisation process, one finds an 
increasing importance attributed to international and supranational institutions and their role in 
defining macroeconomic policies. In fact, the HE sector, and more specifically Portugal and Finland, 
provide a good example of the prominent link between OECD and HE reforms.  
Despite the relevance of economic and political contexts in the understanding of the scenario 
leading to the welfare state decline, there are other aspects that complement this picture. At the final 
stage, but not less important, it is relevant to mention that in terms of demographic and social 
changes that marked the turning point of a welfare state to a managerial state is the fact that societies 
controlled and regulated by governments have became less governable (Peters 2001; Kooiman 1993; 
2003). This incapacity from governments to govern effectively their people results from several 
interrelated causes. Firstly, the increasing social and political heterogeneity among populations, not 
only has made it harder for the welfare state to rectify market-based inequalities, but it also allowed 
for increasing income inequalities in most industrialised societies (Peters 2001: 15). In addition to 
this, societies’ ethnic and racial heterogeneity, which was much developed through immigration, 
contributed to social tensions. Moreover, the author states that the second cause for increasing 
difficulties in governance relates to the type of issues confronting contemporary governments, 
which “… have shifted from being bargainable to less bargainable” (2001: 15). 
Looking at this scenario of social diversity, economic growth complexity and financial and 
employment problems, it seems clear that these issues have evolved in complexity and importance 
since the end of World War II until the end of the twentieth century. Therefore, these problems 
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became more difficult to solve in the 1990s by using the conflict resolution mechanisms created 
during the post-war conflicts (Peters 2001). Governments must work with different instruments, in 
order to achieve some harmony among several interest groups. As Peters (2001) puts it: 
“Governing in most industrialised democracies has become a process of bargaining and mediating 
rather than of applying rules (…). All of these changes make the role of civil service managers even 
more difficult than it had been and also make the role of civil servants within governments even 
more ambiguous” (2001: 8).    
 
The combination of these contexts makes evident the inevitability of change and reconstruction 
of the welfare state (Ackroyd 1995; Pollitt 2003). Such transformations found support not only in 
economic issues, such as those related to the reduction of public spending and demands for more 
efficiency, but also in the ambition of changing mentalities and attitudes of professional 
organisations. As Clarke and Newman (1997) refer, the ‘crisis of welfare’ was necessarily a ‘crisis of 
the organisational regime’. Or, viewed from an inverse perspective, one can say that the 
development of bureaucracy prompted its replacement. Again, the paradox of public organisations 
(Ackroyd 1995) lays in the fact that their efficiency constitutes the basis of their failure. In this sense, 
the conservative political ideology of the New Right seemed to be the new credo of the last three 
decades. 
 
2.3 The Managerial State 
The final stage of public services’ development is considered to be the plural state, according to 
Osborne and McLaughlin (2002). Other authors, especially the Anglo-Saxon ones, use such terms 
as managerialism25 (Reed 2002) and/or New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991) or even 
entrepreneurial government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) to refer and to classify the changes which 
started to occur in the provision of public services from the 1980s. Indeed, the transformation of 
the public sector organisation has been strongly associated with managerialism and modernisation in 
several countries, although through different forms and nuances, according to the different 
governments implementing reforms. In addition to its “backbones” and origins, it is not easy to find 
                                                 
25 It is not easy to find a consensual translation to Portuguese for the word managerialism, namely what term should 
be used in the higher education field. As similar to other authors, we consider managerialismo to be the most 
appropriate concept, instead of  gerencialismo. Amaral et al. (2002); Santiago, Magalhães and Carvalho (2005); 
Carvalho (2009) refer that despite its direct translation, the term managerialismo is the word which best fits the 
complex dimension of  the concept, allowing us to portray the overlap of  management criteria to those criteria of  
governance polices, while simultaneously maintaining the dignity of  the academic dimension of  the word 
management (2009: 28). We faced a similar concern with respect to Finnish language. It can be said that there is 
no translation for the word in Finnish, thus, at least in academic terms, the term “managerialismi” is most used. A 
complementary view is offered by Becher and Trowler (2011: 11) who refer that there are several variants of 
managerialism (e.g. neo-Taylorism; the public service orientation; the public management approach; cultural 
approaches; competency approaches; ‘new public management’; and ‘new managerialism’). Also the sources of 
managerialism are multiple, add the authors, with mixed origins in New Right ideology, management theory and 
elsewhere.  
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overall agreement concerning the novelty and intensity of NPM. As Pollitt (2003) puts it, there are 
different views “(…) about whether it is a global phenomenon towards which most countries are 
converging or something localized to just a few states (…)” (2003: 26). Indeed, there is some 
evidence to believe that, managerialism as an ideology is not uniformly accepted (Amaral, Meek and 
Larsen 2003). Furthermore, and as it is being argued in this study, different cultures and contexts, 
as well as historical and social developments, result in different levels of acceptance (and rejection) 
of ideologies. More recently, Pollitt, Thiel and Homburg (2007) wrote:  
“It may be tempting to assume that, because of the similarity of antecedents of reforms (budget 
deficits, public distrust of public administration and so on), the actual implementation and 
manifestations of reforms are similar in various countries. Indeed, the label that has been given 
to these reforms – New Public Management or NPM – suggests commonality and uniformity. 
However, more detailed analyses show that underlying ideas and their implementation fluctuate 
enormously” (2007: 2). 
 
Thus, through Pollitt and his colleagues’ work, one is acknowledged with the fact that not all 
countries have adopted NPM in the same way, as not every country faces the same economic, social 
and political conditions. What seems to be consensual is the fact that NPM aims at reforming the 
status quo and the faults of the predecessor form of governance. In this sense, it is rooted on the 
general dissatisfaction with the traditional governance model, being thus a departure from the classic 
public administration paradigm (Hood 1991; Pollitt 2003; Pollitt et al. 2007). 
The development of NPM ideals has been constructed during two different moments. The first 
stage is considered more ideological than pragmatic, constituted by a set of beliefs, based on the 
idea that better management represents the solution for economic and social problems. Pollitt et al. 
(2007) refer to this as “talk and rhetoric” phase.  But from this rhetorical period, more realistic and 
concrete actions were then introduced and managerial reforms have actually taken place in the 
practice of public administration. This embodies the second wave of reforms, which is considered 
more pragmatic, and which led to a growing emphasis on performance measures and coordination 
mechanisms, namely an increasing prominence of the EU role and other international organisations 
such as the OECD and the WB (Metcalfe 2001; Pollitt 2003). Generally speaking, during these 
periods there was a replacement of the public service ethos, based on universalism, equity and 
security, by the business ethos characterised by individualism and efficiency. We will now look at the 
term managerialism as a heterogeneous set of management techniques and approaches used to 
describe the wave of public sector reforms throughout several governments since the 1980s, in order 
to understand how it has spread into HE systems and how it affected its further development. 
Despite different degrees of imposition, there are some central principles or commonalities in 
management and public administration procedures which deserve further attention and which 
enable us to understand some reforms that happened in HE. Simultaneously and controversially, 
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NPM central characteristics also raise some inconsistencies and doubts concerning other aspects. 
Nevertheless, before going into this, distinctions need to be drawn between management – as a 
neutral technical activity – and managerialism as a set of ideologically based prescriptions on how an 
institution should operate (Meek 2003: 5). Furthermore, it is also important to refer that the term 
managerialism, or new managerialism as Reed (2002) puts it, is used more frequently to refer to 
management reforms within the HE field, namely the introduction of private sector management 
methods in this sector, whereas NPM refers to the same phenomenon with respect to the public 
sector (Maassen 2003: 33). Throughout this study, and by assuming that HE reforms, with all its 
specificities, should not be seen apart from a broader context, or isolated from the public sector, 
both terms are used interchangeably. It is likely however that the acronym NPM will appear more 
frequently due to its almost “universal use” and popularity.  
 
2.4 The First Wave of Reforms: Managerialism as an Ideology 
From the late 1970s onwards, the Conservative Party in the UK has highly criticised the welfare 
state, especially the professional cadres who had long provided public services (Osborne and 
McLaughlin 2002). Margaret Thatcher has had great success in stabilising the pound sterling, in 
boosting the British economy and in reducing the tax burden. In this way, the Conservative Party 
conquered a large parliamentary majority in the 1983 and 1987 elections, thus becoming the global 
icon of the neoliberal economic ideology26.  
In the UK, the focus of the conservative government laid mainly on a market ideology 
(privatisation of public services) as the solution to promote effective and efficient provision of 
public services, while simultaneously providing “… responsiveness to individual need and user 
choice in service provision” (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002: 9). Nevertheless, as stated by Osborne 
and McLaughlin, this movement towards marketisation was criticised by being more concerned with 
reduction of public expenditure than with effective improvement of public services’ provision. This 
goes much in line with what Pollitt (2003) defined as the first transformation of the public sector 
into a more restricted and managed system, where management would be the central activity for the 
revival of national economies. A more restricted and managed system would be thus achieved through 
                                                 
26 Nevertheless, according to Shephard (2003) these policies have sharply increased social 
inequality, unemployment and child poverty, leading to the situation that in 1990 the British 
preferred a New Labour government, chaired by Tony Blair, who was described as “neo-
Thatchrite” by some, since many of his economic policies mimic those of Thatcher. 
Furthermore, though it is usually claimed that under Thatcher government the tax burden was 
reduced, Pollitt, Birchall and Putman (1998: 159) argue that the overall tax burden on individuals 
increased under the UK Conservative administrations of 1979-97. 
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what Hood (1991) and Rhodes (1996) call the first meaning of NPM, namely managerialism. This 
refers to “(…) hands on professional management, explicit standard and measures of performance; 
managing by results; value for money; and, more recently, closeness to the customer” (Rhodes 1996: 
655). Managerialism was then the main trend in the UK before 1988 and it was seen as the solution 
for “bureaucratic rigidity and professional intransigence” (Reed 2002: 166) in the local government, 
health and social care and education.  
It is quite difficult to provide all NPM characteristics in a clear and straightforward sentence, 
despite its numerous existent definitions. Furthermore, one needs to be careful when applying global 
concepts such as NPM, as this applies differently according to local practices, as observed later on 
when analysing Finnish and Portuguese HE reforms (chapters VI and VII). In addition, as Clarke 
and Newman (1997) state, the applicability of business approaches in different public sectors varies 
not only with the level (macro/micro) but also with the technical and political characteristics of the 
activity in question. Therefore, it is easier to describe NPM key elements, framing them within the 
context in question, and through what Pollitt called the ‘voices of the practitioners’ (2003: 26). As 
such, according to the work developed by the author (Pollitt 1993; Pollitt, et al. 1998; Pollitt et al. 
2007), the core of the managerialist ideology is based on a set of beliefs, practices and values, which 
attest that the analytical methods used by managers to practice a better management are an effective 
solution for economic and social problems that organisations and the system itself face. In this 
sense, management appears as a separate and distinct organisational function, which plays an 
essential role in planning and measuring the necessary improvements in productivity, and where 
managers should have enough freedom to perform such crucial activity (Pollitt 1993: 2-3). As 
follows, management is thus an activity concerned with enhancing both efficiency and effectiveness, 
in the sense that it relates to the best combination between inputs and resources with the 
achievement of objectives, which simultaneously involves leading and controlling a group of people 
and/or entities. These objectives, as Pollitt (1993) refers, are clearly defined in the language of 
economics, stressing managerialist concepts as output and value for money, together with good 
management practices existent in the private sector. In this way, and after bureaucracy (considered 
an impediment to good management) being eliminated, it is possible to formulate clear objectives 
and have highly motivated staff. There is thus a special interest of the managers to promote a set of 
ideas and practices that promote the important contribution of management and therefore justifies 
managers’ special role and power in the process of “saving” a nation-state economy (Pollitt 1993; 
Reed 2002).  
Interestingly, as the author points out, this vision of managers being seen like heroes (and not 
heroines) that the managerialist ideology portrays, carries with it a certain type of sexual 
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discrimination, since it relates to a specific social group, namely managers (Pollitt 1993: 8). 
According to Pollitt (1993), the public management reform has served to strengthen the political 
power over the bureaucracy, since it freed public officials from bureaucratic constraints and 
restrictions, which prevented them from carrying out their activities in a more “political” way. Under 
the managerialist label, public servants were able to support their favourite politicians and 
subsequent programmes, e.g., public management reforms would make public servants more 
accountable to political leaders (Pollitt et al. 1998: 6). Simultaneously, as stated by the authors, civil 
servants would be more accountable to citizens who use public services. As the latest statements 
seem quite contradictory due to the “challenge” it presents: “how can public officials serve two 
masters, masters who are quite unlikely to have identical needs or preferences?” (1998: 153). 
Ackroyd (1995) explains this with the wishes of the state to increase its control over civil servants, 
particularly concerning budgetary decisions and constraints on the way they do their work. This was 
a typical situation in the first period of reforms. Consequently, this new way of managing society 
provided legitimacy to managers and politicians who were seen as “active people” because they were 
doing something (whether it was something good/positive or not, it did not really matter…). 
Indeed, the emergence of management as an essential activity for the effective development and 
improvement of public services provision is based on a certain idea of novelty, which contrasts with 
the older form of bureaucratic public administration. In the words of Dunleavy and Hood (1994) 
management represents a new way for the state steering its issues, occupying much of the same 
territory as traditional administration but differing in style and emphasis. 
With respect to the progressive replacement of administration by management, Pollitt et al. 
(1998) distinguish both concepts by using Desmond Keeling (1972) definitions: while administration 
is “the review, in an area of public life, of law, its enforcement and revision; and decision-making 
on cases in that area is submitted to the public service”, management, similar to what Maassen 
(2003) wrote, represents “the search for the best use of resources in pursuit of objectives subject to 
change” (Keeling 1972 in Pollitt et al. 1998: 13).  
From the literature review on the topic (Pollitt 2003; Rhodes 1994; 1996; Clarke and Newman 
1997; Osborne and McLaughlin 2002; Amaral et al. 2003; Santiago and Carvalho 2004), managerialism 
is frequently presented as a set of management tools designed to help managers in decision-making 
processes, rooted on a deep trust in the superiority of market ideology. The amount of techniques 
which managerialism is about to emphasise, namely the practice of management as a neutral activity, 
can be applied to any institutional context, providing that it presents the best solutions based on the 
flawless principles of the market. As such, and as referred by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004), (new) 
public management reform appears as a means to multiple ends (2004: 6). In this sense, more than 
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the economic context, NPM represents a chosen ideological strategy, rather than an economically 
inevitable practice: “NPM has not been ‘caused’ so much as chosen” (Pollitt 1993: 36). 
Notwithstanding, despite NPM global dissemination, the adoption of the NPM “package” has been 
distinct according to the countries undergoing these reforms (Hood 1995; Pollitt 2003). Countries 
like New Zealand, Sweden and UK were considered the pioneers in the implementation of NPM 
ideology, whereas Canada, Norway and Finland, which launched its public management reform in 
1989, took a more gradual path. At the opposite extreme of the pioneers, one finds Germany and 
Japan, which barely refused to adopt a managerialist ideology (Hood 1995; Pollitt 2003). 
Together with managerialism, one will find what Rhodes (1996) called the second meaning for 
NPM: the new institutional economics, meaning this the introduction of incentive structures, such as 
market competition into public service provision. New institutional economics emphasises 
disaggregating bureaucracies; greater competition through contracting-out and quasi-markets27; and 
consumer choice. In sum, it was a set of techniques and assumptions of efficient organisational 
functioning, and which became more influential in the UK after 1988 (Rhodes 1996: 655). The 
introduction of economic incentive structures, as a result of the new institutional economics, is 
considered a symptom of the modernisation process of the public sector. This ‘dynamic force for 
change’ had many alternative and competitive terms, such as ‘reform’, ‘transformation’, 
‘reinvention’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘improvement’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 16), all with the same 
purpose: to convey the idea of management change. The focus should be thus in a model which 
minimises or attenuates differences between private-sector business management and the running 
of public services (Pollitt 1993: 27). As time went by, this model would be developed through 
specific social trends, more or less intense, which influenced governments to re-organise their 
performance. In other words, those immediate concerns with governments performance, such as 
reducing public expenditures, improving the quality and efficiency of public services provision, as 
well as its flexibility and innovation, increasing political control of bureaucrats, decentralisation of 
management authority and improving coordination (Pollitt et al. 2004) lays on five main movements 
which have been influencing the way governments organise their work: diversification, 
specialisation, incentives, confidence building and accountability (OECD 2004: 2). These trends are 
considered to belong to the second wave of governance reforms, characterised by a more rigid 
market discipline and entrepreneurial culture, seeing that in the first round, managerialism existed 
more as a narrative discourse (Reed 2002). Indeed, Pollitt (2003) assumes that this rhetoric character 
                                                 
27 Dawson and Dargie (2002: 35) define quasi-markets as the situation where “new organizations were created and 
a split imposed between those (still public organisations) which were to commission or purchase public services 
and those (sometimes public and sometimes private organizations) which were to be contracted to provide the 
services”. 
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of the initial managerialism, with simple and promising ideas (therefore easily diffused and accepted), 
was an essential condition for the adoption of the ideology, even in countries that did not follow 
similar political convictions. 
 
2.5 The Second Wave of Reforms: from Ideology to Pragmatism  
It seems clear now that throughout most of the 20th century, whether under the managerialist 
ideology or “welfarism” (Pollitt 1993: 11) practices, national governance arrangements have been 
heavily criticised, leading to reform processes. These were initially driven by an ideological rationale, 
and later by more pragmatic motives:  
“The managerialism of the 1980s and 1990s is therefore not simply a set of broad assumptions 
about the unique potentials and rights of management. It is also a much more specific set of 
models of efficient organizational functioning and of techniques through which such smooth 
functioning may be realized” (Pollitt 1993: 11). 
 
Apart from these “ideal” management models, it is also important to remember that faced with 
the escalating costs of the welfare state in a period of economic stagnation, governments found 
themselves in a defensive position, where they had to explain and justify to the public opinion 
whether tax payers’ money was being spent effectively and efficiently (Bovens, et al. 2001: 8). This 
distinction of periods, between theory and practice, lays on the general agreement that the rise of 
Conservative governments, both in the UK and in the US, in the beginning of the 1980s, provided 
the managerialism concept with a stronger connotation (Newman 2002; Reed et al. 2002). 
Therefore, these authors (among others) consider this wave of reforms as a maturation period of 
the initial ideologies, naming it new-managerialism. Indeed, it is this stage of reforms, which is now 
more consolidated (at least at the doctrinal level), that allowed for the “use and abuse” of the 
expression ‘NPM’, at least in Europe, and ‘reinventing government’ in the US (Bovens et al. 2001; 
Reed et al. 2002). In the words of Reed et al. (2002: xxiii), NPM is new-managerialism’s operational 
and pragmatic face, which entails “… a shared cultural re-orientation and structural redesign that 
inexorably drives in the direction of commodification, rationalization and control” (2002: xxiii). 
Thus, we share Carvalho’s (2009) view, who refers that NPM may be considered as a manifestation 
of the managerialist ideology within the field of public institutions, as it is this set of ideas (combined 
with the historical and cultural contexts previously explained) that serves as a legitimating basis and 
simultaneously as an instrument for redefining public policies and restructuring bureaucratic 
organisations (2009). 
Hood (1991; 1995) describes – in what can be considered now as classical studies – the impact 
of NPM in public organisations according to seven dimensions of change, which go much in line 
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with the five main trends identified above (diversification, specialisation, incentives, confidence 
building and accountability), as can be seen in the following table. 
 
Table 1 - Doctrinal Components of  NPM 
 
Doctrines/Change Trends in Public 
Organisations 
 
Typical Justification 
 
1. 'Hands-on professional management' in the public 
sector 
Accountability requires clear assignment of 
responsibility for action not diffusion of power. 
 
2. Explicit standards and measures of performance Accountability requires clear statement of goals; 
efficiency requires 'hard look' at objectives. 
 
3. Greater emphasis on output controls 
 
Need to stress results rather than procedures. 
4. Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector Need to create 'manageable' units, separate 
provision and production interests, gain efficiency 
advantages of use of contract or franchise 
arrangements inside as well as outside the public 
sector. 
 
5. Shift to greater competition in public sector Rivalry as the key to lower costs and better 
standards. 
 
6. Stress on private-sector styles of management 
practice 
Need to use 'proven' private sector management 
tools in the public sector. 
 
7. Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in 
resource use 
Need to check resource demands of public sector 
and 'do more with less'. 
 
Source: Adapted from Hood (1991: 4). 
 
 More than one decade later, the work of Pollitt et al. (2007: 4-5) does not differ much from 
these main dimensions of change. Hood (1991), as well as Pollitt et al. (2007) also draw the reader’s 
attention to the fact that not all these dimensions of change existed in the same way across nations, 
not even when they were “fully consistent, partly because they do not have a single intellectual 
provenance” (1991: 4). Some of these trends and their specificities will be analysed here. 
Doctrines two and three, namely the move towards measuring, explicit clear goals and 
controlling output, are believed to increase the tendency towards organisational diversity (OECD 
2004). This would happen based on the assumption that, as long as outputs could be controlled and 
quantitatively measured, the type of organisations carrying their production would be less important, 
leading to increasing diversification of public organisations. Nevertheless, as Dawson and Dargie 
(2002) mention, with respect to the case of the health sector in UK, there is also an expansion and 
diversification of NPM mechanisms, e.g. greater emphasis on developing protocols and guidelines 
in order to raise awareness about performance in public services management. Pollitt et al. (2007) 
explain this shift towards more measurement and quantification in the form of systems of 
performance indicators and/or explicit standards with the following example: “Instead of just 
 82 
‘trusting the doctor’, measures are developed that show how often the doctor prescribes drugs, how 
often patients develop post-operative complications, the length of waiting lists and the degree of 
compliance with the best practice protocols, and so on” (2007: 5). As such, diversification and 
performance orientation are intimately linked with accountability and therefore with incentives as 
well as specialisation. The diversity of public organisations and instruments that were subsequently 
developed to “control” the way these public organisations manage their services provision tends to 
incite civil servants to improve and specialise their performance, once they feel pressured by 
accountability measures and, simultaneously feel rewarded by their “good performance”. 
Accountability became a recurrent word in public organisations’ activities, combined with 
regulation, ethics and democracy, as Dawson and Dargie state:  
“To summarize general shifts in the discussion of NPM over the last decade or so, we can note 
that whereas NPM was originally conceptually defined in terms of managerialism and rational 
choice subsequent debates included discussions of ethics, accountability, democracy, regulation 
and the intrinsic nature of the public sector” (Dawson and Dargie 2002: 41). 
 
The emphasis on accountability obviously implies a shift in the way governments organise their 
public services, creating subsequently organisational change, not only in terms of work organisation 
and performance, but also in terms of values and beliefs, as it was observed when carrying out the 
empirical part of this study. There is a growing tendency to reward people’s behaviour and their 
responsibility according to different types of incentives (OECD 2004). At this stage of NPM 
development, also resource allocation is determined according to performance, namely whether the 
goals and targets defined were in facto and effectively achieved (Hood 1991) and policies successfully 
implemented. As Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) put it: “Accountability isn’t simple: public servants 
should be attentive not only to the market but also to statutory and constitutional law, community 
values, political norms, professional standards and citizen interests” (2000: 555). In the Old-Time 
Religion period, professional cadres were not formally accountable for the quality of services 
provided; they were only directly responsible to political officials, as quantitative output measures 
were not (yet) believed to be the best way to capture professionals’ performance. Furthermore, in 
terms of political accountability, it tended to be “less necessary”, once that the importance attributed 
to consumer responsiveness tended to obscure the need for broad strategies and patterns of 
provision (Pollitt et al. 1998). Moreover, according to McLaughlin et al. (2002: 119) accountability 
is considered more inefficient than what actually promises, once that undermines flexibility. 
Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) refer that in old public administration times, accountability was not 
really an issue, considering that politicians were expected to make decisions while bureaucrats would 
carry them out. 
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Another significant change introduced by NPM was the replacement of coordination forms 
based on hierarchy by coordination based on market or quasi-market mechanisms (Hood 1991; 
Bovens et al. 2001; Reed 2002; McLaughlin, Osborne and Ferlie 2002), under the assumption that 
the introduction of these mechanisms in the public sector represents the best way to increase 
efficiency, while reducing costs and a more equitable redistribution of resources is achieved, 
increasing thus social welfare. Under the market ideology, the relationship between public 
organisations and their “customers” is seen as based on self-interest, involving similar operations to 
those occurring in the marketplace (Denhardt and Denhardt 2000: 550), with the exception that 
these services should remain free to its users. Nevertheless, the integration of market-oriented ideas 
in the organisation of the public sector has always been a contentious issue, raising several debates. 
Among others, Ferlie and Fitzgerald (2002) point to the “old criticisms from the Left” about markets 
overemphasis on efficiency and lack of attention with democratic accountability and legitimation 
issues. In addition, such overemphasis by the political right with respect to the need of a radical 
change, “the tyranny of transformation” (Clarke and Newman 2000: 34) in order to promote the 
national economic and social revival, implies changing the interpretations and attitudes towards 
“culture”, once it is presented as something to be managed (2000: 36). Furthermore, NPM strategies 
and mechanisms should not be (and they were not) applied in the same way to all public service 
sectors, since all of them have specific characteristics, as it is the case of HE (Reed 2002: 175).  
The use of market mechanisms and accountability procedures as a means to increase public-
service efficiency incites the promotion of competition in the provision of public services (Hood 
1991; Ferlie 1992). Indeed, competition is one of the NPM central features, once that, as Peters and 
Pierre (1998) explain, without competition there is little point in changing the managerial styles in 
the public sector. In this sense, it was aimed at transcending the divide and having the best of both 
worlds: a democratically accountable public sector that was, at the same time, subject to the rigour 
of the market (Bovens et al. 2001: 8). Thus, such as a looping process, the set of market mechanisms 
and competition also impact the human resource practices of public institutions, resembling them 
to the modus operandi of the private sector. Nevertheless, as Pollitt (2003) remembers, though 
competition is presented as a magic wand, “… there would still remain important goods or services 
where competitive private sector provision would be hard to put in place. This is one of the reasons 
why such ‘public goods’ have very often and in many countries been provided by public authorities 
rather than the market sector” (2003: 14). Nevertheless, through the creation of internal markets, 
competition within the public sector has the advantage of easily and accurately assessing the real 
costs of each unit within public organisations. When compared to traditional organisational models, 
competition also provides meaningful bases for comparison (Peters and Pierre 1998). On the other 
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hand, however, by changing intra-organisational behaviour, the authors explain that the creation of 
internal markets can develop new potential sources of resource waste, provided that these type of 
markets induce organisations to oversupply services, since demand is defined not by the customer 
but by the supplier, as it is the case of the medical care sector (Peters and Pierre 1998: 5). 
The shift towards private-sector practices of human resources management is, at the present, 
one of the main challenges for those HEIs which decided to change their legal framework, as the 
case of Finland and Portugal. In this context, the state ceases to hold the monopoly of public 
services’ provision (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002) and public institutions are thus managed 
according to private sector rules. It might also happen that the state also delegates its functions to 
other organisations (private or voluntary entities) (Dawson and Dergie 2002: 35), though this is not 
so common in HE, at least in these countries.  
The situation of delegation of state powers, more than competition, leads to the existence of 
quasi-markets (or internal markets), where contractual mechanisms are an essential component in 
the governance of public services’ provision (Carroll and Steane 2002: 196). Although government 
regulation and financing will still remain important coordination mechanisms, elements of 
competition, user charges, individual responsibilities and freedom of choice are now important 
elements in the governance process (Teixeira et al. 2004). Nevertheless, as Carroll and Steane (2002) 
highlight, competition between organisational providers might occur when traditional public 
services do not effectively control costs, do not improve their quality, and fail in meeting the 
standards of the services expected by its users. Indeed, the introduction of quasi-markets, a notion 
that derives intellectually from economics (Ferlie 1992; Teixeira 2006), clearly aims at promoting 
market competition in the public sector. In these quasi-market situations, the efficient, cost-
controlling and high quality organisations tend to easily succeed, contrary to their poor performance 
counterparts (2002: 36). Adopting the definition of Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) at the London 
School of Economics, David Dill (2007) explains that 
“Internal or quasi-markets differ from private markets in that they are introduced into existing 
publicly funded systems. Quasi-markets do not evolve naturally from existing factors of supply 
and demand, but are created by government to overcome the perceived imperfections of state 
monopoly or bureaucracy, particularly the problems of efficiency, choice, and responsiveness. 
Quasi-markets encourage competition among monopoly state providers by decentralising demand 
and supply” (2007: 51-52). 
 
In a similar view, and referring to the HE context, Pedro Teixeira (2006: 14) clarifies that HE 
markets differ from traditional markets “… in that they are publicly funded “quasi-markets”, 
introduced into existing state systems of HE in order to increase efficiency and responsiveness” and 
also the potential to improve students’ (consumer) choice. Teixeira et al. (2004: 3) explain that the 
introduction of quasi-markets in HE is a combination of three main aspects, namely: the promotion 
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of competition between HE providers, the privatisation of HE – either by the emergence of private 
HEIs or by means of ‘privatisation’ of certain aspects of public institutions and by the promotion 
of economic autonomy of HEIs, enhancing their responsiveness and articulation to the supply and 
demand of factors and products. Thus, at least in the HE sector, there is a complex interaction 
between market elements and the regulatory power of government (Teixeira et al. 2004). 
Nevertheless, because HE is a non-tangible good or service, and above all, it is considered a “public 
good”, the adoption of (quasi) market forces in this sector as a steering mechanism (or tool) creates 
controversy. Such aspects as imperfect information on academic and institutional quality28 
(insufficient information about the quality of institutions and/or programs hinders the full 
awareness of students to choose what they believe to be the best option for them), the existence of 
tuition fees as well as private HEIs have been object of discussions and reflections. On one hand, 
as explained by Teixeira et al. (2004), the massification of the sector highly increased public 
expenditure, made it increasingly difficult for the government to bear the full costs of HE. At the 
same time, and as a consequence of this factor, it has been argued that students are the main 
beneficiaries of a HE degree and therefore they should largely contribute for its costs. Furthermore, 
as Teixeira (2006: 15) mentions, from the late sixties onwards, there have been significant 
discussions on the possible regressive effects of low or non-existent tuition fees as direct charging 
is a way of making students (and their families) aware that HE leads to a private benefit. 
Nevertheless, on the other hand, because HEIs “(…) provide non-priced social benefits in addition 
to the private benefits for which individuals or organisations will pay, it is in the interest of the state 
to subsidise higher education in order to maximise social welfare” (2006: 14-15). 
This increasing emphasis on competition through contracting-out and quasi-markets is one of 
the most visible characteristics of the new institutional economics period, contributing also for the 
development of several economic theories, as the principal agent theory. Indeed, as Olssen and 
Peters (2005) explain, by applying private sector or quasi-market techniques in management of 
public sector organisations, NPM replaced the public service conventions about the ‘common good’ 
or ‘public interest’ with a new set of contractualist norms and rules, which are thereafter conceived 
as ‘principal/agent relationships’ (2005: 324). The principal-agent model emerged as an attempt to 
replace (or to complete) the neoclassical theories of perfect competition which consider thar 
information is freely available, by a model which assumes that information is imperfect and used 
                                                 
28 Referring to the UK example (although this can be generalised to other European higher 
education systems), Dill (2007) explains that in a “competitive market”, academic prestige is 
based primarily upon research performance, faculty reputation, as well as financial and student 
inputs. As one might expect, when students enrol for their first year, for the first time in any 
HEI, they probably are not fully aware of where this “academic prestige” is based/lays.   
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the concept of transactions costs29 to analyse the efforts expended by market actors, previously 
assumed to be costless (Kassim and Menon 2002). These authors explain that the principal-agent 
model has become the dominant framework for examining the generic difficulties that arise in any 
setting of contractual relationship, e.g. problems of compliance and control in the division of labour 
between work relationships. The theory was initially developed in relation to business firms, but it 
then developed and extended to public sector work relationships as a means of exacting the 
accountability and performance of employees where market incentives and sanctions did not 
operate (Olssen and Peters 2005: 320). In the light of the principal-agent model work relationships 
are hierarchical and move through chains of authority and command according to levels of power 
within the management hierarchy. In this way, “a single person will be principal to those further 
down the chain of command and agent to those further up” (ibid: 320). Agency relationships are 
thus created when one party, the principal, enters into a contractual agreement with a second party, 
the agent, and delegates to the later responsibility for carrying out functions on the principal’s behalf, 
in return for some specified sanction or reward (Kassim and Menon 2002: 2). As such, it is a model 
concerned with how to extract compliance from a voluntary exchange relationship based on 
dependency (Olssen and Peters 2005). Contractual mechanisms30 for the governance of provision 
have thus become a central feature in public management, especially during the new managerialism 
or NPM period. It is in fact argued that within quasi markets there has been an important move 
from management by hierarchy to management by contracts, or as Dill (2007) puts it, the 
modernisation process of the public sector has sometimes been seen in terms of a shift from status 
to contract. 
These contractual mechanisms are opposed to “partnership” forms of coordination, in which 
governments make attempts to learn from developments arising within the public sector, by 
consulting and exchanging ideas with people working in public organisations. As such, decisions 
and policy design are taken through communication and persuasion rather than the exercise of direct 
control (Newman 2002: 82-83). In turn, contractual mechanisms represent the principal-agent 
theory, in which, theoretically, local managers are the agents who exercise tight control within 
organisations in order to ensure the delivery of central government goals and targets (the principal). 
Nevertheless, as can be seen by the public-private partnerships (PPPs) example, not always the 
                                                 
29 Olssen and Peters (2005: 320-321) explain that the Transaction Cost Economics theory (TCE), as a neoliberal 
theory, is used to evaluate the efficiency of  alternative governance structures or sets of  institutional arrangements 
for various kinds of  transactions, especially those generated by the market and it seeks to explain why certain types 
of  organisational forms, e.g. mergers, may be preferred to a pure market form.  
30 The Council of  Europe generally defines contractual staff  as “… rule employed on private-law contracts, which 
may or may not be fixed-term, for the performance of  duties which cannot be assigned to established civil servants 
because there is nobody of  established civil servants able to assure them, or for the performance of  duties for 
which there is a permanent demand but which involve part-time working” (Council of  Europe 1999: 20).   
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principal-agent theory works like that. Frequently, at least in Portugal, the government assumes the 
role of the agent.  
In the awake of NPM, contracts become thus a crucial element in defining individual 
performance measures, which are characterised by pre-defined objectives, usually based on 
quantitative criteria (Hood 1991). This, explains Newman (2002: 83), is strongly associated with the 
British Labour’s government attempt to ensure that electoral promises (services) are in facto 
delivered. Also pointing to the UK, however referring to HE, Reed (2002) argues that NPM 
promoted “(…) the deconstruction of integrated bureaucratic hierarchies into dispersed networks 
of ‘purchasers’ and ‘providers’” (2002: 166), where regulated market exchange was the current 
practice, combined with detailed performance criteria, in order to ensure that overall resources and 
policies would be effectively and efficiently achieved. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that 
contractual management may not be directly linked with NPM developments, as the French example 
shows. Schedler and Proeller (2002) refer that at the local level, the use of contracts has a long 
tradition in France, when the local authorities had to provide services without having the 
organisation and resources to do so on by their own means. “Even though the contracts gained 
some managerial aspects recently, they are highly political instruments. Preferences for local 
providers, party influence and other political variables are still main features in the contractual 
provision of public services in France” (2002: 170).  
Another common feature of NPM identified by Hood (1991) and Pollitt et al. (1998) is the 
importance attributed to disaggregation and decentralisation of units in the public sector. As can be seen 
in Hood’s table (1991), the rationale behind the breaking up of “monolithic units” lays on the need 
to create “manageable” and flexible units as well as to enhance flexibility, responsiveness and tailor-
made solutions (Pollitt et al. 2007). While profiting from efficiency advantages of using contractual 
mechanisms “… inside as well as outside the public sector” (1991: 4), and less hierarchical structures, 
the division between provision and production interests would provide more personalised services, 
targeted to local and individual needs, and which would be delivered faster. Both at rhetoric and 
pragmatic levels, the combination of market and contractual mechanisms, accountability and 
decentralisation are presented as a kind of “magic recipe” for the reorganisation of the cumbersome 
public administration. Nevertheless, following the recipe may be more complex that apparently 
seems, and again, the rhetoric hardly applies to the practice. As Pollitt et al. (1998; 2007) explain, 
decentralisation demands that managers became more accountable for their work and decisions, 
which in turn implies a loss in their autonomy. Furthermore, too much emphasis on decentralisation 
does not allow for sufficient coordination in the public sector, creating excessive fragmentation 
(Peters and Savoie 1996; Olsen 2007). Cheung (2002) argues that decentralisation and downsizing 
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involves political risks in terms of weakening state capacity. Moreover, it creates “…provincial 
‘feudal lords’ that might accumulate enough economic and political resources to defy central 
policies” (2002: 265).  These political tensions led governments to dedicate efforts to search better-
integrated systems of governance with stronger coordination capacity (Olsen 2007: 18). As the 
author argues, these concerns belong to a “second generation” of post-NPM reforms, which have 
changed the focus to the need for a “re-centralisation” of resources and power (2007: 18). 
It is worth to refer that the research literature on NPM implementation indicates that, despite 
the organisational changes happening in public administration, it does not seem completely accurate 
to look at NPM as the new management paradigm operating at an international level. What is 
empirically proved and visible is the “combination and recombination of ‘the old’ and ‘the new’ 
within what we might call ‘soft bureaucracy’ (…)” (Reed 2002: 170), meaning this the existence of 
hybridisation processes, combining elements of the old bureaucracy with new managerialism practices. 
Institutions tend to adopt only some NPM ingredients, and do not completely abolish the old 
organisation models. As a matter of fact, within the HE sector, the implementation of the 
managerialist discourse assumes the form of hybrid models – “(…) of institutional structures, 
organisational forms, control technologies, occupational cultures and work identities” (Reed 2002: 
170).  
An example of micro-management control technologies was the introduction of research 
assessment exercises in the UK in order that academics increase their research productivity without 
compromising their institutional performance. This is one of the distinguishing factors of the HE 
sector, when compared to other public sectors. Indeed, universities are becoming more and more 
like hybrid institutions, combining their public mission with commercial activities (Jongbloed 2004). 
It is at this stage of NPM “maturity” that the role of the State is redefined, assuming governance 
as its main function. Although they refer to the UK administrative system, we take Rhodes (1996; 
1997); Bovens et al. (2001); Osborne and McLaughlin (2002); Olsen (2007) view, among others, 
who consider that NPM belongs to a broader context, in which there is a shift from government to 
governance, where the state is “hollowing out” its initial model of control and rational planning 
(Van Vught 1989) to assume a model in which the state is able to steer itself, through the 
aforementioned mechanisms, where monitoring and feedback are essential aspects of it (Gornitzka 
1999). This shift reinforces the position that it is not just the state the only entity that rules, there is 
a redistribution of powers and functions. In turn, Pollitt (2003) assumes that the impact of changes 
in the ways in which public services were provided has obscured the borderline between public and 
private, leading to what some called the “end of big government” due to the reduction of the 
government capacity for strategic steering (2003: 19). Notwithstanding, it is important to remember 
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that what happens at this stage of reforms does not mean that there is a withdrawal of the state from 
its traditional role, but rather a redefinition of its functions. Indeed, it is argued that those countries 
that started their NPM reforms earlier, and produced results that dashed its citizens’ expectations, 
are now claiming for a more governmental intervention in the management of public policies. 
Furthermore, one needs to understand what has been changing beyond the institutional and national 
spheres, e.g., one needs to consider other “external” factors, which contribute for the way 
governments reorganise their intervention in societies. Rhodes (1997) refers to the emergence of 
privatisation, globalisation, the increasing prominence of EU institutions and alternative systems of 
delivering public services as the main factors which demanded a reconstruction of the State. And, 
in order for this reconstruction to succeed and to gain legitimacy, Pollitt (2003) explains that the 
public sector needs to visibly practice some “forgotten” values, such as universalism, equity, 
impartiality, security and resilience “… which are not central to the commercial marketplace, even 
if they are sometimes found there” (2003: 24). In the next section we will explore how this shift 
from government to governance has been impacting the HE sector. 
 
2.6 From Government to Governance – the Evaluative State: broad 
trends affecting HE 
 
As major public institutions that compose subsystems of the state, universities and polytechnics 
are strongly affected by the nature of the state (Kogan and Hanney 2000). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that since the mid-1980s, within a context of confidence decline in the objectives and 
mission of HE, (reforming) the relationship between the state and this sector has been a constant 
item on the political agenda of most OECD countries (Maassen 2003: 31). This need for changing 
HE arises amidst a broader context, the tyranny of transformation, eager to change the whole public 
sector, and which legitimated the process of state restructuring (Clarke and Newman 2000).  
For the most of the post-1945, in most Western Europe, HE was considered an area of public 
activity, which did not draw much attention and/or interest towards its policy developments (Kogan 
and Hanney 2000). Nevertheless, during the last three decades, this sector is considered to be under 
pressure to change mainly due to general beliefs of its paramount contribution to social and 
economic advancement of nation-states. Naturally, governments have tried to change their modus 
operandi to respond to new priorities in a changing society, or to improve the existing ones. In this 
sense, and as corroborated by the sociologist Esping-Andersen (2003), the results of policy reports 
on the value of (higher) education were quite similar everywhere: “(…) the expansion of mass 
education as the vehicle for equal opportunities and an end to inherited privilege; income 
maintenance as a means to equalize living conditions and eliminate social risks across the life cycle” 
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(2003: 1). But how did different governments realise these assumptions? What drives their increasing 
concern with HE? Which factors/pressures brought about change in the way in which HEIs are 
governed and managed? And which global changes led HE to gain increasing prominence nearly 
everywhere? In sum, what has changed in the past three decades in European HE, particularly in 
Portugal and in Finland?  
As referred in the beginning of this dissertation, the economic and societal contexts described 
above impacted HE, though the relationship between economy and HE development is quite 
complex to be empirically tracked (Scott 1995). There are some aspects that need to be considered 
in this analysis.  
Clarke and Newman (2000) explain that the development of a global economy has promoted 
change, not only in terms of organisational management, but also at the state level, considering that 
the establishment of a global economic policy allowed for some loss of autonomy of nation-states. 
Consequently governments perceived the need to competitively position themselves in this global 
economy (2000: 46). Indeed, some of the strains that national governments face have been the result 
of the increased importance of the international environment and of a substantially diminished 
capacity of those governments to insulate their economies and societies from global pressures 
(Peters and Pierre 1998). With respect to changes occurring at the organisational level, the effects 
of globalisation combined with managerialist discourses result in an increase of institutional 
isomorphism (cf. chapter IV). This is so because since the moment organisations are not immune 
to the effects of a global economy, it is assumed they will have to adopt similar strategies in order 
to remain competitive in an increasingly globalised environment (Clarke and Newman 2000). 
Additionally, Kogan and Hanney (2000: 13) state that these pressures for change, which were 
confronted by, and combined with the ideologies, beliefs and prejudices that constituted 
Thatcherism, created particular tensions when applied to HE, especially those measures demanding 
more efficiency and accountability.  
Not only in the UK, but also in diverse forms across Western democracies, there is the general 
assumption that national governments appear to have grown in size and costs without clear evidence 
of correspondingly large gains in productivity or effectiveness. In this way, a neo-liberal rhetoric 
about the wishes of limiting the role of the state emerged, though this was not consistent with the 
previous conservative movement (Kogan and Hanney 2000: 24). Moreover, in the late 1990s, it was 
believed that the neo-liberal ideology hampered the UK (as well as other pioneering countries in 
implementing NPM reforms) to economically survive to global competition. Ironically, “the New 
Right has continually positioned itself throughout the 1980s and 1990s on the side of the people 
‘against the state’ even though it has been in government throughout that period” (Clarke and 
 91 
Newman 2000: 16). Such ideological and pragmatic developments in the way governments deal with 
their public services naturally affect the governance and management of HE. Meek (2003: 4) states 
that the ‘privatisation’ of public HE and the introduction of concepts of market steering represent 
major trends affecting HE governance, once it implies a redefinition of the basic ideological 
principles behind the traditional relationship between HE and the state on the one hand, and HE 
and society on the other. Such redefinitions are also explained by divergent opinions on the 
traditional conception of governing which arise from changes in the relationship between 
government and the private sector. On one hand, there is a common argument that “the power of 
national states to govern has been ‘hollowed out’ gradually (…)” and that “… other forms of 
‘governance without government’ appear to take for granted that governments have lost their ability 
to act more or less autonomously” (Bovens et al. 2001: 11), due to the appropriation of power by 
supranational institutions, such as the EU (Rhodes 1996, 1997; Clarke and Newman 1997; Peters 
and Pierre 1998; Peters 2001; Metcalfe 2001). As such, in all descriptions of changing patterns of 
government, this idea that the government is weakened and incapable of steering as it had in the 
past, is becoming the dominant pattern of management for advanced industrial democracies (Peters 
and Pierre 1998).  
With respect to HE, these changes in the archetypes of institutional governance relate with two 
broad and distinctive pressures to change the way HEIs are organised, namely the 
European/Continental model and the Anglo-Saxon model (Meek 2003: 3). In this way, European 
universities went through a model in which they were dependent on government funding and where 
the state controlled only managerial matters (a combination of guild arrangements and state 
bureaucracy) to an archetype where the government is increasingly stepping back from its direct 
control, obliging HEIs to adopt management expertise techniques. Although it can sound 
controversial, these changes can be seen as strengthening institutional autonomy (Meek 2003).  
Using Clark’s triangle of coordination (1983) as an analytical tool, one can observe a 
redistribution of functions between centre and periphery, in terms of the location of governance 
(Maassen 2003). In this way, from the mid-1980s, the transfer of authority, responsibility, and 
accountability can be analysed in three different directions: 
“(...) vertical shifts can be observed from national to supranational public bodies such as the 
European Union, or from national to regional authorities, (...). Horizontally, shifts have taken 
place from public to semi public or private forms of governance, (...). An example of a mixed 
horizontal-vertical shift is the rise of international semi-public or private accreditation agencies...” 
(Cloete et al. 2005: 208-209). 
 
Indeed, using Neave’s (1998) conceptualisation, several authors (Kogan and Hanney 2000; de Boer 
and Goedegebuure 2003; Gornitzka, Kyvik, and Stensaker 2005; Santiago, Magalhães and Carvalho 
2005) refer to the late 1980s and 1990s period as the ‘rise of the Evaluative State’, where  
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“(...) functions that previously were vested in government, are assigned to the individual 
institutions. The Evaluative State is linked to lump sum budgeting, contractual financing, greater 
margins of discretion in internal budget allocation within the university, the increasing 
importance of staff productivity and the means of verifying it, and the assignment of 
responsibility for ‘strategic development’ to institutional leadership and its supporting 
management” (de Boer and Goedegebuure 2003: 211).  
 
Nevertheless, as Neave (1998) explains, one needs to consider the origins of the Evaluative State to 
understand these measures as a conjectural response to a series of difficulties that HE policy faced 
by that time. Thus, explains the author, by accepting a technical interpretation of the origins of the 
Evaluative State as a “response to government demands for 'greater quality institutional efficiency, 
and enterprise' and the introduction of the market as the supreme regulating principle of HE” (1998: 
268) one should understand that the Evaluative State emerged in a moment when decisions can no 
longer be fobbed off (…)” (ibid: 268). As such, the Evaluative State can be seen as a NPM “branch” 
considering that it aimed at reducing part of the state intervention in the regulation of HE, while 
encouraging institutions to be more entrepreneurial, and simultaneously more accountable and more 
“surveillant”. This conception of the state role in HE governance does not mean a reduction of its 
importance, but rather a “spurring” to the use of market mechanisms in the governance of the sector. 
As Neave (1998) remembered, it represents a shift from a ‘traditional’ form of ‘State control’ to a 
more remote, semi hands-off nexus between university and central authority (1998: 170). In this 
sense, it is said that this period of governance signals one of the most remarkable changes in the 
history of HE policy, namely the shift from ‘input control’ to ‘output control’ “… with its related 
expectations as regards efficiency and effectiveness in mass higher education” (Enders and van 
Vught 2007: 24). 
At the present, it is now possible to evidence that this steering approach to HE poses 
fundamental changes to the nature and status of the academic profession (Meek 2003; Carvalho and 
Santiago 2004).  
It is now acknowledged that no longer are governments the sole actors involved in the process 
of steering societies. They remain a central actor in governing but, as can be read in governance 
literature, they must bargain and cooperate with both international and private sector worlds. These 
governmental actors, members of its relevant networks, play now a relative equal role in the 
bargaining processes, having the power to appeal decisions when these do not meet their 
expectations. As such, it is important to remember the distinction between the terminologies used 
here. When the government has sufficient know-how and power to govern and depends upon the 
legal authority as the principal instrument for steering (Bovens et al. 2001: 12), we refer to the process 
of governing. Nevertheless, in the long run, when the knowledge accumulated by the state starts to 
be insufficient, or there is a lack of legitimacy or even complex policy processes (Rhodes 1996), 
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hampering governments to successfully control the subsectors which operate within its own sector, 
we refer to the process of governance. The author quotes Kooiman, who easily distinguishes “… 
between the process of governing (or goal-directed interventions) and governance, which is the result 
(or the total effects) of social-political-administrative interventions and interactions” (Rhodes 1996: 
657). Another distinction which illustrates the development of this separation is provided by 
Magalhães and Amaral (2008), who argue: 
“Governing as political steering acquires its legitimacy directly from democratic procedures, 
ultimately from the election of people’s representatives. It is from the realm of ‘polity’ that the 
power to allocate resources to attain certain goals derives its legitimacy. Governance, in turn, 
represents the management of this allocation at the various levels, its implementation and 
evaluation. It develops within the realm of ‘policies’ under the aegis of government rule”  
 
The HE sector is a good example of this situation. Faced with a multitude of different types of 
institutions and organisations, the state cannot cope alone with so many pressures, which arise from 
several directions and several actors, being thus obliged to decentralise and delegate powers to others 
with higher expertise. In fact, over the last fifteen to twenty years, governments have delegated much 
of their authority to HEIs (Van Vught 1989; Neave and Van Vught 1991). In this sense, we believe 
that the state does not lose power, not even becomes totally impotent because it assumes the self-
regulation model, knowing that with other partners “help”, it is able to govern society. As Peters 
and Pierre (1998) put it, the state loses the capacity for direct control and replaces that faculty with 
a capacity for influence. In the context of HE governance, this, as mentioned above, is considered 
to be the state supervising model (Goedegebuure et al. 1994) – the Evaluative State (Neave 1998) – 
in which “… the government predominantly is an actor who watches the rules of the game played 
by relative autonomous players and who changes the rules when the game no longer is able to lead 
to satisfactory results” (Gornitzka 1999: 23). Undoubtedly, the enhancement of NPM within public 
organisations in developed countries (and a high support of international organisations, namely the 
OECD) contributed much to this shift in the paradigm of governance to happen. However, we 
share Pollit’s (2003) opinion that, despite the durability and heterogeneity of managerialist 
characteristics, NPM should not be classified as a universal management revolution, especially when 
one speaks about such different countries like Portugal and Finland. Furthermore, as Meek (2003) 
advises, we do not want to think or feel tempted to assume that the language used here to discuss 
these processes has the same meaning in different HE contexts. 
That being said, it is also worth to refer that in order to achieve coordination among different 
levels, actors and types of organisations, partnership and networking became extremely fashionable 
in most Western countries, namely those involved in the Bologna process signature, and within the 
EC. This brings us to what Rhodes (1996) called governance as self-organising networks, where inter-
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organisational linkages characterise service delivery. Briefly, a network refers to several 
interdependent actors involved in delivering services (ibid). 
“These networks are made up of organisations which need to exchange resources (for example, 
money, information, expertise) to achieve their objectives, to maximise their influence over 
outcomes, and to avoid to becoming dependent on other players in the game. (…) Governance is 
about managing networks” (Rhodes 1996: 658).  
 
As can be seen, dependence and competition relationships between governments, HEIs and 
the environment surrounding them, are important and constant factors in HE policy formulation. 
Briefly, the interaction between HEIs and their environment is easier to understand in the light of 
the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), which shares with open systems theory 
the idea that organisations are flexible and perceived as reactive. This interaction happens in a 
reciprocal way: not only are organisations dependent on the environment where they operate but 
they also relate with it actively, manipulating the environment for their own benefit. Thus, instead 
of assuming a passive position towards environmental constraints, organisation leaders must take 
strategic decisions to adapt to the environment in order to gain resources for an efficient and 
effective performance of their organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). This mutual resource 
dependency also characterises the range of relationships between central government organisations 
and the other organisations with which they interact (Rhodes 1988). 
In addition to economic and ideological changes, social and demographic modifications/ 
transformations also shape the way the HE sector is steered. Esping-Andersen (2003) suggests that 
we are now witnessing another historical shift due to changes in demographic and family behaviour. 
These, combined with student expansion and reinforced by an increasing female participation, as 
well as the opening of the system to new publics, also allowed for more diversity, not only in terms 
of different HEIs types, but also concerning a wide and diversified body of students, academic and 
non-academic staff. As a matter of fact, the expansion of the system – partly due to political events 
and incentive policies, and demography and partly to changes in social attitudes – is considered one 
of the most important factors for changing the governance style of HE (Kogan and Hanney 2000). 
Furthermore, these economic and social factors have influenced demand for HE in specific 
disciplines, particularly applied social sciences and business and management studies at a time when 
traditional industrial occupations have declined. As Kogan and Hanney state, “Changes in society 
both cause, and are intensified by, an increase in access to higher education” (2000: 53). HE 
massification raised demands for selectivity and for quality assurance, not to mention yet changes 
in the traditional “trust relationship” contract between the state and HEIs, namely concerning the 
way funds are allocated.  
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These changes were also prompted by the oil crisis of the early 1970s, and by the radical student 
behaviour of the late 1960s, which contributed to change perceptions about HE growth and 
expenditure levels, namely on the value of its objectives (Maassen 2003). Consequently, the general 
economic downturn of the 1980s drove governments to emphasise the economic dimension in their 
HE policies and to introduce further adaptations in governance arrangements (2003: 35).  
Simultaneously, as Kogan and Hanney (2000) clarify, changes in the economy and its demands 
for different types of knowledge and human resources pushed for adjustments on both the 
curriculum and on research and development (2000: 35). Nevertheless, whilst there is the general 
acknowledgment that HE and advanced training contribute to economic growth and therefore to 
increase population wellbeing, governments adopted the idea that the market must fund that from 
which it will benefit (2000: 51), e.g., governments believed that the market should also contribute 
financially with the costs of those (new) graduates it will “absorb” when they finish their 
programmes. These ideas/practices are especially perceptible when we move to the main focus of 
this study. Quite recently, the Bologna declaration and the EU’s Lisbon Strategy, particularly the 
Modernisation Agenda (2007), which stresses that education, research, innovation and the 
modernisation of HEIs are important pillars of the Lisbon Strategy, provided the latest major factors 
pushing HEIs to change their governance structures and processes in order to ‘engage’ in the 
knowledge-based economy in a more powerful and integrated way. Behind these changes, however, 
one cannot forget the impact of changes in the nature of education and research, which can be 
regarded as both outcomes and contexts for change (Kogan and Hanney 2000). 
At the turn of a new century and at the beginning of the new millennium one can observe a 
“new” context for both universities and polytechnics, where steering tools have became procedural 
and non-coercive. For this, as Neave (1998) explains, much has contributed one’s perception of the 
State’s degree of intervention and its intensity and the outcomes of this intervention. According to 
the author, it is theoretically possible to have a HE system which functions subjected to formal State 
control and simultaneously with minimal interference or with a degree of intervention considered 
“natural”, once that “it is not State control per se which is the source of disquiet so much as what is 
perceived as reinforcing State control beyond established bounds” (1998: 270, Neave’s emphasis).  
 
2.7 Shifts in European HE Governance: a new context for universities 
 
From the perspective of the “interventionary” state, whose mission is to ensure that the HE 
sector meets the interests of its publics (society) while at the same time searches for continuous 
development, HE is not very different from other (public) services that are publicly funded. 
Nevertheless, the general discourse that European universities face demands for urgent and radical 
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reform has been intensified under the argument that environments are changing rapidly and that 
HEIs are not able or willing to respond adequately, at least while applying their traditional collegial 
governance system. As such, it is necessary to rethink and reshape their internal order and role in 
society simply because European universities do not learn, adapt and reform themselves fast enough 
(Olsen and Maassen 2007). As it has happened in the public sector, where management, strategic 
planning and the superiority of market mechanisms were seen as the solution for the lack of 
efficiency of governments’ performance, also in HE, institutional management appeared as the magic 
wand to the challenges HEIs face in the so called knowledge and global society.  
A distinction between HE collegial decision-making and managerial governance is provided by 
Kogan and Hanney (2000: 26) and Bleiklie and Kogan (2007). Within the collegium format, a 
“minimalist organisation”, academics have equal decision-making power and act together to control 
standards of entry and accreditation, to allocate essential common tasks, to determine visions of 
labour and reward systems, and to distribute resources equally to its members whilst avoiding 
control over the amount and nature of the work to be done. According to Ivar Bleiklie and Maurice 
Kogan (2007: 477), the collegial model of governance resembles the vision of the university as an 
independent republic of scholars where institutional autonomy and academic freedom are seen as 
two sides of the same coin and the professoriate have the power to decide about major issues and 
the management of daily affairs. Collegiality is thus the governance model usually called professional 
bureaucracy (Mintzberg 1979) where decision-making is shared by equals – academics – who take 
management roles only temporarily and had relative autonomy in time, teaching and research 
management (cf. Tapper and Palfreyman 2010). Decision-making is based on consensus-building, 
egalitarian environment founded in mutual respect among scholars and good discourse where the 
best argument wins (Birnbaum, 1988). 
On the contrary, managerial governance, or a stakeholder organisation as Bleiklie and Kogan 
(2007) denominated it, implies a hierarchical division of authority and responsibilities, by 
determining policies and objectives which will be detached from academics to whom tasks would be 
assigned. Institutional autonomy is thus considered a basis for strategic decision-making and 
academic freedom is circumscribed by other stakeholders’ interests. Academics are just one more 
group of stakeholders among several others (2007: 478). Kogan and Hanney (2000) explain that 
since HE’s main activities are essentially individualistic, and depend on the expertise and 
commitment of its members, its governmental arrangements fall best within the collegial format, 
where authority and power are shared by academics. Indeed, the collegial model is the one that best 
fits the meaning of the word “university”, which derives from the Latin universitas magistrorum et 
scholarium, roughly meaning “community of teachers and scholars” (Rothblatt and Wittrock 1993: 4-
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5). Defined as such, Meek (2003) states that there are not many HE systems left which follow this 
style of governance. Indeed, not only in the Anglo-Saxon world but also nearly in every European 
country, traditional notions of collegiality and consensus-based decision-making have increasingly 
been put aside, making room for ‘business-like’ management and the “professionalisation” of 
administrative structures (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004). The professionalisation of 
institutional management and the adaptation of administrative structures are thus achieved through 
hierarchical and managerial procedures which refers to the role of institutions’ leadership (rectors 
or presidents at the top-level and deans at the intermediate level) in setting internal goals, regulations, 
and decision-making processes (Schimank and Lange 2009: 59). Nevertheless, on the other side, it 
is argued that in some countries, academic self-governance remains strong because HEIs daily 
operations are based on informal and non-hierarchical peer relationships, and academic 
contributions prevail mostly on personal commitment (Paradeise, Reale and Goastellec 2009). In 
fact, the peer review-based self-steering of academic communities is considered to be an example 
of how academics can control their own work (Enders et al. 2008). Alongside this dissertation, 
changes in the increasing professionalisation of institutional leadership and management will be 
further explored. 
The transition from a collegial governance model to a more entrepreneurial one is framed in a 
general trend observed since the 1980s, in which the traditional characteristics of the university were 
challenged in order to reconstruct or transform the university image as an organisation “as others” 
(Deem 1998). This is better understood when reading the father of HE strategic management 
writings, George Keller. Keller (1983) defended that as one of the largest industries of the American 
territory, universities and colleges should be also transformed into businesslike organisations. More 
recently, Teixeira et al. (2004) started their book about the role of the market in HE with the 
following statement: “All across the world, higher education has become a large enterprise” (2004: 
1). On this, Maassen (2003), drawing on a previous discussion of Becher and Kogan (1992: 181), 
explains that this emphasis on institutional management on HE reflects the transition period of the 
1980s, when management was changing from a second order set of activities into a self justifying 
activity, i.e., a shift towards a self-justified management function in HE (2003: 46). And this 
transition happened not only from the academics’ perspective, who were then transformed in 
institutional managers, but also from the perspective of external stakeholders like state 
authorities/agencies. Indeed, the author remembers that the shift from traditional collegial 
governance to institutional management, especially evident since the 1990s, is quite clear in Burton 
Clark’s books, namely when he wrote The Higher Education System (1983), distinguishing between 
academic and administrative cultures and roles, and later, in his 1998’s book – Creating Entrepreneurial 
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Universities: Organizational Pathways of Transformation – when Clark brings up the importance of the 
interconnectedness of managerial and academic values in order to build a “strengthened steering 
core” for the university of the new century, the entrepreneurial university. This model of university 
governance mentioned by Clark in 1998, which main characteristics were a strengthened steering 
core, an expanded developmental periphery, a diversified funding base, a stimulated academic 
heartland and an integrated entrepreneurial culture, contrasted with the traditional governance 
model of (exclusively) collegiality, mainly due to its rigidity and unpreparedness to deal with the 
changes that the new century and millennium present to HEIs.  
This rethinking of HE governance, which uses management as an indispensable tool in 
institutional governance, lead us to one common pitfall mentioned in the beginning of this 
dissertation, namely assuming that all forms of HE management, or public management reform, are 
pernicious (Meek 2003). Clark (1998) draws attention to the importance of restructuring the 
university management core, which should be enhanced through the fusion of “new managerial 
values with traditional academic ones” (1998: 137). He highlights an adjusted combination of “both 
worlds”, not only the exclusive applicability of only one part. According to Maassen (2003), the need 
to manage HEIs through similar mechanisms used in private organisations naturally relates with the 
new regulations for public sector management, in which the state “steers” the market (Teixeira et 
al. 2004) in order to minimise the risk of market failure by applying private managers’ expertise in 
public sector management (Maassen 2003: 50). This is thus the main argument that proponents of 
the market approach to reform use: there should be enough efficiency gains with the application of 
market principles to justify any efficiency losses from reduced policy coordination (Peters 2001: 
185). 
When compared to the ‘State control’, with its “bureaucratic heavy-handedness” character 
(Neave 1998), the market approach of governance was viewed as something more suitable to create 
both ‘flexibility’ and the skills which HE will need to “survive”. Nevertheless, the balance stressed 
by Clark (1998), the interconnectedness of managerial values with traditional academic ones, is 
especially useful in order to distinguish (or to remind us) that though the latest decades demanded 
HEIs to be governed by applying some private sector mechanisms, these institutions are 
fundamentally different from ideal-type firms (as shoes factories). Furthermore, it is believed that 
the market model of governance also breeds market-failures (Wolf 1979).  
Within the HE sector, the constant claim for increased institutional autonomy for HEIs, in the 
name of efficiency and responsiveness to society’s diverse needs, frequently underlies reforms within 
the sector. In fact, when carrying out their empirical work, Kogan and Hanney (2000) found through 
their interviewees’ answers that, in those HE contexts where the state has traditionally played a less 
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visible role in institutions’ steering, there is a common perception that the power of the institutions 
has grown at the expense of individual academic freedom, e.g. there is an inverse relationship 
between increasing institutional autonomy and decreasing academic freedom. On this, both authors 
and Meek (2003) draw on Eric Ashby (1966) and Berdhal’s (1988) distinction of academic freedom, 
which belongs to the individual academic, namely the  “freedom of the individual scholar in his/her 
teaching and research to pursue truth wherever it seems to lead without fear of punishment or 
termination of employment for having offended some political, religious or social orthodoxy” 
(Berdhal 1990: 172-173) and institutional autonomy. In order to be an autonomous institution, 
Berdhal (1990) states that a HEI needs to fulfil three basic requirements. These are: freedom to 
select staff and students and the conditions under which they access and remain in the institution; 
freedom to determine the curriculum content and degree standards, and freedom to allocate funds 
(within the amounts available) across different categories of expenditures (Ashby 1966: 296 in 
Berdahl 1990: 172). According to Neave (1998) and Meek (2003) no HEI has complete autonomy 
once institutions will always need to be publicly accountable to its stakeholders for what and how 
they do, whether they are public or private. Nevertheless, despite increasing “external” demands to 
be accountable, from the moment (European) universities have the right to decide on the 
aforementioned issues, and to pass their own statutes, it is commonly assumed that HEIs are 
becoming more autonomous. According to the Eurydice 2000 report Two decades of reform in higher 
education in Europe: 1980 onwards, and EUA studies (Estermann and Nokkala 2009), one of the most 
significant reforms observed in the European context is the increased autonomy HEIs conquered. 
This was possible, not only at the expense of individual academic freedom, as Kogan and Hanney 
(2000) noticed, but also (and probably the factor that suits most to countries whose HE systems are 
organised according to the Continental model, such as Portugal and Finland) through the move 
away from an “interventionary state”, where institutions were submitted to detailed control through 
legislation, towards a more “facilitatory state” (Neave and Van Vught 1991; Neave 1998) or the 
Evaluative state supervision model.  
The increasing emphasis on accountability within the HE sector started to be evident in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, stimulated by the ideology of performance orientation, which emerged 
with the second wave of reforms in the public sector. This increase was also driven by a decline of 
trust in public institutions, including universities. Although referring predominantly to the US 
context, Martin Trow (1996) explains that accountability is an alternative to trust, and efforts to 
strengthen it usually involve parallel efforts to weaken trust. As such, European HEIs started to 
apply formal quality assessment mechanisms as a form of self-regulation. Taking Kooiman’s (2008) 
definition on self-regulation, explaining that in modern societies it refers to situations in which 
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actors take care of themselves outside government’s domain and control (2008: 9), it is curious (and 
even paradoxical) to see that greater accountability also implies that HEIs redefine the ways in which 
they inform their stakeholders about their performances, implying a tighter political control of HE 
(Maassen 2008). This, in turn, requires more stringent and detailed procedures for quality assurance 
mechanisms, both at the state and institutional levels. As a matter of fact, the “construction” of 
HEIs as institutions able to be self-regulated in order to better adapt to changes imposed by their 
external environments had not been possible without a huge legislative effort. As Neave (1998: 275) 
argues, deregulation occurred in parallel with the emergence of an arsenal of legally defined 
instruments. Thus, this changing role of the government, the rise of the Evaluative state, vis-à-vis 
HEIs allowed for a transfer in the allocation of responsibility with respect to institutional, legal, 
financial and planning issues, becoming then institutions’ responsibility instead of governments’ 
(Maassen 2003).  
This, however, does not mean that the government is no longer a major player in HE 
governance. Instead, it gets rid of a series of duties and financial burdens (encumbrances) to seek 
other models of governance. As an example, to accomplish this shift in responsibilities, public HEIs 
started thus to be evaluated through ex post instruments, such as goal formulation, performance 
measurement, quality indicators, efficiency and costs standards, benchmarks, etc. (Goedegebuure 
and Meek 1998), also as a way to learn from the effectiveness and impact of their ex ante assessment 
mechanisms and processes, such as legislation and rules. This shift from ex ante regulation and 
incentive mechanisms to ex post instruments of control, or as Maassen (2008) refers, a move away 
from steering on the basis of ‘hard’ regulations and laws to a growing reliance on steering on the 
basis of ‘soft’ mechanisms also reflects a change in the steering paradigm, from vertical to horizontal 
forms of governance (2008: 103). This paradigm emphasises the need to increase the efficiency of 
services provided by the HE sector, culminating in the proliferation of assessment and evaluation 
agencies all over Europe. Nevertheless, as Bleiklie (2000) refers, the traditional tools of governance 
are still highly used in several systems, Portugal and Finland being good examples of that. Indeed, 
it is often argued that what we are witnessing now is a devolution of authority from the state level 
and, at the same time, centralisation tendencies within HEIs when it comes to accountability 
measures such as quality assurance (CHEPS 2008).  
In turn, Paradeise et al. (2009) refer to this relationship between the state and HEIs as a “(…) 
win-win game based on simplification of regulatory and administrative procedures and separation 
of policy-making and management” (2009: 229). When there is asymmetry of power between both 
parties, universities, free from excessive regulation, have freedom to dedicate more attention to 
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develop their strategic capabilities, while public authorities, by reducing top down management 
costs, can concentrate on their steering functions (Paradeise et al. 2009). 
In addition to the instruments mentioned above, or to be more precise, in parallel with them 
and also as a way of implementing these measures, intermediary bodies of negotiation between 
government and HEIs were established as a way to redistribute (and to deregulate) powers across 
the various policy levels. These state control agencies are, among others, research and funding 
councils and quality accreditation agencies. The reallocation of functions and control from the 
central national administration to different ministries can also be interpreted as a renewed focus on 
public governance, namely in the way the “interventionary” state steers the HE sector. As Gornitzka 
et al. (2007: 196) explain, in some countries these intermediary bodies traditionally served as buffer 
organisations to soften the impact of government on universities. Interesting is that based on the 
studies of Meek (2002) and Kogan and Hanney (2000), Gornitzka et al. (2007: 196) refer that in the 
UK these bodies were explicitly changed to act as agencies of national ministries and to protect the 
interest of government rather than the universities in the coordination of HE.  
In such a multi-actor governance approach, national governments are only one of the 
influencing actors in a complex network of many interrelated, more or less autonomous actors. In 
this sense, the sate’s role, via these agents has become what Rhodes (1996), among others, called 
one of a network manager – “governance as a self-organizing networks” (1996: 658), in which the 
state steers by directly adjusting the responsibilities assigned to intermediary bodies (Neave 1998). 
Nevertheless, this model of governance in which the state intervenes by delegating responsibilities 
to its intermediary bodies raises questions with respect to their level of ownership, autonomy, 
independence and even responsibility. Rhodes (1996: 659) argues that these organisms, as 
representations of self-organised networks, are autonomous and resist government steering by 
developing their own policies and managing their environments.  
With respect to HE this mode of functioning is not linear. Neave (1998: 281) defends that 
these intermediary bodies may be seen as a “parallel bureaucracy” which has evolved to a form of 
public service privatisation. On the other side, they also represent another form of “steering from 
distance”, or steering through deregulation, especially when governments aim at addressing 
‘government failures’ of the past, as Wolf (1979) referred. In this sense, the delegation of 
responsibilities through different networks may become bewildering, leading to a sense that there is 
no one actor who can be held effectively accountable. The distribution of power is thus diffuse and 
pluralist (Ferlie et al. 2008: 333). However, despite their significant degree of autonomy, the 
relationship between governments, HEIs, and these intermediary bodies, which have then spread 
not only to the national but also to international levels, is quite complex and it entails a relative 
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degree of interdependency between those involved. This comes in line with what Peters (2000) 
stressed relatively to the fact that governments had lost some policy autonomy to external actors 
such as international organisations and amorphous international markets, creating the perception of 
resistance to being governed.  
This mixture of specific modes of public management, in the governance of HE, namely the 
use of market mechanisms, combined with soft bureaucracy approaches, delegation of powers and 
responsibilities, and the use networks as a governance layer, became typical of this sector, given the 
specificity of the HEIs’ nature. HEIs, as well as many other complex organisations, have always 
been hybrids (Reed et al. 2002: xxiv). According to Ferlie et al. (2008) this occurs due to oscillations, 
when over time, a system may oscillate from one type of governance model to another and back 
again. Gornitzka et al. (2005) refer to this using a similar rationale, the sedimentation process, in 
which remnants of old systems are blended with the new, posing thus serious challenges when 
implementing new policies: “…when ideas of self-regulation mix with continued aspirations and 
practices of central control, and when structures of responsibility and governance are unclear” 
(2005: 48).  
Simultaneously, changes in the way HE policies are steered and the positioning that the sector 
has been acquiring in the society in general brings the problem about definitions of what the term 
public sector means, about who is the public service consumer (Carvalho 2009: 72), and about who 
are the real stakeholders of the organisation (Amaral and Magalhães 2001). These issues demand a 
reflection about what kind of regulatory framework suits the HE sector in order to best satisfy the 
‘public interest’. This, in turn, brings up concerns about the way the sector is going to be funded, 
considering that European governments have traditionally remained the primary funding source of 
HEIs and institutions are increasingly pushed to diversify their funding sources. Nevertheless, at the 
present there still are many HEIs, albeit in a lesser scale, which still depend on government for 
funding and even for legitimacy, especially in those countries that are now moving into a 
‘modernisation’ process of their HE systems.  
Meek (2003) also draws attention to the movement from the public good concept of knowledge 
to one of commercialisation and ‘private’ ownership, which finds its roots on the neo-liberal 
ideology of NPM, challenging in this way the traditional academic values with respect to HEIs 
structure and organisation. Moreover, this movement is accompanied by harsh criticism to the image 
of the scientist protected from the world in an ivory tower, e.g., the idea that science was a different 
activity in which scientists were seen as a group outside the society (Ferlie et al. 2008: 328). Such 
discussions may be analysed in the light of the ‘contractualisation’ concept as the new governing 
principle between government, society and HE (Neave 1998), when the state has to steer through 
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contracts, partnerships and networks the services provided by these intermediary bodies. According 
to the author, contractualisation “… puts an end to the idea of the university as a service to the 
State and instead recasts it as a public service of which one of the funders and supporters happens 
to be the State” (1998: 276, author’s emphasis). This shift changes substantially the traditional 
‘trusting relationship’ between the state and institutions, namely with respect to the way HEIs, as 
self-regulated institutions, administrate their opportunities and in the way HE is seen and assessed 
by its publics. Thus:  
“As a service to the public, clearly the university has to be judged on the basis of the perceptions 
that the public has of the services it receives and which, increasingly, it is being asked to pay for 
directly out of its own pocket. However, the apparent loosening of ties between State and 
University also means that the university has the opportunity to seek support – financial, moral 
or donatory – from third parties and to pass contracts with them as well” (Neave 1998: 277). 
 
Such HE dynamics point to the fact that what can be seen as a reduction of state’s power at a 
particular time and situation can also be seen as its reinforcement in other moments. According to 
Van Kersbergen and van Waarden (2004), coordination increasingly takes place through several 
ways, policy levels and actors which have the ability to influence the agenda setting, policy 
implementation, developments and its evaluation (de Boer, Enders and Jongbloed 2007). Indeed, it 
can be said that ‘multi-actor governance’ (and multi-level, as we shall see below) is one of the most 
recent and outstanding characteristics of HEs systems in the Western world, especially in those 
countries integrating the Bologna process. Somehow seen as an extension of the European 
dimension, Bologna is probably the most visible representation of this multi-actor and multi-level 
environment, characterised by a balance in power distribution. This is diluted among the different 
actors according to the nature of the policy to implement and their aims, which is also 
complemented with a certain degree of freedom in its implementation, both at the institutional, 
regional, national and international levels. 
Being HE management a relatively new function that is “(…) internally embedded in a 
democratic governance structure and a traditional administrative structure” (Maassen 2003: 48), it 
is understandable and reasonable the idea that one needs to improve continuously the governance 
and management structures of the sector in order to achieve an optimum level of performance, 
especially after the moment HEIs are confronted with a general discourse of diminishing level of 
trust in their missions and performance. Nevertheless, and as Pollitt (2003) signals, it is also 
important to take into account that even when a particular reform clearly ‘succeeds’ in respect of 
one or two of its objectives, it is unlikely that it will succeed in all. As universities (and other types 
of HEIs) are being increasingly identified as “key actors” in developing the knowledge society, 
European governments have never been so attentive to HE and research than today, and it is 
therefore natural that they search for means which enable them a less expensive and more efficient 
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management of the sector (Ferlie et al. 2000). In this sense, changes in the development of the 
contexts where HEIs operate, namely the increasing emphasis on a knowledge based economy and 
the globalisation of the labour market for graduates with a HE degree, revested HE with increasing 
value. This happened both socially – due to increasing massive participation – and economically, 
considering that knowledge and technology are seen as key elements for both economic and social 
development. As such, HE has become more visible politically and more strategic economically, but 
simultaneously “less special” (Maassen and Olsen 2007). Therefore, while it became more expensive 
to sustain the sector, simultaneously governments and other stakeholders put increased expectations 
and pressures towards the sectors’ modernisation. These expectations gained extended 
expressiveness at the expense of several aspects, namely pressures to change modes of knowledge, 
training and education production (from mode 1 to mode 2 and more recently to mode 3, Gibbons 
et al. 1994).  
Parallel to this, many European countries HEIs are under strong pressure to increase their 
cooperation with society and industries (public-private partnerships) by implementing a third 
component in their mission, namely technology or knowledge transfer in order to be more relevant 
to its stakeholders. This relevance happens through the promotion of innovativeness, job creation, 
and establishment of direct links between research/knowledge and commercial activities (Maassen 
2008). Indeed, the emphasis in the productivity of research and teaching is turning so fast to 
economic demands that this poses challenges to the “true” value of knowledge and to the fact of 
who decides (and to whom) what is “useful knowledge”. As Henkel (2000) put it: “This implies that 
HE exists to provide knowledge that is useful and efficiently produced for society and its value will 
be determined substantially, if not wholly, by those outside academia” (2000: 60). Thus, since the 
moment knowledge is recognised of paramount importance to enhance economic growth and global 
competitiveness, it seems obvious that governments put more efforts to adapt governance to the new 
situation, setting policies in this direction.  
 
2.8 Modes of Governance  
Issues related with the way societies are ruled and organised have always raised great interest 
and debates amongst different publics. However, as Peters (2001) puts it, very often, these 
discussions are not more than continuous and hollow criticisms to government and to the people 
working in it.  
In order to understand the context that prompted changes in the HE sector, especially those 
stemming from recent legislative reforms, the evolution of the “different roles” of the state in the 
public sector will be explored. The analysis starts to describe the traditional model of governance, 
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its specificities and why it was considered such a successful model during several decades. By doing 
this, it is then possible to understand the context which gave rise to increasing dissatisfaction and, 
ultimately prompted attempts to reform. Subsequently, and sharing the assumption that the 
traditional governance model is being left behind (van Vught 1989; Neave and van Vught 1994; 
Kooiman 2003; etc.), the rationale for shifts in governance modes will be explained, as well as the 
alternatives which have been emerging in the last decades and how this scenario affects HE systems 
and institutions. 
The main rationale for linking general reforms in the public sector with particular changes 
within the HE system lays on the belief that HEIs are complex organisations operating in an open 
system, receiving inputs (professionals, students, financial resources, etc.) from, and producing 
outputs (students finishing their studies, research results, etc.) for their environments (Birnbaum, 
1989). Furthermore, the system of political and socioeconomic relations underlies any public sector 
activity, namely HE governance. Thus, since institutions do not exist in a vacuum, both private and 
public sectors constitute part of the external environment where HEIs operate. As noticed by 
Maurice Kogan and Marton (2006), as universities are major public institutions, they can be 
considered either as sub-systems of the state or as independent institutions that are strongly affected 
by the nature of the state (2006: 69). Sharing an analogous opinion, Ferlie et al. (2008) defend that 
the transformations experienced in HE are similar to those experienced by other key public services 
due to the redefinition of the role of the nation state in the generality of public services.  
There are, however, other viewpoints on this. For example, Guy Neave (1998) argues that the 
reforms the public sector went through in the last decades should not be compared or resembled 
to the HE sector. He advocates that this is an extremely peculiar sector, which was affected by 
“exclusive” factors, such as the massification and, in some regions, like the US and in some 
European countries (Nybom, 2007), the universalisation of HE. And, at least in Europe, this has 
happened without any fundamental structural and institutional changes in the existing, “often 
unitary and inflexible”, HE systems (2007: 74). Nevertheless, since the mid-1980s that broad 
questions such as how should government govern, what should it do, who decides, how do they decide, and what do 
they decide (Amaral, Jones and Karseth 2002: 279) have been gaining growing importance in the 
political agendas of national HE systems.  
A curious point is that, although the concept of HE governance is scarcely used in the Bologna 
documents, governance is an area that underlies all the aspects of the Declaration (Kohler 2006; 
Zgaga 2006). This intertwining between governance issues and the Bologna process should be 
understandable considering that the objectives and tools of the process are to create change – both 
at the system and institutional levels; they are about a culture of change and about change 
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management, aspects which undoubtedly are an essential part of governance (Kohler 2006: 22). 
Furthermore, the fact that the Bologna documents have been highlighting the notion of HE as a 
public good and a public responsibility, reinforces the pressures for implementing “good” 
governance in the sector (Kohler 2006). 
Generally speaking, these discussions fall in the wake of previous studies on the relationship 
between the state and professional public organisations, such as hospitals and universities. Among 
others, the different forms of organisation and state intervention were denominated as State Models 
of State Governance (Johan P.   Olsen, 1988), Steering Models (van Vught 1989), Governance Modes/Models 
(Kooiman 1993;  Rhodes 1996; Peters 2001; Pierre and Peters 2005), etc. Although the majority of 
models and changes presented in the literature refer to public sector specificities, the 
conceptualisation of the stages presented in these models, as ideal types, can be applied to different 
realities (Carvalho, 2009). In this research, some of these models will be applied to the HE reality.  
According to Enders et al. (2008: 114), a mode of governance is made up of several dimensions 
that are combined in empirical situations, which means that they refer to the approaches 
governments use to steer and influence specific public sectors, such as HE. Although they all require 
both social and public sector actors to perform their tasks, these actors are assigned with different 
roles and different powers. Therefore, they represent different political histories and state traditions 
(Peters 2005: 10).  
Olsen (1988) orders governance models along two dimensions that explain decision-making: 
voluntaristic and deterministic. Decisions are either voluntary and reflect the goals and expectations 
of rational actors, or they are determined and respond to environmental forces (1988: 237-238). 
Complementing these ideas, Gornitzka and Maassen (2000) refer that steering models concern the 
institutional context of policy processes. As such, these models encompass two distinct types of 
institutional rules: interaction and context rules, which determine the relationships between state 
and society in a policy subsystem. Thus, whereas interaction rules configure the interaction 
behaviour of actors in the public sector, context rules refer to the way the context in which this 
interaction happens is regulated (2000: 268). There are several stages specifying the intensity of 
state’s intervention and its purposes in the public sector. Kogan and Hanney (2000) explain that this 
intensity can be placed on a spectrum, going from  
“(…) the minimalist position advocated by Nozick (1974) in which the state does not do more 
than to protect the natural rights of individuals, through more traditional liberal and conservative 
thinking, to the maximalist communitarian of absolutist views both of which grant maximum 
authority to collectivity” (2000: 24).  
 
Thus, these different governance models share some important commonalities as well as crucial 
differences (Peters 2005). All of them represent alternatives to the traditional system of governance, 
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even if some of them still incorporate characteristics from the traditional mode. Additionally, there 
is the common belief that different steering models should be interpreted and understood bearing 
in mind different political, social, historic and cultural contexts (Peters 2001; 2005; Kooiman 2003; 
Carvalho 2009). Furthermore, with the exception of the typology introduced by Van Vught (1989), 
these steering models are not necessarily mutually exclusive; they refer to hybrid forms of 
coordination, i.e. the use of elements from more than one theoretical model in any governance 
approach in practice (Gornitzka and Maassen 2000; Cloete et al. 2005; Muller et al. 2006). While 
Olsen (1988) presents four different governance models and Pierre and Peters (2005) introduced 
five models31, the typology introduced by Van Vught (1989) varies only between two steering 
models. Both models represent the extremes of the spectrum with respect to the intensity of the 
state’s intervention in public sector and this is why Van Vught’s models do not overlap.  
Hybridism, the combination of state regulation and market coordination, is in itself not negative 
or positive, once it depends upon the effects of its application in practice by a government (Cloete 
et al. 2005: 220). The models presented here are just borders on being ideal types, and therefore one 
needs to acknowledge that there is no national case that fits neatly in any of the patterns described 
(Peters 2005: 17). The purpose is to apply these models to different situations (Olsen 1988). Political 
hybridism is thus a recurrent feature of governance in HE, resulting from an ambiguous role of 
government towards HEIs performance.  
When comparing state steering models in eight Western European countries, and referring to 
the Portuguese HE system, Å. a. Gornitzka and Maassen (2000) explain that hybrid forms of 
governance in specific areas appear “… where there is an overlap between the legal decision–making 
capacity given in the law to the Ministry of Education and the capacity given to the institutional 
decision making bodies” (2000: 83). Referring to this type of political hybridism, A. a. Amaral and 
Magalhães (2001) point to the Janus-headed character of state governance in the HE field, e.g., when 
increased institutional autonomy is still shared with significant government regulation. 
Frequently used classifications for HE are the state models introduced by Olsen (1988) and the 
basic steering models developed by van Vught (1989) which are the central/rational planning and 
control model, and the self-regulation model. These were later elaborated into state control and 
state supervision models in order to analyse changes in the relationship between the state and HE 
(Neave and van Vught 1991; Muller et al. 2006).  
Briefly, the state control model is characterised by strong confidence in government’s 
capabilities and decisions and therefore the government steers through stringent rules and extensive 
                                                 
31 Peters’ (2005) governance models which roughly correspond to Olsen’s classifications: Étatiste, Liberal-Democratic, 
State-Centric, the Dutch Governance School and Governance without Government. 
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control mechanisms (Gornitzka and Maassen 2000: 269). Governments see themselves as 
omniscient and omnipresent actors able to steer a part of the society according to their own 
objectives (ibid). According to this model, governmental actors and agencies acquire comprehensive 
knowledge of problems to examine all alternatives for action and their consequences before taking 
the best decisions (Amaral and Magalhães 2001: 10).  
As a stereotype, or an “intellectual construct against which to compare reality” (Pierre and 
Peters 2005: 24), this model would correspond to Peters (2005) Étatiste model, where the government 
is the principal actor for all aspects of governance and governs with little or no involvement of 
societal actors. This pattern of governance, as pointed by the author, seems quite unlikely to appear 
in contemporary democratic societies. 
On the other side, the self-regulation model is more “modest” when it comes to state control 
and it emphasises monitoring and feedback. In this model, governments behave predominantly as 
actors “… who watch the rules of the game played by relative autonomous players and change the 
rules when the game no longer is able to lead to satisfactory results” (2000: 269). Muller et al. (2006) 
explain that the assumption supporting a development from the state control model to the state 
supervision model is based on the rationale that the supervisory role of the state leads to a better 
performance of HE systems than the controlling role. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind 
that this dichotomy of analysis does not allow for accurately and completely study shifts and/or 
developments on the specificities of HE governance. This is why Olsen’s typology of state 
governance models will be used here as a framework of analysis. This typology is a more flexible 
tool of analysis that includes more variations between these two spectrums, allowing us to position 
both case studies.  
With respect to administrative reforms in the public sector, Olsen (1988) explains that the 
significance of his four models of governance (the Sovereign, rationality-bounded State, the Institutional 
state, the Corporate-pluralistic state, and the Supermarket classical liberal state) lays on the fact that they can 
be found in Western democracies in different blends. In this way, and as referred also by Rhodes 
(1996), they materialise different democratic ideals and views of the role of the state, social actors 
and government’s agencies. Additionally,  
“(…) their [governance modes] relative prominence may shift over time and from one societal 
sector to another. The result being a heterogeneous state consisting of different organs and sectors 
not necessarily applying the same approach to government steering and control, and where 
changes in this approach may occur without necessarily doing away with the remnants and 
institutional arrangements of former approaches32 (Gornitzka and Maassen 2000: 269).  
                                                 
32 These types of  reforms, where changes are implemented without former approaches have been completely 
“removed” or rejected, is called sedimentation and is a typical process HE. Ackroyd (1995: 23) defines to sedimentation 
as a situation in which old institutions and processes are seldom completely abolished; rather they are improved 
and restructured or even downgraded. The sedimentation process is thus similar to organic growth and opposes to radical 
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Olsen’s models portray different explanations for the links between central governments and 
various public agencies, while trying to answer to question of why governments should provide 
agencies with more autonomy (1988: 234). Each model is based on a different view of the proper 
role of the state, the public and government agencies. In this sense, all models can operate with 
autonomy – only the criteria and standards (justification) for it and the underlying ideas for such 
autonomy are different (Olsen 1988: 237). 
The main characteristics of Olsen’s models will be briefly summarised here and applied to the 
HE context, drawing on the work of Gornitzka and Maassen (2000). A summary of the four models 
of governance and their dimensions is provided in table 2. These models assume that conflict is 
solved a priori so that decisions are made with reference to shared goals and norms (Olsen 1988: 
237). 
 
2.8.1 The Sovereign, Rationality-Bounded State Model  
According to this model, which assumes a managerial perspective, the role of the state is to 
adapt society to political preferences, plans and visions of good society (Olsen 1988: 237). By winning 
public elections, political leaders get the authority, legitimacy and power to architect society. 
Administration is an instrument to implement political goals and it is therefore seen as a neutral 
activity. The author refer that the standard organisational model is the departmental agency 
constituted by a hierarchy of influence, responsibility and control and insulated from other 
influences. Thus, an agency gains autonomy from the central government through leadership choice 
or delegation. The degree of this autonomy depends on the importance and attractiveness of 
decisions for political leaders. In this way, political leaders face a dilemma when dealing either with 
tightly controlled agencies – which often show little initiative and become then impotent and 
formalistic – or with less tightly controlled agencies, which might give priority to special self interests 
(ibid: 239). Olsen explains that political leaders prefer loosely coupled relations in situations where 
they are much dependent on an agency’s expertise, and where differences in interests and 
identifications are modest. “In such cases, agencies or boards of experts are given a central role in 
public policy making” (ibid: 239). Loose coupling results thus from the leader’s choice as he sees this 
as a means for achieving his goals. In this way, changes in organisations follow changes in the political 
arena, as for example, via elections (when a government looses an election) or via changes in political 
coalitions (ibid: 239).  
                                                 
change, once “… change is viewed as processes where new ideals come in addition to and are ‘layered on top’ of  
established ones” (Bleiklie and Kogan 2007: 483). 
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With respect to HE, the sovereign state model is closely associated with the state control model 
or with the interventionist state, in which HE is seen as an instrument for reaching economic, 
political or social goals, e.g. HE is seen as an instrument of achieving national purposes. This purpose 
is best achieved through tight control over HEIs (Gornitzka and Maassen 2000: 270). In this way, 
HEIs need to be highly accountable to political authorities. Nevertheless, institutional autonomy is 
based on the idea that the government is overloaded and therefore “technical” decisions can be left 
to the institutions themselves. Institutional governance is strongly hierarchical and the decision-
making is centralised with ‘top down’ procedures. Policy-making happens in elected assemblies and 
in the neutral but politically loyal civil service. Change happens according to changes in political 
leadership. Being one of the most centralised HE systems in Europe until recently, Finnish 
universities have been an essential contributor in the creation of the Finnish national identity 
(Treuthardt & Välimaa, 2008). Changes that have been happening in the Finnish HE system result 
from a mixture, or a blend of these two aspects: developments of historical processes and political 
reforms. 
 
2.8.2 The Institutional State Model  
In this model, the state is a political and moral order and represents a collection of enduring 
standard procedures that reflects the shared principles and beliefs of the population. The state’s 
primary task is to guarantee the political order and the autonomy of the various sectors of society 
(Olsen 1988: 239). In this way, the duty of political leaders is to support rather than direct society. 
Similarly to the New Public Service model (Denhardt and Denhardt 2000), the public is viewed as 
citizens with system-defined rights and duties. Contrary to the sovereign state model, in the 
institutional model governmental agencies are not neutral institutions: they are cultural systems that 
embody missions, values and identities (Olsen 1988: 239). Organisations develop over time through 
a natural, historical process. This long-run development allows for smooth reorganisations. 
Reorganisation processes formalise then developments that have already taken place. As such, not 
only reorganisation facilitates the maintenance, development and transmission of cultural norms and 
beliefs, but it also keeps concepts and theories alive (ibid: 240).  
In this scenario, the agency’s autonomy is based on a shared norm of non-interference, stable 
values and ministerial responsibility. It does not depend upon the political leaders’ choices. Actors 
exercise authority in a way that reflects the history and the future of the institution, without adjusting 
preferences or demands to “a current set of political leaders, voters, consumers, employees, or 
owners” (ibid). In this sense, there might be conflicts between immediate and long-run self interests 
and legitimacy appears as problematic, once the main concern of the state is the development and 
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maintenance of norms and meanings (ibid: 237). In this model, reform is slow and incremental, 
reflecting the wider political culture. Change follows the development of shared understanding 
among different interest groups (ibid: 240).  
In the HE arena, the institutional model is better portrayed by the relationship between the 
State and traditional elitist universities. As the name itself suggests, this model remits us to the 
institution, namely to the responsibility HEIs have in protecting academic values (e.g. academic 
freedom) against shifts of political regimes and market values, in storing, transmitting and 
transferring knowledge (Gornitzka and Maassen 2000: 270-271). In this model, prevailed the social 
contract between HEIs and the State, i.e. there is a shared understanding and unwritten conventions 
with respect to the non interference of the state in the civil service, namely in universities’ life as elite 
institutions. Institutional autonomy is thus based on the shared norm of non-interference of the state 
and decision-making is specialised and traditionalist. According to this model, change in HE happens 
through historical processes and evolution rather than as a result of reform (ibidem). Muller et al. 
(2006) explain that the sovereign state model and the institutional state model are considered 
variations of the traditional governance model, whereas the other two following models are 
alternatives to the traditional governance approach. 
 
2.8.3 The Corporate-pluralistic State Model 
In this model, and contrary to the sovereign state model, the state is not the only holder of 
power and it is involved in a political struggle between self interested, powerful and organised actors. 
Thus, according to this model, power appears as the problematic dimension because it is assumed 
that the state is an arena for resolving conflicts between self-interested public and private actors 
(Olsen 1988: 237). In fact, the public is viewed as members of a variety of self-interested formal 
organisations. In the corporate-pluralistic state model, agencies are unlikely to be neutral institutions 
for elected leaders: “they act strategically and take part in various coalitions of public and private 
interests” (ibid: 241).  
The sedimentation process, so characteristic of HE reform, fits in this model of governance. 
Olsen explains that reorganisations processes are the outcomes of struggles over the control of 
organisations, and, in turn, organisational structures result of previous political fights. Thus, 
reorganisation processes reflect the heterogeneity of interests present in policy making, and the 
autonomy of agencies comes from the choices of a winning coalition (ibid). In this model, the 
standard organisational form is collegial with interest representations. As such, bargaining between 
representatives solves conflicts and compromises should be reached, as no single actor can decide 
unilaterally (ibid). Change depends upon changes in power interests, resources and alliances, as well 
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as the results of political events such as elections, changes in the relative position of agencies and 
professional groups (ibid). 
With respect to HE, the corporate-pluralistic or segmented state opposes to the idea of the state 
as a unitary actor with monopoly over power and control. It rather shares the idea that the role of 
HE reflects the interests and ideas of its stakeholders (e.g. students unions, professional associations, 
industry or regional authorities, buffer organisations, etc.), where the government represents just one 
more interest group among the other stakeholders. Networking is the main set/modus operandi of 
policy-making in which actors act strategically to promote the interests of their organisations or 
interest group. The main mode of decision-making is negotiation and consultation. As institutional 
autonomy is negotiated, there is a distribution of interests and power. As mentioned above, change 
in the sector depends upon changes in power interests and alliances (Gornitzka and Maassen 2000: 
271). This model roughly corresponds to Peters’ liberal-democratic state and governance model.  
 
2.8.4 The Supermarket State Model  
The last model introduced by Olsen (1988) is the classical liberal state or the supermarket 
steering model, where the state is merely a service provider to a public that is seen as sovereign 
consumers or clients. Public agencies should perform services in the most efficient way and to adapt 
as fast as possible to changing needs and circumstances. Thus, in this model, the environment 
dominates the state, although administrative reforms hinder agencies adaptation to environmental 
forces (1988: 242). In this way, and doing justice to the population ecology of organisations 
developed by Hannan and Freeman (1977), there is no need of developing assumptions about actor 
rationality because those organisational forms that are inconsistent and/or do not adapt to 
environmental contingencies perish. Only the most adaptable, flexible, economic and efficient 
organisational forms will survive, and the state only delegates decisions to those which have the 
necessary information and expertise. Agency autonomy is thus the result of environmental necessities 
(1988: 242). 
The standard organisational model is the corporation embedded in a competitive market. As 
such, an agency is just one among many market actors. According to the supermarket model, the 
relationship between the state and society is that of the perfect market, where there are perfect 
information, easily available alternatives and easy entry. Competition is then the main factor in 
maintaining flexibility, adaptability and innovation (ibid). According to this model, changes in the 
administrative machine depend on the rate of change in the environment. In this way, whereas in 
turbulent societies or unstable times, administrative patterns change rapidly, in rigid societies, 
administration is highly stable, independent of shifts in governments or ruling conditions (ibid). 
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Also in HE, the role of the state is minimal, according to the supermarket state model. It can 
be said that this model fails in the Nozick’s spectrum extreme, in which the state limits its role to 
(only) assure that market mechanisms in HE run smoothly. In Pierre and Peters (2005) 
conceptualisation, this would be the “governance without government” model, in which the state 
has lost its capacity to govern and private actors have greater legitimacy than the state to govern. 
“Governance is conceptualised as being “bigger than government” or a more encompassing process 
than the policy process, and also as a process which sees political and other actors connected in 
networks” (2005: 41). Peters (2005: 12) refers that the empirical references for this model are found 
primarily in northern Europe, although this governance model has increasingly spread to other 
European countries. 
Table 2 – Olsen’s (1988) Typology of  Governance Models 
 Decisions are voluntary and reflect 
the goals and expectations of 
rational actors 
 
Decisions are determined and 
respond to environmental forces 
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Sovereign Rationality-Bounded 
State Model 
 
 
Institutional State Model 
The organisation’s 
role in the state 
The state is the architect of society; the 
agency is a neutral instrument 
implementing political goals; the public 
are voters subordinate to the state. 
 
The state develops and maintains political 
and moral order; the agency protects the 
order and individual rights; the public are 
citizens with rights and duties defined by 
the system 
Formation of 
organisations 
Organisations are designed by political 
leaders; autonomy is delegated. 
 
Organisations develop over time in a 
natural, historical process. 
Criteria used to assess 
organisations 
 
Organisations are judged by their 
political effectiveness. 
Organisations are judged by their effects 
on structures of meaning and norms. 
The organisation’s 
form and place in a 
network 
 
The organisation is a departmental 
agency embedded in a hierarchy. 
The organisation is an independent court 
embedded in a moral order. 
Reasons for an 
organisation’s 
autonomy 
 
Autonomy is justified by rationality and 
expertise; it relieves political leaders 
and avoids embarrassment. 
Autonomy is justified by shared norms of 
non-interference. 
Reasons for change in 
an organisation 
Change depends on changes in political 
leaders, elections, coalition formation 
and breakdown. 
 
Change depends on the historical process, 
mostly influenced by changes in the 
government. 
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Corporate-Pluralistic State Model 
 
 
Supermarket State Model 
The organisation’s 
role in the state 
The state is an arena for bargaining and 
conflict resolution; the agency defends 
special interests; the public are 
members of formal organisations. 
The state is a service provider and 
“bookkeeper for the great necessities”; 
the agency facilitates service delivery; the 
public are sovereign consumers or clients. 
 
Formation of 
organisations 
Organisations develop out of bargaining 
and political struggles among interests. 
Organisations are formed by 
environmental pressures, “evolutionary” 
selection. 
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Criteria used to assess 
organisations 
Organisations are judged according to 
who gets what. 
Organisations are judged according to 
their economy, efficiency, flexibility and 
survival. 
The organisation’s 
form and place in a 
network 
The organisation is a collegium with 
interest representation embedded in a 
corporate-pluralistic network. 
 
The organisation is a corporation 
embedded in a competitive market.  
Reasons for an 
organisation’s 
autonomy 
Autonomy is justified by realpolitik, or 
the distribution of interests and power. 
 
Autonomy is justified by the ability to 
survive. 
Reasons for change in 
an organisation 
Change depends on changes in power, 
interests and alliances. 
Change depends on the rate of stability or 
change in the environment. 
Source: Adapted from Olsen (1988: 238). 
In the classical liberal state model, where the dominant organisational form is similar to a 
corporation embedded in a competitive market, HEIs should be assessed in terms of efficiency, 
economy, flexibility and survival and therefore institutional autonomy depends on institutions’ ability 
to survive. The role of HEIs is to deliver their primary services as teaching and research. In turn, the 
role of the state is to assure that market mechanisms in HE work perfectly, in order that 
government’s interference is just to strength the self-regulating capacity of HE. Thus, as there is a 
high level of decentralisation, there is no dominant arena of policy-making. Change in HE depends 
on the rate of stability or change in the environment (Gornitzka and Maassen 2000: 272).  
According to Olsen (1988: 242), each of the four models represents a form of government that, 
if implemented under a specific set of circumstances and/or certain conditions, is politically efficient, 
being able to discover viable solutions with minimum administrative costs. Nevertheless, and 
analysing the Norwegian case, the author points to the fact that there is no simple solution to the 
organisational problems of the welfare state, as none of the four models or any single model of 
governance can alone guarantee representative and responsible government (ibidi: 247). 
Due to the specificity of the countries of this research, it is necessary to refer to the different 
cultural traditions and political approaches to problem solving as part of this “specific set of 
circumstances”. Furthermore, it should be remembered that this typology was created in 1988, and 
the increased importance of professional networks, as well as the role of globalisation and 
internationalisation in policy making.  
In sum, HE governance is thus a multidimensional concept and phenomena, i.e. a multi-actor 
and multi-level process. As such, the researcher believes that the policy processes of this study 
include the five HE governance dimensions explained by Schimank (2005). Elaborating on former 
concepts from Clark’s (1983) triangle of coordination (market forces, state and academic oligarchy), 
Schimank (2005) distinguished five mechanisms to conceptualise university governance and that can 
be used for comparative purposes. Briefly, these are:  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 State regulation (or bureaucratic regulation, Schimank and Lange 2009: 58): means top-down 
regulation by directives; the government prescribes in detail what universities have to do under 
particular circumstances. It relates to the traditional notion of top-down authority vested in the 
state.    
 Stakeholder guidance (also called external guidance, Schimank and Lange 2009: 59) relates to 
activities that direct universities through goal setting and advice, leaving universities room to 
manoeuvre. In public HE systems, the government is usually an important stakeholder, but not 
necessarily the only one. The government may delegate certain powers to other actors, such as 
intermediary bodies or representatives of industry in HEIs’ boards. According to Schimank and 
Lange (2009: 59) this mechanism can allow for new forms of “network governance” and 
strengthen a more democratic involvement of taxpayers through representation in HEIs’ 
boards. However, if this participation is limited to elites only, it can favour a more hierarchical 
model of governance.    
 Academic self-governance, as the denomination itself suggests – concerns the traditional role 
of professional communities (i.e. disciplines) within the HE system. This mechanism is 
institutionalised in the form of collegial decision-making within HEIs and the peer review-based 
self-steering of academic communities, e.g. in decisions of funding agencies.    
 Managerial self-governance (or hierarchical management, Schimank and Lange 2009: 59) relates to 
hierarchies within HEIs as organisations. In this dimension, the role of institutional leadership 
– Rectors and/or Presidents at the top level and Deans   and Heads of Departments on the 
intermediate level – in internal goal setting, regulation, and decision-making is at stake; and 
finally, there is a   
 Competition for scarce resources (competitive pressure), i.e. for money, personnel, prestige and 
even for students takes place within and between HEIs, mostly on “quasi-markets” where 
performance evaluations, i.e. competitive processes, by peers substitute the demand pull from 
customers (Mora and Vieira 2007; Schimank and Lange 2009: 59). Varying in path, speed and 
intensity, each HE system entails a specific mixture of these five mechanisms at a particular 
point of time. These dimensions are thus present in institutional governance practices, 
impacting on decision-making process and are shaped by several forces and dynamics.  
 
2.9 The Bologna Process and the NPM: Linking a Blurring Boundary 
 
It has been argued here that under the guise of the Bologna process, national governments 
have been legitimising reforms in their HE systems, even when these do not (exclusively) belong to 
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the Bologna domain. And, such as it has happened with the public sector, also HEIs have seen shifts 
in their steering procedures:  
“(…) not so much as a result of a distrust in the efficiency of the universities to run their own 
affairs per se, but rather as a consequence of the shift from input control to performance control 
of public institutions, based upon the general belief that public institutions perform better when 
they are in competition with each other and private sector organizations” (Gornitzka et al. 2007: 
189).  
 
Competition, the ethical centrepiece of neoliberalism (Neave 2009: 30), has become one of the 
buzzwords of HE “reform discourses” and it is, probably, the most used word to justify the 
creation/existence of the Bologna process. And, although the Bologna declaration does not 
explicitly refer to economic objectives, it is now acknowledged that there is a market ideology 
moving the process further – if by no other reason, than the ambition to transform Europe into the 
most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, as claimed in the Lisbon strategy. In this 
sense, several authors suggest that the Lisbon project, strongly supported by the EC, prioritises 
economic issues over social and academic concerns and it is therefore embedded in neoliberal 
ideology (Radaelli 2003; Amaral 2005; Antunes 2006; Neave 2009; Cachapuz 2010; Mota 2010). This 
ideology gains applicability and consistence through the soft law methodology, incorporated by the 
OMC which entails (all) the NPM ingredients, e.g.: management by results and objectives 
(introduced in the Finnish HE system in the 1990s), self-evaluation, diversification of funding 
sources, peer-review and external mechanisms for monitoring and accreditation, flexible forms of 
regulation oriented towards increasing effectiveness, etc. Thus, it can be said that through different 
strategies and at different paces, both the NPM practice and the Bologna process push universities 
towards increasing competitiveness. As Stromquist (2000) states: “The diffusion of ideas concerning 
school ‘efficiency’, ‘accountability’, and ‘quality control’ – essentially Anglo-American constructs – 
are turning schools all over the world into poor copies of romanticized views of private firms. 
Moreover, these notions are being applied with little understanding of several important cultural 
dimensions” (2000: 262). 
This view goes much in line with the vision of the University as an enterprise that needs to 
operate in competitive markets while simultaneously works as an instrument for supporting 
government interests. These, in turn, have been dictated by a supranational agenda (J. P. Olsen, 
2005), as it is the case of the Bologna process. And, in this context, education and training should 
be a major responsibility of the student, and therefore the state is no longer the main responsible 
for what and how institutions teach. In the Bologna logic (and according to the Commission’s view), 
education is now seen as an accumulation of knowledge and/or competencies to be negotiated in a 
wider space than before, where the market instructs institutions about what should be transmitted 
to students (Mota 2010). This, wrote the author, transforms universities into companies’ appendices.  
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Following this, Gornitzka (2007) refers that since the moment the EC became a full member 
of the process, it also adopted the discourse of the knowledge economy to set concrete and 
quantifiable targets for collective achievements in relevant policy areas. Consequently, and although 
attention to quality assurance was initially pushed aside for a while, this is a policy area which has 
gained renewed attention with the Bologna process, especially after the Berlin Communiqué in 2003. 
In fact, aiming at improving European HEIs quality, i.e., under the argument that in an increasing 
competitive environment, institutions urgently need to modernise33 and improve the quality of what 
they deliver, it is possible to witness a growing use of performance indicators as governance tools and 
to see that quality assurance labels have gained extraordinary importance (Hartmann 2008: 214). 
Therefore, as pointed out by Hartmann, independently of national quality control mechanisms, 
institutions may ask to be evaluated by other international quality assurance and accreditation 
agencies. As the author explains, this is possible because, overall, quality assurance agencies benefit 
from the “EU credo of freedom of establishment” (ibid) and thereby they can easily offer their 
services throughout the EU, although this is not a linear process and each country has its own 
regulations for this.  
It should be mentioned here that pressures for institutional efficiency, accountability and 
quality control have also been legitimised by the OECD normative discourse on national HE 
policies, as well as by the development of international benchmark and good practices (Ferlie et al. 
2008; Kallo 2009). In fact, Gornitzka (2007: 161) goes further and states that the OECD must be 
seen as a core international site where the idea of the knowledge economy has been pushed. Indeed, 
if one looks at the OECD (and other international entities) as diffusion agents of public 
management reform, it is understandable why certain reforms circulate internationally while others 
remain local/regional (Ferlie et al. 2008: 343). 
In a similar logic, the Bologna process was successful at driving attention to quality issues. Or, 
by other words, it created awareness in measuring and verifying the knowledge (and how it is) 
transmitted within institutions of HE. And, as it happens with the Bologna process itself, which 
involves multiple actors at various levels of action, the use of quality assessment standards (not only 
within the HE sector) is a process that also goes through a multiplicity of actors (e.g.: national 
governments, national agencies, HEIs and academic associations, international organisations, 
                                                 
33 The word “modernise” is written here in italics because the researcher has certain doubts 
about whether the Bologna process really creates modernisation (in the sense the meaning of 
the word is understood by the researcher) within the HE sector. We share from Mota’s (2010) 
opinion who refers that the modernisation of the state apparatus can not be only measured by 
a simple reduction of costs, with all the implications this entails for the higher education sector 
(e.g. reduction of years of study, reduction of the overall theoretical lectures, reduction of 
professors, etc.).   
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professional groups) who put them into practice (Gornitzka et al. 2007). Consequently, all these 
quantified standards and performance indicators are being used as an alternative to hard law (the 
traditional Community method) and they dictate a new way of governing institutions, as they have 
been formalised and moved out to an academic and political-administrative arena (Gornitzka et al. 
2007: 203).  
Also Fátima Antunes (2006: 71) argues that the emphasis on accountability (typically inspired 
by the NPM discourse) suggests a new form of regulation prescribed by objectives. In turn, these are 
carefully monitored by means of numerous national reports full of performance indicators, 
scorecards, tables of comparative performance, etc. There is an extensive range of instruments, 
procedures and control methods carried out by external entities which contrasts with the (virtual) 
absence of responsibility towards the actors involved in the definition and implementation of 
national educational policies (2006: 71).  
Based on the investigation carried out by Dale (1997), Antunes (2006) illustrates this way of 
regulation based on results (outcomes) with those assessment exercises like PISA34 studies. As 
explained by the authors, these dynamics of governance help to understand why despite different 
national HE agendas, the OMC “naming and shaming” logic creates change: governments will move 
efforts to conform to common goals due to reputational reasons. As such, this “numerical 
information” on institutional performance spreads out to attract talent and excellence to institutions, 
putting pressure on low performers (‘laggards’) (Veiga and Amaral 2009). At the same time (and at 
least theoretically) this will enhance the attractiveness of the EHEA (one of the earliest objectives 
of the Bologna agenda) and to position HEIs in the education sector market so that paying students 
will be attracted to Europe instead of going to the US. Nevertheless, as the literature 
has demonstrated, there is a strong criticism against this worship to US HE system and the loss of 
European diversity. Furthermore, there is also a common disbelief whether the Bologna structure 
can, in fact, contribute to an effective knowledge economy, once it pursues the acquisition of an 
immediate, volatile knowledge instead of deep and substantial learning (Mota 2010).  
In addition, and in order to successfully implement the Bologna guidelines and “to make their 
full contribution to the Lisbon Strategy” (COM 2005), the EC advocated the need for HEIs to 
strengthen management and leadership, while simultaneously encouraging them to become more 
autonomous and less dependent on state regulation35. As a matter of fact, since the 1993 White 
                                                 
34 PISA (Programme of  Student International Assessment) was created in 2000 by the OECD 
and is repeated every 3 years in order to assess how far students near the end of compulsory 
education (15 years old teenagers) have acquired some of the essential knowledge and skills for 
full participation in society (PISA website 2013).  
35 Martens and Wolf  (2009) state that “by involving the commission in the Bologna process 
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Paper on Competitiveness, growth and employment – the challenges and ways forward into the 21st century, the EC 
(and the Council of the EU, since December 2007)36 has been adopting a discourse (and practice) 
to enhance institutions modernisation by promoting quality assurance, efficiency and flexibility, by 
means of diversification of their funding sources, adapting their legal frameworks, establishing 
structured partnerships with the business community and reform curricula and teaching methods 
so that students acquire “(…) skills and competences necessary to succeed in a globalised, 
knowledge-based economy” and which “(…) enhance directly the employability of graduates (…)” 
(COM 2006: 6-8). Nevertheless, as António Cachapuz (2010: 6) reminds and most of the 
interviewees confirmed, it is important to notice that institutional autonomy is frequently hindered 
by all the bureaucracy at the supranational (and institutional) level, which was increased by the 
Bologna process. Moreover, there is certain confusion between cooperation (a process which 
happens at the horizontal level) and coordination (a vertical and supranational process). In fact, full 
institutional autonomy should be understood as a public service (only in this way national 
governments can contribute to a global knowledge-based economy) and it necessarily implies shared 
responsibility between the state and the educational community (Cachapuz 2010: 7; Mota 2010). 
The emphasis on the use of private sector logic in the public sector, and this idea that the 
functions provided by the public sector should be reallocated to the private domain, affects the way 
knowledge is organised and provided within HEIs. One can witness trends towards more market-
oriented HE systems, and therefore a growing concern with economic interests that dictate what is 
“more relevant”, more “employable” and more likely to create economic growth (and preferably 
within the shortest possible time). These changes in institutional governance make us reflect on how 
far it is possible to prioritise and/or measure (the importance of) knowledge, and whether is possible 
to do that based only on an economic rationale. And who determines the organisation (governance) 
of the main building block of HE and how its quality is assessed? (quis custodiet ipsos custodes – who 
nominates and appoints evaluators; who guards the guards)? And which are the implications in the 
structure and organisation of human resources within HEIs?  
It is thus difficult to establish frontiers/borders between these HE dynamics. The literature 
shows and confronts us with the difficulty in separating the reforms that were initiated under the 
aegis of the NPM doctrine, namely the introduction of the OMC, from the activities that were 
developed under the Bologna process, and later on by the specific political ambition agreed upon 
                                                 
while trying to control it at the same time, governments paid the double price of making 
education an economic issue and spreading new modes of governance which weakened their 
own importance” (2009: 91). 
36 In 2007, the Council of the European Union adopted a resolution urging measures to 
modernise universities to in make them drivers for the European competitiveness. 
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the 2000 Lisbon strategy. From the researcher’s perspective, and as a multi-actor and multi-level 
process, the implementation of the Bologna declaration, and more specifically the changes initiated 
(and continued) under this reform include the five governance dimensions provided by Schimank 
and Lange 2009. Although the EC (as well as other partners) has taken the leading role concerning 
the unfolding of the Bologna process, and despite pressures for privatising tasks, which used to be 
the competence of national governments, the state (ministries of education/HE) is still the ultimate 
actor when it comes to prescribe behaviours. It has the power to draft and put into practice 
legislation which determines (to a certain extent) internal governance and management structures. 
Indeed, while the OMC leaves policy implementation in the hands of national governments, the EC 
is responsible for monitoring the progress of the member states (Veiga and Amaral 2009). A good 
example of the freedom of manoeuvre that nation-states have is the case of Spain, which decided 
to adopt a 4 years first cycle degree instead of the common 3+2 model.  
In addition to the implementation of supranational decisions, the state is expected to act as a 
negotiator and a guardian protector of the national interests. Nevertheless, one needs to remember 
cultural differences and member-state’s specificities. Finland is characterised by being a country with 
a strong social welfare state and it is therefore expected that the government has a firm grip when 
it comes to implementing change. Portugal distances itself a bit more from this governance model. 
Traditionally, (public) Portuguese HEIs have a high degree of autonomy when compared to their 
Finnish counterparts.  
In the middle of the process, institutional management becomes strengthened and leadership 
assumes paramount importance, accompanied with an increase in the number of mid-level 
positions. Also Antonio Magalhães and Amaral (2007) have verified that in Portugal, due to an 
increasing adoption of managerialist values, there has been strong criticism against the presence of 
students in decision-making bodies. One of the most visible faces of this dimension of governance, 
stakeholder guidance, is the establishment of quality assurance agencies, which have the advantage 
of facilitating the recognition of qualifications, but also the Europeanisation of the evaluation 
through intermediary organisations (Hartmann 2008: 214). 
In both HE systems, competition for resources is high, especially when institutional 
performance became the focus of attention and performance-based mechanisms for allocate funds 
start to be used.  
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III 
Making Sense of Organisational Change 
 
 
“(…) institutions matter because they are seen, inter alia, as the 
points of crystallization of social forms, as defining the rules and resources 
of social action, as defining opportunity structures and constraints on 
behaviour, as shaping the way things are to be done if they are to be done, 
as path-dependent path-defining complexes of social relations, as the 
macrostructural matrices of societies and social formations, and so on” 
(Jessop 2001: 1217).  
 
This chapter brings together literature on organisational adaptation and on institutionalism 
framed in a global and international setting where HEIs operate. A brief overview of the origins and 
developments of institutional perspective is provided in order to better understand how it has been 
applied in the field of HE policy and governance. It draws extensively in new institutionalism as 
well as in other theoretical contributions of HE policy change and policy implementation. 
This part of the theoretical framework portrays the interaction between institutions, and the 
specificity of HEIs, the institutional setting of national HE systems, and actors – the organisational 
actors in national HE policy. This will help to understand the importance of the individual and the 
institutional contexts, as well as the influence of larger environmental factors such as culture, social 
norms, and conventions have in the processes of policy change and institutional decision-making 
(Koelble 1995: 231-232).  
 
 
3.1 Policy Change and Policy Diffusion  
The rise of the new governance means that the state increasingly depends on other actors to 
deliver services and coordinate policies to deal with the new and complex societies (Bevir 2009), 
where the local and the global interact in dynamic processes of structural change (Newman 2003: 
3).  
Policy networks refer to a specific area of public policy (e.g. HE policy, agriculture policy) and, 
like policy networks, are fairly stable. Bevir (2009: 141) explains that whereas policy networks focus 
on generating policy in a specific area, intergovernmental networks concentrate more on 
administration and especially policy implementation. Therefore, actors in intergovernmental 
networks are state actors and may include different levels of government – local, regional, and 
national bodies. Networks can serve as a source of information, resource dependence, trust, 
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collusion and/or reciprocity among the members of the networks (Fligstein and Doug 2010). Olsen 
(2005) refers that the idea of change underlying supporters of network organisation (or even market 
organisation) share the belief that existing institutions and organisations survive because they work 
better than their alternatives as well as provide better and more and/or different services.  
It is challenging to draw a distinction line between policy change, policy implementation and 
institutionalisation of change and/or new policies. As Fullan (2000) refers, policy change goes hand in 
hand with policy implementation. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) define implementation as “the 
carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the 
form of important executive orders or court decisions. Ideally that decision identifies the problem(s) 
to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) to be pursued, and in a variety of ways, ‘structures’ the 
implementation process” (1983: 20 in Hill and Hupe 2014: 7).  
Even if it is analysed at different stages, and by different professionals, it is difficult to assess 
which factors, conditions and/or variables facilitate or allow for successful policy implementation 
and change institutionalisation. By other words, change processes (can) originate from a variety of 
sources and their combination. Additionally, one needs to remember that success of change 
processes (or their lack) depends on the national and institutional context and complexity of analysis, 
political, cultural and social environments as well as on the economic situation of the study objects. 
Referring to change processes in schools, (Fullan 2007: 84) refers that educational change is 
technically simple but socially complex and therefore actors need to have a shared meaning of 
educational change, and the commitment to pursue it.  
Some authors tend to distinguish policy change from policy reform as the terms are often used 
interchangeably in the literature. As Cerna (2013: 4) puts it, whereas policy change refers to incremental 
shifts in existing structures, or new and innovative policies, policy reform usually refers to a major 
policy change. However, based on the work of Michael Fullan (2000), Cerna (2013) refers that 
reform as an intentional intervention through policy may or may not generate change.  
On policy change, Cerna (2013: 6-7) points to policy learning and policy diffusion as important 
elements of policy change. Policy learning highlights that countries, regions and systems can change 
policies by learning from others and hence shifting their beliefs. However, the author draws 
attention to the difficulty to operationalise and measure the concept of learning in general due to its 
complexity as it includes three processes: learning about organisations, learning about programmes, 
and learning about policies (e.g. government learning, lesson-drawing and social learning according 
to Bennett and Howlett 1992: 289 in Cerna 2013: 7). Similar to policy learning, policy diffusion is a 
process in which policy innovations spread from one government to another. It is possible to say 
that policy diffusion works in a similar way to the process of layering and/or sedimentation, i.e. 
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knowledge about policies, governance, management and administrative practices and institutions in 
one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and 
institutions in another time and/or place” (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 344). Tolbert and Zucker 
(1996: 184) explain that complete institutionalisation involves sedimentation, a process that 
fundamentally rests on the historical continuity of structure, and especially on its survival across 
generations of organisational members. Therefore, to fully understand the process of sedimentation, 
one needs to identify the factors that affect the extent of diffusion and the long-term retention of a 
structure (cf. previous chapter). 
According to Shipan and Volden (2008) there are four mechanisms of policy diffusion: learning 
from earlier adopters, economic competition (among proximate cities), imitation (of larger cities), 
and coercion (by state governments). As the name itself suggests, policy-makers, HE systems and 
institutions, can learn from experiences of others (e.g. governments, institutions, etc.). Thus, if an 
adopted policy elsewhere is deemed successful, then another country/system/institution might also 
implement it.  
The second mechanism, economic competition, can lead to the diffusion of policies with 
economic spillovers across jurisdictions, state welfare policy being a classic example of this type of 
policy diffusion (Shipan and Volden 2008: 842). Policymakers consider the economic effects of 
adoption (or lack of adoption) by other governments. In this way, if there are positive spillovers, 
governments are more likely to adopt these policy rather than others whose outcomes are unknown 
or proved to have negative spillovers (ibidem). Following this, Olsen (2005: 21) states that the reforms 
imposed on developing countries have often been justified by crises, although the standard 
prescriptions are also used when such problems do not exist. In fact, Reich (1995: 49) argues that 
the enactment or non-enactment of reform is often associated with regular political events or 
political crises; a fact which explains why reforms can have significant consequences for a regime’s 
political stability. 
The third diffusion mechanism - imitation, is sometimes also referred to as emulation, and it 
involves “copying the actions of another in order to look like that other” (ibidem). The process of 
imitation can be seen or understood in contrast to learning. In learning, the focus is on the policy 
itself: how was it adopted, whether it was effective, and what were or might be its political 
consequences. In turn, when diffusing policies through imitation, the focus lays on the other 
government: what did that government (system; institution) do and how can the other governments 
do the same? The crucial distinction between both processes is that learning focuses on the action 
(i.e., the policy being adopted by another government – one learns about consequences), while 
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imitation focuses on the actor (i.e., the other government that is adopting the policy – one aspires to 
be like the other actor).  
The last mechanism of diffusion – coercion – differs from the previous three, which are 
voluntary (Shipan and Volden 2008: 843). Countries can coerce one another through trade practices 
or economic sanctions, either directly or through international organisations, such as the OECD, 
the IMF, the World Bank, the EU, etc. (ibidem; Olsen 2005). 
 
Table 3 - Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion elaborated by Shipan and Volden (2008) 
 
 
Table 3 summarises the four mechanisms of policy diffusion as elaborated by Shipan and Volden 
(2008). The researcher considers pertinent to refer here to this analytical tool because it allows us to 
analyse change through a broader spectrum while complementing the organisational perspectives 
of institutional change. As we shall see later in this chapter, institutionalism has been a useful 
framework for the study of international diffusion of governance structures in HE. Moreover, 
national characteristics and traditions, like political constraints and/or ideological preferences, can 
condition policy diffusion, such as domestic politics (Meseguer & Gilardi, 2009). For example, by 
“profiling” and historically tracking both Portuguese and Finnish HE (cultural) settings (cf. Chapter 
IV), it is expected to better understand in what ways national characteristics conditioned the HE 
reforms analysed here. Also, as earlier noticed by Sabatier (1988), changes in the main aspects of a 
policy usually result from shifts in external factors such as macro-economic conditions, changes in 
governments (as Portugal exemplifies) and/or the rise of a new systemic governing coalition. 
Nevertheless, it is still unclear why some policies diffuse faster than others or why regional patterns 
of policy diffusion vary considerably (Meseguer & Gilardi, 2009). 
Although institutional change does not (necessarily) imply policy change, there are some 
overlapping points between both processes. The process of policy-making has become increasingly 
complex: actors move between different levels of action and authority is dispersed across multiple 
tiers, i.e. international, national, or regional (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Government reforms can be 
seen as integral parts of ongoing processes of change where policies of governments can be a 
response to change as well as a source of change (Gornitzka, Kogan and Amaral 2005: 9; Cerna 
2013: 7). Following this, Fumasoli and Stensaker (2013: 482) refer that organisational change in 
HEIs is observed because of changes in the environment, specifically due to policy reforms. 
Institutional change may be externally imposed through the introduction of legislative frameworks, 
Voluntary Involuntary 
- Learning from earlier adopters 
- Economic competition 
- Imitation (Emulation) 
- Coercion 
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but it might also happen by means of assuming new identities and self-understanding, resulting in 
changes of norms and values, practises and repertoires used by the universities to refer to themselves 
(Nokkala 2007). In order to understand the behaviour of the universities it is important to consider 
the nature of the University as a social institution, constrained and constituted by the social context 
as well as the internal institutional logics (Scott 2001; Nokkala 2007). HEIs are thus assumed to be 
adaptive organisations and/or reactive complex systems responding and adjusting to external shifts. 
For example, changes in national and international funding schemes and in HEIs’ governance led 
also to shifts in scientific research systems (Whitley and Gläser 2014). Streeck and Thelen (2005) 
refer that theories of institutional change can be theories of policy change when these are policies 
that “(…) stipulate rules that assign normatively backed rights and responsibilities to actors and 
provide for their ‘public’, that is, third party enforcement” (2005: 12). On their article about 
organisation studies in the HE field, Fumasoli and Stensaker (2013) state that our understanding of 
transformations in HE needs to bear in mind the following questions: how and to what extent HEIs 
are changing; how and to what extent policy reforms influence change processes, and how reforms 
produce intended and unexpected outcomes (2013: 489). 
More broadly, Streeck and Thelen (2005: 8-9) refer that widespread change “(…) can be 
accomplished through the accumulation of small, often seemingly insignificant adjustments (…) to 
distinguish between processes of change, which may be incremental or abrupt, and results of change, 
which may amount to either continuity or discontinuity”. Based on this, the authors developed a 
useful typology for institutional change. Table 4 presents the options of institutional change defined 
by Streeck and Thelen (2005). 
 
Table 4 - Typology of Institutional Change: processes and results 
 Results of Change 
Continuity Discontinuity 
 
Processes of Change 
Incremental  Reproduction by 
adaptation  
 
Gradual 
Transformation37 
Abrupt Survival and Return Breakdown and 
Replacement 
 
Source: Adapted from Streeck and Thelen (2005: 9).  
 
Change that results in discontinuity takes place through abrupt institutional breakdown and 
replacement (the cell on the lower right). Incremental change also happens. However, according to 
the authors, it is usually seen as fundamentally reactive and adaptive, serving to protect institutional 
                                                 
37 Annex number 1 shows Streeck and Thelen (2005: 31) complete table of  the five types of  gradual transformation 
in institutional change. 
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continuity (upper left cell) (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 8). Whereas continuity still happens through 
and in spite of historical breakpoints, gradual transformation (upper right cell) stands for 
institutional discontinuity caused by incremental, creeping change (ibidem: 9). In turn, fundamental 
change happens when a multitude of actors switch from one logic of action to another. This may 
happen in a variety of ways, and it certainly can happen gradually and continuously (ibidem: 18). 
Following this, the model of Saarinen’s and Välimaa’s (2012: 55) on the different types of HE 
policy change adapted to the Bologna process is used. This framework of analysis is useful to locate 
actors’ different viewpoints towards the reform process. The model uses the metaphors of 
(transnational) intervention, reform, evolution and revolution to illustrate how ‘one’ process can be 
seen as many processes. 
 
Figure 1 - Different Metaphors of Change in HE Policy: the case of the Bologna process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Taina  Saarinen and Välimaa (2012).  
 
The Bologna process encapsulates several perspectives on change, not only from the 
perspective of (social and) organisational theories, but also from the interviewees involved in the 
process, both at the system and institutional levels.  
As the authors explain, viewing process of change according to these dimensions (internal or 
external, continuous or discontinuous) treats change in a definable way. Being an intellectual device 
to understand change as a result of policy implementation, these metaphors do not aim at assessing 
whether policies fail or succeed, but rather to illustrate the fact that an education policy field always 
consists of various actors with conflicting needs. In fact, HE policy is legitimated with a continuous 
need for change, which makes us question whose view of change becomes the dominant one 
(Saarinen and Välimaa 2012: 57). The dominant view will steer to the dominant action. 
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In the first part of this manuscript, it was referred how the origins of the Bologna process can 
be seen in light of a competitive arena in order to resemble European HE to Anglo-Saxon and Asian 
HE systems in order to enhance a knowledge-based economy. Simultaneously, the EU has gained 
increased leverage in national educational policies. In this way, the Bologna process can be seen as 
a transnational intervention into the traditional monopoly of nation-sates as definers of national 
educational systems (Saarinen and Välimaa 2012: 56). This view goes much in line with the 
understanding of the Bologna process as an outcome or as a tool of neoliberalism (ibidem). As we 
have argued, the Bologna process, while being the most visible face of the internationalisation and 
Europeanisation of HE, it entails managerialism practices both at the system and institutional levels. 
In this construct of change, policy implementation allows for authoritarian interventions (ibidem).  
The second quadrant positions the Bologna process as a reform (top right corner). As such, a 
transnational process demands change in national HE systems and consequently, some reforms are 
then initiated (ibidem). This type of metaphor is the one Portuguese interviewees used most to 
describe change induced by the Bologna process both at the system level and in their institution.  
Sharing the same view of Anne Corbett (2006), a third construct is to look at the Bologna 
process as a natural development or evolution in European HE (lower right corner). It continues 
the earlier policies and programmes on student and staff mobility and HEIs cooperation. This 
construct of the Bologna process goes much in line with the idea of sedimentation explained earlier 
on (cf. Chapter II). Furthermore, in addition to the role of the EU, Bologna appears also as a process 
steered at the national level, as nation-states have tried to match the objectives of the process with 
national demands that existed before the process and have (some) freedom and autonomy to decide 
on several aspects of the implementation process. It is possible to position Finnish interpretations 
of the process in this quadrant. 
Saarinen and Välimaa (2012) refer that the last construct – Revolution – is, for now, something 
unseen in HE, at least, whether one understands revolution as “(…) a violent bottom-up 
development of advocating or resisting a policy” (ibidem: 56). And, at least in Portugal, despite the 
strong opposition the process found in the national HE arena, it ended up to be implemented. 
Nevertheless, as it happens with Olsen’s (1988) models of governance, this construct is important 
as it depicts a possible reality for other policies and allows for picturing hierarchies of power in 
(higher) education reforms. Moreover, as pointed by the authors, the conflict theoretical metaphor 
of revolution does not fit easily into HE policy research. 
In line with what Hargreaves (1998: 291) and Cerna (2013) argued, these perspectives on 
institutional change – applied to the case-studies – reinforce the idea that “introducing, sustaining and 
assessing educational change is a political process because it addresses issues of conflict and 
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representation among multiple actors” (Hargreaves 1998: 291). Also Reich (1995: 49) has previously 
suggested that reform is political for the following reasons: a) it represents a selection of values that 
express a particular view of society; b) it has distinct distributional consequences in the allocation of 
benefits and costs; c) promotes competition among groups that seek to influence consequences; d) 
the enactment or non-enactment of reform is often associated with regular political events or 
political crises; and e) reforms can have significant consequences for a regime’s political stability (as 
clearly exemplified by Portugal and Finland…). 
 
3.2 Institutionalism and Organisational Change  
This section analyses why organisational institutionalism is a good theoretical ground for the 
study of HE, especially HE reforms (Ferlie et al. 2008: 273). Inter alia, by shedding light on the 
structures and processes of HE, institutionalism helps us to understand political transformations in 
organisations and the relationships between institutions and the government, and their internal 
dynamics (Gornitzka 1999). It can help to identify patterns, analyse problems, and think of the 
organisation as an open system (Bess and Dee 2008). Thus, change in open systems (and thereby in 
HE) can be explained by the interaction process between systems and their environment.  
The idea of the University as a loosely coupled organisation attempts to provide an image of a 
more fluid and decentralised institution (Weick 1976). Open and social systems produce social 
norms and cognitive references (Thoenig 2012). Thus, change in HE can be explained by the 
interaction process between institutions and their environments. As dynamic tensions and pressures 
for change are built into institutions, there are different types of institutional change (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010: 15). It is this broad mindset that provided fertile soil for the development of the 
organisational theory while simultaneously made it a tool for developing frameworks for 
understanding, analysing and leading organisations, such as HEIs. Furthermore, over the past 
decade, institutionalism has become one of the dominant approaches to the study of European 
integration (Pollack 2009: 129). 
The environments where HEIs operate are frequently associated with the idea of open systems 
(Scott 2001: xiv), which emphasises “(…) the importance of the wider context or environment as it 
constrains, shapes, and penetrates the organisation”. From this perspective, HEIs are viewed as 
complex organisations, embedded in multiple environments, receiving inputs from and producing 
outputs for their environments, to which institutions must respond. Within each institution there 
are independent units, which are separated and/or tied from its environments according to their 
level of loose or tight coupling (Birnbaum 1989; Scott 2001).  
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Several perspectives have been developed to analyse and explain how institutions change or 
why one kind of change occurs rather than other (Scott 2004).  
According to Tolbert (1985), contemporary research on organisations has produced a variety 
of theoretical perspectives, each pointing to different explanatory factors, although empirical 
research typically draws on a single theoretical approach in explaining particular cases of 
organisational behaviour and structure. For Tolbert and Zucker (1996), organisations were not 
conceived as independent social actors and therefore, they were not typically acknowledged as a 
distinctive social phenomenon worthy of study in its own right despite the key role assigned to 
formal organisations by Max Weber and the work of Robert Merton in the late 1940s (Tolbert and 
Zucker 1996).  
Institutional theory usually refers to a broad group of perspectives that interpret the 
relationship between institutions and human behaviour, assuming that not only human actions (i.e. 
behaviour, perceptions, power, policy preferences, decision-making processes, etc.) shape 
institutions, but these are also influenced by them. More specifically, institutionalism focuses on the 
need of organisations to adapt to their institutional environment, such as norms, rules and 
understandings about what is an acceptable, normal behaviour and that cannot be changed easily 
and/or instantaneously (Meyer and Rowan 1977; March and Olsen 1984). Organisations take many 
rules and norms for granted, because they seem obvious or natural. Failure to act in accordance with 
norms and expectations may lead to conflict and illegitimacy. Olsen (2005: 9) refers that rules 
provide codes of meaning that facilitate the interpretation of ambiguous worlds and they do not 
necessarily imply rigidity and inflexibility, being even able to prescribe change. For example, in the 
EU, with its strong emphasis on legal integration and formal rules, changing patterns of attention, 
behaviour, and resource allocation have taken place within fairly stable structural frameworks. 
As an empirically grounded theory, institutionalism sees public institutions through three 
different analytical lenses: as pillars of political order, as outcomes of societal values, or as self-
constructed social systems (Thoenig 2011: 96). It is thus a general approach to governance and social 
science (Bevir 2009: 210) as it argues that organisations take rules and norms for granted because 
they seem obvious or natural. Failure to act in accordance with norms and expectations may lead to 
conflict and illegitimacy. Changes occurring at the institutional field of HE are said to increasingly 
constrain HEIs. Given this, it is increasingly relevant to analyse the development of institutionalist 
theories and the way they have been adapted to the HE field. 
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Amongst the strands of institutional theory, we locate the research object on the new 
institutionalism38 approach to institutional analysis of HE. This approach is chosen elected because 
it allows us to better understand the interaction between institutional contexts (also known as the 
organisational field) and actors in HE policy at the organisational and national levels (see later on 
location of the study part). Furthermore, considering that “organizational phenomena are much too 
complex to be described adequately by any single theoretical approach” (Tolbert, 1985), the new 
institutionalism approach allows for a mix of combinations to institutional analysis. The researcher 
agrees with most institutionalists that the new-institutionalism represents an advantage to analyse 
organisational change and action as fundamentally shaped by broader social and cultural processes 
(Scott 2001; Lounsbury and Ventresca 2003). Additionally, it is attempted to extract from this 
perspective (while building it up) possible rationales for the tensions and/or contradictions “(…) 
between environmental pressures to conform and the need to retain significant elements of national 
difference and diversity within an increasingly globalised HE system” (Reed, Meek and Jones 2002: 
xx), and how these tensions affect different actors’ behaviour, how do they influence, implement 
and develop national and institutional reforms and strategies, and how governance and management 
practices have been redefined.  
The works of Selznick (1948; 1957) and Parsons (1956) are usually considered pioneers in the 
study of organisations. These scholars theorised on the richness and importance of the institutional 
environment for organisational structures and processes, e.g. how institutions function to integrate 
organisations in society through universalistic rules, contracts, and authority (Thornton and Ocasio 
2008: 99-100). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a new approach to institutional analysis emerged 
with Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Meyer and Scott 
(1983) who stressed the role of culture and cognition in institutional analysis (Thornton and Ocasio 
2008). Scott (2004) refers that both Selznick and Parson viewed organisations not only as technical 
production systems but also as adaptive social systems attempting to survive in their environment. 
This is why that, although institutionalism is not entirely new (March and Olsen 1984: 738), the new 
institutionalism proposes new orientations with respect to organisations. In addition to the technical 
elements and resources, these institutionalists argued that organisations must consider their 
“institutional” (internal) environment: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive features that 
                                                 
38 The term new institutionalism was coined by March and Olsen in 1984 to distinguish it from 
both the approaches to public administration theory in the United States and administrative 
science in Europe. The label “new” accounts mostly to note that there was an “old 
institutionalism” which was updated regarding the way institutions are seen and studied in 
political science (March and Olsen 1984: 738).  
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define “social fitness”, i.e. rational myths, knowledge legitimated by education, professions and 
legislation as shapers and influencers of organisational practices and structures (Powell 2007).  
Modern governance largely occurs in and through institutions, under the influence of the actors 
who exert power and mobilise institutional resources, political relationships and struggles (Bell 2002). 
In fact, governance theories draw on institutional theory to better grasp power-dependent 
relationships and organisations in the processes of policy design and implementation and in 
decision-making dynamics. Institutions can also play an important role not only in reducing 
transaction and information costs and various associated forms of market uncertainty, but also in 
helping to monitor and enforce contracts and/or agreements (ibid: 3-5). Nevertheless, because 
influencing and shaping institutional dynamics does not explain all institutional phenomena and actors’ 
preferences, institutionalism is considered a ‘middle-range’ theory as change can be derived from 
other sources. Thoenig (2012) points to structural forces influencing institutions’ life, such as 
globalisation, international economic and political agendas and pressures on national structures. For 
example, governance structures look at the environment in terms of the internal strategies to adapt 
or to minimise the influence of surroundings upon organisations, e. g. change within HE can be 
seen as an organisational response to market dynamics (Ordorika 2014). Also cultural factors, 
institutional capacities and relationships among actors are factors that shape behaviour. 
According to Lounsbury and Ventresca (2003: 458), new institutionalism is explicitly anti-
reductionist and rejects the causal primacy of efficiency or narrow self-interest, in contrast to such 
perspectives as resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), transaction cost analysis 
(Williamson 1975) and organisational demography (Hannan and Freeman 1977), which focus on 
concrete exchange processes within and between organisations. These approaches are related to and 
complementary to institutional analysis. For example, the transaction cost theory developed by 
Williamson in 1985 (based on the work of Coase 1937 – in Scott 2004: 6) argues that all transactions 
of goods and services are costly, but some are more costly than others. As such, the organisations’ 
role is to deal with transaction costs that markets are ill equipped to handle (Scott 2004). In fact, 
literature on economic theories has pervaded governance ideas by focusing on regulatory and related 
arrangements for the governance of markets, either at the domestic or at the international levels 
(Fligstein 2008). Fligstein (2008: 17) argues that even if the term governance is not always explicitly 
recognised in these economic theories, they typically offer solutions for public policies dilemmas in 
relation to the governance of economic transactions, which is surely an aspect of governance. 
Also the resource dependence theory formulated by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978; 2003) stresses 
the benefits of adaptation to the environment, although it conceives environments as political and 
economic systems (Scott 2004). As the name itself suggests, the resource dependence theory 
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explains how organisations react in presence of a scarcity of resources in the environment. It focuses 
on power-dependence and uncertainty relations: organisations must exchange resources to survive, 
but if these exchanges are imbalanced there will be power differences. This perspective shares with 
open systems theory the idea that organisations are flexible and perceived as reactive once they 
interact with their environments. In this way, organisations are dependent on their environments to 
search for key actors in order to gain more resources. Simultaneously, they strive to attain 
effectiveness and efficiency in the pursuit of objectives that are important both for these actors and 
for the organisation. This mutual interaction is easier to understand if one looks at other 
organisations as part of the environment where a specific organisation tries to adapt itself, and 
thereby, during the process of adaptation and interaction, it will react to the outcomes brought by 
these changes. Starting from the assumption that environmental transformation induces 
organisational change, the emphasis of this perspective lays not only in understanding how 
organisations relate strategically to other social actors in their environment. It tries to put forward 
the rationale on how organisations make active and rational choices to manage their dependency on 
those parts of the environment that control vital resources (Gornitzka 1999: 7). As such, in order 
to create survival strategies, HEIs have to take into account both its internal and external 
environments. Nevertheless, interdependence can lead to conflict and uncertainty, which in turn 
leads to changes in the relationships between organisations. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) point out 
that, as organisations become mutually dependent and work to ensure themselves a sufficient flow 
of resources they try to manage their interdependence with other organisations while maintaining 
as much discretion as possible. By doing this, they try to reduce the uncertainty created by 
dependence on others. Nevertheless, as the authors refer, it is important to notice that when 
organisations try to adapt to the constraints imposed by interdependence and conflict relations, they 
tend to merge or create joint ventures, which might contribute to an increase in the homogeneity 
levels among organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  
Both the resource dependence theory and the new institutionalism perspective create 
conditions, which allow “(...) to predict the likelihood that organisations will resist or conform to 
institutional pressures and expectations” (Oliver 1991: 146). The resource dependence approach 
resembles to a rational actor model of decision-making in organisations, albeit one in which the 
actors’ behaviour is based on calculation aimed at maximising power and autonomy rather than pure 
efficiency (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). Additionally, this approach implies the existence of 
predictability and reduction of uncertainty factors in institutional behaviour when facing a situation 
of resources scarcity.  
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In parallel, organisational ecology was developed as an alternative perspective to study the 
interaction between organisations and their environment through a model of natural selection of 
organisational populations. Hannan and Freeman (1977; 1989) argued that previous theories 
exaggerated the extent to which individual organisations are able to undergo fundamental change 
and therefore attention should be placed not on a single organisation but rather on “populations” 
of organisations, i.e. organisations of the same type that compete for resources in the same 
environmental niche. This is so because fundamental change typically involves the replacement of 
one type of organisation with another (Scott 2004: 6). Scott (2004) refers that operationally, scholars 
focused on organisations sharing the same form or archetype, exhibiting a similar structure, and 
pursuing similar goals. Thus, and in line with historical views, when a given organisational form 
arises at a particular time, combining in a distinctive way existing technologies and types of social 
actors, it tends to persist with little change through time. However, in an organisational 
environment, certain types of organisations will survive while others will die. The changes of survival 
are greater the more the organisation fits the environment’s specific characteristics (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977: 943). Based on this assumption, the authors inquired “Under a given set of 
environmental circumstances the fundamental ecological question is: which forms thrive and which 
forms disappear?” (ibidem: 949). Similarly to the resource dependence perspective, the population 
ecology of organisations theory defends that, in a situation and/or environment of scarce resources, 
some organisations will be able to fit better to their environment than others and consequently they 
will survive, especially “(…) if they hedge their bets by seeking a wider variety of resource bases” 
(ibidem: 956). The organisational ecology theory encloses some specificities worth to be referred, 
namely the focus on the species’ natural selection rather than on the adequacy of organisations. 
Additionally, it emphasises the inability of organisations to be adaptively managed. This happens, 
not because managers could not effect organisational adaption, but because they could not do it 
quickly enough (Greenwood et al. 2008: 3). By providing significant contributions to the 
understanding of the process of homogenisation that occurs in organisations, the organisational 
ecology theory broadens our understanding on the ways in which new types of organisations arise, 
grow, compete, and decline over long periods of time (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Briefly put, 
institutional theories after the 1980s (new institutionalism period) find consensus about the fact that 
institutions are created to produce local social orders, that they are social constructions with more 
or less defined powerful groups who create rules of interaction and maintain unequal resource 
distribution and that, once in existence, both constrain and enable actors in institutionalisation 
processes and institution building (Fligstein 1999). 
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Examples of studies in HE using these research perspectives focus on the analysis of public 
and private organisations, namely by emphasising that many public services are not exclusively 
delivered by government, but by networks of actors from the government, private and voluntary 
sectors. These networks coordinate and allocate resources, and represent an alternative to the 
market or the state and not a hybrid form of these actors (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004: 
148). 
Research on the influence of organisation studies in HE policy research started with Burton 
Clark (1970; 1972) case studies on selected HEIs in the United States (Fumasoli and Stensaker 2013), 
with Cohen et al. (1972) famous “garbage can model” on universities’ decision-making processes, 
and with Cohen and March (1974) description of universities as “organised anarchies”. Major 
research topics analysed through institutional lenses have been changes in institutional governance, 
in decision-making practices and patterns of leadership, in the roles of academic leadership, in the 
funding models of HE, in the challenges facing the academic profession, the rise of managerialism, 
the institutionalisation of policy design and implementation processes, and the (different) effects on 
the functioning of HEIs and institutional autonomy (Witte 2006; Veiga 2010; Carvalho and Santiago 
2010a; Fumasoli and Stensaker 2013; Carvalho 2014).  
At this stage, a note should be included to refer that the concept of institution is not synonym 
of organisation (Scott 2001: 48), although it is common to see in the literature the word organisation 
and institution being used interchangeably39. However, under new institutionalism, institutions are 
seen as different from organisations in the sense that the set of norms and culture that constitute an 
institution are not only associated with the organisational processes of an organisation (Scott, 2001) 
but include influencing institutional actors’ actions and vice-versa in a way that organisations cannot 
(March and Olsen 2005)40. Streeck and Thelen (2005) argue that the nature of institutions is defined 
“(…) by continuous interaction between rule makers and rule takers during which ever new 
interpretations of the rule will be discovered, invented, suggested rejected, or for the time being, 
adopted” (2005: 9). 
                                                 
39 Hodgson (2006) distinguished between organisation and institution by referring that “Institutions 
are systems of  established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions” and 
“Organizations are special institutions that involve (a) criteria to establish their boundaries and to 
distinguish their members from nonmembers, (b) principles of  sovereignty concerning who is 
in charge, and (c) chains of  command delineating responsibilities within the organization” 
(2006: 18). 
40 As sociological institutionalists, March and Olsen (2005) wrote that “an institution is a 
relatively enduring collection of  rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of  
meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of  turnover of  individuals and 
relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of  individuals and changing 
external circumstances” 
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The importance attributed to the significance of institutions lays in its centrality underlying 
different institutional approaches, which look at institutions as vital to discern the “significance of 
existing structures, histories and dynamics for understanding political transformations” (Olsen 2002: 
925). Considering that the use of institutional theory in HE allows to better interpreting HEIs’ 
behaviour, their actors, and interactions between these Universities and polytechnics are viewed as 
institutions rather than as organisations, and therefore not focusing so much on issues related with 
management, control and success. Furthermore, as clarified by Marilena Chauí (1999), “The 
University as a social practice is ‘based upon the public recognition of its legitimacy and of its attributions which 
grant its autonomy in relation to other social institutions, being structured by its own internal ordinances, rules, norms 
and values of recognition and legitimacy’” (in Amaral and Magalhães 2003: 247). As social institutions, 
modern universities conquered their legitimacy not only from the idea that knowledge is 
autonomous from religion and the state and therefore inseparable from the ideas of education, 
reflection, creation and critique (ibidem), but also on the institutional “taken for granted” rules and 
behaviours. One can say that HEIs evolved and persist as a way for society to preserve and 
disseminate knowledge, especially nowadays when they have an unquestionable role in the creation 
of the so-called knowledge economies and societies. It is this instrumentality that positions the 
university as a social institution rather than as a “social organisation”, based on concepts of 
management, control and success. In turn, organisational practices based on these concepts impact 
on institutional structures and on the behaviour of top-management, faculty, staff and students (see 
also Cohen et al. 1972). Also Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that education is both a central feature 
for society as an institution per se and simultaneously an instrument to the needs of society and 
labour.  
Another point to bear in mind is that institutions provide an environment consisting of 
routines, images and information, which can enhance the capabilities of individuals. Accordingly, 
institutions provide a structured environment consisting partly of routinised practices that can 
augment individual capabilities, making the institutional whole to be more than the sum of its 
individual parts (Hodgson 2008: 33). 
 
3.3. The New Institutionalism 
Attention to organisations and to their effects on social life, i.e. working systems productivity 
and efficiency, emerged due to changes in social structures associated with industrialisation and 
bureaucratisation (Scott 2004). Organisational studies emerged then as an interdisciplinary 
recognised field of social scientific study during the 1950s (ibid). 
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Scott (2004) divides the field of organisational studies in two main periods. These two periods 
can be considered the old and new institutionalism. This section focus mostly on the new-
institutional perspective and it is mostly drawn on the work of Diogo, Carvalho and Amaral (2015). 
The 1990s witnessed the rise of the new institutionalism (Bevir 2009: 111), with a renewed 
focus on individuals based on the rules and logic of appropriateness, and on the actor-centred 
institutionalism perspective developed by Mayntz and Scharpf in 1995 (Thoenig 2012: 135). In 
addition to the technical and institutional environments, new institutionalists draw attention to the 
role of symbolic elements – schemas, typifications, and scripts that perform an important, 
independent role in shaping organisational structure and behaviour (Scott 2001).  
New institutionalism deals with the inner functioning of institutions, the sources of differences 
between institutions, and their internal changes (Bevir 2009: 111) and sees politics and governance 
as important “social rituals” (March and Olsen 1984: 742). The old institutionalism is considered 
somewhat “theoretically anaemic” (Bell 2002) and, in the researcher’s view, somehow myopic for 
analysing changes in HE dynamics. The new institutionalism attempts to bridge this anaemia by 
focusing on explicit theory building and on how institutions interact with structural forces in politics 
and the economy (Bell 2002).  
The new institutionalism questions how actors’ behaviour is shaped and conditioned by the 
institutional contexts in which they operate (Bell 2002). The institutional context is defined as the 
widespread social understandings that define what it means to be rational – rationalised myths, as “(…) 
the rules, norms and ideologies of the wider society” (Meyer and Rowan 1983: 84). Being pluralistic 
and inconsistent, institutional contexts do not react similarly to the same institutional pressures. The 
institutional context both regularises behaviour and provides opportunity for agency and change 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 102). The institutional environment works in a twofold way: it both 
enables and limits institutions and actors’ possibilities and opportunities. Ultimately, institutions are 
important in providing actors with behavioural incentives and disincentives, with normative codes 
that shape their behaviour and preferences and with (power) resources (Bell 2002). In fact, it is this 
theorisation on organisational fields (Bourdieu 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983), sectors (Meyer 
and Scott 1983), or strategic action fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2011) defined as the set of 
“organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life” (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983: 64) that makes new institutionalism to stand out among other perspectives of 
organisational behaviour. 
By conceiving institutions as “entities” that structure fields and help to guide actors through 
the muddle around them, they define who was in what position in the field, give people rules and 
cognitive structures to interpret others’ actions, and scripts to follow under conditions of uncertainty 
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(Scott and Meyer 1983; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Fligstein 1997). The advantage of this unit of 
analysis is that it focuses attention no only in competing organisations and/or institutions (e.g. other 
HEIs – as the population ecology theory does), but in the totality of relevant actors (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983: 65).  The environment and/or the organisational field of HEIs consist of technical 
and social/cultural elements. Technical environments include resources, information and know-
how (knowledge) and markets (or, depending on the circumstances, market niches). Social and 
cultural environments encompass values, norms, beliefs and policies of the larger society (Scott 
1992; Clark 1983). In turn, these environments such as values, norms and policies play a crucial role 
in institutional decision-making practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
What is regarded as reasonable or appropriate and the means used to pursue interests are 
products of socially constructed rules. “Institutional rules invent rationality, defining who the actors 
are and determining the logics that guide their actions. (…) Where social agency is located –who has 
the right to take self-determined and self-interested action – is expected to vary over time and place” 
(Scott 1995: 140). Similarly, on their study of new-structuralism, Lounsbury and Ventresca (2003) 
have pointed to developments of field-analytic approaches that examine the evolutionary dynamics 
of logics, actors, practices and governance structures (Thornton and Ocasio 1999). In sum, new 
institutionalism perspective analysis how fields of action come into existence, remain stable, and can 
be transformed. The institutionalisation process occurs when rules move from abstractions to being 
constitutive of repeated patterns of interaction in fields (Jepperson 1991). 
These theoretical developments on organisational fields remit us to the importance of 
analysing institutions beyond their individuals (agents). As organisational theory emerged as a 
management subfield, “(…) conceptualisations of both social structure and organisations became 
increasingly instrumental, driven by functional imperatives, and animated by the prominence of 
narrow exchange approaches to behaviour” (Lounsbury and Ventresca 2003: 462). Such 
developments allowed for a broader conceptualisation of interorganisational relations: from highly 
rationalistic and instrumental, they include more direct consideration of cultural processes and 
meaning systems. This shift in looking to organisations with a cultural-cognitive perspective is the 
greatest contribution of Meyer et al. (1987), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and DiMaggio (1997) 
studies. 
A complementary theory to analyse change in institutional settings is provided by the 
institutional logics approach (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). The institutional logics approach – the 
content and meaning of institutions attempts to elucidate on the following question: ‘How can 
actors change institutions if their actions, intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very 
institution they wish to change’? (Holm 1995: 398). As Thornton and Ocasio (2008: 114-115) 
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explain, this problem of embedded agency is approached by conceptualising society as an inter-
institutional system in which logics are characterised by cultural differentiation, fragmentation, and 
contradiction, and therefore actors wishes and/or logics may not always be compatible with the 
institution they belong. 
The following sections draw upon the three approaches to new institutionalism – as 
traditionally classified by Hall and Taylor (1996) – to explain why the specific nature of HEIs allows 
them to endure over time while simultaneously exogenous shocks or shifts prompt institutional 
change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 7).  A similar process is used in the section devoted to explain 
institutional change and isomorphism. Drawing on these developments the aim of the theoretical 
framework is to inform the analysis of the cases and the final discussion, affording a conceptual lens 
to carry out the empirical investigation and to interpret its findings. It should be mentioned that it 
is not the objective of this section to debate whether new institutionalism is, actually, a theory or 
not. The researcher shares Palmer, Biggart and Dick’s (2008) opinion with respect to the usefulness 
of new institutionalism as a theoretical framework for understanding the links between 
organisational context and intra-organisational dynamics. Nevertheless, as referred by Greenwood 
and Hinings (1996), the new institutional theory is weak for analysing the internal dynamics of 
organisational change in the sense that it does not provide sufficient information on why some 
organisations adopt radical change whereas others do not, despite experiencing the same 
institutional pressures. That is why we are more interested in depicting the most interesting and 
useful elements of the three new institutionalism schools of thought for the research in a unified 
way. In this way, I agree with the recent research of Greenwood et al. (2008) who suggest that 
institutional research applied to organisational behaviour has evolved over time and the 
classifications offered by Hall and Taylor should be updated. 
 
3.3.1 The Three Approaches to New-Institutionalism 
For Hall and Taylor (1996: 936) there is considerable confusion about what sort of questions 
the new institutionalism answers to. They argue this confusion can be minimised by recognising that 
institutionalism does not constitute a unified body of thought, but rather three different but 
complementary analytical approaches, “(…) each of which calls itself ‘new institutionalism’”. These 
three schools of thought are the historical (comparative) institutionalism, the rational choice 
institutionalism (also associated with the economic institutionalism due to the similarities of both 
approaches) and the sociological (organisational) institutionalism. All of them devoted attention to 
the understanding of the role institutions play in the determination of individuals’ behaviour, 
although they explain social, political and organisational world relationships and outcomes in 
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different ways. As such, the concept of institution assumes different meanings in these different types 
of theoretical approaches. However, the three approaches are connected by their common concern 
on structures, namely what are structures and where they come from, and the role of institutional 
actors in the production of structures (Fligstein 2008: 17). Aspinwall and Schneider (2000: 30) 
provide an interesting point by arguing that the label of historical institutionalism is a “misnomer”, 
because every social phenomenon can be attributed to the influence of history. It is thus the duty 
of the researcher to be able to differentiate between important and unimportant historical 
influences.  
According to Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 7), these three institutionalisms explain what sustains 
institutions over time while simultaneously accounting for cases in which exogenous shocks or shifts 
prompt institutional change. Extrapolating the authors’ analysis, we can combine these three strands 
of thought to better understand why the specific nature of HEIs allows them to endure over time 
and how external events affect institutional change. Roughly speaking, these three complementary 
views share the conception of institutions as relatively enduring features of political and social life 
(ibidem: 4). This is why it makes sense to look at HE as an institution and to consider the 
consequences of its extensive and intensive institutionalisation processes (Meyer et al. 2008). In 
institutional thinking, environments constitute local situations – establishing and defining their core 
entities, purposes, and relations, and therefore local HE arrangements are heavily dependent on 
broader institutions (ibidem), such as quality assurance agencies, central government institutions, 
international organisations, etc. Thus, looking at HE as an institution allows us to see the cultural 
scripts and organisational rules built into the global, international and national environments that 
establish the main features of local situations. “(…) together with their disciplinary fields and 
academic roles, HEIs are defined, measured, and instantiated in essentially every country in explicitly 
global terms” (ibidem: 188). 
 
Historical Institutionalism 
According to historical institutionalists, the long life of universities as institutions is not justified 
by specific economic and political functions or shaped by particular historical legacies or power 
struggles, but by their association with the development of social progress and knowledge societies 
(Hall and Taylor 1996). Historical institutionalism seeks to explain institutions by reference to the 
past, focusing on their unique features and conventions (Bevir 2009: 110).  
For most historical institutionalists, institutions are likely to be path dependent or even “sticky” 
(Fligstein 2008: 240). According to Levi (1997: 27) path dependence happens because “(…) once a 
country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high”. Institutions tend to 
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resist change because they embed actors’ interests and also because institutions are implicated in 
actors’ cognitive frames and habits. Path dependency elucidates on the nature and speed of changes 
and whether these are on the same continuum as previous developments or whether they cause 
discontinuities. According to historical institutionalism, actual and future actions are the reflection 
of experience and radical changes in public administration hardly occur. Public policies and formal 
institutions are usually designed to be difficult to change so past decisions encourage policy 
continuity (Pierson 2000). According to Cerna (2013), the main strength of path dependence 
perspective is that it is able to explain why policy continuity is more likely to occur than policy 
change. As countries establish certain policy paths, it remains difficult to change these paths because 
actors and policies have become institutionalised, demanding great efforts and costs by actors who 
desire change. However, as Cerna (2013: 5) refers, it is difficult to show the costs and incentives 
created by the original policy choice and how it affects decisions about future policy choices. It is 
thus this focus on developmental continuity of historical institutionalism that makes it handicapped 
to explain institutional innovation and rapid change (Hodgson 2008: 4-5). According to Thelen 
(2002: 104) historical institutionalism is concerned with how a particular set of rules affects the 
strategic orientations of individual actors and their interactions, and with the ways in which 
institutional configurations define the organisational fields. This is so because organisational fields 
have a very broad influence on both the strategies of individual players and on the identities of 
actors and the networks that define their relations to each other. The current outcomes of public 
policies are inevitably shaped by current and past institutional arrangements and therefore policy 
decisions made in the past shape choices made today (Thoenig 2012: 170). 
Similar to path dependence, Streeck and Thelen (2005: 22-24) explain that layering is a type of 
change that “involves active sponsorship of amendments, additions or revisions to an existing set 
of institutions” (2005: 24). This type of change takes place through “differential growth”: the 
introduction of new elements sets in motion dynamics through which over time they actively crowd 
out or supplant the old system as the domain of the latter decreases relative to the former (ibid). Or, 
as Christensen (2012) puts it, layering processes may happen by the simple instrumental fact that 
leaders decide to keep reform elements they support or alike when introduce new reforms because 
“it is never easy to start from scratch, and continuity in norms and values helps a public organisation 
to cope with periods of transition” (ibid). Another reason may be that a diversity of reform elements 
from different sources makes it easier to make flexible political compromises, decrease conflicts and 
increase legitimacy. A third and more culturally oriented reason could be that path-dependent 
mechanisms and cultural resistance make it difficult to remove all elements from an old reform 
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when a new one emerges. In contrast, a fourth and more symbolically oriented reason is related to 
the layering of reforms (Meyer 1979; Christensen 2012).  
Layering also relates with displacement processes. Displacement happens as new models emerge 
and diffuse which call into question existing, previously taken-for-granted organisational forms and 
practices (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 19). Previous research suggests that “(…) given the 
development and promotion of alternative structures to achieve the same ends, organisations are 
likely to abandon older arrangements in favour of newer, promising structures, at least if costs 
associated with the change are relatively low” (Tolbert and Zucker 1996: 184). Nevertheless, it is 
also true that “recycling” old structures and ideas is a low-cost strategy, which demands fewer “social 
resources” than creating new organisational structures (ibidem: 182). 
The literature considers historical institutionalism in between the sociological and the rational 
choice streams, and has been criticised due to lack of focus and to the broad approach it uses in 
social inquiries, without addressing issues about individual behaviour raised by rational choice theory 
(Bevir 2009). However, historical institutionalists agree with rational choice scholars that actors 
operate in a strategic manner (Thelen 1999). Interest lays in determining the content of such strategic 
behaviour and understand, through historically based empirical analysis, why certain goals, policies, 
ideas, etc. are emphasised over others and why there are different national responses to similar 
policies and/or political changes (Hall and Taylor 1996; Bell 2003). This is crucial for this study, and 
helps to understand why institutional factors have been used to explain why countries pursued 
different responses to the common economic challenges of the 1970s and 1980s (Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992). For Thoenig (2012: 127-128), historical institutionalism criticises the idea that the 
state functions as a single, hands-off and neutral agent, elaborating consensual compromises. This 
view is of particular interest to track the role of state and its relationship with HEIs in both Portugal 
and Finland. In this sense, Christensen (2012) refers that the historical development of public 
institutions shows that at certain point in time, elements of the institutions’ basic structures and 
cultures are either pushed aside or deinstitutionalised when a new reform wave comes along or 
something else manages to remain viable and influence the further development of the organisation, 
regardless of new reform waves. An example of this scenario is the layering of various elements 
from the “old public administration”, NPM and post-NPM, making public organisations 
increasingly complex (Christensen 2012). 
With respect to change and decision-making dynamics in the EU domain, institutional and 
policy change become “path dependent” as actors define their preferences endogenously, based 
upon what has occurred in the past (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000). As Bulmer (1994: 355) states 
“political struggles are mediated by prevailing institutional arrangements. History creates contexts, 
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which in turn shape choices (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 16). This means that member states’ 
preferences are conditioned and shaped by what they have already agreed to within EU 
arrangements. Therefore, causality flows both ways: while agents chose institutions, institutions then 
constrain agents. The authors refer that the EU institutional and policy development ultimately 
follow one of several ‘paths’, although historical institutionalism does not favour one path over 
another. However, despite being possible for agents to subsequently alter or shift institutional 
arrangements to better suit their needs, they prefer the ‘stickiness’ and longevity of prior structural 
arrangements” (ibidem).  
Historical institutionalism also points to different perspectives on power: “the structure of 
supranational institutions and policy competence privileges certain types of competence over others, 
and by extension, certain actors over others” (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 16). As the authors 
explain, institutions are not necessarily the product of neutral bargaining or efficient historical 
evolution; they embody ideas and practices, which are then passed to agents, influencing their 
options and behaviour. As such, historical institutionalism stresses the role of policy stickiness in 
the process of European integration. European integration is thus a cumulative process according 
to historical institutionalism where prior decisions form a basis upon which new decisions are made 
(ibidem).  
Johanna Witte’s (2006) study on the implementation of the Bologna degree structure in four 
different national and institutional settings uses mostly historical institutionalism to analyse policy 
responses to similar challenges. In this scenario, she concludes that cultural and historical arguments 
seemed to feature particularly stronger in Germany and Italy when compared to the Netherlands 
and that the success or smooth implementation of change in HEIs depends on the conformity 
and/or dependences of the institutional path. 
 
Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Rational choice institutionalism relies on rational choice theory and it incorporates economic 
models to the study of institutions (e.g. cost transaction theory, principal-agent theory, etc.). In fact, 
these theoretical developments have been used to justify how and why institutions matter as they 
advocate that institutions can play an important role in reducing transaction and information costs 
and various associated forms of market uncertainty, as well as in monitoring and enforcing contracts 
and agreements (Bell 2002: 3-5). Rational choice institutionalism assumes that institutions are 
created by utility-maximizing individuals with clear intentions (North 1990). Rational choice 
institutionalism assumes that all actors are rational and therefore each person ponders his/her 
decisions in terms of utility for him/herself.  
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As Aspinwall and Schneider (2000: 11) state “since most decisions are affected by several 
individuals, decision-making has to be seen as an interdependent process. Since actors might have 
incentives to cheat on other players, a society might end up with institutions that are suboptimal 
from a collective viewpoint”. Additionally, by behaving rationally, actors assume a quality related 
perspective and institutions are seen to overcome market failure (Fligstein 2008: 17). Actors behave 
in a purely utilitarian way to maximise the satisfaction of their preferences, being efficiency the factor 
that conditions choice. Institutions and actors are clearly separable (Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
Efficiency, translated mostly as the maximisation of individual preferences, is a debatable issue in 
institutionalism. By pursuing the idea that institutions could be efficient, economic new 
institutionalism could also lead to the conclusion that current arrangements might be suboptimal 
and/or bring suboptimal outcomes for the community that, by behaving rationally, assumes a 
quality-related perspective. Thus, according to this perspective, both governmental institutions and 
the market are important factors in explaining why some countries develop efficient economies and 
others do not (Koelble 1995: 232). Institutions are thus capable of affecting an individual's choices 
and actions but not determining them (ibid). In turn, economic developments or the opposite 
scenario – e.g. economic crises – determine governments and institutions strategies towards these 
external pressures. Institutions change because people’s preferences also change (Bell 2002). 
Institutions are thus an intervening variable, but, ultimately, and according to (Koelble 1995: 232) 
they cannot determine actors’ actions. Contrary to sociological institutionalism, the 
economic/organisational choice view assumes that each human being is an outcome of his/her own 
choices, rational and utilitarian, and not of the context in which he/she is living. Institutions come 
into existence to help solve collective action dilemmas by providing people with more information 
about the strategic actions of others and give them opportunities to make trade-offs (Fligstein 2008). 
It should be remembered that rational choice theory has first found ground in the international 
relations field, where it assumes that actors behave in a strategic manner, adapting their strategies 
and beliefs to the assumed actions of other players (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 11)41. Thus, in 
order to make the most from cooperation and/or agreements, national governments create and 
maintain institutions to lower the transaction costs associated with intra-national activity, such as 
incomplete contracting, imperfect information and the inability to monitor and enforce agreements 
(ibidem). In this sense, cooperation is instrumental and not necessarily a socially ingrained and 
habitual practice (ibidem). In line with this, in this framework of analysis, political action involves the 
                                                 
41 Aspinwall and Schneider (2000: 30) refer that this is also the reason why according to Moser, 
Schneider and Kirchgässner (1997) rational choice institutionalism has also been called the 
theory of  strategic integration. 
 144 
management of uncertainty and how important flows of information are for power relations and 
political outcomes. Rational choice institutionalism strongly believes that strategic interaction 
between actors plays a determinant role for successful political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996: 
951). 
For historical institutionalists, interests and preferences matter, but they argue that this is more 
dependent on existing institutions and political opportunities than rational choice theorists would 
generally allow (Fligstein 2008). Rational choice theorists and historical institutionalists also share 
different views concerning the degree to which preferences could be endogenously determined. 
While historical institutionalists see preferences as a product of situational social roles or situations 
that cause actors to rethink who they are and what they want, rational choice proponents are less 
able to predict what might happen, also because they are not so focused in the (details of the) 
historical and social processes by which arrangements are made (ibid). Nevertheless, actors’ 
behaviours are predictable to some extent because if they face similar constraints, one would expect 
them to behave in a similar way (ibid). Differences in outcomes can also result from different amount 
of resources, as the rational choice strand believes that resources and rules produce both constraints 
and opportunities (Fligstein 2008: 15). Actors enter situations, consider their resources, their 
preferences, and then select actions oriented towards maximising their preferences.  
Emerging from the neoliberal ideology, from globalisation and from the influence of 
international organisations, the NPM fits this school of thought since it advocates that organisations 
must make rational choices and target efficiency. This has supported a wave of managerialism in 
universities which have to compete in an increasingly global scale, as national and international 
schemes for rating, ranking and accrediting promote competition at the global level (Meyer at al. 
2008: 206).  
 
Sociological institutionalism 
Sociological institutionalism defines institutions broadly, including the rules, procedures and 
norms, but also the symbols, cognitive schema and moral patterns that guide human action, 
establishing a systemic relationship between individuals and institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947). 
March and Olsen (1984) see institutions from a Weberian view, as constructs designed to assign 
rewards and sanctions and to establish guidelines for acceptable behaviour – giving birth to the value 
of meritocracy and promoting the idea of social mobility (Koelble 1995: 233). Individuals are 
embedded in cultural and organisational fields which determine the concepts of “self-interest” and 
“utility” (Koelble (1995: 232)42. An organisational field is a set of organisations that, in aggregate, 
                                                 
42 Although the new institutionalism links both sociological and rational choice institutionalism, 
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constitute a recognised area of institutional life. “Not all organisations respond in similar fashion to 
institutional processes. Yet, organisations confront institutional contexts containing multiple and 
inconsistent myths that allow for multiple yet equally legitimate responses” (Meyer and Rownan 
1977: 356). 
March and Olsen (1984; 1989) argued that human behaviour is guided and shaped by a logic of 
appropriateness which shapes behaviour and choices besides the maximisation of utility. They 
explained that individuals perceive the need to follow rules, which associate particular identities to 
particular situations in order to acquire personal self-knowledge skills, which in turn will help in the 
decision-making process. In this case, appropriateness refers to cognitive and ethical dimensions, 
targets and aspirations and it guides individuals to fit within an institution. Nevertheless, one should 
note that actors make different interpretations about institutional values, routines and rules (Peters 
1999). Actors ask what is expected from them given their role – a view that suits this study and that 
underlies all interviewed actors.  
According to Peters (1999: 30), “the institution defines a set of behavioural expectations for 
individuals in positions within the institution and then reinforces behaviour that is appropriate for 
the role and sanctions behaviour that is inappropriate”. Putting it like this, it seems that this is a 
simple process. However, one could wonder whether institutional dynamics of expectations and 
sanctions work as described by Peters? Data extracted for this study suggest a higher degree of 
complexity (cf. Chapter V). Additionally, the degree to which rules and a logic of appropriateness guide 
(administrative) behaviour depends on the competition from other behavioural logics, such as the 
logic of consequentiality and utility maximization, considering that both goals and rules can pervert 
behaviour (Olsen 2005: 14). According to this stream of thought, the culture, society and 
organisational identity have an important role in the definition of institution, and therefore on the 
behaviour of its actors. Institutions not only affect the strategic calculations of individuals, but also 
their basic preferences and identity (Hall and Taylor 1996: 948). Fligstein (2008: 241) advocates that 
one of the strengths of sociological institutionalism is pointing out that action occurs in fields where 
collective social actors gather to orient themselves to one another. According to this perspective, 
the institutions’ objective is to provide collective meanings by which the structuring of the field 
occurs and actors can come to interpret one another’s actions in order to reproduce their social 
groups. Once a set of beliefs and/or meanings is shared, actors both consciously and unconsciously 
                                                 
sociological institutionalism is much more influenced by the Durkheim view than rational choice 
institutionalism as the former strand attributes primal importance to the influence of  social 
structure in institutional building and development as well as on the extent to which institutions 
are internalised by agents (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 4).  
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spread or reproduce it. In sum, actors use the existent (institutionalised) rationalised myths about 
their situations to structure and justify their behaviour (DiMaggio 1988) and then to replicate it. 
Important differences between the sociological and the rational choice schools lay in the way 
decision-making processes are made. When making decisions, sociological institutionalists do not 
ask: “how do I maximize my interests in this situation?” They rather ask: “what is the appropriate 
response to this situation given my position and responsibilities?” (Koelble 1995: 233). Thus, more 
than the utility maximising thought, institutions and their set of rules of conduct and behaviour 
provide legitimacy and appropriateness to institutional actors (ibid: 232). Institutions are thus 
dependent upon larger “macro level” variables such as society and culture, where the individual is a 
largely dependent and unimportant variable (Koelble 1995: 232). Within HEIs there are legal, 
administrative and professional procedures, which facilitate and direct both institutions and actors 
to gain meaning, authority and legitimacy. Nevertheless, power relations lead to situations where 
often it is more important to embody exogenously legitimated properties than it is to adapt to local 
possibilities and demands (Meyer et al. 2008: 192). For example, in the case of profiling research, 
the interests of the university leaders may not be in line with the interests of the policy-makers 
(Pietilä 2014). If the values and aims of the actors are in disagreement, the leaders might respond to 
external demand symbolically in order to defend the organisation’s inner core. It is vital for the 
organisation to achieve a normative match between the values and beliefs of the proposed policy 
reform and the identity and traditions of the organisation (ibid).  
Also with respect to differences between both the sociological and rational choice 
institutionalisms, Kaplan (2006) points out that institutional effects upon the decision-making 
processes of HEIs can be expressed in various ways. For example, (political) struggles over 
institutional resources and strategy, as well as the allocation of benefits and/or sanctions “(…) will 
be shaped by structural features of the organization, the organization’s relationship to its 
environment, and the social environment in which its participants are embedded” (2006: 216). A 
deep analysis of these points will allow us to better understand how the outcomes that we observe 
in HE are related to the structure and HEIs’ governance processes (Kaplan 2006).  
More recently, the actor-centred institutionalist approach, which combines rational choice 
theory and new institutionalism, has been used in studies on the field of HE, namely on the analysis 
of policy networks and multi-level and multi-actor governance reforms (e.g. Witte 2006; Martens 
and Wolf 2009). This perspective seeks to explain policies and policy outcomes from intentional 
actions of interdependent actors, acknowledging that these are shaped by their institutional settings 
(Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004: 149). According to this perspective, the concept of 
‘network’ is used to describe how informal institutional settings help to overcome collective action 
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problems and it specifies conditions that reduce transaction costs of negotiations (Van Kersbergen 
and Van Waarden 2004; Witte 2006). This is probably why Scharpf (1997) believes that the rational 
approach is ‘an actor-centred’ institutionalism, and the analytical focus is on the actors and their 
choices, whereas rules are secondary limitations or constraints (Bleiklie, Høstaker and Vabø 2000: 
17). 
Martens and Wolf (2009: 84) point to the fact that international organisations not only influence 
the strategic choices of rational actors, but also develop in ways unanticipated by their creators, i.e. 
international organisations are able to emancipate from the states that initially created them for a 
specific purpose (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). Such as HEIs, international organisations 
incorporate ‘symbolic systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the “frames of 
meaning” guiding human action’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947). Nevertheless, or in parallel with their 
emancipation process and with their institutional frames of meaning which guide action, international 
organisations act as important (political) actors making policies themselves and unfold their impact 
on HE political processes (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Martens and Wolf 2009), contributing then 
for convergent behaviour. Also Bell (2002) points to the impact that international economic 
pressures have on national policies which will affected a country’s economic structure and also the 
institutional capacities and make-up of the states. 
From the sociological institutionalist perspective, and with respect to European dynamics, 
Aspinwall and Schneider (2000: 21) refer that “(…) integration depends crucially on cultural and 
cognitive variation, and consequently the impact of values, beliefs, and identities on actors’ 
responses to integrative challenges”. The authors point several reasons for this cultural and cognitive 
variation. It may occur along professional lines, where groups of professionals from different 
countries respond in similar ways to proposed or agreed policies; it may also occur within 
international organisations such as the EC, etc. Thus, whether on one hand we have seen that 
institutions can reduce transaction and information costs, on the other hand, cognitive boundaries 
add transaction costs to cooperation, even if these links are founded in language, faith geography, 
‘epistemic professionalism’, or some other bound which assigns common meaning and value to 
human experience. Cultural persistence may be the result of external pressure or the 
internationalisation of norms (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 22).  
In fact, certain elements of historical institutionalism are closely related to sociological 
institutionalism (ibidem). As Aspinwall and Schneider (2000) argue, with time, the mutual impact of 
culture and historical evolution are impossible to separate. Nevertheless, regarding the study of the 
EU, namely issues related with convergence and integration, institutionalist theoretical approaches 
diverge in at least two important aspects. They first differ with respect to the intensity that these 
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theoretical contributions try to establish causal explanations of the interrelationship between actors, 
contexts and rules. Sociological and historical institutionalisms pay particular attention to the 
contexts which, in their opinion, help to shape policy change, mediate between actors and alter 
conditions in which decisions are reached. Thus, especially sociological institutionalism sees 
structure prior to agency. In historical and sociological institutionalism, human action is more 
context-driven and goal-driven than in rational choice institutionalism (2000: 7), whereas for 
rationalist researchers context matters less (2000: 23-24).  
Table 5 summarises the main features and differences of the three theoretical approaches of 
new institutionalism along nine dimensions developed by Aspinwall and Schneider (2000). One of 
the features that immediately stands out is that all perspectives understand institutions as rules and 
norms. Briefly, it can be seen that historical institutionalists share with rational choice 
institutionalists an emphasis on actor intentionality in the short term. According to Pierson (1996) 
and Aspinwall and Schneider (2000), one of the most important underlying differences between 
theorists concerns the time horizon. While rational choice theorists tend to concentrate on short-
term decision-making, sociological institutionalists concentrate on long-term institutional effects. 
An important notion we take from new institutionalism refers to culture. From the sociological 
perspective, “(…) culture is extremely important because it contains the bedrock cognitive 
similarities that cause people to share perceptions of the world around them. (…) Culture is one of 
the most important driving forces behind the institutionalisation of human behaviour” (Aspinwall 
and Schneider 2000: 8). The authors argue that although culturally based commonalities do not erase 
the potential for conflict, the common interpretation of events shared by similar cultural norms or 
habits reduce transaction costs and lead to an “economy of effort” (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 71 
in Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 9). Moreover, shared cultural and cognitive-based understandings 
may promote common action, whereas different understandings may act as a constraint (ibidem). 
Thus, actors with similar interests, who do not emerge from the same cultural context, find that 
there is a cross cutting cleavage separating them (ibidem). The same process happens recurrently in 
trying to agree in common economic policies in the EU. For example, whereas some actors prefer 
a liberal approach, others choose a protectionist approach. However, as pointed by the authors, it 
is very difficult to measure the effect of “cultural variables” or “signs” on actors’ behaviour, because 
it is impossible to imagine individuals acting without reference to cultural roots; “(…) to ascertain 
the effects of these roots, becomes exceedingly difficult.” (ibidem: 10). 
 
 
Table 5 - Main features of the three new institutionalists approaches 
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Dimensions 
 
Sociological 
Institutionalism 
 
Historical 
Institutionalism 
 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
 
Concept of 
Institution 
Institutions as ‘culture’; 
norms and values are 
similar to ‘patterns of 
behaviour’, but also 
includes rules 
Equal weight given to 
formal and informal 
rules, procedures, 
norms and conventions 
Rules; procedures. 
Institutions as facilitators 
of economic transactions  
Creation of 
Institutions 
Evolutionary; occasional 
abrupt changes caused by 
new events or 
reinterpretations 
Delegation; self-
maintaining and 
potentially expensive 
Distributional conflict, 
reduction of transaction 
costs or collective 
dilemma, reduction of 
transaction costs or 
collective dilemma as 
driving force 
Evolution of 
Institutions 
Cognitive/memory 
process of mythologizing 
common events  
Contingent processes 
with path dependency 
and unintended 
consequences 
Bargaining process, 
evolutionary selection 
Role of 
institutions for 
human action 
Major independent 
variable; cultural 
constraint  
Intervening variable. 
Grown constraint and 
opportunity  
Intervening variable. 
Situative constraint and 
opportunity 
Relationship 
between 
institutions and 
actors 
Institutions provide moral 
or cognitive templates for 
interpretation and action 
(Hall and Taylor 1996). 
Institutional norms and 
values are internalised / 
adopted individuals 
Institutions influence 
actors’ perceptions and 
preferences, but do not 
determine them. 
Institutions set 
boundaries/limits, 
incentives and the scope 
of action, constituting in 
this way the framework 
in which utility 
maximising behaviour of 
individuals takes place 
Actor 
motivation 
Legitimacy and 
appropriateness (March 
& Olsen 1989); culture 
Self-interest and 
normative goals; 
‘calculus’ and ‘culture’ 
Narrowly defined 
economic self-interest; 
‘calculus’ 
Time Horizon Long term Long term Short term 
Independent 
and Intervening 
Variables 
Institutions as major 
independent variables 
and actors as intervening 
Institutions as 
independent variables 
and actors as 
intervening 
Actors as the 
independent variables 
and institutions as 
intervening 
Typical 
Research 
Method 
Inductive; case studies, 
thick description 
Mixture of inductive 
and deductive 
approaches; analytical 
case studies 
Deductive; illustration of 
hypotheses 
 
Source: Adapted from Aspinwall and Schneider (2000: 7).  
 
In reconsidering the theoretical foundations of the three major new institutionalism strands, 
several authors refer that institutions can be positioned in a continuum of ideas that ranges from 
‘calculus’ to ‘cultural’ views on the behavioural impact of institutions. The calculus perspective 
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claims that institutions reduce uncertainty in strategic interactions, whereas the cultural perspective 
addresses the institutional framing of individual rationality (North 1981: 12; DiMaggio and Powell 
1983: 55; Hall and Taylor 1996; Hodgson 2008). Previously, also DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have 
conceived and divided organisations into two types distributed alongside a continuum. At one side 
of the continuum, one can find institutionalised organisations whose success depends on the 
confidence and stability achieved by isomorphism with institutional rules. At the other point of the 
continuum, there are production organisations under strong output controls where success depends 
on the management of relational networks (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 55). Figure 2 attempts to 
explain this continuum. 
 
Figure 2 – Continuum of  Institutional Behavioural Impact  
 
 
By differentiating new institutionalism subfields, this study contextualises and elucidates on the 
analytical challenge of understanding system and institutional changes in both Portuguese and 
Finnish HE systems, more specifically issues with respect to the creation and diffusion of similar 
policies and governance structures.  
The new institutionalism should be brought to this analysis as a blend or mix of disciplines rather 
than being interpreted isolated so that its contributions can be maximised. Nevertheless, it is true 
that the lack of agreement and panoply of definitions of institutions has granted several critics to 
institutionalism. For example, Donaldson (1995) criticises the institutional theory for being 
internally incoherent and, consequently, for being difficult to understand its basic premises and/or 
to discern its evolution. However, these arguments do not affect the object of this study, neither the 
use of these perspectives. As mentioned above, it not the researcher’s intention to reflect on the 
historical evolution or even whether new institutionalism can be considered a theory or not. The 
purpose is to extract information that help us to understand institutional change and actors 
behaviour, the relation between these both focus and even how Portuguese and Finnish actors react 
and deal under similar pressures.  
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Aspinwall and Schneider (2000: 22): “Institutions, conceived as those formal and 
informal mechanisms that produce social patterns of social behaviour, act as both independent 
and intervening variables in this research. The dependent variables include such outcomes as 
common policies, reform of the supranational institutions, enlargement and many other 
practical questions facing the European Union”  
Behavioural,impact,of,institutions,
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The researcher assumes that the representative reform movements of the study object are 
characterised by a combination of different and complex organisational processes such as layering, 
hybridisation and even dominance, and pendulum swings (Christensen 2012). As informal rules, 
also cultural practices and cognitive patterns encompass this mixture of elements present in national 
and institutional HE reforms, as studied along the next chapters. At the institutional level, and 
following the continuum drawn above, institutionalised organisations need confidence and stability 
to succeed. In turn, human identity, behaviour and rationality determine institutional culture 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
 
3.4 Institutional Change and Isomorphism 
For institutionalists change happens through institutionalisation of a certain organisational field 
and/or sector, i.e. a set of organisations that, in aggregate, constitute a recognised area of 
institutional life. In fact, it is this theorisation on organisational fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), 
sectors or strategic action fields (Meyer and Scott 1983) that makes new institutionalism to stand 
out among other perspectives of organisational behaviour. Structure and context are primary factors 
to consider when studying collective behaviour. By conceiving institutions as entities that structure 
fields and help to guide actors through the muddle around them, institutions define who was in 
what position in the field, give people rules and cognitive structures to interpret others’ actions, and 
scripts to follow under conditions of uncertainty (Scott and Meyer 1983; DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). Institutionalisation happens when “(…) social processes, obligations, or actualities come to 
take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” (Meyer and Rowan 1977). However, in my 
opinion, institutionalisation does not necessarily mean “taken-for-granted” behaviours, neither 
“widely accepted and/or resistance to change” (social inertia). We rather see institutionalisation as 
something widely practiced, but which does not necessarily mean acceptation and/or compliance. 
In turn, coercive institutionalisation might result in actors’ frustration, loss of identification with the 
institution and even alienation (cf. Amaral et al. 2002; Välimaa 2005; (Sara Diogo, 2014) 
Furthermore, we believe that institutionalised practices need to be monitored, assessed and 
discussed. Control technologies (Reed 2002) have become institutionalised and transmitted from 
one generation to another, although with some degree of change in it, according to actors’ beliefs 
and culture. As such, concepts and ideas are the first steps for a practice become institutionalised. 
Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) refer that in highly institutionalised contexts, managers need to exercise 
‘sagacious conformity’ if they are to understand ‘changing fashions and governmental programmes’, 
implying a level of active management as organisations adapt to their institutional environment, a 
fact that can be applied to the institutionalisation of managerialism in HEIs. Those organisations 
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whose technologies are not clearly linked to outcomes and whose outputs are difficult to evaluate, 
are particular sensitive to the need to appear rational, i.e. institutionalised organisations (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977).  
The Bologna process is an example that, in the researcher’s viewpoint, does not fit the idea of 
institutionalised practices as defined by earlier institutionalists, but rather a (successful?) attempt to 
the process of becoming institutionalised. Today, 16 years after the Declaration has been signed, 
and although the changes brought by the process to HEIs have been passing through different 
generations of students (and academics), they have not been widely accepted (not even at the system 
level), and resistance to change has been high (cf. chapter VII).  
According to Meyer and Rowan (1985: 94-95) the formal structure of an organisation is a social 
myth. Institutions avoid social censure, minimise demands for external accountability, improve their 
chances of securing necessary resources and try to raise their probability of survival (Greenwood et 
al. 2008: 4). The formal, symbolic structure may be window dressing and not aimed at changing the 
organisational status quo. Therefore, what institutional actors do in practice (the reality) is different 
from what they appear to do (the facade) (Meyer and Rowan 1985: 96). The institutional forms and 
practices used are not chosen because they are more effective, as implied by the notion of rationality. 
Institutional forms function as cultural practices compared to the myths and ceremonies that happen 
in societies and that orgnisations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced 
survival prospects (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 340). Thus, variations in the organisational structure 
also affect the cultural content carried and transmitted by HEIs: while some HE systems are adverse 
to change and to establish links with societies, others are more prone to engage in a wider array of 
activities (Meyer et al. 2008). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified a paradox in organisational behaviour: since the 
moment a group of organisations emerge as a field, actors make their organisations increasingly 
similar while trying to change them. “Why is there such startling homogeneity of organizational 
forms and practices?” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 147). What can lead organisations, after 
becoming an institutional field, to adopt a common set of patterns, characteristics and specific 
behaviour, leading them to be increasingly homogenous? Under what conditions public 
organisations imitate each other and avoid innovation (Thoenig 2012)? Even when organisations 
try to change and seek new ways to improve their performance, after some time these efforts are 
not balanced with the level of diversity that exists within a field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This 
happens due to the structuration of organisational fields. In the short term, pressures toward 
isomorphism are strong (Thoenig 2012). For DiMaggio and Powell (1983), the process that most 
clearly translates the cognitive dimension of isomorphic behaviour is imitation, i.e. mimetic 
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processes, as explained below. As fields mature, there is an inexorable push towards homogenisation 
as powerful forces emerge, leading institutions to become more similar (Greenwood et al. 2008: 6). 
Institutions and their actors deal with uncertainty by imitating others they consider models or 
successful ones in the same field (Scott 2001). Isomorphism is thus a “(…) constraining process 
that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 149). Greenwood et al. (2008: 6) summarise this view by 
referring that organisations become isomorphic with their institutional context in order to secure 
social approval (legitimacy), which provides survival benefits. 
Institutionalisation occurs through three forms of institutional isomorphism, i.e. three kinds of 
conformity to environmental expectations or “mechanisms of diffusion”: coercive, mimetic and 
normativee (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150). These mechanisms decrease systematic diversity, since 
all of them lead to increasing similarity in institutions’ behaviour.  
“Coercive factors involved political pressures and the force of the state, providing regulatory 
oversight and control; normative factors stemmed from the potent influence of the 
professions and the role of education; and mimetic forces drew on habitual, taken-for-granted 
responses to circumstances of uncertainty” (Powell 2007: 2).  
 
When coercive isomorphism results from the pressures (formal and informal) applied by the state 
on organisations (Van Vught 2008), the changes brought by these pressures are a direct response to 
government orders: “(...) the existence of a common legal environment affects many aspects of an 
organization’s behaviour and structure” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150). Both researchers also 
analysed Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) contributions on organisational diversity and concluded that in 
a politically constructed environment, political decision makers tend to not experience directly the 
consequences of their actions; and also that, once political decisions are applied to a set of 
organisations, decisions become less adaptive and less flexible (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Although institutional isomorphism tends to be classified in three main categories – coercive, 
mimetic and normative – it is now known that organisations do not compete only for resources 
and/or clients. They also compete for political power and legitimacy – competitive isomorphism. 
All of them are empirically interconnected, but they emerge from distinct conditions and impulses 
(or forces) and might lead to different results too. These mechanisms of diffusion are usually the 
motivation factors explaining adoption. In this way:  
“Coercive isomorphism occurs because organizations are motivated to avoid sanctions 
available to organizations on which they are dependent. Normative isomorphism occurs 
because organizations are motivated to respect social obligations. And mimetic isomorphism 
occurs because organizations are motivated by their interpretation of others’ successful 
behavior” (Greenwood et al. 2008: 7).  
 
A strong factor that causes homogeneity of structures and behaviour within the HE sector is 
the tendency to emphasise research excellence, when research intensive universities are the role 
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models that other HEIs mimic. Emphasis on research excellence is accelerated by national and 
institutional evaluations, benchmarking and funding schemes (Pietilä 2014). In the case of profiling 
research, the interests of the university leaders may not be in line with the interests of the policy-
makers (cf. Oliver 1991). If the values and aims of the actors are in disagreement, institutional leaders 
might respond to the external demand symbolically in order to defend the organisation’s inner core. 
It is vital for an organisation to achieve a normative match between the values and beliefs of the 
proposed policy reform and the identity and traditions of the organisation (Gornitzka 1999). And 
this is the basis of institutional theory: to highlight the tendency of organisations to look for 
appropriate structures to appear as socially fit. According to Meyer and Rowan (1985: 94-95) the 
formal structure of an organisation is in good part a social myth. As such, the formal, symbolic 
structure may be a facade and not aimed at changing the organisational status quo (ibidem: 96). 
Ramirez (2012) addresses the question of what makes persons, organisations, and nation-states 
to pursue some routes and not others. In HE, it can be asked why some educational trends and 
reforms diffuse and others not. How do they travel, assuming that they do? “The local indeed 
matters, but how much it matters varies over time and space” (Ramirez 2012: 434). Indeed, 
understanding time and space is one of the keys to avoid the most common pitfalls in comparative 
(educational) research: assuming that all HE systems are experiencing the same changes and at the 
same pace (Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal 2003). Institutionalism has been a useful framework for the 
study of the international diffusion of governance structures of HE (Diogo 2014; Whitley and Gläser 
2014).  
In line with DiMaggio and Powell, Scott (2001) argued that institutions are based in three 
distinct pillars – regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive, which provide stability and meaning 
to social behaviour. Additionally, each of Scott’s pillars offered a different rationale for legitimacy, 
either by being legally sanctioned, morally authorised, or culturally supported (Powell 2007). 
According to Scott (2001) each pillar provides a basis for legitimacy. “Legitimacy is not a commodity 
to be possessed or exchange but a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or 
consonance with relevant rules or laws” (2001: 45). The regulative element stands for institutions’ 
rules and constraints that condition actors’ behaviour, e.g. regulatory processes, monitoring and 
sanctioning activities (Scott 2001: 35). Economists and economic historians (e.g. Douglas North) 
see institutions mainly based on the regulative pillar, which operates through coercive isomorphism 
(formal or informal exogenous pressures). Thus, whereas the cognitive element puts emphasis on 
the importance of social identities, i.e. conceptions of who individuals are and what ways of action 
make sense in a given situation, the normative pillar (right after) emphasises the power of roles, i.e. 
normative expectations guiding behaviour (Scott 2001). The existence of a common legal 
 155 
environment affects many aspects of HEIs, such as behaviour, structure and responses to external 
pressures. Coercive isomorphism may also emerge from soft regulation mechanisms (e.g. EC modus 
operandi in the area of educational policy-making43). The Bologna process reflects an example of 
imposing and spreading a common educational model to different countries, promoting convergence 
of national HE systems (Veiga and Amaral 2012).  
The normative pillar includes values, norms, roles and normative rules that introduce a 
prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life (Scott 2001: 37). Normative 
schemes push compliance for social obligations. In HE, the normative pillar works through 
certification and accreditation, forcing HEIs to conform and ensure they meet certain quality 
standards (Huisman 2009). Normative isomorphism stems from professionalisation as it is subjected 
to the same process of socialisation, and behavioural norms and standards to become similar 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). For example, HEIs need to cope with innovation, which might 
challenge the traditional model of knowledge transmission, e.g. e-learning. Situations like these can 
lead to more diverse forms of delivering knowledge, or innovation might lead to common responses 
from institutions of the same sector by seeing how successful organisations operate (Meyer et al. 
2008).  
The cultural-cognitive pillar corresponds to the shared conceptions of the rules that constitute 
the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is made. At the inter-
organisational level, social scientists recognised the presence of scripts and shared beliefs as indicators 
of cultural-cognitive schemes44. The most important cognitive elements are the constitutive rules 
(Scott 2001), involving the creation of categories and typifications, which in turn contribute to the 
social construction of actors and interests (ibid: 41). The cognitive pillar relates to mimetic 
isomorphism as organisations are motivated by their interpretation of others’ successful behaviour 
(Greenwood et al. 2008: 7). As such, it results from competitive market forces contrary to normative 
conformity, which happens through strong social and cultural expectations for certain organisational 
behaviour (Bess and Dee 2008: 142-143). Mimetic isomorphism happens when institutions ’copy’ 
each others’ behaviours in order to find solutions which do not demand a high investment and it is 
driven by uncertainty. These three pillars balance institutional dynamics and help us to understand 
how institutional theory works in practice. 
In the context of European collaboration, institutions can function as independent, intervening 
or outcome variables. As independent variables, they include bedrock values, ideas and norms at the 
national, organisational, or some other level. As intervening variables, they may comprise codified, 
                                                 
43 Cf. Souto-Otero, Fleckenstein and Dacombe (2008) on this topic. 
44 Cf. Greenwood and Hinings (1993) for the concept of  archetype. 
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clearly-visible rules or they may have routines and standard practices which are less visible but 
equally important determinants of social behaviour. As dependent variables, they include those 
equilibria and patterns of behaviour that characterise the process of European collaboration 
(Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 5). 
 
Figure 3 - Patterns that characterise institutions’ behaviour in the process of European 
collaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Aspinwall and Schneider (2000). 
 
In the process of the EU construction, the patterns of behaviour that characterise the outcomes 
of European collaboration are much based in the logic of appropriateness representing dominant 
institutional values (Veiga 2012). With respect to the other two patterns (independent and 
intervening variables), Laffan (2001) refers that in the EU, the cognitive systems entail national 
frames and the emergence of new frames of meaning (e.g. flag, passport, the single currency) 
constructed within the EU. As such, “the cognitive pillar remains the most underdeveloped of the 
pillars largely because the EU was founded by states, institutions with a powerful cognitive 
dimension” (2001: 722).   
Whether we look at the implementation of the Bologna declaration through a ‘top-down’ 
perspective, the role of the main actors should be as follows: the European level defines guidelines 
and principles, the national level translates those guidelines, sets policies and lines of action, HEI – 
depending on their autonomy and power attributed to them – interpret guidelines, policies and lines 
of action, adapting, changing or transforming HEIs’ own profile in such a way that the outcomes 
fulfil – or not – the Bologna process goals. But policy implementation in HE is closer to the idea of 
mutual adaptation. And soft law mechanisms steer the “top-down” diffusion process by combining 
HEIs’ steering mechanisms with “bottom-up” approaches. The new-institutionalism perspective is 
therefore useful to construct a feasible framework of analysis, based on rules, routines, norms and 
Institutions
Independent: bedrock values, ideas and norms at the 
national, organisational, or some other level.
Intervening: codified, clearly-visible rules or routines and 
standard practices which are less visible but equally 
important determinants of social behaviour
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patterns of behaviour that characterise the process of 
European collaboration
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identities of an institution, rather than micro rational individuals or macro social forces (March and 
Olsen 2005: 20). 
 
3.5 Location of the Study  
Earlier in the dissertation (chapter II), it was mentioned that changes in HE should be 
understood in the light of the emergence of a context of public sector reforms, framed by 
neoliberalism, where governance is conceptualised as a minimal state. These changes have led to the 
rise of the Evaluative State (Neave 1998) originating from the belief that universities are inefficient 
in their governing capabilities, although responsible for “(…) the production of a whole system of 
knowledge” (Meyer et al. 2008: 190). 
Instead of hollowing out the state, the neoliberal movement “created new patterns of service 
delivery based on complex sets of organisations drawn from all of the public, private, and voluntary 
sectors” (Bevir 2009: 6). The greater emphasis on informal institutions led institutionalists to gain 
increasing interest in the study of formal bureaucracies but also of policy networks, concluding that 
under the new governance, the state had to rely less on rules and more on indirect management, 
based then on negotiation and trust (2009: 112). In this scenario and according to the rational choice 
theory, in the absence of/or less government, one expects that the stability of organisational norms, 
agreements and patterns of rules (loose norms) dictate individuals’ behaviour. As such, according to 
institutionalism, institutions are tied to codes of appropriateness, and reproduction occurs as actors 
socialise or learn from collective scripts that regulate human behaviour (March and Olsen 1989; 
Scott 2001). In other words, in the absence of any higher authority or any enforcing agent, networks and 
logics of appropriateness also help to guide institutional actors beyond what is legally stipulated. 
Concurrently, mostly after the 1960s and 1970s, the term “management” spreads to the public sector 
and, with the rise of conservative governments in Britain and the United States in the 1980s, the 
concept of managerialism takes over a new meaning, leading some authors to classy this period as 
neo/new/hard managerialism (Ferlie et al. 1996; Denhardt and Denhardt 2000; Reed 2002; 
Kirkpatrick et al. 2005)45. Moreover, the public policy reforms of the 1970s have also encompassed 
                                                 
45 The authors who follow this distinction seek to emphasise what they consider a fundamental 
difference in these two periods. While, initially, in the 1960s and 1970s, the aim of  the reforms 
was to restructure the organisational forms and practices based on bureaucratic rationalisation; 
in the last period, in the 1980s and 1990s, the whole restructuring movement is reconfigured 
and materialised assuming the inevitability of  breaking with institutional and professional 
autonomy (Reed 2002). Indeed, by insisting that cultural factors play an equal and independent 
role alongside structural and material factors, institutional theorists created the idea that there 
are generic types of  social structures – organisations – to be administered under a common 
body of  knowledge management and which contains recognised subcategories such as firms, 
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institutional restructuring, as for example shifts in power between institutions and between actors, 
impacting especially on the role of the state, namely on the possibility and desirability of the 
government shaping society (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Olsen 2005).  
At the macro-level, new institutionalism provides a fruitful framework for analysing 
institutional restructuring and destructuring/de-institutionalising processes, as well as reproduction 
and production mechanisms in HE systems and institutions. By explaining the processes of 
institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation, Carvalho and Santiago (2010) refer that new-
institutionalism allows us to better understand the outcomes that follow from these processes, 
nevertheless drawing our attention to the fact that a theoretical approach that restricts itself to 
environmental relations may constrain both processes of institutionalisation and de-
institutionalisation imposed on HEIs as well as limit the analysis of what and how academics 
interpret and respond to the pressures of managerialism/NPM at the micro-organisational level 
(2010: 166). As the authors remind: “If strategic responses to external pressures differ for each 
institution, internal response may also be expected to differ” (ibidem 2010: 166). This is so because 
institutional restructuring emerges at two levels. At first, it originates in the political initiatives to 
reshape the structures, roles and routines of individual HEIs and its academic cultures. Second, it 
emerges in the steps taken to legitimate a new cultural-cognitive ‘milieu’ or ‘order’, closely bonded 
to market ideologies and/or NPM (2010: 165). Thus, one should not forget that “attempts to 
institutionalise the components of NPM go hand in hand with efforts to de-institutionalise long-
established features of both institutional and professional culture” (2010: 166). 
Among the three new institutionalisms streams, this research has the most in common with 
the historical and sociological institutionalisms due to the way these perspectives conceive 
institutions and actors, and the relationship between them. This proved to go in hand with the 
researcher’s interest in international comparative research into policy responses to similar 
challenges. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of path dependency and layering are important 
theoretical tools to put into perspective the research object.  
Change is conceived here as an outcome of reforms, i.e. we look at changes as a result of 
governmental and intergovernmental initiatives. Nevertheless, the study shares from Clark’s (2004a: 
367) view, who believes that reforms enacted by the state do not handle change properly considering 
that system-based policies always overlook the characteristics, dynamics and needs of the individual 
institution. In methodological terms (Chapter V), it is often difficult to determine the points in time 
when change occurs. In addition, the perspectives on institutional change presented here are more 
able to explain change in the past rather than predict change in the future based on certain conditions 
                                                 
schools, and agencies (Scott 2004: 7). 
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(Cerna 2013). Nevertheless, this study attempts to combine elements of these three research 
perspectives: it stresses historical, structural, cultural and sociological continuities in the role of the 
main intentional actors in the reform process presented here: the government and HEIs. Such 
interaction of views and elements allow us to trace political decisions in both countries and to 
understand actors’ preferences, who shaped and lived these political decisions. 
With respect to actors, the study drinks from their perceptions, preferences and capabilities 
that characterise them and that they use(d) throughout the processes analysed here. Witte (2004) 
defines the sum of actors’ perceptions, preferences and capabilities as the actor constellation, which 
then plays out dynamically through actor interaction in the policy formulation process. The 
researcher believes that the groundness of this study is also located in the variety of actors involved, 
adding also levels of analysis due to their role in policy and governance reforms, as for example the 
European context. However, the main handicap of the three new institutionalisms as Filgstein 
(1997) puts it, is that they miss the point that actors (decision-makers, managers, leaders, or elites) 
have many constituencies to balance off and they must continuously be aware that they have to 
produce arrangements to induce cooperation with both their allies and opponents. 
Kaplan (2006) reminds us of the importance of institutions and key actors and strategic groups. 
Institutions represent the context within which polities come to decisions about policy. They make 
certain outcomes possible and stable and make other outcomes unlikely. However, if institutions 
retain such power in society, if they control and shape outcomes, they possibly award some 
advantages to some groups over others: how is this then translated in institutional life? Which groups 
are these and how do these dynamics vary in HEIs with different governance structures and 
management practices? And, at the system level, how can different government types and rules 
affect decision-making processes and change policies when governments change? These questions 
led us to the conceptualisation and formulations on institutionalisation processes. We know (from 
institutionalism lessons) that full institutionalisation of a structure is likely to depend on the conjoint 
effects of organisational actors distinguished by a number of properties (e.g. hierarchical authority, 
unique legal responsibilities, etc.) who relatively low resistance by opposing groups (Tolbert 1996: 
181). The reversal of this process, deinstitutionalisation, is likely to require a major shift in the 
environment which may lead to conflict between actors whose interests are in opposition to others 
with different cognitive frameworks (Pietilä 2014). In fact, once in existence, institutions both enable 
and constrain social actors; “privileged” actors can use institutions to reproduce/reinforce their 
position (Fligstein 1997). In fact, differences in power explain how organisational groups with 
different beliefs and interests influence a change process (Arnaboldi, Azzone and Palermo 2010: 
79). Following this (or because of this finding…) Scott (2004: 11) referred that rather than 
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organisations absorbing societies, it may rather be the case that societies are absorbing 
organisations… 
 
3.6 The nature of HEIs as important factors in organisational change  
 
Topics where it is easy to find general consensus among the public is the fact that universities 
are “among the most traditional of all the institutions of our society and, at the same time, it is the 
institution most responsible for changes that make our society the most changing in the history of 
man” (Hesburgh in Clark 1983: 182). Indeed, this very often-claimed exceptionalism of HE seemed 
to justify, as referred by Kogan and Hanney (2000), an unique relationship between the state and 
HEIs, largely supported by their mission of knowledge generation and diffusion (though the 
research function is still relatively new, Wittrock 1993). The process of transformation of the 
universities into primary knowledge-producing institutions followed two important events: the 
declining of influence of their ecclesiastical (religious) function (namely teaching priests) and, at the 
same time, the rise of the modern nation-state throughout Europe in 1648, with the landmark Treaty 
of Westphalia (Wittrock 1993: 305).  
Drawing essentially on Burton Clark’s (1983) work, some of HEIs main hallmarks will be 
briefly remembered. The first basic concept (it is difficult to find a nominal category for this) 
composing HE everywhere is knowledge (Clark 1983), and it is this “material” which determines 
how activities are organised within HEIs. Around the different types of knowledge, “… each 
national system develops a division of labour that becomes traditional, strongly institutionalized and 
heavily influential on the future” (ibid: 6). As such, one of the main distinctive characteristics of 
HEIs is their bottom-dominated (“bottom-heavy”) form of governance, which implies that the 
organisation of academic work is thus fragmented by scientific disciplines or by institutions. As Clark 
remembers “… a national system of higher education is also a set of disciplines and professions, 
even though we do not normally perceive larger systems in these terms” (ibid: 29). This organisation 
naturally affects the nature of the academic profession and the structure of the institutions. Indeed, 
with respect to the organisation of the academic work, the author highlights the importance of the 
discipline (rather than the enterprise – institution) in the working life of academics, seeing that when 
one gives to an academic the choice of leaving the discipline or the institution, he/she will leave the 
institution and will remain committed to his/her discipline (ibid: 30). Probably, and considering that 
almost three decades have passed since Clark wrote what many called the “higher education bible”, 
such a view might raise debates. Many would argue that at the present the academic profession has 
lost much of its attractiveness that once had, and faced with such a “difficult choice”, it would be 
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perfectly possible that he/she leaves both the institution and the discipline and would engage in 
another activity.  
The second basic element constituting (and integrating) not only academic systems but also any 
organisation is a set of common beliefs, e.g., the norms and values of the actors of a HE system – 
its symbolic side. The social structure existent in HEIs (which may be formal and/or informal) 
transmits a special meaning to both the personal and professional fulfilment of its members, giving 
them a sense of belonging to the institution. Although it is the “least-understood part of modern 
organisations” (Clark 1983: 7) the beliefs, as well as the cultural side of the organisation, allow to 
share a common identity, helping the members of any organisation in finding answers for the 
following questions: “(...) who they are, what they are doing, why they are doing it, and whether they 
have been blessed or cursed” (Clark 1983: 72). As Oliver (1991) also mentioned, organisational 
behaviour is very often driven by “... preconscious acceptance of institutionalised values or 
practices” (1991: 149). In addition to the common shared values, and different from other types of 
institutions, the academic community is also encouraged to enrich/contribute in their working place 
with their individual creativity, as long as this contribution does not harm their colleagues. 
Furthermore, beliefs have constantly pushed universities towards the accomplishment of their social 
obligations (Rothblatt and Wittrock 1993), namely and very broadly, generation and diffusion of 
ideologies, selection and formation of dominant elites, creation and application of new knowledge 
and the training of bureaucracy – the skilled labour force (Castells 2001). The author still adds that 
in all societies and throughout their history, universities have performed their basic functions with 
different priorities, according to different periods, countries and their respective historical, scientific, 
cultural and ideological backgrounds, as well as specific institutions (Castells 2001). 
Authority, or its distribution, is, according to Clark, the third basic element of universities’ 
organisation and occupies a first place when analysing governance issues. According to Rothblatt 
and Wittrock (1993), authority represents the “less romantic” view of HE, implying levels of 
bureaucratic and technocratic organisation and coordination which are not common to universities. 
Indeed, the fact that universities deal with knowledge production and transmission and its influence 
on academics’ role has created the idea of the HE sector as an ivory tower and the university as a 
special kind of organisation, fostering the idea that it would be very difficult to manage such a 
complex institution, with “… so many highly competent persons at the base of the hierarchy – even 
if the concept of hierarchy does not apply well to universities” (Weber 2008: 256 in Amaral 2008). 
Nevertheless, as Clark mentions, it is not practicable to discuss work and belief without implying 
related aspects of authority, once that, among such diversity, it is necessary to discern patterns of 
legitimate power and to articulate the academic groups’ interests (1983: 107). Thus, within HEIs 
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(the middle structure and therefore the third level of authority)46 the primary source of authority is 
the professional expertise, e.g., only the professional expert can take the majority of decisions 
(Gornitzka 1999: 12). As such, and arguing against the more pessimistic view described above, 
others would say that the academic profession, particularly under the Humboldtian tradition and 
due to its high level of fragmentation, still enjoys great autonomy and freedom of teaching and 
research. As Gornitzka (1999) explains it is believed that the function and objectives of HEIs are 
best served in an environment of academic freedom. This brings us to another distinguishing 
characteristic of universities, namely the existence of low interdependence of faculties, therefore 
relating to the concepts of “loose coupling”47 (Weick 1976) and “social choice” explained by Clark 
(1983) in the following way: “... at the far end there is a ‘social choice’ context in which there are no 
inclusive goals, and decisions are made independently by autonomous organizations” (ibid: 137). 
The combination of these two factors (distribution of decision-making power and a high degree of 
fragmentation) condition “... the extent to which co-ordinated change in as well as of HE 
organisations is possible or likely to occur” (Gornitzka 1999: 12). Nevertheless, and as the author 
refers, one should not forget that these conditions vary not only according to the type and size of 
HEIs, but also according to different national systems of HE. It would be very incoherent to 
compare, for example, China and Finland (or Portugal) for these conditions. Although it is not the 
researcher main objective, the study of institutional freedom and autonomy offers the possibility to 
deepen our understanding on the different types of relationships between governments and 
institutions, institutions and society and even government and society.  
Intimately linked with academic authority, we will find another aspect of HE: integration and 
coordination of disciplines and institutions. And here we find the fascinating triangle of 
coordination created by Burton Clark, a tool that has been widely studied, used and even adapted 
by all of those involved in the study of HE, explaining how to “position” a HE system in ways that 
vary from tight bureaucracy control, to professional academic oligarchy and to the market. It can be 
said that during our analysis of the evolution of the state’s role in the public service and more 
                                                 
46 According to Clark (1983) there are six levels of  authority, but not all of  them can be found 
in every higher education system. “From the bottom to the top, the first level is the lowest major 
operating unit: the department (…)” (ibid: 108-109). The second level is the ‘faculty’. “The third 
and most readily distinguishable level is the individual university or college (…)”. The fourth, 
fifth and sixth levels of  authority organisation are administrative entities of  increasing 
inclusiveness (ibid: 109). 
47 Weick describes loose coupling as “... the image that coupled events are responsive, but that 
each event also preserves its own identity and some evidence of its physical or logic 
separateness” (Weick 1976: 3). 
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specifically in the HE sector, we have been exploring the different potentialities (corners) of the 
triangle.  
The last (but not the least) and one of the most challenging aspects characterising HE is change, 
as Kerr and Hesburgh’s statements, among others, show. Analysing change in HEIs can be quite 
“frustrating” considering the variations of interpretation the word might have. Additionally, 
although the sector is characterised by “observable inertia” “… there is also so much change in HE 
and change generated by it for the rest of society” (Clark 1983: 182). Wittrock wrote that: “The 
university is, together with the Church, the most time-honoured of all present-day, macro societal 
institutions. Yet arguably is also the most innovative” (1993: 303). In a general way, it can be said 
that the processes of change in systems organised around knowledge, the “building block of HE”, 
is disjointed, incremental and invisible (Clark 1983). This has to do with the fact that change 
mechanisms of HE are moved through, or according to, the “evolution” of knowledge production. 
As Kogan and Hanney (2000) referred, these changes in the way knowledge is produced create new 
forms and boundaries, sub-disciplines and domains, according to national contexts and traditions 
and institutional management. Thus, “… process determines structure” (2000: 26). Additionally, 
and as a kind of final remark, it is important to refer that change within HE parallels large societal 
changes, and as Wittrock (1993) and Clark (1983) among others remember, knowledge of these 
changes provides an useful tool to better understand current and future changes within HE. 
To conclude, it would be worth to remember that the size of an organisation, as well as the 
persecution of multiple and ambiguous purposes also influence the way HEIs deal with external 
pressures and demands. It is commonly argued that larger organisations have more resources and 
abilities to deal with external environment constraints, though this is not always verified (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978).  
The external environments in which HEIs operate are increasingly complex and it seems to be 
clear that, at the beginning of the 21st century, “After remaining a comparatively isolated universe 
for a very long period, both in relation to society and to the rest of the world, with funding 
guaranteed and a status protected by respect for their autonomy…” (COM 2003: 22), universities 
can no longer take their continued existence for granted, not in the form in which they have 
appeared for centuries. As Neave (2007) stated: “the very particular relationship between State and 
higher education that upheld institutional stability for more than two centuries, is dead” (2007: 49). 
Nevertheless, it is believed (and empirically shown) that the university modernisation model 
proposed by the EC differs significantly from the one ambitioned by the academic community:  
“The new model proposed by the Commission questions the Humboldtian ideal of a community 
of autonomous professors and doubts that self- governing scholars will produce the best results 
for society at large. It emphasises leadership, management and entrepreneurship more than 
individual academic freedom, internal democracy and the organizing role of academic disciplines” 
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(Maassen 2007: 94).  
 
To sum up… 
To understand how HE systems and institutions adapt to changes, how this is perceived by the 
public, by the representatives or administrative authorities, and how HE should meet external 
change are relevant issues in HE research (Neave 2012). The previous sections discussed why 
institutional theory is a tool to better understand institutional dynamics and to extrapolate lessons 
of institutional behaviour and institutional relationships.  
Particularly rational choice institutionalism has had very significant impacts on recent major 
reforms in the public sector management and institutional design, namely governance reforms since 
the 1970s and 1980s. According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 952), rational choice institutionalism has 
produced the “most elegant accounts” of institutional origins and explanations on the reasons why 
existing institutions continue to exist by analysing their functions and the benefits they provide. 
Nevertheless, the authors also note that this strand of thought has been criticised because it lacks 
convincing explanations for institutional inefficiencies and overemphasises the efficiency that some 
institutions show (Hall and Taylor 1996). When making decisions, people tend to act in a balanced 
calculated way, pondering their main motivations (which might not be rational) and then, attempt 
to fulfil their needs the best they can. In this sense, individuals act based upon limited information. 
At the highest institutional hierarchy level – i.e. HEIs top-management – behaviours and 
circumstances change. In other words, it might be argued that, although HEIs’ decision-makers are 
engaged in the “Herculean task” of calculating every possible aspect of utility involved in taking a 
decision, they might lack the ability and/or the resources to achieve an optimal solution (Koelble 
1995: 233). As such, they need to narrow their best available choices by using their rationality, and 
chose the best satisfying strategy instead of the optimal one (Simon 1947). Students do not behave 
as perfect informed clients either. 
Simultaneously, HEIs have varied considerably in the extent to which they construct separate 
organisational identities and have been able to exert some independence from the state (Whitley and 
Gläser 2014). Complementary theoretical grounds need then to be formulated to frame these 
developments. The researchers believe it would be erroneous to focus only in one new 
institutionalism chapter and isolate it from its siblings when focusing on HE research.  
As process-based approach, institutionalisation is almost always treated as a qualitative state: 
structures are institutionalised, or they are not (ibidem). As such, knowledge on questions related to 
the determinants of variations in levels of institutionalisation, and of how such variation might affect 
the degree of similarity among sets of organisations is lacking. A clearer understanding of 
institutionalisation processes would also enlarge understanding on aspects related to decision-
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making practices, levels of reform acceptance and cooperation according to different institutional 
groups (i.e. top-management, middle-management; faculty, non-teaching staff and students), and on 
the relationship between the government and HEIs. Furthermore, in an era of increasing 
internationalisation of HE, institutionalism may shed light on possible rationales for the tensions 
and contradictions between environmental pressures to conform and the need to maintain elements 
of national diversity. Institutionalism has also helped to frame and to create some order and give 
meaning to the different metamorphosis of HE systems and their institutions.  
In sum, new institutionalism has been a conceptual and theoretical framework used by HE 
research to better understand how external and internal tensions affect HEIs actors’ behaviour and 
what we may (or not) expect from them given their role; how do they design, implement and develop 
national and institutional reforms and strategies targeting HE, and how institutional governance and 
management practices are redefined in order to meet increasing demands and possibilities as well. 
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IV 
The National Contexts: Finland and Portugal 
 
This chapter contextualises both Portuguese and Finnish HE systems. Their features, as well 
as their evolution and also the events that point to the current scenario of change will be described. 
Indeed, any analysis to the reforms or changes introduced in the system could never be properly 
done without taking into account the different historical and social periods, as well as cultural 
specificities, which dictated the present governance arrangements of Finnish and Portuguese HEIs. 
As such, by using the concept of historical layers (Välimaa 2001; 2005) Portuguese and Finnish 
exceptionalisms will be analysed. Referring to the Finnish HE system, Välimaa (2005: 247) explains 
that historical contexts constitute the present landscape of HE systems like archaeological layers 
which influence not only the present structures, but also the way HE is perceived in the countries 
of analysis.  
The comprehensive process of change within both HE systems as it has unfolded in Portugal 
and in Finland in the period of this analysis has two main characteristics: a strong increase in student 
numbers (though at different phases) and a comprehensive reform effort with many layers and actors 
who have emerged and gained their positions over time. These actors are “part of our historical 
presence because they still exercise their effects” (Bourdieu 1984: 34 in Välimaa 2005: 247).  
Thereby special attention should be given to the following topics: a) overview of the national 
contexts of HE and their evolution, where special attention is provided to the emergence and 
development of the vocational subsystem in both HE systems; b) the influence of international (or 
supranational) organisations (e.g. OECD, WB and EU) in the development of HE policies in both 
countries; c) the developments and impact of managerialism in HEIs in order to understand and 
contextualise the influence of both the private sector management and the market in the 
organisation and operationalisation of the HE system and HEIs particularly after the late 1990s.   
 
4.1 Overview of the Portuguese and Finnish HE Systems  
The education system in Portugal is regulated through the Education System Act of 1986, more 
specifically by Law 46/1986 of 14th October, further amended by Laws 115/1997 of 19th September 
and 49/2005 dated of 30th of August, which established the general rules and organisation for all 
levels and types of education (Ferreira, Machado and Santiago 2008: 191).  
Briefly put, the amendments to the Education System Act of 1986 (Law 46/1986) have mainly 
focused on the establishment and autonomy of the vocational and private subsystems and on the 
redefinition of the degree system, following the implementation of the Bologna process. The 
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changes introduced by Law 115/1997 of 19th September focused on the access conditions to HE 
by giving HEIs the autonomy to decide on the evaluation process concerning the ability to attend 
HE, and to select and rank candidates. It also introduced some regulatory measures with respect to 
the degrees and type of training for polytechnic institutes (Law 115/1997). The second amendment 
to the Education System Act of 1986 (and the first amendment to the HE Financing Act) was 
through Law 49/2005 of 30th of August. This law aimed at organising the national HE system 
according to the Bologna degree system based on three study cycles; to provide polytechnics with 
the possibility to confer master degrees; to change access conditions to HE, lowering from 25 to 23 
years the (minimum) age for people who did not enter at the reference age and/or did not complete 
high school could now attend HE; and the creation of conditions that allow the recognition of 
professional experience through its accreditation and certification. Later on, through the Decree-
Law 64/2006 (which regulates the exams to assess the ability of students older than 23 years old to 
attend HE), HEIs gained full responsibility of selection procedures (DGES 2012).  
Until the legislative elections of 5th June of 2011 there were two different ministries for the 
education sector: the Ministry of Education and the Ministry for Science, Technology and Higher 
Education (MCTES). This model – consisting of two different ministries for educational policies – 
began in 2002, under the action of the Minister of Science and HE by then, Pedro Lynce (2002-
2004) and it lasted until 2011. The MCES was created in 1995 and in 2002 became the umbrella 
organisation for HE, which was until then under the tutelage of the Ministry of Education. In 2011, 
this tutelage went back to the Ministry of Education, changing its name to “Ministry of Science and 
Higher Education”. At the present moment, and in order to shrink as much as possible the 
government and administrative machine (due to constant neo-liberal policies and as a result of the 
disastrous economic situation in which the country is emerged), there is only one Ministry for all 
levels of education: the Ministry of Education and Science. 
The Ministry of Education was accountable for policy at the compulsory basic education and 
non-compulsory secondary education;48 HE and science policy in general were under responsibility 
of the MCTES. In 2005 it was elected a socialist government with parliamentary majority that stayed 
in power until 2011. By then, at the peak of the political and social unrest due to economic crisis 
that hit Portugal since 2007, there were new elections. The party that was in power since 2005 had 
lost legitimacy and credibility to continue in office and therefore it was not difficult for the largest 
opposition party to won the elections. However, it must be said that since 1976 until today, when 
the first Constitutional Government of Portugal was established, the parties that have been in 
                                                 
48 In Portugal, the term secondary education corresponds to what in Europe is typically referred 
to as upper secondary education (CHEPS IHEM 2008: 8). 
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power, alternated between the Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party (the two main national 
parties). Only when they are not elected with parliamentary majority, coalitions are established, 
usually with the Social Democratic Centre Party (CDS-PP). Since 1976 until the present year (2015), 
Portugal had 20 constitutional Governments.  
With respect to science and technology, the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) is 
the central Portuguese governmental institution responsible for evaluating and financing scientific 
research activities. 
Portuguese HE is fairly diverse in terms of systemic diversity (OECD 2006). There are three 
major lines of institutional differentiation: a binary distinction between universities and polytechnic 
institutions, a distinction between specialised schools typically with a single focus area and larger 
integrated multi-focused institutions, and the coexistence of both public and private sectors of HE 
(OECD 2006: 21). There is also the Catholic University, which is the oldest non-public university 
in the country49. Both subsystems of HE are linked and it is possible to transfer from one to the 
other. It is also possible to transfer from a public institution to a private one and vice-versa (Sousa 
and Fino 2007: 621) 
 
Finnish HE policy, “in the modern sense”, i.e. in the sense of (state) regulation(s), emerged in 
the 1960s and has evolved through HE development acts (Välimaa 2005: 248). The first HE 
Development Act was passed by the Parliament for the years 1966 to 1986. Its major objectives 
were to enhance social and geographical equality by promoting access to universities and to increase 
the development of the rural areas (ibid) and to foster leadership and management in Finnish HEIs, 
while simultaneously introducing accountability and quality assessment into the system (Välimaa 
1994). After this first Act, others have followed: a procedure which has become “a necessary political 
routine” (Välimaa, Hoffman and Huusko 2007: 45), and which is the way Finnish government 
approaches educational issues, thereby allowing a strong interference of the state in regulating HEIs 
life.  
The creation of a uniform and regionally distributed university system was achieved by means 
of centralised control and bureaucratic procedures; a strategy used during the 1960s and the 1970s, 
when Finland was (still) described as a “static society” (Hölttä and Rekilä 2003: 63). Nevertheless, 
                                                 
49 The Portuguese Catholic University was created with a unique status under article XX of  the 
Concordat between Portugal and the Holy See (Lusitanorum Nobilissima Gens) of May 1940, 
officially recognised in 1971. According to the Decree-Law 307/71 of 15th July (further amended 
by the Decree-Law 128/90 of 19th April which establishes the University’s legal framework), the 
Catholic University has autonomy to create faculties, institutes, departments, research centres 
and other organisational units (Decree-Law 128/90). 
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this “closed system approach” (ibidem) gave way to the “open system strategy” during the 1980s and 
1990s, a time when great efforts to link HE policy to other areas of social and economic life were 
made. However, changes in Finnish culture need to be framed in the aftermath of the World War 
II, when Finland transformed from an agrarian society into a post-industrial one almost overnight 
(Kivinen 2007: 193).  
With respect to the structural organisation of the system, Finland has also a binary division 
between universities (yliopisto) and polytechnics (ammattikorkeakoulu). This binary divide has been 
subject to several discussions, critics, assumptions and choices (OECD 2009). Additionally, the 
debate about the terminology used to refer to the institutions outside the university sector has been 
under discussion in the country during recent years. Both the government (in its official 
documentation and website) and (traditional) universities still call these institutions “polytechnics”. 
Indeed, this is the closest translation of the word ammattikorkeakoulut (vocational high school; 
technical college). However, without national consensus, and under the argument of increasing 
internationalisation of the sector, professionally oriented HEIs started to call themselves in English 
“universities of applied sciences” and also use this English designation in their websites and official 
documentation in English.  
In order to simplify comparison and the association between different types of HEIs in both 
countries, and as we also believe it is the most appropriate denomination of these institutions, 
throughout this dissertation the word “polytechnic” (or the abbreviation AMK) will be used to refer 
to Finnish HEIs which have a vocational and/or professional mission/orientation. 
In 2014, the Portuguese HE network comprised 295 HEIs of which 176 are public institutions 
and 119 are private institutions (131 within the university subsystem and 164 within the polytechnic 
subsystem) (PORDATA 2015). The public university system, which is the oldest and the most 
prestigious in the country, is constituted by 14 universities (including the Open University) and a 
non-integrated university school (university institute)50. The public polytechnic network is 
composed of 15 polytechnic institutes51 and some polytechnic schools integrated into the 
                                                 
50 These public universities are: Universidade Aberta de Lisboa (Open University of  Lisbon), 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, Universidade de Lisboa, 
Universidade de Aveiro (university foundation), Universidade do Algarve, Universidade da Beira 
Interior, Universidade de Coimbra, Universidade da Madeira, Universidade dos Açores, 
Universidade de Évora, Universidade do Minho, Universidade de Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro 
e Universidade do Porto (university foundation). ISCTE (an university institute) was founded 
in 1972 under the designation of  Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa, but in May 
2009 changed its name to Instituto Universitário de Lisboa when it adopted the new legal status of  
public foundation operating under private law. 
51 Polytechnic Institutes of  Beja, Bragança, Guarda, Castelo Branco, Leiria, Cavado e Ave, Porto, 
Coimbra, Lisboa, Portalegre, Santarém, Setúbal, Viana do Castelo, Viseu and Tomar. 
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universities (OECD 2007: 26). Five police and military institutes complete the Portuguese landscape 
of public HEIs. 
This means that almost every region52 of the country has a university and/or polytechnic or 
both, as can be seen in Figure 4. The map also shows that despite being strongly concentrated in 
the coastal regions, public HE covers the whole country and, according to Almeida and Vieira (2012: 
143), in 2008 it enrolled 75% of the student population. Private institutions are usually small (the 
average size is around 1000 students per institution) and the majority of them are polytechnics 
(OECD 2007). It should also be mentioned that most of private HEIs are located in the same 
regions where public HEIs are. Teixeira and Amaral (2000) concluded that private education did 
not constitute an innovation point in geographical and programmatic terms. 
 
Figure 4 - Geographical distribution of  the public and private network of  Portuguese HEIs 
a) Network of Portuguese HEIs  b) Public HEIs   c) Private HEIs 
 
  
Source: FENPROF (2012: 20). 
 
The most important actor in the political organisation of the Portuguese HE system is the 
Ministry of Education and Science. The DGES is the entity responsible for all the administrative 
procedures related with HE. After the Autonomy Law of 1988, its role was significantly reduced in 
what regards public universities, and at the present its role is merely administrative, as it has no 
power and/or influence in any political/institutional decision. The National Council of Education 
                                                 
52 Whenever the term region is used for the Portuguese territory, it refers to districts (distritos). 
These are geographical regions aggregating municipalities (concelhos) Ferreira et al. 2008: 200). 
Portugal comprises 18 districts and two constitutionally autonomous regions: Azores and 
Madeira, which have large legislative and administrative competences. 
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(CNE) is an advisory body which includes, among others, representatives of the government and 
the parties of the National Assembly, local authorities, trade unions, industrial and commercial 
associations, parents’ associations and from cultural and scientific associations (Amaral et al. 2002: 
59). However, as argued by the authors, despite this huge representation of stakeholders, CNE is 
not a very effective body and its influence is very much connected to the leadership skills of the 
president. 
Public universities are represented by the Council of Rectors of Portuguese Universities 
(CRUP) and the Coordinating Council of the Portuguese Polytechnic Institutes (CCISP) represents 
public polytechnic institutes. Private HEIs are represented by the Portuguese Association of Private 
HE (APESP). Cultural and social traditions have made CCISP a weaker partner than its university 
homologous body. The 1988 Autonomy Law gives to CRUP the mission to cooperate with the state 
in the elaboration of national policies for education, science and culture (§4º). At the formal level, 
this cooperation is reflected in the CRUP’s mandatory hearing with respect to all legislative projects 
related to HE. The political role of CRUP has thus been more important than this formal role might 
have suggested initially. This is due, probably, to the fact that there was a significant number of 
rectors who were elected for several successive mandates, allowing them to cementing enough 
personal trust bonds to define a common set of academic values which were then translated into 
clear strategic choices in their relations with other political actors (Amaral et al. 2002: 43). However, 
both CCISP and CRUP (although CRUP had a more notorious role) were important actors in the 
negotiations that led to the agreements of the funding formula and to the quality evaluation system 
in education (Santiago 2004). 
In sum, together with the Portuguese Minister of HE, the representatives of all types of 
subsystems (CRUP, CCISP, APESP), the FCT, the DGES, the CNE and the national agency for 
assessment and accreditation of HE (A3ES), HEIs, rectors and polytechnics’ presidents, students’ 
unions, the national union of HE and professional associations embody the main actors of the 
Portuguese HE system. It should be mentioned that the professional associations in Portugal have 
an important role in society through their advisory mission in the quality assessment and accreditation 
system. In fact, not only in Portugal but also in other countries, accreditation has been used by 
professional bodies (e.g. engineering, medicine or law) to certify the capacity to exercise a profession 
(A3ES 2013).  
According to Amaral et al. (2002: 29; 43), the major issues related with HE (access, equality of 
opportunities, quality, autonomy, professional profiles of graduates, etc.) are assumed by the 
different parties of the National Assembly with a diffuse importance, in the form of generic political 
declarations. By other words, all political parties emphasise the strategic role of education for the 
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economic, political and social development of the country, although political debates are generally 
characterised by their low technical quality (the ‘paralell state’, mentioned in Chapter 2). 
These actors do not differ much from the Finnish landscape of HE stakeholders, whose main 
actors/participants are the FMEC, HEIs, the Finnish Council of University Rectors – universities’ 
representatives (UNIFI) and the Rectors Conference of Finnish Polytechnics (ARENA). 
FINHEEC, the Finnish HE Evaluation Council is the body that assists HEIs and the Ministry in 
terms of evaluation and accreditation issues. FINHEEC is also responsible for evaluating the 
polytechnics seeking operating licences. 
A major difference between countries relates to the importance attributed to academic trade 
unions, employer organisations and students’ organisations, as these have been important actors 
throughout Finnish HE reforms and continue to play a major role in the governance of Finnish 
HEIs53 (Välimaa 2005: 254). Finnish student’s unions (ylioppilaskunta) are a very active political 
power in the country, commenting and influencing on social welfare and education policies. The 
National Union of University Students in Finland (SYL) is the umbrella organisation of all the 17 
student unions in Finland and it was founded in 1921 by the student unions of Helsinki University 
and Åbo Akademi. After it’s creation in 1921, “the Union has diversified its activities to include 
looking after the interests of students with regard to issues relating to the content and the 
organization of higher education and to living conditions” (UNESCO 1998: 49). 
In Portugal, after the 1974 Revolution, students were able to participate in all levels of 
institutional governance and, although not directly involved in the drafting of HE policies, they have 
participated in the process: student unions have to be heard in the drafting of HE legislation. 
Although national students’ associations had a quite ‘unlit’ role in the sector during some years, in 
1992, after the Law 20/92 of 14th August was passed to regulate the tuition fees system in the 
country, students’ joined forces and there were manifestations in Lisbon and Porto. Tuition fees 
were increased in 1997 through the Law 133/97 (of September 16th). Later on, the framework 
approved though the Law 37/2003 (of August 22nd) gave institutions the authority to set tuition 
fees within a minimum and maximum value. Cerdeira (2009: 3) explains “owing to cost pressures 
and the progressive decline in resources allocated by the Government, public institutions have been 
pressed to maximize tuition fee revenue”. The (increase in) tuition fees, scholarships, and student’s 
social support have been constant aspects in the agenda of Portuguese students’ unions. 
                                                 
53 The first Finnish trade unions were created in 1967: the Finnish Union of  University 
Researchers and Teachers (FUURT) and the Finnish Union of  University Professors (FUUP). 
The Finnish Union of  University Lecturers (FUUL) was created in 1969 (Välimaa 2005: 254).  
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Furthermore, their contribution for the shift of regime during the Estado Novo period was far more 
significant than academics’ contribution (Amaral 2003: 36; Cerdeira 2009). 
Another important difference between both systems of  HE is that the Finnish system is a 
typical example of  Nordic HE in the sense that it is mainly funded by public funding sources and it 
offers equal and high quality education free of  charge to its students (Treuthardt and Välimaa 2008: 
608).  
In 2008, in a country with little more than 5 million people (roughly half of the Portuguese 
population) there were 16 universities (including 4 universities of Arts)54, 6 regional university 
centres, 25 polytechnics55 and 18 public research institutes (Turunen 2011). These numbers equate 
to one HEI for each 100,000 inhabitants (Välimaa 2005: 247).  
Similarly to Portugal, every region in the country has an institution of HE. However, it is 
expected that in 2020 this number will be significantly lower (see Figure 5). The 2020 Strategic Plan 
of FMEC wants to have a maximum of 18 polytechnics, 15 universities and 4 to 5 strategic 
university-polytechnic alliances56 (ibid).  
Figure 5 - Evolution of  the geographical distribution of  Finnish HEIs Network 
Universities in 2008 Universities in 2020 
                                                 
54 Finnish universities are: Aalto University (university foundation), University of  Lapland, 
University of  Oulu, University of  Vaasa, University of  Tampere, Tampere University of  
Technology (university foundation), University of  Turku, Åbo Academy University, 
Lappeenranta University of  Technology, University of  Helsinki, University of  Jyväskylä, 
University of  Eastern Finland (a merger between the University of  Joensuu and University of  
Kuopio and it also has a campus in Savonlinna) and the Hanken School of  Economics which 
joined the Helsinki School of  Economics and Business Administration and Swedish School of  
Economics and Business Administration. The four Arts universities are the Sibelius Academy, 
University of  Arts and Design, Theatre Academy, Academy of  Fine Arts. All of  them are 
located in Helsinki. 
55 Finnish polytechnics are: Arcada, Centria, Diaconia, Haaga-Helia, Humanities, Häme, 
Jyväskylä, Kajaani, Kemi-Tornio, Kymenlaakso, Lahti, Laurea, Metropolia, Mikkeli, North 
Karelia, Turku, Novia, Oulu, Vaasa, Seinajänoki, Satakunta, Tampere, Rovaniemi, Savonia, and 
Saimaa.  
56 These will be the Aalto University (HUT, HSE, UIAH), University of  Eastern Finland 
(Universities of  Kuopio and Joensuu) and the new Turku University also called the Consortium 
of  Turku (University of  Turku and the Turku School of  Economics). There is also a strategic 
partnership formed in 2008 (the University Alliance Finland) by three independent Finnish 
universities in southern central Finland, namely the University of  Jyväskylä, the Tampere 
University of  Technology and the University of  Tampere. 
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Polytechnics in 2008 Polytechnics in 2020 
 
Source: Turunen (2011); Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture (2012). 
 
There is no private HE system in Finland, at least in the way it exists in Portugal. However, 
Finnish polytechnics’ ownership is “hybrid”, as it is divided between the state and private companies 
and/or local municipalities. Additionally, according to the latest University Act (Law 558/2009), 
Finnish universities assume the status of independent corporations under public law or foundations 
under private law (Foundations Act – 109/1930, Amendments up to 248/2011), which represents 
a step forward towards privatisation of HE. Nevertheless, until the present moment, all HEIs get 
their basic funding from public sources and are steered under the same rules in spite of their diverse 
legal statutes (BFUG Finland 2009: 1; OKM 2012).  
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Interesting is the fact that most Finnish HEIs were originally private, with the exception of the 
University of Helsinki (founded in Turku in 1640) and the new HEIs established after the mid 1960s 
(Hölttä 1988: 91). However, as Hölttä explains, these institutions were not private in the strict sense 
we know private education today (e.g. like Portuguese HEIs). Only the Swedish-speaking minority 
institutions could actually represent an alternative to the rest of the network. All these institutions 
were gradually subject to government control and therefore to almost total state support, which was 
not a difficult process considering that the mission of private HEIs was “(…) to a great extent 
compatible with those of state institutions throughout their existence, so that assimilation into a 
single uniform sector did not entail major change” (Hölttä 1988: 91). Since the late 1960s, all these 
institutions have been formally incorporated into the (public) HE system (ibid).  
The overall institutional landscape of both countries’ HE can be seen in table 6. 
  
Table 6: Categorisation of  Portuguese and Finnish HEIs 
 Portugal Finland 
 Universities Arts 
Universities 
 
Universities 
Public 131 
 
16 4 
Private 
 
Polytechnics 
Public 164  
25 
Private  
Total                   295 45 
 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2007: 34); OECD (2009); PORDATA (2015). 
 
 
4.2 Origins and Development of the Portuguese University System 
 
The university system in Portugal has its origins in the 13th century, with the establishment of 
the University of Coimbra in 1290, one of the oldest universities in the world (Solsten 1993). Under 
the reign of King Dinis, this university operated initially in Lisbon, where King Dinis founded an 
academic centre, named Studium Generale, similar to the “General Studies” centres that had been 
created in León and Aragon. In 1308 this centre was moved to Coimbra where it remained, except 
for a brief period between from 1521 to 1537, and became the University of Coimbra (Braga 1892). 
By that time, education was firmly under the control of the church and civil authorities, mainly 
controlled by priests (and the King), who determined the curricula and hired the instructors (Solsten 
1993). Indeed, the power of the church was such, that if we would like to encompass this period in 
one of the five governance dimensions, either we would have to add another dimension to his 
framework, or we had to substitute the state regulation by the church guidance dimension. This guidance 
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should be understood in the context of Counter Reformation period, where the Society of Jesus 
(Jesuits) played a strong role in the Catholic Renewal.  
The Jesuits had a very strong role in the Portuguese educational and pedagogical scene, as they 
created several colleges across the country where education was free. By 1558 they had established 
the University of Évora. This religious influence would, however, stop in the 18th century, when the 
Jesuits were expelled from the country (in 1759) and the ideals of the Enlightenment infused the 
Portuguese education. This is how competition between the powers of the Church and the powers 
of State started to emerge in the educational field. The State, however, started to progressively 
control formal education, laying the foundations of an education system directed, funded and 
controlled by it. 
After the fall of the Portuguese Monarchy, new universities were created in Lisbon and Porto, 
in 1911, and new teacher training colleges (“medium level” schools) were opened. In addition to 
that, intermediate level education institutions were also established in Lisbon, Porto and Coimbra57 
(Portuguese Ministry of Education 2003). One can say that the system was developing slowly but 
steadily, since the medieval times, through liberalism (Liberal Revolution of 1820) until the end of 
the first Republic period (1910-1926), or, by other words, until the beginning of another historical 
layer.  
In 1926, António Salazar came to power as the Finance Minister and initiated a dictatorial 
regime entitled Estado Novo that lasted about five decades, and which would end in 1974 with a non-
violent revolution. The 25th April of 1974 is also known as the Carnations Revolution because these 
flowers were in bloom at that time of the year and were placed in the guns of the soldiers. It was a 
peaceful revolution since there was little resistance from the opposition forces (Sousa and Fino 
2007: 607). Indeed, in order to understand the current HE system it is important to recognise the 
historical, social and political effects of the 25th April 1974 revolution which displaced this 
dictatorial regime.  
During the Estado Novo period, the country then “(…) reverted to a situation of quasifeudalism 
with the most backward economy and education in Western Europe” (Solsten 1993). The battle 
against illiteracy was not considered a priority, as in the dictator’s opinion, ignorance prevented the 
contamination by doctrines deemed pernicious and destabilising” (Ministry of Education 2003.  
                                                 
57 These institutions had seen their status upgraded after the 1974 Revolution. “Medium level’ 
schools were promoted to HEIs “(…) in order to redress what was considered an unjust 
situation which mainly penalised the less favoured classes. Intermediate level education 
institutions were upgraded and transformed into the Industrial and Commercial Institutes of  
Lisbon, Porto and Coimbra (Decree-Law 830/74, of  31 December)” (Amaral and Magalhães 
2005: 118). 
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It was only in 1971, with the Minister of Education Veiga Simão that the Portuguese education 
system would gain a new impetus. After presenting the “General Ideas of the Reform of Higher 
Education”, the Government passed on the 25th July of 1973 the Law 5/73 and the DL 402/73, 
which defined a new reform of the education system. In parallel, for the first time, this legislation 
introduced the concept of democracy within a nationalist and conservative political regime. Veiga 
Simão was also responsible for the expansion and diversification of the national HE system, both 
geographically and institutionally. Through his action, and believing that this was the only way of 
transforming and modernising the university, new HEIs were created. According to Veiga Simão, 
old universities were not capable of self-reform, which made the establishment of new institutions 
a vital step for the modernisation of the system (Amaral et al. 2002). In this way, for the first time, 
the legal homogeneity of the system had been timidly challenged once that institutions were allowed 
to create some optional disciplines within the traditional curricular organisation of the programmes 
(ibidem: 15)58. However, his reform was not fully implemented due to the military coup of April 
1974, which restored the democratic state. In this way, due to the 1974 Revolution, and within a 
short period of time, Portugal would pass through a dramatic turn from a right wing conservative 
authoritarian regime to a radical left wing socialist regime (Amaral and Magalhães 2005: 118). 
However, stability was difficult to achieve considering that the days that followed the revolution 
were quite troubled. Despite the political programme of the Revolution promising a “3 D’s action 
plan”: Democracy, Decolonisation and Development, consensus was not achieved among national 
political players. While some aimed for a liberal democratic state, others sought radical social 
transformations. As a consequence, during the following two years:  
“(…) there were six provisional governments, two presidents, a failed right-wing coup attempt, a 
failed left-wing coup attempt, three elections, seizures of land and housing, bombings and strikes, 
while the country was flooded by millions of Portuguese settlers, escaping from ex-colonies at 
war” (Sousa and Fino 2007: 607). 
 
A democratic commitment was achieved when the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic was 
passed by the Constituent Assembly on the 2nd April 1976 (ibidem).  
                                                 
58 Amaral et al. (2002) explain that Veiga Simão was considered a modern academic of  liberal 
ideas, who initiated a deep reform in the national educational system. With respect to higher 
education he diversified the system both geographically through the creation of  new HEIs (the 
New University of  Lisbon, the University of  Aveiro, the University of  Minho and the University 
Institute of  Évora were founded; polytechnic institutes in Covilhã, Faro, Leiria, Setúbal, Tomar 
and Vila Real were established, as well as Teacher Training Schools in Beja, Bragança, Castelo 
Branco, Funchal, Funchal, Guarda, Lisboa, Ponta Delgada, Portalegre and Viseu), and at the 
institutional level, as the University of  Coimbra, through its Faculty of  Sciences, was allowed to 
lecture new courses of  engineering (becoming later on the Faculty of  Sciences and Technology) 
and it was created a new Faculty of  Economy (2002: 3). 
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Due to more than half a century of right wing narrow-minded policies of the former dictator 
Oliveira Salazar, at the time of the 1974 Revolution, Portugal was still a backward country (Amaral 
and Magalhães 2005: 117). Consequently, as the authors refer, “(…) despite the socialist climate that 
followed the overthrow of the authoritarian regime, the importance of education in economic policy 
remained unchallenged” (Amaral and Magalhães 2008: 208). Only in 1975, the government 
recognised the importance of education policy as a fundamental tool in promoting economic 
development. As such, when Portugal was proclaimed to be a democratic State and the Constitution 
of 1976 declared that every citizen had the right to education, it was also declared that the state 
should not orientate education and culture according to any particular philosophical, aesthetic, 
political or religious guideline (1976 Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, §43º). In fact, as Sousa 
and Fino (2007) refer, immediately after the revolution  
“Education won a place in the mass media with radio and television programs and periodic pages 
on educational themes; there were direct consultations of the population on some educational 
reforms; parents’ associations had the right to express their opinion on the general lines of 
orientation of educational reforms (…); schools themselves obtained the capacity of electing their 
management boards (the so-called democratic management) instead of the nominated principals 
(…); Azores and Madeira Autonomous Regions obtained an enlargement of decisional power on 
educational affairs (2007: 609).  
 
After the political turmoil that followed the revolution, the period between 1974 and 1976 is 
characterised by a total openness of the higher education system to every citizen who wished to 
enrol in any HEI, hoping that the economic and cultural backwardness of the country would be 
reversed. As Amaral et al. (2002) explain, the dominant political objective during the revolutionary 
years (1974-1976) was ideological, aiming at completely transforming an educational system tainted 
by the previous dictatorial regime. The teaching doctrine (and methodology) based on the slogan 
“God, the Country and the Family”, praising values as obedience, submission, order, respect for 
hierarchy and conformity, had to be substituted by values as freedom, tolerance, solidarity, etc. 
(2007: 609). This was clearly evident in the Programme of the Socialist Party (the winner of the first 
elections after the revolution), which stated: 
“The school will no longer be used as an instrument for diffusing the ideology of a society divided 
into classes, by means of a teacher-student relationship following the model of dominator-
dominated. Education will no longer develop young people’s behaviours and reflexes leading to 
acceptance of the aggressions of an oppressive system” (Congresso do Partido Socialista 1974: 39 
in Amaral et al. 2002: 284). 
 
After the 1974 Revolution, the demand for HE grew significantly, forcing the authorities to 
seek solutions to relieve it (Almeida and Vieira 2012: 138). Access to HE was suspended during one 
year, being substituted by one year of ‘civic service’ for students in their last year of high school with 
the objective to increase the integration of the university into Portuguese society and to develop 
students’ awareness for national causes and the problems of working life (Amaral et al. 2002: 4).  
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A restrictive system of numerus clausus was introduced as an experiment in 1976-1977 and 
applied to all degrees the following year (Almeida and Vieira 2012). At the same time, universities 
were called to help in searching for answers to national problems while simultaneously using their 
scientific and technical capacity in the development of other public services. In one hand, HE should 
expand, providing vocational training and increasing the supply of its specialised services; on the 
other hand, it should diversify, either by creating new schools and new programmes or by 
differentiating some existing courses, as for example medicine (e.g. dentistry and nutrition). Another 
important political objective by this time was the regionalisation of some universities in order to 
better serve the social and economic needs of the population (Amaral et al. 2002: 4-5). 
The end of the Estado Novo period represents then a turning point in the history of the 
Portuguese HE sector. It contributed to the democratisation of education by enabling the transition 
from an elitist system, characterised by low enrolment levels, to one of mass HE using Trow’s 
terminology (Amaral and Teixeira 2000: 246). Until the 1970s, the national HE system was very 
homogenous (systematic and programmatic diversity was almost non-existent) and elitist. The four 
universities that existed in the country by that time were under very strong ideological governmental 
control (Ferreira et al. 2008: 193). The authors refer that this supervision was reflected in the 
recruitment of academic and administrative staff, curricular design and programme offerings, 
teaching and research (2008: 193). Admission to the university was a competitive process, although 
it could be waived whenever the student obtained a high score in the final examinations from the 
secondary school. In turn, this elitist system produced a small group of people, an elite, which tended 
to dominate the government, big business and the professions (Solsten 1993). In this way, it is not 
surprising that after the April Revolution there was a fast increase in the demand for HE although 
the signals of a dictatorial regime that lasted almost 50 years were difficult to erase (Amaral and 
Magalhães 2008: 208). 
The country went then through a period of normalisation until the mid-1980s. Between 1976 
and 1986, and as we will see later on, the binary system was consolidated and governmental policies 
started to change from centralised state control to less restrictive ways of regulating HEIs (ibidem: 
5). In fact, it was in 1982 that the Universities Autonomy Law started to be prepared, entering into 
force in 1988. 
The normalisation process of the system included also the political intention of joining the EU 
(Amaral, Rosa and Tavares 2007: 313), which would happen in 1986. This consolidated the shift 
from a right wing to a radical left wing socialist regime, which later on evolved to more centrist 
views and converged with European politics. Being the modus operandi of the EU based on Treaties, 
which are agreed by all constituent members, Portugal had to adapt itself to new rules and to “(…) 
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subjects of direct importance for the Portuguese citizens’ everyday life, such as their rights to 
freedom, security and justice, job creation, regional development, environmental protection, in 
order to raise Portuguese living standards” (Sousa and Fino 2007: 608).  
 
4.2.1 International Organisations in the Portuguese HE system 
At this stage it is important to mention that much of the development of the Portuguese HE 
system was achieved through the recommendations and guidance of international organisations, 
such as the WB, the OECD and the EU.  
The expansion and diversification of the system was an outcome of the action of the Minister 
Veiga Simão. In turn, his work was inspired by human capital theories and spurred by the OECD 
reports and recommendations (Amaral et al. 2002: 3). Concerns with the development of the system 
were of economic nature, being traditional universities seen as an obstacle. As such, if in one hand, 
the Veiga Simão reform is considered to have an economistic character, absorbing the OECD 
commandments, as it aimed to use all the available resources to reach the same development 
patterns that other Western European countries reached some decades ago; on the other hand it is 
considered that the main objective of the reform was the democratisation of education, and 
consequently (or through this) the democratisation of the Portuguese society. Thus, above all, Veiga 
Simão’s reform fulfilled a function of social improvement (Stoer 1983: 818). In the Minister’s view, 
HE, especially science and technology fields, was a tool to reach that political objective (Amaral et 
al. 2002: 3).  
Referring to the influence of the OECD in Portuguese policies, Sacuntala de Miranda (1981 in 
Teodoro 2000: 54) used the expression ocedeísmo to describe the diffusion of an educational ideology 
based on the active participation of the country in the OECD projects. This started in the field of 
education, with the Mediterranean Regional Project in 1964 (OECD contributed with 15 230 USD), 
representing the most important legitimacy source for the positions and proposals of economic, 
educational planning and workforce training offices.  
The WB had also an important role in the guidance and “normalisation” of Portuguese HE 
policies. Two different examples illustrate its role. First, and with respect to the boom of enrolments 
taking place after 1974, it was decided to introduce quantitative restraints in order to control the 
number of vacancies offered by HEIs and thereby as a way of preventing a loss of quality in 
education provision59. This happened through the DL 701/76 of 28th September, which 
                                                 
59 In 1976 the numerus clausus system was firstly introduced for the courses of  Medicine and 
Veterinary Medicine. One year later, in 1977, the Decree-Law 397/77 of  17th September 
extended the numerus clausus system to all HEIs study programmes (Amaral and Magalhães 
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implemented a system of numerus clausus. These numbers are annually fixed by the Portuguese 
Ministry of HE in consultation with HEIs (public and private) according to their proposals, i.e., 
although numerus clausus are established by the institution, the final decision needs to be supported 
by the Ministry (DGES 2012). In this sense, the WB recommendations were quite straightforward: 
“In view of the rapidly increased university enrolments, which represent an uneconomic drain in 
the economy… [the Bank recommends a] gradual introduction of quantitative restraints” (World 
Bank 1977: ii in Amaral and Magalhães 2008: 208). Amaral et al. (2002: 60) refer that the 
establishment of numerus clausus followed much more a strategy of HEIs’ development than the 
manpower needs’. Later on, the government sought to contain the numerus clausus in some fields of 
study of the public sector (e.g. social sciences) as there was a high supply of these courses in the 
private sector.   
A second example of the Bank’s influence comes with the recommendations in terms of human 
resources production. The 1978 “World Bank Report 1807-PO” suggested that Portugal needed to 
train no only top-level technicians, but also needed to produce annually middle training technicians 
in the following occupations: short-cycle post-secondary technicians (1400), agricultural experts 
(500) and middle level managers (6000) (Amaral et al. 2002: 6). Both the WB and the government 
shared the conviction that in order to normalise its economy and join the European Economic 
Community, the country should promote that education would assume an active role in technical 
training (ibidem). These orientations, continue the authors, appeared later on reflected on the 
Education System Act of 1986, which clearly defined as one of the main objectives of Portuguese 
HE the training of graduates in different areas of knowledge, eligible to integrate professional 
sectors and to participate in the development of the Portuguese society (ibidem).   
In Stoer (1983) and Amaral et al. (2002) views, it is valid to say that the need to catch up with 
European standards together with the influence of international organisations as the OECD and 
the World Bank (and even the IMF) led that governmental policies reflected a steady increase of 
education ‘functionalisation’ in general, and in particular of HE with respect to the issues related 
with the economic development of the country (Amaral et al. 2002: 7). 
One can say that at this stage the involvement of the national government in HE has intensified 
and its regulation was seen as inevitable, given the quantitative expansion of the system. Indeed, the 
                                                 
2005). As the authors explain, after the 1974 revolution many students took advantage of the 
new freedom to enter the schools of medicine, as this offered better prospects of upward social 
mobility. Thus, students who did not have a vacancy in medicine would immediately try 
veterinary medicine. Nevertheless, these decree-laws did not solve the problem considering that 
those students unable to enter either medicine or veterinary medicine enrolled in areas such as 
pharmacy or biological sciences. As such, the government was forced to extend the numerus 
clausus system to all higher education study programmes in 1977 (2005: 119). 
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establishment of mechanisms that limited access to HE in a country with a very small percentage of 
the relevant age cohort students attending HE should never be understood as an isolated factor. 
Amaral and Magalhães (2005: 119) point out that HEIs were not prepared to cope with the large 
increase in demand without serious disruption. Furthermore, there were no resources available to 
invest in expanding the system. As such,  
“The numerus clausus system was in general determined by the institutions’ capacity in terms of 
physical infrastructure and academic staff rather than by market demands. This policy has 
protected higher education institutions from an excessive increase in enrolments but has 
generated very strong social tensions because many candidates have been left outside the system 
without any alternative” (2005: 119). 
 
It was in this context – a huge increase in HE demand, a generalised numerus clausus system, and the 
constitutional guarantee of the freedom to learn and to teach60 (Amaral and Magalhes 2005) – that 
the diversification of the system (by means of establishing private institutions of HE and a 
vocational subsystem) was thought. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons that highly contributed 
to the substantial increase in access to HE was this diversification of the system. Despite the late 
massification of the Portuguese HE system, one can see (table 7) that between 1980 and 2000, there 
was in fact a huge increase in access to HE. Whereas in 1971/1972 there were 49,461 students 
enrolled in HE (Ferreira et al. 2008: 194), in the academic year of 1981/1982 this number went up 
to 84,173 students and one decade later (1991/1992) it almost reached 200,000 enrolments. Fonseca 
(2012: 383) refers that during the decade of 1985 to 1995, the number of students trebled from 
106,000 to 313,000. During this same period, Portugal’s population grew by less than 20%, from 
8.9 million in 1975 to 10.6 million in 2008 (ibid). However, since the mid 2000s, the total number of 
enrolled students started to decline. In parallel, and as Fonseca reminds, despite this extraordinary 
period of growth, the highest level of education attained by the active population aged 15+ is still 
considerably lower than the EU average (ibid).  
Table 7 - Evolution of  enrolments by type of  subsystem in Portuguese HE  
Type of 
subsystem 
1971-
72 
1981-
82 
1991-
92 
2001-
02 
2006-07 2009-10 2014-15 
 
Publi
c 
Universit
y 
43 191 64 659 103 
999 
176 
303 
169 449 183 806 191 707 
Polytech
nic 
2 981 12 195 31 351 108 
486 
105 872 110 022 100 652 
Total Public 46 172 76 854 135 
350 
284 
789 
275 321 293 828 292 359 
                                                 
60 The authors explain that the 1976 Constitution recognised the right of  all Portuguese to 
education. “But by sanctioning the freedom to learn and teach as a fundamental right, the 
Constitution opened the way for the development of  private higher education” (Amaral and 
Magalhães 2005: 120). 
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Private 3 289 7 319 51 430 111 
812 
91 408 89 799 57 299 
Total 49 461 84 173 186 
780 
396 
601 
368 982 389 841 349 658 
 
Source: Adapted from Ferreira et al. (2008: 194), GPEARI (2011: 75) and PORDATA (2015). 
 
Other factors explaining this “boom” in the last decades of the 21st century relate to the following 
set of factors: changes in population’s social, cultural and economic conditions; democratisation of 
non-HE systems (implementation of compulsory education to 9 years and growing trends towards 
the universalisation of secondary education); extension of the non-HE network to the whole 
country; the attempt (after 1973) of speeding up human resources’ training considering the country’s 
economic backwardness when compared to other more developed countries of Western Europe 
and the enlargement of the public HE network through the creation of new universities and the 
creation of the binary system with polytechnic institutes. It also important to remember that the 
considerable increase of students in the national system of HE was due the fact that access 
requirements became less demanding (Santiago 2004; Amaral et al. 2007; Ferreira et al. 2008). For 
this, it much contributed the policies and ideals of Roberto Carneiro, who served as a Minister of 
Education in the XI Constitutional Government (1987-1991) and a great promoter of private HE. 
In 1989, Roberto Carneiro determined that access exams ceased to be eliminatory for getting a place 
in a HEI, and being used only to range candidates in the access competition without requiring a 
minimum score. The immediate consequence of this was to induce artificially a very rapid growth 
in demand, creating in this way a good market for the emergence of a large number of private HEIs. 
Consequently, in 1991, the number of vacancies offered by the private sector already exceeded those 
offered in the public sector (Amaral et al. 2002: 7). Moreover, it should also be mentioned that 
private HEIs are seen as a kind of a parallel system with significant less quality than the public 
system: “it has become common knowledge that in general most private institutions are of rather 
low quality” (Amaral and Teixeira 2000: 254–255). 
To sum up, with respect to HE, Portugal followed the general European trend of shifting from 
a system of state control and legal homogeneity to a system of state supervision and institutional 
autonomy. Before the 1974 Revolution, and mainly due to its elitist nature, the Portuguese HE 
system was highly centralised. This would start to change in 1976, when the Constitution of Portugal 
included a reference to universities autonomy, guaranteeing its statutory, scientific, pedagogic, 
administrative and financial autonomy (1976 Constitution, article 76, 2). The reasons explaining this 
pattern of behaviour in the Portuguese context relate with the objectives of the supervision model 
itself. As Neave (1996) identifies and explains, this steering model possesses the advantages of 
 186 
reducing the expenses of central government with the HE sector, while it maintains an effective 
strategic supervision on national priorities (Amaral et al. 2002: 19).  
The period from 1976 to 1986 is considered the normalisation period of HE, where the 
polytechnic subsystem was assumed as an instrument to diversify the system (Amaral et al. 2002). 
The binary system was consolidated and a shift from a centralised system, based on state control 
over HEIs, to a less centralised one was initiated (Santiago and Carvalho 2004: 431). In parallel, HE 
continued to be present in political discourses and it was already assumed as a fundamental support 
to economic development, while simultaneously serving the creation of a new society and a new 
humanism, and against a disputed capitalist ideology (ibidem).  
 
4.3 Institutional Autonomy 
According to Pedrosa et al. (2012: 16), the autonomy of public HEIs from the state generally 
refers to the ability granted to them by law to carry out their own choices in pursuing their own 
mission; it involves both the legal rights and duties that they are bounded, as well as the funding 
method and allocation of other resources. The academic freedom and self-government are 
recognised in most of the institutions’ statutes and they are critical pillars of HE autonomy. 
Autonomy is not a recent achievement of Portuguese universities (Amaral 2003: 33). After the 
implementation of Republic in 1911, the Universities of Porto, Coimbra, Lisbon and Porto, their 
faculties, schools and integrated establishments had an autonomy regime with a high degree of 
internal decentralisation, whereby universities’ administration was up to senates, and the 
administration of faculties and non-integrated schools felt to school boards (ibid). Nevertheless, this 
autonomy was completely voided by Oliveira Salazar in 1952 (DL 38692 of 21st March). Indeed, 
during the whole Estado Novo period, the conception of autonomy was significantly incipient when 
compared to what “institutional autonomy” is today.  As Amaral (2003) explained, autonomy was 
only applied in terms of the election of the Rector (although in 1928, Rectors stopped to be elected, 
being again freely chosen and appointed by the government) or associative autonomy from the 
Academy side. Academic freedom ceased to exist after Salazar came into power. The year 1936 is 
quite illustrative of this: the elections for the Academic Association of Coimbra were suspended and 
an administrative commission was appointed, students were no longer represented in the University 
Senate and General Assembly, and it was published the DL no. 27 003 (14th September of 1936), 
which required all civil servants to take the oath of allegiance to the regime. 
Institutional autonomy was reinforced in 1988 with the publication of the Autonomy Law of 
Universities (Law 108/88) that conferred on public HEIs a high degree of freedom for establishing 
their statutes, together with educational, scientific, administrative and financial autonomy. Two years 
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later, autonomy was also granted to public polytechnics through Law 54/90, although more limited 
in scope as polytechnics need prior approval from the government to create new programmes 
(Amaral et al. 2002; Santiago and Carvalho 2004). These laws represent an important step towards 
institutional self-regulation once they invested universities with powers to decide on their internal 
matters (Amaral et al. 2002: 12). 
Law 108/88 also regulates universities’ government bodies: the University Assembly, the 
Rector, the Senate and the Administrative Council. This is a typical collegial system with the 
participation of the three governing bodies of the university. The system is defined as “democratic”, 
where the legitimacy of the exercise of power is based on elections for most positions. Whenever 
the statutes allow for it, the civil society can intervene, participating in the Senate by 15% (§24º, nr. 
3), or in consultative/advisory bodies (§16º, nr. 4). In some (special) cases, the University Assembly 
has the power to dismiss the Rector (Amaral 2003: 39; 57).  
In 1997, universities’ financial autonomy increased substantially through the DL 252/97 of 26th 
September, which transferred to universities all real estate that was until then owned by the state 
(Amaral et al. 2002: 9). The consolidation of institutions’ autonomy was accompanied by the 
awareness of the responsibility that their role in the economic development entailed. Simultaneously, 
HEIs assumed as their own business the connections between their development programmes with 
the regions they were located and with the objectives of national policy and also with the EU policies 
and programmes (Amaral et al. 2002: 9). Nevertheless, in 2000, the Law 26/2000 of 23rd August 
(Law for the Organisation and Planning of HE) was passed, which decreased the autonomy of 
universities in terms of creation and changes of programmes, since the Law reinforces the 
supervision requirements by the Ministry of Education for the registration of programmes. The 
Ministry could refuse the registration of the programmes in case of any irregularities in the way they 
were designed. If that happened, the courses could not be taught (Amaral et al. 2002: 13). Amaral 
et al. (2002) explain that in practice, the control that the Ministry had over private HEIs and public 
polytechnics was then extended to public universities.  
It should be reminded that during the period that passed between the approval of the 
Portuguese Constitution of 1976 and the Universities Autonomy Law of 1988, the system developed 
and increased in complexity as that participation rates have also grown. Therefore, it was necessary 
to find some strategies in terms of institutional autonomy to deal with these developments and with 
“bureaucratic bottlenecks” (Amaral et al. 2002: 16). Also because Law 108/88 imposed single 
governance model to all universities, without taking into account their own specificities (Amaral 
2003: 39). After the democratic revolution of 1974, the rectors started to be elected instead of being 
appointed by the Minister of Education, and it was transferred to universities the responsibility of 
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renovation and construction of buildings (Amaral et al. 2002). At present, the situation changed 
substantially. Although Portuguese polytechnics enjoyed a lower degree of autonomy, namely with 
respect to the creation of new programmes (because they needed the Ministry prior approval when 
registering their programmes), when compared to Finland, and until quite recently, Portuguese HEIs 
were conferred higher degree of autonomy than their Finnish counterparts. This does not mean that 
academics have been gained more academic freedom: institutional autonomy does not imply more 
academic freedom (chapter VI).  
The last two decades correspond to the period in which Portuguese HE has undergone the 
most significant changes with respect to the structure of the system, the programmatic offer, 
visibility within the international arena and in the way HEIs organised their internal governing 
bodies. The system acquired new dimensions and audiences; it became more scattered 
geographically, and the number of women attending HEIs grew rapidly (Almeida and Vieira 2012). 
It is fair to say that Portugal caught up with its fellow European countries through a very rapid 
transformation (30 years) of its HE system (Diogo 2014b).  
 
4.4 Origins and Developments of the Finnish University System 
After being a part of Sweden and since the early 19th century (1809) an archduchy of Russia, 
Finland became an independent nation in 1917 (Sweden would lose Finland to Russia during the 
Napoleonic wars fought in 1809-12). In this way, it has been said that during this period Finland 
developed from a geographical concept into a political one (Välimaa 2001; 2007: 69)61. After the 
civil war of 1918 and the Second World War, Finland was able to position itself as one of the best 
European economies and built a typical Scandinavian welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990).  
(Naturally), due to the country’s history, its HE journey is shorter than the Portuguese one. The 
first national HE institution was the University of Turku, founded in 1640. During Russian rule it 
was moved to the new capital, Helsinki, in 1828, reopening as the Imperial Alexander University of 
Finland. It remained Finland’s only institution of HE until 1908, when the present Helsinki 
University of Technology was founded. The University of Turku trained civil servants for the 
Kingdom thus replacing the former practice of sending Finnish students abroad (Välimaa 2001: 13). 
In fact, training civil servants has always been an important social function of Finnish HE, also 
                                                 
61 Finland was invaded by Sweden and the Roman Catholic Church in the 12th century tying the 
country culturally, politically and economically to Western Europe, whereas the political powers 
of  Eastern Europe, mainly Russia, spread to Eastern Finland, Karelia (Välimaa 2001). Thus, 
since the Middle Ages, Finland has been a borderland between the Eastern and Western 
European cultures and between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches; a reality that, 
according to Samuel Huntington (1998) still holds today (in Välimaa 2001: 7). 
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because the majority of university students have been and are still employed by the public sector 
(Välimaa 2005: 247). At that time, Finland was still part of the Swedish Kingdom and universities 
served mainly the purposes of the Lutheran Church and those of the Swedish King (Välimaa 2001; 
2007). The Åbo Academy University, a Swedish-language institution, was founded in 1917 and three 
years later, in 1920, a Finnish-language University was established in Turku. Compulsory education 
was introduced in 1921 (Rinne et al. 2000: 30). 
Drawing on the work of Kivinen, Rinne and Ketonen (1993), Välimaa (2005: 245) refers that 
it is possible to distinguish in Finland, after the Second World War, three periods influenced by 
different doctrines of HE policy making.  
Until the mid-1900s universities had existed only in Turku and Helsinki, and education was 
mainly for the elite. Hölttä (1988) and Välimaa (2007: 70) refer that University professors enjoyed a 
high social status and many of them acted as ministers in the governments of the 1920s and 1930s. 
Also prior to that date, when Finland was still ruled by Sweden (until 1809), the Royal Government 
had representatives in the university. Political control over academics was later on strengthened 
when the country was under Russian domain, from 1809 to 1917 (Hölttä 1988: 92; 2000: 466). 
Notwithstanding, highlights the author, the academic profession has generally been involved in the 
leadership of the state: Swedish, Russian as well as Finnish leaders, since the early times of the 
independence, were recruited from universities (ibid). Indeed, Treuthardt and Välimaa (2008: 609) 
refer that the development of a Finnish conception of university laid on two main principles. The 
first one was the idea that universities are national cultural institutions. As a matter of fact, during 
the 19th and the 20th centuries, universities were an essential factor in the creation of the Finnish 
national identity. Secondly, university and HE have always been considered important aspects of 
the development of the nation and the nation state (2008: 609). In this sense, the high social prestige 
of universities and university degrees remains one of the most emblematic realities in Finland at the 
beginning of the 21st century. Finnish society has a very positive attitude towards education which 
has been considered important throughout the Finnish history. Universities and university degrees 
still retain a high social prestige in Finland (Välimaa 2001), while in Portugal, the value of a university 
degree has depreciated (Almeida and Vieira 2012: 155). Välimaa (2007: 70) draws attention to the 
fact that this might be difficult to understand in a mass HE system, when HE degrees’ value in the 
labour market is diminishing. Välimaa (2007) then explains that this Finnish peculiarity should be 
grasped beyond rational choice theories. Instead, one needs to take into account the history and 
culture of the country during which HE degrees were both highly appreciated and secured a good 
position in society. “The high reputation of a higher education degree is a cultural assumption, which 
has a strong symbolic continuity” (ibid). 
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 The social status of Professors has traditionally been high in Finland (Hölttä 1988: 92; Välimaa 
2007). As Hölttä (1988: 92) explains, Professors had an important role in the struggle for political 
independence of the country, as well as in its cultural and linguistic identity. Indeed, the social status 
of HE and the academic profession was so high that the University of Helsinki was granted the right 
of autonomy in the constitution of Finland in 1919 (ibid). Also in Portugal, as explained by Teresa 
Carvalho (2012: 333-334), during the dictatorship period, academia could be classified as an elite 
profession. This classification is based n three characteristics: due to the i) social prestige academic 
professionals enjoyed amongst most professionals in the country; ii) academics were a small 
minority, whose selection procedures for academic positions were so rigorous that only a “privileged 
elite” was permitted to acquire this status; and, at last due to iii) the government involvement, 
considering that during the “Estado Novo” period, the number of ministers who previously held 
professorial posts was a particularly pronounced feature in Portugal, a fact that was qualified as 
“catedratocracia (Gallagher 1981 in Carvalho 2012: 334), i.e. an autocracy of full professors. 
The National Committee for HE, which operated from 1952 to 1956, drew up the first national 
guidelines for HE policy and research. Since then, the government adopts a Development Plan for 
Education and University Research for a six-year period, which did not happen until then – the 
Finnish university system grew without any clear national policy up to the 1950s (Eurydice 2000: 
458). At present, educational legislation is passed by the Parliament that also determines the overall 
lines of education policy (Ministry of Education 2001: 5). 
Between the 1950s and 1960s, Finland had around 4 million inhabitants, 4 universities, one 
university-level arts college and institutions specialising in the fields of economics and technology 
were created, though HE was mainly concentrated in Southern Finland. In the 1950s, nearly 15000 
university students were attending one of these HEIs and ten years later the threshold of 20,000 
students had been exceeded (Statistics Finland 2012), as can be seen in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 - Students attending HE 1920-2005 
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Source: Statistics Finland (2012). 
 
Table 8 – Number of  students attending Finnish HE from 2001 to 2014 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Students 162 
939 
164 
312 
169 
846 
173 
974 
176 
061 
176 
555 
176 
304 
164 
068 
168 
475 
169 
404 
168 
983 
169 
041 
167 
179 
163 
759 
 
Source: Statistics Finland (2015). 
 
This was the period of academic and traditional doctrine characterised by strong values based 
on the Humboldtian ideas of a university, linking research and teaching and a weak Ministry of 
Education (Välimaa 2005: 245; OECD 2009). Indeed, the idea of the university as an institution 
with full autonomy and academic freedom of its professors and which focused on the moral 
development of students during their studies has been deeply rooted in Finnish academic world 
(Välimaa 2006; Hölttä 1988, 2000). According to Hölttä (1988), this view has had implications in 
the institutional structure of the Finnish HE system: the new institutions founded in the 1960s and 
even in the 1970s would follow the model of the research university, although at the beginning they 
were more like regional colleges than real research universities (1988: 91). However, the rapid 
expansion of Finnish HE in the 1960s ended this first era, and the new thinking meant that HE 
would become a part of regional politics, associated with the idea of keeping the whole country 
progressive (Rinne 2010).  
The second period of Finnish HE policy making is characterised by the systematic development 
of the system on the basis of HE development acts (Välimaa 2005: 245). The first HE development 
act covered the years from 1966 to 1981, although the Act’s validity was later extended to 1986, due 
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to economic recession of the mid 1970s (Hölttä 1988: 94)62. However, despite the fact that this 
situation posed several constraints to the state budget, the Finnish HE system was protected from 
financial cutbacks. For two decades, the system was planned, developed and organised based on this 
Act (Eurydice 2010: 458; Hölttä 1988: 93). This was an outcome of the consolidation of the welfare 
state which focused on educational reforms, namely on the provision of public and egalitarian 
education, increasing the length of compulsory education to nine years (peruskoulu).  
Through the 1960s and 1970s, and continuing on the basis of this type of policy organisation 
(HE development acts), Finland witnessed a rapid growth and regional expansion of the HE system 
(Välimaa 2005), by means of locating universities evenly throughout the country with the objective 
of enhancing social and geographical equality, by promoting access to universities and increasing 
the development of rural areas (ibid). In fact, the expansion of HE has been supported by the 
egalitarian policy principle in all the Nordic countries (Välimaa 2001). The aim was to offer university 
education to one fifth of each age group63. Then, in order to increase the number of students in HE 
and to ensure a balanced regional development, the university network also expanded to Eastern 
and Northern Finland, considering that the provision of HE was heavily concentrated in the 
southern parts of Finland (Eurydice 2000: 457). As a matter of fact, Hölttä (1988) refers that in the 
early 1960s, only 6% of student places were to be founded outside Helsinki and Turku, whereas in 
the late 1980s about 40% of students were enrolled in institutions in rural areas. The University of 
Oulu was then founded in 1958. 
Another objective during this time was to foster leadership and management in Finnish HEIs, 
while simultaneously introducing accountability and quality assessment into the system (Välimaa 
1994). Despite quite reasonable social an economic development, universities’ steering system was 
considered too rigid and centralised and institutional university management was poorly efficient 
(Eurydice 2010: 458). One should remember that the creation of a uniform and regionally 
distributed university system was achieved by means of centralised control and bureaucratic 
procedures; a strategy used during the 1960s and the 1970s, when Finland was (still) described as a 
“static society” (Hölttä and Rekilä 2003: 63). As such, the Finnish HE system would be submitted 
to substantial structural change during the 1970s: a regional decentralisation with the objective of 
achieving economic and cultural integration of the Finnish nation and territory (Hölttä 1988: 94). 
Nevertheless, as aforementioned, the economic recession in the middle of the 1970s, and the 
                                                 
62 In the 1970s, the Finnish growth went through a trouble period on the occasion of two 
petroleum crises in 1973 (the “oil price shock”) and 1979, and the 1973-1974 stock market 
crash. 
63 The term “age group” is commonly used in the Finnish education system to refer to those 
students born in the same year (Eurydice 2000: 457). 
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constraints it placed on the state budget, made the implementation of the Development Act difficult, 
and therefore there was the need to extend its validation period from 1981 to 1986 (ibid). During 
the second half of the 1970s it was also time to do an extensive reform of the Finnish degree system, 
where academic and vocational elements were combined in the study programmes of the basic 
degrees (ibid).  
Välimaa (2001: 26) identified other socio-political processes which, “in interaction and in 
various combinations”, also contributed to the expansion and development of Finnish HE during 
the 20th century. These “social forces” (Välimaa 2001) were the industrialisation and labour market 
needs; political struggles between Finnish-speakers and Swedish-speakers; the academic drift and 
the regional policy principle combined with the construction of the welfare state, supported by all 
major political parties. Creating equal educational opportunities – including equal access to HE – 
became one of the most important objectives of Finnish HE policy from the 1960s and the 1990s. 
The expansion of HE was supported by the regional policy principle that all major provinces were 
allowed to establish a university of their own during this period (Treuthardt and Välimaa 2008). 
Rinne et al. (2000) add to this list factors like immigration and diminution of age classes and Kivinen 
(2007) points to the student grant system set up in the 1970s as an important factor contributing to 
the expansion of Finnish HE. Nevertheless, as it is documented in the Eurydice report (2010: 458), 
the rapid expansion of the Finnish HE system during the 1960s and 1970s was not altogether 
favourable. This is due to the great majority of students being enrolled in humanities and social 
sciences – disciplinary fields which were/are less resource demanding than technology or natural 
sciences. Consequently, this situation led to disparities between the provision of graduates and the 
actual demands of the labour market. That is why this first Act also sought to ensure sufficient 
financial support to universities combined with a better coordination between educational offer and 
the world of work (Eurydice 2010).   
Similarly to Portugal, although used to justify compulsory school reform, in Finland, the human 
capital argument was also crucial to boost interest in HE policies, as pointed out by Rinne et al.: 
“Most of the population in all occupations are about to work in such tasks that their efficiency 
can be increased immediately by education. This leads us to an educated society and it is at the 
same time the rational case for increasing education” (Committee of School Reform 1966: A 12, 
9-10, 99-100 in Rinne et al. 2000: 27). 
 
These developments need to be framed within a broader context of change, i.e., they result 
from the government’s ideal of rational planning (Välimaa 2005: 250). In fact, important educational 
decisions were also made at the beginning of the 1970s: as for example, teacher education and 
training was incorporated into universities, and institutes providing translation studies were merged 
with universities in 1981 (Eurydice 2000: 457). Also universities’ administration and decision-making 
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processes as well as universities’ regulations concerning professors were reformed at the turn the 
1960s and the 1970s  (Välimaa 2005). Aiming at abolishing the traditional authority of professors in 
the decision-making bodies, the government thought about introducing democratic decision-
making practices into all university councils and establishing universal suffrage in university (ibid). 
Naturally, the academia did not welcome this reform and the rectors of the universities created in 
1968 the Finnish Council of University Rectors. The draft law presented by the Council of State 
proposed that the universities’ regulations concerning professors were thus reformed into more 
democratic versions (Välimaa 2005). The new system had representation quotas for three groups: 
professors, non-academic staff and students. The three groups’ representation penetrated all levels 
of governance, i.e., departmental, faculty and university (ibid). Nevertheless, as Välimaa states, this 
change was highly resisted by professors “(…) who established their trade union in 1969 to fight 
against the reform, whereas the students supported it” (2005: 250). Universities’ governance fell 
then under the state regulation and academic self-governance model because the draft law did not 
pass the parliament (it was supported by the government, constituted by the Centre party and the 
Social Democrats, but resisted by the opposition, mainly right-wing parties) (Kivinen, Rinne and 
Ketonen 1993: 80-106 in Välimaa 2005: 250-51). It was also during this stage, about two decades 
earlier than in other Nordic countries, that the Finnish HE system reached the level of mass HE 
(Välimaa 1994; 2007: 71; Välimaa and Treuthardt 2008: 609).  
This doctrine would come to an end in the middle of the 1980s, when the policies of rational 
planning did not work very well anymore (Välimaa 2005: 245). Slowly but steadily, the “closed 
system approach” (Hölttä and Rekilä 2003: 63) gave way to the “open system strategy” during the 
1980s and 1990s, a time when great efforts to link HE policy to other areas of social and economic 
life were made. This process was stimulated by the rapid economic growth the country lived by that 
time, an increase in the number of people with general upper-secondary education, a strong demand 
for academically educated labour in working life as well as demands for educational equality64 (Rinne, 
et al. 2000). As such, the 1980s marked a breaking point in the HE policy based on rational planning. 
The transition to the new HE management policy started in the middle 1980s when the Ministry of 
Education reformulated the national policy goals, and a new HE Development Act came into force 
                                                 
64 It is important to mention that at the beginning of  the 1960s the political power in the 
educational field shifted. In 1963 the Parliament forced government to reform the educational 
system along the principles of  comprehensive schooling (Rinne et al. 2000: 30). In the 
Parliament, the left and centre/agrarian parties were the impetus behind the reform. 
Simultaneously, for the first time there was a powerful representation of  the Social Democratic 
Party, which together with Communists demanded equality of  educational opportunities 
regardless of  social background. In turn, the agrarian party was more interested in reform 
education due to regional policies (Rinne et al. 2000: 30). 
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at the beginning of 1987. This also marks the third period (or another historical layer) of Finnish 
HE, which started with the HE Development Act of 1986 (1052/1986 – Laki korkeakoululaitoksen 
kehittämisestä). The Act was drawn for the period of 1986-91 and government efforts were driven 
towards the enhancement of universities’ autonomy and efficiency (Välimaa 2005: 245). The 
objective of the 1986 Act was to guarantee stable resource development for universities until the 
mid-1990s and to prepare the ground for internal reform (Rinne et al. 2000: 31). Effective planning 
and cooperation started to be emphasised in research activities and university evaluation was 
developed. The internationalisation of education started to be planned in the 1980s and in 1987 the 
FMEC designed a strategy for internationalisation of HE with clearly defined quantitative targets 
for international student exchanges (Eurydice 2000: 468)65.  
The acceptance of this Act was quite consensual considering that, until then, Finland had been 
one of the most centralised HE systems in Europe in terms of governance control (Hölttä and 
Rekilä 2003: 61). The internal organisation and decision-making of the universities was regulated by 
administrative orders and decrees and other aspects of academic life were thoroughly determined. 
Examples of this centralisation are the state university budget, which stipulates the allocation of 
funds in detail; the decrees on studies and degrees included detailed stipulations on the curricula and 
the provision of instruction and teachers’ duties were laid down in detail in collective agreements 
(Eurydice 2000: 462). Thus, since the late 1980s the administrative structures have been streamlined 
by reducing the number of levels and by delegating authority to the rector, deans and other heads 
of units who are now charged with most responsibility for the internal operations of universities 
(Eurydice 2000). Furthermore, and being an exceptional trend in most Western Europe, towards 
the end of the 1980s and on the basis of this legislation, the government guaranteed universities 
their basic resources together with 15% annual growth in appropriations related to research and 
instruction (e.g. salaries, scholarships and appropriations for research materials). Such scenario 
meant very favourable economic conditions for Finnish universities (Hölttä and Rekilä 2003; 
Välimaa 2005). Nevertheless, the government agreed previously on some requirements for these 
measures take effect, namely:  
i) HEIs should be able to improve the conditions for setting performance goals as well as to 
improve the conditions to decide on the use of funds allocated to them;  
                                                 
65 With respect to internationalisation strategies, it was stipulated that by the end of the 1990s 
every postgraduate student and at least 5,000 students per year attending a second-cycle degree 
should spend at least one academic semester studying abroad. For more data on Finnish HE 
internationalisation policies and developments, see: 
http://www.hsv.se/download/18.539a949110f3d5914ec800082193/9708S.pdf  
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ii) research carried out in HEIs should be more systemic and quality and efficiency should be 
improved in cooperation initiatives among HEIs;  
iii) all universities should apply a performance evaluation system able to provide comparable 
and sufficient information about outputs, as well as research and teaching costs and to report 
regularly to the Ministry the results of their activities; and  
iv) when allocating new resources, universities should take into account the results obtained in 
their research activities (Höltta and Rekilä 2003: 60-61). These preconditions are considered to be 
the basis of what would be later known as the “management by results” mode of governance (ibidem) 
– the general governance model of Finnish HE.  
Although the government’s promise failed, funding rose steadily until the 1990s (2005: 248), 
contrary to what was happening in most European countries. Again, one needs to understand this 
exceptionalism in the light of historical and cultural factors. The ambition of expanding HE 
throughout the whole country and providing equal educational opportunities became important 
objectives of a welfare state agenda supported by the major political parties from the 1960s to the 
1990s (Välimaa 2007: 70), as aforementioned.  
The 1986 Act paved thus the way for internal reform of the system as there was a shift in 
universities’ governance modes: from steering through legislation (through Universities Acts) to 
steering by results (Välimaa 2005). In fact, the basic principles of the steering by results model have 
already been enacted when the government decided on the preconditions for which it would provide 
a remarkable additional funding to Finnish universities during the years 1988-91, as aforementioned. 
In this way, the basic elements of the new steering strategy of the government (a governance model 
based on outputs) were laid first within the HE sector, namely in the university system, even before 
the general public sector reform was implemented (Hölttä and Rekilä 2003: 61). However, Hölttä 
and Rekilä also point to the fact that this steering model would end up to work as a tool for 
governments to provide universities with the autonomy to “… do the dirty work of institutional level 
cutbacks by themselves” (ibidem), when the country went through a deep recession in the 1990s.  
The 1990s marked a turning point in the Finnish economic and social prosperity, when the 
country was hit by a severe economic recession in 1991. Rinne (2004: 93) refers that the recession 
reached its deepest point in 1993, when the unemployment rate was at approximately 20%, the 
interest rate at 15% and the GNP decreasing for many consecutive years. “Suddenly, Finland was 
with Spain and Ireland at the top of the unemployment statistics in Europe, leaving behind the old 
days of almost full employment” (Blom 1999: 16 in Rinne 2004: 93).  
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Under the “national innovation system”66 programme in the 1990s, investments in research 
and development were made, aiming at creating new innovations and productivity (Kivinen 2007; 
Hölttä and Malkki 2000)67. The official national rhetoric put then attention on HEIs as part of the 
national innovation strategy (Treuthardt and Välimaa 2008). As part of the national innovation 
system, it was established in 1985 the KOTA-reporting mechanisms between universities and the 
Ministry of Education (Rinne 2004). The 1990s were also the time for the latest expansion of the 
university network. Structural changes during this decade include the Academy of Fine Arts gaining 
university status in 1993 and the College of veterinary medicine, previously an independent 
university, being annexed as a faculty of the University of Helsinki in 1995 (Eurydice 2000: 457). In 
addition to this, and within a context of crisis, the major reform introduced in the country was the 
establishment of professional HEIs in 1992, when the government authorised 22 temporary 
vocational HEIs (Välimaa 2005: 259), as analysed later on in this chapter. However, in 1991, there 
was a change in government, and universities’ economic growth started to slow down. In 1992 the 
budget was frozen to the level of 1991, when the country was hit by the economic recession (Välimaa 
2005: 248). Thus, due to the budget cutbacks made in 1993, it was difficult to continue following 
the 1986 Act of HE. In this way, a new HE Development Act (the III Act) was launched in 1999 
covering the years of 1999 until 2004.  
It should also be mentioned that in the beginning of 1995, as a result of the Government’s 
decision to improve arrangements for research training, postgraduate schools offering a 
considerable number of full-time positions in research training were established. In parallel, during 
the period of this II HE Development Act the Student Financial Aid was rethought. The new Act 
on Student Financial Aid (65/1994) stipulated that a student can get financial aid for a period no 
longer than 55 months for a higher academic (second-cycle) degree. This period can be lengthened 
in cases of illness and/or for students of certain disciplines (e.g.: the extent of the first degree can 
be longer for an unusually demanding syllabus as medicine, some languages not taught at secondary 
schools) (Eurydice 2000: 461). 
                                                 
66 Aarrevaara and Hölttä (2007) highlight that “the coordination of  the national innovation 
system in Finland is in the hands of  political leadership at the highest level. The national science, 
technology and innovation policies are formulated by the Science and Technology Policy 
Council, which is chaired by the Prime Minister” (2007: 205). This Council has as main functions 
to advise the government on issues related to science and technology, the general development 
of  scientific research and research training, and Finnish participation in international scientific 
and technological cooperation (ibidem).  
67 Despite the huge investment that Finland takes in R&D (the country exceeds the 3% 
benchmark share of  its GDP in R&D that was set in the Lisbon Strategy), the author states that 
these investments have not produced the wished outcomes, which would be, for example: new 
companies, innovations and growth in experts (Kivinen 2007: 195). 
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The changed steering system consolidated during the III HE Development Act provided 
universities with extensive freedom of action. The role of the government is restricted to strategic 
plans and target-setting and monitoring the overall performance of the universities (Eurydice 2000: 
462). On should remember that result-oriented management was introduced in the late 1980s when 
university budgets began to include performance-based funds. Under this system, institutional 
objectives and the resources needed to achieve them were determined in negotiations between the 
Ministry of Education and each HEI. However, the funding system reform only started in 1996 
(Eurydice 2008: 19). This reform involved a formula based on the agreed target number of second-
cycle (masters) and doctoral degrees (Eurydice 2000: 463). At the present, about three-quarters of 
the university education budget is financed from the state budget through the Ministry of Education. 
The rest comes mainly through the Academy of Finland which finances basic research and 
researcher training in universities, other ministries and research institutes. Universities also receive 
a great deal of external financing, e.g. for research projects, and have income from services they 
provide, such as continuing professional education (Eurydice 2008; FMEC 2012). From November 
2003 until December 2007, the entire public sector went through structural reforms under the 
national Productivity Programme. The aim of this programme was to improve productivity and 
efficiency of public service provision. This programme would impact personnel policies and 
organisational structures of universities: for example, some administrative services were transferred 
to Service Centres established by collaborating institutions, and alternative production models were 
debated from the regional perspective (Eurydice 2008: 28).  
The IV HE Development Act (1997/645) continues to focus on the importance of HE to 
educate students to serve their country and attests the importance of achieving a high international 
level of research, education and teaching. The update of this Act (715/2004) pays more attention to 
the ‘Third Mission of Universities’ – that is, the social utility of HE and cooperation among HE 
institutions, business enterprises and society (Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 82), as can be 
seen by the following citation of the Amendment of the Universities Act 1997/645: 
“The mission of the university shall be to promote free research and scientific and artistic 
education, to provide higher education based on research, and to educate young people to serve 
their country and humanity. In carrying out their mission, the universities shall interact with the surrounding 
society and promote the societal impact of research findings and artistic activities” (Universities Act1997/645 
§1º, italics by the author to emphasise what has been added in the Amendment 715/2004). 
 
 
According to Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala (2008) this addition to the Law “(…) not only shows 
that the Finnish government wishes to regulate the functioning and objectives of the universities 
but also indicates that universities are seen as an integral and useful part of society” (2008: 83). Table 
9 summarises the most important periods of Finnish HE. 
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Table 9 - Summary of  the most important periods of  the Finnish HE system  
1st Period: 
1917 - 1950s 
Cultural University 
- Elitist HE system with 4 universities in the country (University of Helsinki; Helsinki 
University of Technology; Åbo Academy University and a Finnish Language University).  
2nd Period: 
I Act: 1966 - 1986 
Research and Service 
University 
- Regional decentralisation + Reform of the degree system  
- Introduction of accountability and quality assessment into the system 
- 1st OECD Evaluation of Finnish educational policy (1982) 
- Establishment of the KOTA-reporting mechanism between universities and the Ministry 
of Education (1985) 
- Mass HE system 
3rd Period:  
II Act: 1987 - 1996 
Enterprise University   
 
- Increment of universities’ autonomy and efficiency  
- Development of university evaluation  
- Establishment of polytechnics (1991; 1995) 
- First funds by result are distributed to universities 
- Implementation of management and budgeting by results 
- 2nd OECD assessment to the Finnish HE system 
- Government development plan for education and university research for 1995-2000 
- Establishment of FINHEEC (1995) 
III Act: 1997-2004 
Enterprise University  
 
- Consolidation of management by results and competition doctrine  
- First evaluation of the state and quality of scientific research in Finland by the Academy 
of Finland (1997) 
- First three-year agreement period (1998-2000) between the Ministry and universities 
- Government development plan for education and research for 1999-2004 
- Extra budget and increase in basic university funding after the funding crisis 
IV Act: 2004 - 2009 
Entrepreneurial 
University 
 
- Implementation of the Bologna process and emphasis on the harmonisation of the 
European HE region and degree system 
- Implementation of the performance-based salary system 
- Since 2006, universities have been allowed to establish companies, though it did happen 
until present. 
V Act: 2009 – present 
The Business 
University* 
- Marketization of academic capital 
- Privatisation of Finnish universities through the latest Universities Act (558/2009) 
* Researcher’s denomination 
Source: Adapted from Rinne (2004). 
  
 
4.4.1 Support of International Organisations in the Finnish HE 
system 
 
Through different paths from Portugal, the OECD has also its history in Finnish HE policy. 
In 1992 the OECD made the first evaluation of Finnish educational policy (Rinne 2004). Several 
authors have been consensual about the fact that not only Finland has been the EU’s star pupil 
concerning the implementation of HE policies, but it has also been exemplarily devoted to OECD’s 
recommendations (Kivinen 2007: 194; Kallo 2009). As Kallo (2009) concludes in her thorough 
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research: “OECD country and thematic reviews have regularly preceded legislative reforms of the 
national HE system from the 1980s until the present day” (2009: 368). In fact, two important 
reforms in the Finnish HE system catalysed by the OECD were the managerial reforms and the 
decision to create in the mid-1990s a binary system by establishing polytechnics (Rinne, Kallo and 
Hokka 2004; Kallo 2009; Kauko 2011). 
 
4.5 Diversification of the system: creation and development of the 
vocational sector in Portugal  
 
 
Before the official and effective establishment of  the vocational sector, Portugal had only 
university education, namely four public universities, which explain the low students enrolments 
(Teixeira, Amaral and Rosa 2006). 
The vocational sector was formally established in 1973 through the Reform Act passed by the 
National Assembly on the 25th July (DL 402/73), under the so-called ‘Veiga Simão Reform’. Thus, 
the new national HE system included on one hand, short-cycle HE with a predominantly vocational 
character, and which focused on the transition of students to the employment market and, on the 
other hand, it would maintain the university training, characterised by a stronger theoretical bias 
(Almeida and Vieira 2012: 138). However, due to the 1974 revolution, the process of expansion and 
development of the sector was disrupted. Still, the binary conception of HE as it was formatted in 
1973 endures up to the present (ibidem). It was only in 1977 that the DL 427-B/77 of 14th October 
instituted polytechnic HE as “… short-term higher education aiming at training expert technicians 
and professionals of education at an intermediate level of higher education” (DL 427-B/77, §1º). 
This explicit policy intention not only aimed for the diversification of the system, “either by creating 
new schools and new courses or by differentiating some already established courses such as 
Medicine, Dental Medicine and Nutrition” (Amaral et al. 2007: 315), but also “to meet urgent needs 
in various economic sectors through the training of qualified technicians in activities which are 
clearly lacking and even absent in the country” DL 427-B/77, §1º). 
From 1977 to 1981 there was a clarification of the strategic guiding principles defining the 
objectives of the polytechnic subsystem, namely bringing it closer to the economic and social needs 
of the country (Amaral et al. 2002: 21). For this strategic guidance to happen, it much contributed 
the OECD reports and recommendations as well as the focus on the ‘human capital’ theory (Amaral 
and Magalhães 2005: 117; Amaral et al. 2007: 314).  Nonetheless, this decision, as Amaral et al. 
(2002: 21) explain, was not based on any credible prospective analysis of the sectorial and global 
demand, resulting from the development dynamics of the Portuguese economy. It was rather based 
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on an accumulation of diffuse beliefs, as well as on a number of intuitions on the predictable effects 
of the polytechnic skilled manpower on the economy. These beliefs related with: 
i) a sense of loss due to the extinction of secondary technical schools and middle level education 
schools as a consequence of the education reforms after the 1974 Revolution;  
ii) the idea that the regionalisation of an intermediate network of HE would be a powerful tool for 
the economic and social development of the country, while simultaneously allowing to rebuild or 
consolidate management intermediate structures and/or activities in industrial and services 
organisations;  
iii) an overemphasis of the advantages of having human resources with specialised narrowband 
training while universities would provide broadband programmes;  
iv) a clear lack of confidence towards the universities’ capacities, (especially the classic ones) to 
redirect part of their training and research programmes to specialised labour market niches (Ferreira 
et al. 2008: 193); and  
v) the democratisation of HE by providing a local choice for HE to students coming from technical 
professional secondary schools (Amaral et al. 2002: 22).  
By decentralising the supply of HE, which used to be concentrated in Lisbon, Porto and 
Coimbra, the system would be available to students in their region and thereby it would speed up 
the dynamics of regional development (Almeida and Vieira 2012: 138). The regionalisation and 
diversification of HE would not only promote more equality in accessing HE, but it would also 
allow more diversity in terms of student choice, while simultaneously, it would be a solution for the 
demographic pressures resulting from increased compulsory schooling.  
Being the more developed countries of Western Europe the comparison target (or the examples 
to follow), the main expectation with the diversification of the system was that the binary 
organisation would stimulate economic competitiveness and would better prepare people to the 
requisites of the labour market (Magalhães 2004). Simultaneously, the diversification of the system 
was also seen as a tool to facilitate industrialisation and to develop the services sector. In sum, as 
Amaral et al. (2003: 23) explain, the Portuguese industry was in great need for manpower at 
intermediate level, able to perform more concrete and practical work, rather than a more skilled 
workforce, which was already being produced in universities – perhaps in excess (ibidem: 22). 
It was in this context that in 1979, this short-term HE (technical and teacher training colleges) 
was renamed as “polytechnic HE” through the DL 513-T/79, being successfully promoted by the 
ministers of education and the World Bank (Amaral and Magalhães 2005: 124; Ferreira et al. 2008: 
193). Moreover, the link with the economic and regional development was reinforced through the 
agreement on specific objectives concerning the institutional mission of public polytechnics, which 
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was meant to be different from “the more conceptual and theoretical characteristics” of universities 
(Magalhães 2004: 303). As such, polytechnics were expected to develop non-traditional research 
areas. 
The development of the vocational subsystem was also strongly motivated by another attractive 
political objective namely to increase the chances of Portugal becoming a EU member. The 
priorities and attentions were therefore turned to other European countries in order to act 
strategically in terms of quantity, quality and access procedures (Amaral et al. 2007). With respect to 
quantity, it was believed that it would be necessary to expand and diversify the system by 
implementing a binary structural organisation and simultaneously by allowing the emergence of the 
private subsystem. This required a continuous effort in a developing public universities network by 
granting increased institutional autonomy to it. As aforementioned, this was the time when 
autonomy laws started to be prepared, becoming a reality in 1988. Simultaneously, it was necessary 
to regulate the size of the HE system by means of access policies (Amaral and Magalhães 2005; 
Amaral et al. 2007: 315).  
Referring to the recommendations of the World Bank, the authors explain that “(…) without 
reducing the supply of university graduates, particularly in engineering, graduates from the 
polytechnics might find employment opportunities scarce; the Bank saw this as a threat to the new 
vocational education programmes” (Amaral and Magalhães 2008: 208). In addition, the 1978 World 
Bank Report (no. 1807-PO) suggested that, as regards manpower provision, Portugal needed to 
train not only high level technicians, but also middle level personnel (technicians with short cycle 
post-secondary education, i.e.: engineering and health technologies, middle level managers and some 
500 agricultural technicians on a yearly basis), while professors for basic education should complete 
shorter degrees than those traditionally offered by universities (Amaral and Magalhães 2007: 70-71). 
Thus, during this period, the Portuguese government driven by the World Bank’s recommendations 
and wishing to enter into the EU, defined as priority the normalisation of the country’s economy. 
In this process, polytechnic HE would perform a central role in the development of the national 
HE system. Thereby,   
“Access policies were combined with large investments in new buildings and equipment and an 
academic career progression more attractive (less demanding) than a university one to promote 
the development of the polytechnic sector. The regional character of the polytechnics was stressed 
by allowing the institutions to reserve a percentage of vacancies or students living in the region68” 
(Amaral and Magalhães 2005: 124).   
 
                                                 
68 This is called preferência regional (regional preference) – Article 28º c (national competition 
regulation to access to polytechnic higher education) of  the Decree-Law 296-A/98 of  25th 
September. 
 203 
The 1980s and 1990s were in fact the “golden years” for this type of institution. Public polytechnics 
have concentrated their enrolments in Engineering, Management and Business Administration 
(within the area of Social Sciences), Education/Teacher Training, Health and Social Protection and 
Agriculture, which corresponded roughly to the recommendations of the World Bank (Amaral and 
Magalhães 2007: 70). 
As the figures themselves show, the development of the polytechnic sector was impressive. 
“From 1983-84 to 2001-02, the share of enrolments changed from 76,2% in public universities [and] 
12,6% in public polytechnics (…) to 43,6% [and] 27,9% (…) respectively” (Amaral and Magalhães 
2005: 124). Nevertheless, more than thirty years after its creation, and despite this quantitative 
success the operationalisation of the binary system still remains a central political issue.  
The first problem pointed out for this type of institutions lies in the lack of a clear definition 
of their mission. Despite all the good intentions behind it, since their creation, there was never a 
clear (legal) distinction between polytechnics and universities, as “the legislator did not have the 
courage to draw a clear distinction between polytechnics and universities” (Amaral and Magalhães 
2005: 126). In addition to the lack of clear legislation, the majority of polytechnics, instead of 
developing a differentiation strategy, positioning themselves as the (only) provider of intermediate 
level human resources training, most polytechnics have chosen to reproduce the university model, 
with obvious drawbacks, particularly in terms of a perceived lower status when compared to 
universities (Amaral et al. 2002: 25). Additionally, the fact that the higher schools of education were 
in many cases the initial core of the new polytechnics created problems in defining the mission and 
the role of the new institutions (ibidem). 
This resulted in pressures to change polytechnics’ legislation (Magalhães and Amaral 2005). In 
this way, in 1977, Marçal Grilo (who served as Minister of Education in the XIII Constitutional 
Government, from 1995-1999) introduced an important amendment to the Education System Act 
(Law 46/86). Law 115/97 of 19th September demanded the same level of education for all teachers 
and allowed for polytechnics to confer the degree of licenciado, which was until then only conferred 
by universities (Magalhães 2004). This is usually pointed as the first sign of undesirable academic 
drift in the vocational subsystem, which despite the ambiguity of both subsystems could be noticed 
quite before (ibid). Magalhães (2004) argues that this ambiguity was also perceived in the research 
field, once polytechnics were not excluded from doing this type of activity. In 1978, Law 61/78 (of 
28th July) conferred polytechnics the permission to develop some (applied) research. Indeed, 
polytechnics were expected to explore non-traditional areas in this field, such as applied research, 
areas of experimental technologies and education, and link these with regional and local needs 
(Magalhães 2004: 303-304). In turn, some universities, especially the more recent ones, have adopted 
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a closer orientation to the needs and requirements of the labour market. As such, polytechnic 
graduates will compete against universities’ graduates in a labour market where, in principle, they 
are in a disadvantage position.  
As consequence of the unfolding of this situation, built up on ambiguous policies, polytechnics’ 
expectations and objectives have not been fully achieved. For example, with respect to the possibility 
of attracting a significant number of students, what happens is that despite the existence of distinct 
types of HEIs in Portugal, universities continue to offer a higher number of vacancies, and public 
universities still are the students’ first choice. Therefore, there is a higher number of enrolments in 
this subsystem. Thus, as Almeida and Vieira (2012) conclude, “(…) within the public sector of higher 
education, consolidating the polytechnic subsystem took far longer than it did for the university 
subsystem” (2012: 138).  
The access and attraction dynamics of both Portuguese subsystems were analysed by Amaral 
and Magalhães (2005) who refer that the cultural background of the family is related with the 
academic access of the different sectors of HE. In general, students from families with higher 
cultural capital enrol preferably in public universities, while students from families without such 
higher cultural capital, but who possess a significant economic capital, prefer private universities. 
Local polytechnics are then the option of students from families of lower cultural capital, where the 
economic factor has clearly more influence (Amaral and Magalhães 2005: 131). In fact, socio-
economic conditions are increasingly more a determinant factor to access HE, as a great majority 
of students have to leave their homes and arrange rooms in the town where the HEI is located 
(Sousa and Fino 2007: 612). 
A recent study from Almeida and Vieira (2012: 144-145) corroborates this situation. By 
crosscutting data about students’ familiar background with their preferences in terms of types of 
HEI and programmes chosen, the researchers concluded that the most prestigious university 
degrees are still taken up by students from families of privileged socioeconomic status. This 
distinction is also perceived by students who see vocational education as less prestigious than 
university education, which explains why this subsystem has lower attraction capacity for students. 
Moreover, “the academic trajectory of polytechnic students tends to involve a lower performance 
level than university students. Such a profile allows us to grasp how economic factors – regional 
proximity and reduced expenses that such proximity may imply – as well as academic considerations 
– lower entrance grades, for instance – influence candidates to apply to polytechnics” (Almeida and 
Vieira (2012: 144-145). 
This situation should be understood bearing in mind the positional character of the different 
types of HE (Hirsh 1976 in Magalhães 2004: 306). In fact, “Diversification via the binary system is 
 205 
tainted by a political suspicion: the elitism implicit within the university subsystem” (Amaral and 
Magalhães 2005: 126). University education is thus connected to an elitism character, strengthened 
by the type of students attending both sectors. This scenario probably explains why countries with 
a binary organisation of their HE systems, face some instability due to the academic drift of 
polytechnics in search of social standing vis-à-vis universities and due to professional drift of 
universities responding to societal pressures to become more ‘relevant’ and to respond to increasing 
demands for employability of their graduates (Amaral 2003a: 2). Portuguese universities also 
directed part of their curricula to the needs and demands of the labour market and included in their 
initial training postgraduate curricula more room for vocational components. As Santiago (2004) 
explains, the shift from Mode 1 to Mode 2 of knowledge production (Gibbons et al. 1997) can be 
observed in some areas of intervention of Portuguese universities. The experiences of collaboration 
and partnership that have been developed with the industrial and services sectors, as well as the 
transfer of knowledge and technology to the business environment, generated some effects that 
universities, at different paces and degrees, were using to make their curricula more vocational 
(Santiago 2004). 
In sum, although this situation might change in the future, it is possible to say that polytechnics 
were, since their creation, and still are, in a disadvantageous position, especially in what concerns 
their capacity of attracting students and therefore in terms of social standing. Although lately due to 
the economic situation of the country and the problem of unemployment for undergraduate degree 
holders, polytechnics’ degrees might be perceived as ‘more employable’. However, they still lag 
behind universities in their capacity of attracting students. Students’ preferences can be better 
pictured in the following map (figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 – Distribution of  Portuguese students’ preferences according to the type of  
subsystem  
a) Public University    b) Private university  
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c) Public 
Polytechnic 
  
 d) 
Private 
polytechnic 
 
Source: GPEARI-MCTES (2011). 
 
Looking back to 1977 and assessing the present moment, it is possible to say that there was some 
evolution. There was the transformation of two polytechnic institutes into universities (Ferreira et al. 
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2008: 194). There was also the inclusion of HE schools of teacher training into polytechnic institutes 
and, in some cases, into universities (ibidem). However, as referred by the authors, this integration 
was controversial, as it resulted in the provision of duplicate courses, both in polytechnic institutes 
and in universities. This happens because, in some cases, polytechnic institutions are steered like 
national institutions instead of regional institutions, whose main concern should be the 
establishment of a strict connection with regional development, and economic and social activities 
(ibidem: 200). In turn, this can be explained by the fact that access to HE is organised from a national 
perspective, rather than a regional one. Nevertheless, due to their regional character, polytechnics 
are closer to local and/or regional authorities and, during some time, instead of being elected, 
polytechnics’ presidents were appointed by the government. Somehow, this made polytechnics 
more vulnerable to local politics, but simultaneously, the local political forces were able to take up 
some demands to the government (Amaral et al. 2002: 41). By other words, by being appointed by 
the government, polytechnics’ presidents could raise attention to the region, to local problems and 
opportunities. The authors also refer that some local authorities aspire to see the polytechnic of 
their region being promoted into a university convinced that such a “transformation process” will 
get them more votes from the electorate as well as (or consequently) to attract more people and 
development to the region. 
At this stage it is important to include a brief note concerning private HEIs in the country, so 
one can better understand the dynamics of Portuguese HE. Actually, the consolidation of the 
national HE system is not only the result of developments observed in the public HE sector. During 
the 1980s, the paradoxical situation between the access restrictions imposed by the numeri clausi and 
the investments in the non-university subsystem, resulting in a huge increase in the number of 
candidates to HE, created the perfect scenario for the emergence of private non-profit HEIs. 
Indeed, they “… absorbed the excess in demand that could not be met by public institutions” 
(Amaral and Magalhães 2008: 209). Private HEIs are mainly teaching schools and do not contribute 
substantially to research (Amaral and Magalhães 2005: 130), and as confirmed by the representative 
of private HEIs in 2012 in the interview for this dissertation. 
During the mid 1990s, the increasing mismatch between demand and supply of HE forced 
many students to choose any available programme or institution, without paying attention to quality 
issues or future employment prospects. Especially in the years of severe economic stringency 
following the revolution, the government allowed the development of private HE network, “… 
without close scrutiny of the quality of what has being offered” (2008: 209). This situation, 
combined with changes in the democratisation of secondary education, as well as lower 
requirements for students graduating from secondary education and entering HE created an 
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enormous growth in the sector (Amaral and Teixeira 2000: 252), as can be seen in table 10. As 
aforementioned, in 1989 the Minister Roberto Carneiro induced artificially a very rapid growth in 
demand. Although the rationale behind his policies is not clear69, the fact is that a large number of 
private HEIs emerged, and from 1994 until 1999 the number of vacancies offered by the private 
sector exceeded those offered in the public sector (Amaral and Magalhães 2005; GPEARI) (see table 
10). Nevertheless, as the figures show, the increase in vacancies in the private sector does not 
correspond to a similar huge increase in the number of enrollments. 
Table 10: Evolution of  the number of  access vacancies and new enrolments by type of  HE 
subsystem 
Type of 
subsystem 
1995-
96 
 
1996-
97 
1997-
98 
1998-
99 
1999-
00 
2004-
05 
2007-
08 
2010-
11 
P
u
b
lic
  Vacancies 
 
34 306 36 873 40 704 43 293 46 243 47 138 49 584 54 284 
Enrolments
* 
47 450   51 
734 
56 187 55 232 59 074 63 365 84 279 102 
895 
P
ri
v
at
e 
 Vacancies 
 
37 286   43 
551  
44 935 45 955 45 312 34 130 36 646 35 529 
Enrolments
* 
33 633 30 406 25 698 23 978 25 672 20 998 29 835 28 613 
(* - Number of student enrolled in a HEI in the first year, for the first time). 
Source: GPEARI-MCTES (2011). 
 
According to the OECD (2006), from 1990 to 2000, enrolments in public polytechnics had 
increased 224.7% and 121.7% in the private sector. The development of the private HE sector in 
Portugal needs to be framed in the new political and social context of the system. It was mentioned 
already that changes in strategies of regulation and state control, contributed for the emergence of 
new (hybrid) governance modes. During the consolidation of the binary framework, as Santiago and 
Carvalho (2004) explain, a shift from a centralised system, based on state control over HEIs, to a 
less centralised one was initiated (2004: 431). Moreover, at a time of competition for economic 
relevance and for international visibility, it is no surprise the proliferation of private HEIs. 
Nevertheless, this uncontrolled growth of private institutions distorted the system in the opposite 
direction, as it evolved contrary to the aims of the geographical and supply diversification policies 
(Amaral and Teixeira 2000: 264). Instead of contributing to the geographical expansion and 
programmatic diversification of the national network of HEIs, private institutions were located in 
the most populated areas of the country and, although they invested in those study fields of higher 
                                                 
69 Amaral et al. (2002: 34) explain that it is not clear whether the Minister Roberto Carneiro 
really believed in the benefits of  private HE could bring to the country, or if  his objective was 
just to save private HE from bankruptcy. 
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demand, these also correspond to those which need lower investment costs (e.g. economics, 
management, administration and law) (Amaral et al. 2002: 35). Thus, at a time when “… the rhetoric 
about the flexibility of the students’ skills and profiles in the adaptation processes to the labour 
market became increasingly common in the discourses of social and academic actors” (Santiago and 
Carvalho 2004: 432), it is with no surprise that when the number of applicants started to decline, 
private institutions were the first to feel difficulties in attracting students. Not only were they 
considered low quality providers of HE, but they also charged higher tuition fees.  
National exams in secondary schools with a minimum grade to access HE were introduced 
again in 1996, as an outcome of the government concerns with increasing and improving quality 
rather than (only) quantity. Immediately, private HEIs suffered a drastic decrease in the number of 
students enrolled. Such situation stems from two factors: the sustained increase of public 
institutions’ vacancies and a significant decrease in the number of applicants to (private) HEIs, 
which, in turn is a consequence of demographic factors and the introduction of more demanding 
criteria to access the system (Amaral et al. 2002: 36). 
With respect to the expansion and diversification of the public HE sector, it should be 
mentioned that these periods were not an outcome of the development of new programmes to meet 
the changing needs of the labour market, neither from the creation of sufficient technical 
programmes. In fact, the development of the system is more an outcome of institutions’ strategic 
interests and to the development of new knowledge fields. In turn, the policies that favoured a 
generalised increase in HE participation rates resulted more from the huge increase in demand than 
from institutional or governmental decisions (Amaral et al. 2002: 35).  
In view of such dynamics in the national system of HE, a question comes out: considering that 
the government (through the Minister of HE) had, until recently, a firm grip in both private and 
polytechnic subsystems, how was possible that a mismatch between the government objectives and 
the outcomes of the policies to achieve these objectives happened? The expansion and 
diversification of the HE system, as well as the increase of students number in relevant areas for the 
economy of the country were explicit objectives of government policies. Until the Law 62/2007 
came into force, polytechnics were obliged to previously submit for approval all the proposals for 
creating, suspending and/or eliminating programmes. In turn, private HEIs needed to obtain 
government’s permission before initiating a new programme and after that they had to ask for the 
official recognition of the courses and diplomas approved. Then, why this system, apparently failsafe 
did not work? Amaral et al. (2002: 39) refer that this situation must be analysed bearing in mind 
some peculiarities of the Portuguese society. This will also provide some explanation to understand 
both countries dynamics with respect to the process of policy design and implementation. We will 
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take the well-known 1991 Geert Hofstede model which explains how values in the workplace are 
influenced by culture based on 5 different dimensions70. According to the Hofstede model, Portugal 
is a collectivistic, feminist, long-term oriented, high uncertainty avoidance, and high power distance 
culture (Hofstede 2013). These characteristics, on one hand, imply an appetite for many regulatory 
and detailed laws, a tendency for searching consensus and for solving conflicts by compromise and 
negotiation, as well as a generally permissive attitude. In fact, according to Amaral et al. (2002: 29), 
the major issues of higher education (access, equality of opportunities, quality, autonomy, 
professional profiles of graduates, etc.) are assumed by the different parties of the National 
Assembly with a diffuse importance, in the form of generic political declarations. This is then 
reflected in the legal framework and originates to what the sociologist Boaventura Sousa Santos 
(1990; 1993) calls of “parallel state” to characterise the mismatch between the objectives and 
intentions of the laws and the social and political actors that they attempt to regulate. Indeed, the 
Portuguese society can be considered permissive and gentle. Conflicts rarely end up in violence, as 
demonstrated by the revolutionaries of 1974.  
It is also true that there are many laws with a strong regulatory/statutory character but which 
are not always taken very seriously. Drastic measures are rarely taken to their logical conclusion and 
the public often creates feelings of sympathy for the weak (Amaral et al. 2002: 40). Due to all this, 
and quoting the authors, it is difficult for the state to use a credible a posteriori control system, 
preferring then, in general, to rely on a priori analysis of the proposals submitted for approval to the 
Ministry of Education. In practice, however, the great majority of private HEIs have a strong 
‘lobbying’ power and many politicians have vested or hidden interests in private institutions. In 
addition, many of these institutions were able to obtain official recognition without a rigorous 
scrutiny of the legal requirements or the quality of education. Thus, the national practice of avoiding 
conflicts or drastic decisions often resulted in the delay of approving proposals. In this way, as the 
authors explain, it is not surprising that sometimes, the Ministry, instead of directly replying with a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the proposals of HEIs, prefers to ignore all the legal deadlines, not replying or 
assessing HEIs proposals. Consequently, many private HEIs started illegally programmes without 
the mandatory government approval but they did not suffer any sanction for their “misbehaviour”.  
 
 
                                                 
70 Hofstede’s six dimensions of national cultures are: Power Distance; Uncertainty Avoidance; 
Individualism vs. Collectivism; Masculinity vs. Femininity; Long vs. Short Term Orientation, 
and Indulgence vs. Restraint. Hofstede stresses the idea that dimensions of cultures do not exist 
in a tangible sense: they are constructs. 
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4.6 Diversification of the System: creation and development of the 
vocational sector in Finland 
 
By the early 1990s, Finland was one of the few countries in the EU with a uniform HE system, 
consisting of universities only.  
There are several reasons explaining the establishment of the binary system in Finnish HE. 
Underlying all the possible explanations for this, one should bear in mind the Finnish belief in 
education as the ultimate and indisputable spearhead of national progress (Rinne 2004: 98). The 
investment in human capital provided the system with legitimacy and willingness to advance 
educational visions proposing new concepts of youth and higher vocational education and to expand 
higher and adult education (ibid: 98). Nevertheless, this national belief and willingness to enhance 
Finnish HE needs to be framed and understood amidst other factors contributing for the creation 
of the vocational subsystem of HE in Finland. 
In the early 1990s the Finnish government aimed at transforming Finland into a knowledge 
society. In order for this to happen, it was necessary to raise the knowledge and skill levels of the 
population by doubling HE enrolments (OECD 2003a). This means that 60-65% of pupils of the 
same age in the early years of the 21st century were aimed at attending HE. As it was visible that 
universities could not expand their offers without endangering the quality of education and research, 
there was the need to find an attractive alternative at HE level. In this way, it was expected that 
universities provided education for ca. 20% of the 60-65% target for HE entrants, and polytechnics 
for the remainder (Eurydice 2000: 461).  
In parallel, according to the 2000 Eurydice report and the 2002 Ministry of Education report 
on polytechnic education in Finland, there were some clearly dysfunctional elements in the 
vocational education and training system. For example, the former system of vocational education 
was considered too rigid and not transparent or easily comparable to other European systems. 
Indeed, the Finnish vocational education system was difficult to describe and there was little 
understanding of the role of postsecondary vocational education and its standing (OECD 2003a: 
50). Furthermore, vocational education was divided into separate fields, each with its own schools 
and institutes, which were often very small and with little cooperation between fields of study (ibid). 
Additionally, the vocational education and training system was not attractive enough for those 
school-leavers who had taken the matriculation examination, and thus successfully completed 
general upper secondary school71 (Eurydice 2000: 461).  
                                                 
71 The purpose of  the matriculation exam is to check the level of  maturity and knowledge of  
students. When passing this exam, students are eligible to apply to a HEI. 
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In Finland, the number of young people going to the general upper secondary school is very 
high: nearly 60% of annual cohorts continue their studies in general upper secondary school after 
comprehensive school (Eurydice 2000: 461). Thus, as universities could enrol only one quarter of 
this number, there were many disappointed students with the required matriculation exam 
successfully completed, but who could not find a place in one of the 16 universities that existed in 
the country by that time. Therefore, it was important to improve students’ chances of finding a HE 
study place.  
 It should be added that during the expansion period of the Finnish HE system, the provision 
of equal educational opportunities became one of the most important objectives pursued by 
governments. The founding of a university was not only seen as an important mark for the cultural 
and economic development of the given region, but it also had a symbolical value. Therefore, since 
the 1960s until the 1980s, all major provinces were allowed to establish a university of their own, 
which means that places which did not succeed in founding a university were very active in 
establishing polytechnics (Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 78). Thus, as it happened in 
Portugal, pressures emerging from an increasingly massified system allowed for the diversification 
of Finnish HE. Or, as the authors put it, the creation of a non-university sector in Finland was a 
logical expansion of the mass HE system. In this sense, the existence of a dual system would not 
only broaden the scope for individual student choice, but also to responded better to the needs of 
working life and society (Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 79). Simultaneously, the 
development of modern technology and its rapid introduction into Finnish working life demanded 
the need to have better qualified people in the labour market (Eurydice 2000: 461). Indeed, this also 
contributed for the emergence of pressures for status competition of HE degrees among 
professions and institutions as well as from labour market allocation and recruiting needs (Rinne 
2004: 98).  
 Another important factor contributing for the establishment of Finnish polytechnics was the 
rapid phase of internationalisation since the latter half of the 1980s and 1990s. Especially after 1995, 
when Finland joined the EU, there were pressures from EU policies for the new role, status and 
functions of HE in society. Also the Bologna process and European integration policies accelerated 
the development of AMKs. Indeed, the Bologna process had a decisive role in the promotion of 
these HEIs, as analysed in chapter VI. Furthermore, as part of the Finnish internationalisation 
process, it is important to refer that in its 1981 review of Finnish education policy, the OECD had 
recommended that polytechnics should be established side-by-side with the existing universities. 
However, by that time, the government considered that the proposal was not practicable in terms 
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of the future development of the education system, as Finland had lunched a large-scale reform of 
vocational education that also included post-secondary education (Ministry of Education 2002: 45). 
The establishment of the non-university sector was thus part of an extensive reform of post-
secondary education, which consisted in merging around 215 existing technical and business colleges 
and other secondary level institutions to form 32 polytechnics (Hölttä 2000; Hölttä and Malkki 2000; 
Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008). It was initially created as an experimental basis (a typical 
Finnish reform strategy, Välimaa 2005) and through several stages.  
In 1990, after careful analysis of the changes outside the educational system, the Ministry of 
Education appointed a steering group and a monitoring group for the reform of post-compulsory 
education. For each experimental institution, steering groups were composed of rectors, teachers, 
other staff and students of the participating institutions as well as representatives of the polytechnic 
owners. The groups submitted a memorandum on the development needs and principles of post-
compulsory education (Hölttä 2000: 470). Then, the government passed legislation on experimental 
polytechnic institutions in 1991. No political party opposed the reform, even though decision-
makers felt quite unprepared for such a grand move as the establishment process of polytechnics 
was felt to be too rapid (Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008). In fact, according to the 2002 
Ministry’s report, the proposal for the reform came as a surprise to politicians, the press, the 
universities and the vocational institutions themselves, considering that up to that point, HE was 
understood solely in terms of university studies, and there were doubts about the country’s potential 
for creating professionally oriented HEIs. This also explains why the reform should begin with an 
experimental phase (Ministry of Education 2002: 46). 
In addition to the Ministry, the main supporters of the foundation of AMKs were the 
representatives of provinces and provincial institutions who saw the status of their upper secondary 
education institutions upgraded. On the side of universities, there were some mixed feelings about 
the new sector of HE (Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 80). As the authors explain, 
universities were initially critical of the founding of a dual system, fearing that it would shrink the 
HE budget. However, academics were also conscious of the advantages that the expansion of the 
system would bring in terms of higher qualification requirements that would be set for teachers in 
vocational HE. In this sense, academic drift was one of the driving forces behind the reform (ibidem: 
80). 
The experimental institutions were based in all parts of the country and included practically 
every type of study field (Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008). From this moment (1991) until 
1995, there was a piloting phase to give to 22 temporary polytechnics time to develop their 
operations. Then, on the basis of the positive results obtained, the AMK system was made 
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permanent in the autumn of 1996 (ibidem: 79), when Parliament passed the Polytechnics Act 
255/1995, under which the Government grants permanent licenses to polytechnics (Hölttä and 
Malkki 2000). For an experimental institution to qualify for a license, it must have successfully 
undergone the evaluation by the Council for HE Evaluation, which means to meet educational 
needs and quality criteria and other requirements, which allow to provide HE (Hölttä 2000: 470). 
As the author explains, these criteria are mainly related to labour market needs and the quality 
standards of the programmes and resources. Throughout the second half of the 1990s the 
Government continued to grant new polytechnics operating licences every year. By August 2000 
most of these institutions had developed into polytechnics operating on a permanent basis (Välimaa 
and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 79). The establishment of vocational HEIs was thus considered 
successful. Because post-secondary vocational education had been systematically developed in every 
field during the 1970s and 1980s, the reform process did not start from scratch: it had strong 
qualitative and quantitative foundations that led to solid developments of the overall system of HE 
(Finnish Ministry of Education 2002: 46). At the turning of the new millennium, there were 29 
polytechnics in Finland. About 80% of the volume of education provided by the old post-secondary 
vocational schools was qualified for admission into the polytechnic system. The remaining 20% 
continued to function in initial vocational educational institutions (Finnish Ministry of Education 
2002: 47). 
At the present, most polytechnics are regional multidisciplinary institutions and students are 
encouraged to make use of this multidisciplinarity, namely by establishing their own business and 
combining enterprise education in many forms (Eurydice 2000: 466; Hölttä and Malkki 2000: 234; 
Ministry of Education 2002). Student selection in polytechnics is mostly based on secondary school 
achievement, work experience and in many cases, entrance examinations. Although the majority of 
students admitted to polytechnics have passed the matriculation exam, the Ministry of Education 
encourages “transit possibilities” for those with upper secondary vocational qualifications (Eurydice 
2000: 465). “The key reform for polytechnics is that the regulation of study places for young people 
and adults will be abandoned. This provides polytechnics with more flexible opportunities to 
organise their operations” (Ministry of Education 2009: 10). 
The number of study fields offered by a polytechnic depends mainly on its traditions and region 
without any connection with its size. The smallest polytechnics may have three to seven study fields, 
while medium-sized and big polytechnics may have four to eight study fields (Välimaa and 
Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 81). The largest fields of study are technology and transport; 
administration and commerce; social services and health care. These fields enrol together about 80% 
of the AMK students (Hölttä and Malkki 2000: 234). According to the FME website, in 2012, the 
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total number of young and mature polytechnic students is 130,000 and these institutions award over 
20,000 polytechnic degrees and 200 master’s degrees annually.  
Similarly to the Portuguese reality, the polytechnics applicants’ educational background and 
socio-economic status also help to explain the differences in their orientations. Students with a 
higher-status familiar background who have received academic education normally apply to 
universities, whereas applicants of working-class families tend to enter polytechnics (Välimaa and 
Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 87). 
As can be seen in table 8, and at least until 2008 there was a moderate increase of polytechnic 
students, but this increase is substantially more expressive in the number of Masters degrees’ 
applicants.  
Table 8 - Finnish polytechnic applicants, entrants and students 1998-2008. 
 
 
Source: Finnish Ministry of Education (2009: 67). 
 
At the first sight, immediately comes up the discrepancy between the number of students who 
apply for a polytechnic master degree and the number of applicants who effectively make it to the 
system. Again, national historic and cultural specificities explain this mismatch. For those who do 
not enter at the first attempt is not a “big” problem. Some end up going to Sweden or Estonia to 
continue their studies, others find part-time jobs to gain work experience and money, while 
continuing to study for the following year round of applications and others chose other 
programme/HEI, etc.  
According to Hölttä and Malkki (2000: 234), the field of engineering is represented in most 
polytechnics, and the subfield related to information technology and telecommunications has been 
characteristic for the expansion process within the AMK sector, as can be seen in the following 
picture. In this way, the development of Finnish AMKs has thus been compatible with the 
government goals related to the information society programme (ibidem), namely the increase of 
students in the study field of Technology, Communication and Transport. 
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Figure 9 - Polytechnic students by field of  study 2008 
 Youth 
Education 
Adult  
Education 
Polytechnic 
Master’s Degree 
Total 
Total 107 857 19 622 4536 132 015 
Humanities and Education 1198 167 40 1405 
Culture 10 456 1301 102 11 859 
Social Sciences, Business and 
Administration 
 21 333 4559 1196 27 088 
Natural Sciences 5264 996 156 6416 
Technology, Communication and 
Transport 
32 984 4745 1131 38 860 
Natural Resources and the 
Environment 
3493 687 151 4331 
Social Services, Health and Sports 26 183 5584 1472 33 239 
Tourism, Catering and Domestic 
Services 
6946 1583 288 8817 
 
Source: Adapted from Finnish Ministry of Education (2009: 68). 
 
An important characteristic of  Finnish AMKs is their emphasis on establishing links with the 
working life and international connections. The interviews carried out in Finland to actors of  this 
subsystem corroborated the literature review on the topic, which highlights the importance of  these 
vocational institutions to educate students in response to the needs of rapidly changing (national 
and international) labour markets. Therefore, AMKs are expected to build networks which facilitate 
the planning of studies and that will meet the requirements of various employers (Hölttä and Malkki 
2000: 234). Furthermore, a distinctive feature of  AMK’s degree programmes (whose minimum 
duration of studies is 3 years – 120 credits – and the maximum duration is 4 years) is the compulsory 
on-the-job-training period, i.e. a practical training (Polytechnics Act 351/2003). 
 
4.7 Institutional Governance, Management, Ownership and Decision-
Making of Finnish Polytechnics  
 
The administration and finance of  polytechnics is regulated by the Polytechnics Act 
(Ammattikorkeakoululaki) 351/2003 and the Decree 352/2003. The Polytechnics Act determines the 
educational mission, the disciplines, the intakes, the language of instruction and the location of each 
polytechnic. Polytechnics’ management is based on the overall policy objectives laid down in the 
Government’s Development Plan for Education and University Research and yearly consultation 
on performance and objectives between the Ministry of Education and the institutions themselves 
(Eurydice 2000: 462). Polytechnics have then autonomy in their internal affairs (Ministry of 
Education 2001; 2012). Within their internal autonomy, they are responsible for the degree 
programmes and syllabi, although the Ministry of Education makes decisions concerning degree 
programmes based on proposals submitted by the polytechnics in accordance with further 
provisions issued by Government Decree (Polytechnics Act 351/2003, §5º). They also have 
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autonomy to decide on educational arrangements, degree regulations, student selection, study 
administration, students’ legal protection, the appointment of teachers, budgetary responsibility, 
operational strategies (internationalisation, contacts with working life, etc.), certification, evaluation 
and participation in the negotiations on objectives and results with the Ministry of Education 
(Ministry of Education 2004: 17). In terms of internal autonomy, Finnish polytechnics do not differ 
much from universities, however, they are expected to be more regional in orientation and have 
more direct relations with local business and industry than the universities (Eurydice 2000: 462). 
With respect to polytechnics’ administration and its governing bodies, the Polytechnics Act 
refers that polytechnics should be managed by a board and a rector72, and, if necessary, an advisory 
committee. One or more vice-rectors can also be appointed. The law allows for external 
stakeholders (“representatives of business and industry and other sectors of the labour market”) to 
participate in institutional governance (Polytechnics Act 351/2003, §4º). This is a big difference 
from Portuguese polytechnics. Already in the 1990s, the Polytechnics’ Autonomy Law (Law 54/90) 
demanded 20% of  external stakeholders in polytechnics’ governance. In this type of  institutions, 
external members even participated in the election of  the president.  
The governing board consists of representatives of polytechnic directors, full-time teachers, 
other full-time staff and full-time degree students of the polytechnic and representatives of working 
life, i.e. external personalities. The total number of board members is decided by the maintaining 
organisation (Polytechnics Act 351/2003, §4º). External members, who should constitute no more 
than one third of the total number of board members, are also part of advisory boards. Advisory 
boards, in addition to their advisory tasks, also participate in the development of programmes and 
curriculum (Hölltä 2000: 470). By 2000, all these governance structures had been institutionalised 
(ibid).  
Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala (2008: 87) explain that an important concept in the 
governance and management of Finnish polytechnics is that of ylläpitäjä, which can be translated as 
the “maintainer”73, the maintaining body of a polytechnic. As it is perceived by the law, it refers to 
an organisation responsible for the administration, management and functioning of a polytechnic. 
When deciding on the polytechnics’ administration bodies, the aspects taken into account are 
practical considerations related with the organisation and combination of different types of 
traditional vocational institutions (ibidem). 
                                                 
72 Differently from Portuguese polytechnics, where the head of  the polytechnic is called 
“President” (also with the purpose to distinguish polytechnics and universities titles), both 
universities and polytechnics’ heads are called Rectors.  
73 MOT dictionary suggests “administrator” as the translation for ylläpitäjä, which might be more 
suitable and/or easier to understand the purpose of  this governance body. 
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The ylläpitäjä is responsible for appointing the polytechnics’ board, to recruit the rector and 
other staff, for example, the vice-rector(s); for allocating resources and deciding on the budget for 
the polytechnic, as well as for the polytechnic’s strategic planning (Polytechnics Act 351/2003, §4º; 
Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 87). This maintaining body is also the polytechnic’s owner: 
as such the nature of this ownership varies because of the different maintaining organisations 
(Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 87). The authors explain that this variety in ownership 
means, in principle, that polytechnics are private institutions considering that they are maintained 
by foundations, limited companies, municipalities or federations of municipalities (2008: 81). In fact, 
the Government grants an operating license (an authorisation) for a polytechnic to a local authority 
or a municipal consortium or to a registered Finnish association or foundation74 (Polytechnics Act 
351/2003, §6º). However, in practice, Finnish polytechnics are public institutions which provide 
their students with public goods free of charge and which are funded from public sources, mainly 
by the Ministry of Education. The different forms of ownership affect mainly their decision-making 
structures and practices. 
In their study of the non-university sector in Finland, Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala (2008) 
conclude that even when polytechnics state their objectives different from their counterparts, all 
polytechnics operate on a national, a regional and a local level irrespectively of their maintaining 
organisation. Naturally, polytechnics that are owned by single municipalities have a stronger local 
focus than other types of polytechnics, although no big differences can be seen among the 
institutions (2008: 89). At the present there are 25 polytechnics of which 4 are municipal and 21 are 
private (limited companies or foundations) (BFUG Finland 2009-2012). 
Every four years, the government adopts a Development Plan for Education and Research for 
a specific period of time, outlining general development targets for polytechnics as well as education 
and research policies (Polytechnics Act 351/2003, §3º). The Finnish Ministry of Education and 
Culture (OKM), the polytechnics and their maintaining organisations conclude three-year 
performance agreements in which they agree on target results and their monitoring and on major 
national development projects (Ministry of Education website 2012). The performance agreements 
between the Ministry of Education and the individual polytechnics have the same structure of 
                                                 
74 “The legal status of a limited company is regulated in the Finnish Companies Act 
(Osakeyhtiölaki 29.9.1978/734), whereas the legal rights of foundations are laid down in a 
different act (Säätiölaki, Foundations Act, 5.4.1930/109), and the rights and duties of 
municipalities in yet a third act (Kuntalaki, Local Government Act)” (Välimaa and Neuvonen-
Rauhala 2008: 88). Combining the different Act principles might seem quite complex but, as 
the authors explain, a foundation or a limited company have been considered good solutions 
when polytechnics were established on the basis of traditional private institutions with 
considerable assets. 
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management by results as applied for universities (Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 84). Since 
1994, on the basis of performance agreements, the Ministry of Education and the polytechnics 
agreed on objectives and results. In this way, the Development Plans together with the performance 
agreements and management by results constitute the most important tools of the Ministry of 
Education for steering the activities of polytechnics (Ministry of Education 2012).  
As local and regional establishments, the ownership of polytechnics is divided between the 
government and local authorities, which also share their costs. In this sense, the government 
allocates resources in the form of core funding, which is based on unit costs per student, project 
funding and performance-based funding. They also have external sources of funding (OKM website 
2012). Core funding is attributed on the basis of the number of students and a unit cost determined 
per student, as provided in the Act on the Financing of Education and Culture 635/1998 
(Polytechnics Act 351/ 2003 §8º, section 32). Nevertheless, as Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 
(2008: 90) point out, the funding system of the polytechnics is criticised for working in a complex 
way, which is difficult to explain and not comparable with the funding system of universities. In 
addition, the authors refer that the polytechnics funding system lacks transparency due to the fact 
that even the funding that polytechnics get from local authorities has been provided from the 
government to local authorities. In turn, the government’s subsidy that local authorities receive is 
based on the number of residents in the municipality rather than on the number of residents 
attending HE in a polytechnic institution (Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 90). Thus, 
different from universities, polytechnics are not entirely financed by the state, once funding comes 
from state budget funds and contributions by the students’ home municipalities (Eurydice 2000: 
463).  
The development of the binary system in Finland is (still) one of they key issues in Finnish 
education policy. As Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala (2008) put it “(…) the relationship between 
polytechnics and universities will become one of the major political issues in Finnish higher 
education policy-making” (2008: 95). Similarly to Portugal, and to every higher education system 
constituted by universities and polytechnics, both at the national and institutional levels, there are 
concerns and doubts on how to maintain both subsystems working differently while simultaneously 
strengthening their specific mission and profiles, without overlapping their programmatic offer. Or, 
by other words, a constant and actual concern is “how to create a high-quality, effective and cost-
effective higher education network that can accommodate the needs of the increasingly 
heterogeneous student population and the needs of the rapidly changing world of work” (Eurydice 
2000: 470). In the case of Finland, there are some specific challenges when analysing the 
development of the polytechnic network. As pointed out by the OECD (2005), there is the need to 
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achieve a balanced provision of education to meet the regional working life needs of Finland's two 
official linguistic groups: Finnish and Swedish (2005: 10). In order to accomplish this, the report 
states that it is necessary “(…) to establish a network in which each degree-teaching unit is large 
enough to be able to provide education of a sufficiently high standard and to conduct R&D which 
serves the region” OECD 2005: 10). Additionally, and probably more complex than this, seems to 
be the question of ownership. There has been recently a decline in the number of new entrants to 
higher education accompanied by an increase in vacancies. As Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 
(2008: 95) refer, there is an overcapacity in the Finnish system of higher education. In such scenario, 
an increase of institutional competition for students is naturally expectable. The race will probably 
evidence those institutions most capable of changing their strategies to adapt to new situations. 
Furthermore, as explained by Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala (2008: 95), the challenge of 
overcapacity is also related to the Bologna process, once the new two-tier degrees’ structure changes 
the relationship between polytechnics and universities. This is so because, although the Bologna 
process provides universities’ and polytechnics’ bachelors with the same legal value, they are (as it 
is supposed to be), “equal but different” degrees. By other words, when polytechnics’ students finish 
their bachelors and they wish to advance their studies in a university, e.g., to do a master, they should 
first upgrade their studies to pursue a full-time degree in the university. By other words, due to the 
difference of training and education provided in both types of subsystems, it is considered a normal 
procedure that AMKs’ students do some bridge studies to continue their studies in universities. 
Although it seems a normal path, the fact is that these bridge studies are usually in fields as business 
studies, social work and IT, where there are overlapping professional qualifications (Välimaa and 
Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 95). This, as the authors explain, could mean that in the future 
polytechnics will develop, in some disciplines, into “stepping-stones” to universities and/or 
overlapping disciplines.  
 
 
4.8 NPM in the Portuguese HE  
Since its developments after the 1974 Revolution, especially since the Education System Law 
of 1986, Portuguese higher education has been characterised by wide institutional autonomy, which 
impacted on the choices and changes in HEIs governance and management models. Until quite 
recently, Portuguese HEIs have been governed on the principle of collegiality. The composition of 
their governance and management bodies was then based on the principle of institutional members’ 
representation: faculty (academics), students and staff. Following the Humboldtian tradition, the 
framework that served as main reference to HEIs was still related with the construction and 
transmission of knowledge and with the faculty’s academic freedom (Santiago 2004). It was only in 
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the late 1990s, early 2000s that the traditional collegial forms of academic management have come 
under more visible public attack (Amaral, Magalhães and Santiago 2003: 137). 
Although at a different pace, the national higher education system has also followed the general 
trend of many continental European nations of moving from a model of state-control and “legal 
homogeneity” to a state supervision model with increased institutional autonomy (Amaral, Jones 
and Karseth 2002: 281). The Autonomy Laws for universities and polytechnics reinforced this 
supervision model by institutionalising HEIs’ autonomy and their collegial decision-making process 
(Carvalho and Santiago 2004), while the state still assumes the role/position of the system’s main 
regulatory actor. Simultaneously, the state introduces regulatory mechanisms similar to market ones 
(although not always consciously and/or clearly sure to be heading in that direction), which are used 
as public policy instruments (Amaral et al. 2002: 55). 
As in other countries, this supervisory model – also called remote steering and/or steering from a 
distance model (Neave and Van Vught 1991; Amaral, Magalhães and Santiago 2003; Santiago 2004) 
is justified by the perception that it is impossible for the state to efficiently regulate the processes at 
system and institutional levels within a ‘centralised control’ logic (Amaral, Magalhães and Santiago 
2003: 137). Thus, through this, the state not only aims at creating inter institutional competitiveness 
mechanisms that increase institutional efficiency, but also mechanisms that make institutions more 
responsive to external calls, namely when these are bonded to the economy needs (Amaral et al. 
2002: 55). In fact, and as Portugal exemplifies, the welfare dismantling is quite often connected to 
periods of financial stringency and/or crisis.  
Since then, it can be said that the relationship between the state and HEIs has been a hybrid 
one. The state assumed a mixed role, an ambiguous position between (state) regulation and control 
and the use of market instruments. In fact, with respect to this ambiguity and political hybridism, Neave 
(1998) refers that the use of direct control mechanisms is a way to legitimise the supervision model. 
In the words of Maassen (2008):  
“Portugal is a country somewhere ‘in the middle’ when it comes to university governance, given 
its hybrid situation with respect to state steering with the state moving from an overstaffed and 
bureaucratic system towards a model of ‘state interference’, amongst other things, via the use of 
market-based instruments” (2008: 101).  
 
In fact, this hybrid position (i.e. ‘in the middle’; neither fish nor meat) is one of the most emblematic 
Portuguese characteristics which impacts on political design and implementation in every sectors of 
society. With respect to higher education, and as Lima (2012) recently wrote, “(…) legislative 
measures aimed at introducing an educational market have yet to be taken, which in itself is another 
of the specificities in the Portuguese case. This, however, may be explained by the fact that both the 
market and civil society have historically been weak” (2012: 297-298). A fact that had been stated in 
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the study of Amaral et al. (2002) who, among other things, concluded that employers' organisations 
are the most absent stakeholders in the national higher education system. Portuguese employers and 
their organisations do not have an effective political role in the definition of higher education 
policies. This is a curious, or a paradoxical fact at a time (2002: 56) when the states uses a discourse 
giving an increasing importance to the idea of the market as a regulatory element and it assumes a 
concern in articulating higher education with the economic activity (ibidem)75. As the authors explain, 
it is due to the “parallel state” and to the Portuguese “heterogeneity” already explained here, that 
one can understand the rhetoric character in higher education because those characteristics produce 
to a weak central level regulation (Amaral et al. 2002: 56). Moreover, as the authors explained in 
another study (Amaral, Magalhães and Santiago 2003: 137), the new Constitution approved in 1996 
had a very strong left-wing influence and had a detailed programme for building a socialist country. 
However, none of the governments elected after the Constitution was approved could be considered 
extreme-leftist and therefore this resulted in a gap between the objectives and intentions of 
legislation and the social and political issue that they intend to regulate. Over the years, many laws 
have fallen into oblivion without producing effects while the Constitution was progressively 
amended into a less socialist ideology (Amaral, Magalhães and Santiago 2003: 137). 
With respect to the Portuguese case, organisational efficiency, as it is understood in the market 
logic, was not the main criteria for diversifying the system (Amaral, Magalhães and Santiago 2003). 
Mainly due to the delay the country experienced during the dictatorship of Salazar, Portuguese HEIs 
were protected from some more fundamentalist market demands. As such, and because of that, 
institutions assumed the expansion and diversification of the system more in the context of the 
“knowledge model” (Scott 1995), rather than in the logic of adapting the training provided to the 
pressures of the economy and/or the labour market (Santiago 2004: 46). Moreover, the presence of 
external stakeholders in universities governance bodies was, until recently, minimal.  
According to Amaral, Magalhães and Santiago (2003), the managerial rhetoric has emerged in 
the national higher education context both at the system and institutional levels. At the system level 
is possible to evidence (some impact of) managerialist narratives in the political discourses about 
                                                 
75 This mismatch between the political discourse and the social and political fabric, which is only 
filled up by rhetoric, should be understood bearing in mind the heterogeneity of  the Portuguese 
society and the Portuguese state. As already mentioned, Boaventura Sousa Santos (1993) 
summarises this peculiar heterogeneity in the following way: “The Portuguese corporative state 
suffered a transition to socialism, a Fordist regulation and a Welfare State regulation, and even 
a neoliberal regulation. In each moment, the structure of  the state presents a geological 
composition with several layers, sedimented in a different ways, some old, some recent, each 
one with its own internal logic and its own strategic direction. This is the meaning of  the 
heterogeneous state” (1993: 41). 
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the purposes and means on how to organise education. In the late 1980s, Roberto Carneiro tried to 
popularise the idea that there was the need to make companies more similar to schools and the 
schools more similar to companies (Santiago 2004: 47). In Portugal, as the authors explain, and as 
mentioned above, this assimilation of ‘firms to schools and schools to firms’ is contemporary to the 
rise of the supervisory mode. However, as Amaral and Magalhães (2007: 68-69) remembered, 
throughout the system’s expansion period, there was no competition among institutions. As demand 
for higher education exceeded the supply, creating thus the perfect environment for the 
development of private higher education, market mechanisms could not play an effective regulation 
role. In turn, as the government was so concerned to increase student participation, it did not even 
bother when the private sector increased its vacancies in areas that did not correspond to the stated 
political public priorities, and did not exercise any credible control over the quality of education 
provision. Furthermore, resources were not scarce considering that demand largely exceeded the 
available supply (ibidem 2007: 71). Additionally, private HEIs’ main objective was the maximisation 
of short-term profit rather than increasing their quality, a fact that, as referred by the authors, would 
offer them better prospects of survival. However, since the mid-1990s, “(…) the accumulated 
effects of years of lower birth rates and the government’s decision to pay more attention to quality, 
namely by reintroducing minimum grades in the access to higher education – has progressively 
decreased the number of candidates for higher education” (Amaral and Magalhães 2007: 69). Such 
situation led to a strong competition for students. Initially, only in the private sector was this 
competition felt, but more recently it is also visible in the public sector, with public universities 
being students’ first choice.  
Santiago and Carvalho (2004: 432) also refer that the opening of the system to the private sector 
coincided with the emergence of the managerialist rhetoric in political discourses about education. 
Topics about quality and efficiency became central issues in political and institutional discourses, 
both with respect to the organisation of the system and to HEIs governance and management. Also 
other themes related to the relationship between science and technology and firms/enterprises and 
human resources improvement became more important (Santiago and Carvalho 2004: 432): “The 
rhetoric about the flexibility of the students’ skills and profiles in the adaptation processes to the 
labour market became increasingly common in the discourses of social and academic actors” 
(ibidem). 
The emergence of the managerial discourse in Portugal is thus connected to the approval and 
implementation of the 1988 University Autonomy Act (Amaral, Magalhães and Santiago 2003: 137). 
The authors refer that during the 1990s managerialism became more visible as a conception of 
institutional governance and linked to a new political discourse that associated the new institutional 
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autonomy with the need to demonstrate that HEIs were well run (ibidem) and a conception of 
participation as a management technique (Lima 2012). 
It was in this context that throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Portugal would embrace NPM 
ideology and practice. There are several key factors that explain managerialist trends in the country 
– the general context is similar to European trends. By questioning the efficiency of traditional 
public services, managerialism also questioned the established role of HEIs, namely their 
governance and management procedures and more specifically, their collegial model of decision-
making (Amaral, Magalhães and Santiago 2003; Santiago and Carvalho 2004). In Portugal, until the 
late 1990s the governance structures resulting from the Autonomy Act were in an experimental 
phase, as the dictatorship had forged an autocratic system of governance for HEIs, based on a 
centralised and tightly coupled administration (Lima 2012: 289). Additionally, another reason that 
threatened the traditional collegial governance forms relates to the recent economic difficulties that 
have put in jeopardy the funding formula and have obliged HEIs to look for alternative funds 
(Amaral, Magalhães and Santiago 2003: 137). 
It is also important to remember that NPM, in all its forms, opposes to collegial governance 
modes (Magalhães and Santiago 2011: 8). This is so because collegial governance and professional 
power are considered inadequate to the needs of competition induced by economic globalisation 
and by the knowledge society. But other factors explain why managerialism found fertile soil in 
Portugal. As aforementioned, these relate to: 
i) a decrease in demographic rates which, combined with a decrease in the number of higher 
education applicants, created an increasing rhetoric of interinstitutional competition, as well as 
competition for students;  
ii) pressures to change the way in which knowledge, training and education are provided, which 
emerged mainly due to the popularity of the “knowledge society/economy” expression in the 
discourses about the purposes of higher education. The ‘knowledge economy’ rhetoric found a 
favourable context for its dissemination through the Law 38/94 (of 21st November), “(…) which 
emphasises criteria related to the economy, students’ employability and the presence of external 
stakeholders in the evaluation teams (Santiago and Carvalho 2004: 433), and Law 91/88 which 
attributes significant importance to the link between research and the economy, as well as knowledge 
and technology transfer to the industrial sector (ibidem). However, it is important to refer that the 
importance of CRUP and CCISP in the design and implementation of higher education policies in 
the country, illustrates the strong power professionals have in the organisation and regulation of the 
system, contrary to what the managerialist ideology suggests (Santiago 2004: 45). For example, the 
implementation of the quality assessment system of public and private HEIs (Law 38/94) was a 
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process that has always been more academic driven than imposed by the government (Amaral et al. 
2002). 
iii) the difficulty for the bureaucratic-professional/collegial model to manage a mass higher 
education system;  
iv) pressures resulting from financial and economic stringencies and budgetary control;  
v) changes in regulation strategies and state control, namely a shift from a weak state regulation and 
the absence of market competition to a state supervision model, characterised by the establishment 
of financial and quality agreements between the state and HEIs (Santiago and Carvalho 2004). These 
agreements, refer the authors, are then based on the accountability principle. And finally, 
vi) neoliberal policies initiated by the socialist governments in the mid-1990s, reinforced by the 
conservatives since 2002, developed by the 2004 socialist government (Amaral, Magalhães and 
Santiago 2003; Santiago and Carvalho 2004; Santiago, Carvalho, Amaral and Meek 2006), and which 
continue until the present with a coalition government between two right-wing parties (the Social 
Democratic Party and the Conservative Party). Indeed, as Lima (2012) refers, it is impossible to 
ignore the increasing influence of neoliberalism over the past decade. 
vii) the influence of international organisations. Additionally, one should not forget that throughout 
the country’s Europeanisation journey, strongly based on the orientation of international 
organisations, the launching of a single European currency (the euro) gave Portugal a new 
philosophy, strengthening a neo-liberal economic trend (Sousa e Fino 2007: 608). 
In addition, and in face of a “parallel state”, Lima (2012) identified the following managerialist 
dimensions in Portuguese higher education:  
“(…) the modernisation of the higher education system in order to adapt to the imperatives of 
economic competitiveness; rationalization measures with the purpose of obtaining internal 
efficiency gains; pressure to increase productivity; added importance of the institutions’ private 
budgets and fund-raising activities; (…) employment of business management methods; advocacy 
of total quality management and the transferral of management control from academics to new 
purpose-built technostructures” (2012: 298). 
 
 It is in this context, more rhetorical than practical, that helps us to understand the latest 
reforms in the Portuguese higher education system. Following this new managerialist rhetorical layer in 
the Portuguese higher education environment, the end of the traditional collegial times started to 
be prepared in 2005, when a new (socialist) government came into power with parliamentary 
majority and commissioned the OECD and ENQA an extensive review of the national higher 
education system. The government’s objective was to propose reforms and adopt the European 
guidelines approved in the context of the Bologna process. 
 By this time, several problems could be identified in the national higher education system: a 
lack of clarity of the binary system, a network of HEIs and programmes without coherence, a high 
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number of programmes with little or no demand at all, several HEIs in deep financial crisis, low 
equity in accessing the system, an ineffective quality assessment framework, a funding formula 
which did not relate/connect to efficiency, low levels of internationalisation as well as low 
international competitiveness, the absence of effective state regulation, a mismatch between supply 
and demand and between demand and the labour market needs (Amaral 2007: 17).  
As outcomes of these international assessments a series of legislative reforms emerged in 2007, 
namely the new legal framework for HEIs – the RJIES (Law 62/2007 of 10thSeptember), the new 
legal framework for the evaluation of higher education, the RJAES (Law 38/2007 of 16th August), 
the establishment of the Higher Education Accreditation Agency (A3ES), the new academic staff 
career, both for universities and polytechnics, among others. From these, the new legal framework 
for HEIs, the RJIES (chapter VI) is the research object of this study. Law 62/2007 represents a new 
archetype in Portuguese HEIs, mirroring NPM ideology, as well as OECD recommendations 
(Bruckmann and Carvalho 2014). 
 
 
4.9 NPM in the Finnish HE landscape 
Such as it has happened in Portugal and in other OECD countries, the common/main rationale 
that led Finland to institutionalise NPM was the need to find alternative ways to the traditional 
Weberian heavy bureaucratic model, so that public services could be provided in a more efficient 
and flexible way (Temmes 1998). Nevertheless, according to Pollitt (2003: 37), Finland launched 
public management reforms “(…) cautiously and selectively, taking the bits they find useful, but not 
buying the whole NPM package” (Pollitt 2003: 37). 
It is important to remember that the Finnish welfare state (the so-called Nordic or social 
democratic model in Esping-Andersen’s classification), started to be built in the 1950s and 
continued until the beginning of the 1990s. Gradually, the construction of this welfare state has 
incorporated such aspects as social security, health care and education, significant income transfers 
– services that are highly taxed. But (and as also happened in other nations that established welfare 
states), in the later part of this period, the welfare model faced many financial problems: “the 
massive build-up of the welfare state from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s resulted in the growth 
of bureaucratic features in Finnish administration and management” (Salminen 2003: 57). 
Furthermore, as Markku Temmes (1998: 447-448) referred (and as pointed out by some 
interviewees), the Finnish public sector was criticised for its old-fashioned and bureaucratic 
structures and administrative culture already in the 1980s, when some reforms were initiated. When 
summing up what led to the end of the first Finnish welfare state, Rinne (2004: 94) points the 
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downswing of the 1990s, the rapid increase in unemployment, joining the EU and the increasingly 
right-wing bias of government policy. 
These bureaucratic developments ended up to be reflected in the governance and management 
of Finnish higher education, featuring the 1980s as the administrative steering period due to its 
norms and strict budget regulations (Hölttä and Rekilä 2003). The authors explain that the idea in 
administrative steering was to maintain the welfare state by using the centralised machinery in the 
implementation of policy goals. As such, it was a hierarchical model characterised by the belief in 
control instead of competition – as managerialism advocates (2003: 64). Notwithstanding, contrary 
to Portugal, the design and implementation of reforms, as well as the whole process behind it, takes 
place in a context of political and governmental consensus. When governments have significantly 
different opinions, they aim at finding a workable compromise (Hölttä and Rekilä 2003). With 
respect to public administration, and based on the previous work of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000), 
Temmes, Peters and Sootla (2004) state that “Finnish reforms were also very carefully coordinated 
and balanced by the developed lead agency institution in cooperation with the ministries to avoid 
implementation failures” (2004: 14). The same procedures apply to the higher education sector, 
where dialogue with all stakeholders is encouraged, as well as continuation of policies. Transparency 
and confidentiality are typical of good steering processes (Treuthardt and Välimaa 2008: 613), at 
least at the system level. At the institutional level, and as evidenced through the empirical data, it 
seems increasingly challenging to combine both characteristics. 
In order to understand the rise of NPM in the country, it is important to remember the strong 
stagflation that happened in the 1970s combined with lower economic growth and rising public 
spending (Salminen 2003: 56). Later on, in 1991, Finland dropped into a deep economic depression 
and heavy NPM type administrative reforms started (Temmes, Peters and Sootla 2004). From 1991, 
the sudden collapse of trade with Russia (then Soviet Union), together with the more general 
recession in the West, sparked a severe economic crisis (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 263). “Trade 
fell, banks got into great difficulties, unemployment soared to unprecedented heights (18.4% in 
1994)” (ibidem). Faced with this scenario, the Finnish government had to reassess all societal 
structures and functions and launched a strong programme of budgetary reform and restraint 
(Hölttä and Malkki 2000: 231; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 263). 
As part of the reforms in the country, and more specifically with respect to marketisation 
processes, there was a huge decrease of labour force in public services together with privatisation 
processes. In fact, core staff dependent on the state budget has gradually decreased. In the 1990s, 
state enterprises employed over 67 000 people, whereas in 1997 employees of state enterprises were 
less than 5000 (Salminen 2003: 61). The majority of the people, refers the author, is now employed 
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in private organisations. Competition and profit making as well as new forms of public 
entrepreneurship were also elements of the market orientation policies. In this sense, it can be said 
that globalisation and Europeanisation have influenced Finnish politics and administration, by 
means of installing pressures to increase competitiveness in the public sector. Salminen (2008: 1246) 
refers that finance markets have been liberalised and deregulated, as Finland had to fulfil the 
economic and political criteria of the European Monetary Union.  
Bearing this specific context in mind, how did managerialism develop in Finnish higher 
education? Hölttä and Rekilä (2003: 64) refer that throughout the economic recession in the early 
1990s and after this period, the welfare state had to be revaluated and, consequently, universities 
had to take into account the new environment of public sector reform, financial cuts in higher 
education budgets and the accelerating process of market orientation of society. “Knowledge and 
education were selected as the major cornerstones of the new (economic) development policy” 
(Hölttä and Malkki 2000: 231). As such, HEIs needed to develop their strategic capacities to cope 
with an increasingly changing environment and to deal with regional partners and industries (Hölttä 
and Rekilä 2003). The cuts in higher education budgets forced the universities and the Ministry of 
Education to look for new channels of funding (Hölttä and Malkki 2000: 233). There was need to 
develop a national infrastructure and higher education and research would have an important role 
in increasing the competitiveness of Finnish industries in global markets (Aarrevaara and Hölttä 
2007: 201). In sum, the Finnish higher education system has also faced pressures to reform, namely 
pressures to improve performance and increase accountability by means of using performance 
indicators. However, the transition to another steering culture was challenging: “The administrative 
mentality was bureaucratic, which had to be replaced with a managerialist mind. The Ministerial aim 
was to create responsive state steering mechanisms instead of hierarchically dictating one” (Hölttä 
and Rekilä 2003: 64). 
Two main managerialist trends can be tracked in the developments of Finnish higher education. 
The first one concerns the decentralisation of management authority, i.e., the delegation of power 
authority from the ministerial to university level: universities have now (procedural) autonomy in 
deciding how to reach the targets set by the FMEC (Välimaa 2007: 72). Universities also have 
autonomy to hire their own personnel, select students (although not deciding on the number of 
students to take in), organise teaching and research (although the degrees and fields of study are 
controlled by the Ministry through a separate decree, the content of degrees is determined by each 
university) and determine the powers of administrative bodies (Hölttä and Rekilä 2003: 63). In fact, 
since the 1980s, administration and decision-making systems have been streamlined by reducing the 
number of levels in decision-making and delegating authority. In the universities central 
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administration, authority has been transferred to the rectors and, at lower levels to the deans, and 
other heads of units (Hölttä and Rekilä 2003). 
The second main trend has been the introduction of market or quasi-market type mechanisms 
into the sector, as for example shifts in funding structures combined with decreasing public funding 
(Välimaa 2007: 72). As an example, and as aforementioned, between 1991 and 1994, public funding 
declined by 16% in real terms (Eurydice 2000: 463). Välimaa (2007) also refers that the marketisation 
of Finnish higher education has led to competition both among and within HEIs. Competition is 
also used by the Ministry of Education as a national steering instrument in the ‘management by 
results’ negotiations with each university (2008: 609). Simultaneously, universities also kept up with 
this competitive spirit of management by results, although for some, these practices have been 
translated into an extra burden for the departmental level staff (Treuthardt, Huusko and Saarinen 
2006: 214). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the use of market-type mechanisms 
has been classified as ‘medium’, considering that the degree of decentralisation that has taken place 
happened mainly from the central to local government (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). In turn, in 
Temmes et al.’s (2004: 8) opinion, the decentralisation from the state administration to the 
municipalities has increased coordination problems and fragmentation in Finland. Thus, under 
similar pressures to make Finnish higher education more economically efficient, and as has 
happened in the whole Finnish public sector, at the late 1980s/beginning of the 1990s, it was 
established a steering model based on the regulation of results instead of inputs, which would 
increase the autonomy of traditionally heavily regulated universities (Hölttä and Malkki 2000; Hölttä 
and Rekilä 2003). Välimaa (2008: 611) explains that the management by results model aimed at 
creating a standardised system for steering Finnish higher education. “This aim is in line with the 
traditions of the Finnish welfare state which has tried to harmonise and standardise its 
administration and management in all the spheres of public administration” (Välimaa 2008: 611). 
Or, as Aarrevaara and Hölttä (2007: 201) refer, the development of government steering policy 
instruments was based on the restructuring of the welfare state. 
“The principle underlying management by results is that the objectives set for institutional 
activities and the resources needed for their implementation are determined in negotiations 
between the Ministry of Education and each university. (…) The steering system, in which the 
Ministry mainly has a strategic role, highlights performance evaluation and incentives” (OKM 
2001: 7)”. 
 
This was also the time (in the beginning of the 1990s) when Finland shifted from a very traditional 
and detailed funding allocation model to a system of lump-sum budgeting (Hölttä and Malkki 2000: 
234), and where the university budgets began to include performance-based funds. The funding is 
allocated to the universities as a block grant to be used at their discretion and it has been based on 
the management by results strategy since 1991. By the beginning of 1994, all universities adopted 
 230 
budgeting based on operational expenditure and performance agreements – budgeting by results 
(Kuoppala 2005).  
‘Results agreements’ have become important instruments for the Ministry to steer higher 
education and they form the basis for strategic decision-making within universities. Since 1998, the 
Ministry-university agreements (public documents) have been concluded for a 3 years period, where 
the goals (target results) are collectively defined, resources (operational expenditure) are allocated to 
implement goals, and performance is measured in terms of outputs. The three-year agreement is 
revised annually in a supplementary protocol appended to the following year’s budget (Ministry of 
Education 2001: 7). This means that financial aspects are checked and negotiated every year 
(Treuthardt and Välimaa 2008: 612). All these aspects are determined in negotiations between the 
Ministry of Education and each university (Ministry of Education 2001: 7). At the end of these 
negotiations, universities are required to draw an action and economic plan, i.e. an output-based 
funding agreement (results-agreement) with the Ministry, as well as several other planning 
documents and annual reports. In turn, the FMEC gives every year all Finnish universities uniform 
general guidelines concerning the results based on management steering processes between the 
Ministry and the universities (Treuthardt and Välimaa 2008: 611). Universities are then allocated 
funding according to the Ministry’s funding model. At last, the Ministry is accountable to Parliament, 
to which it submits an annual report on activities in its administrative field (Ministry of Education 
2001: 8). As can be read in the document prepared by the Ministry of Education (2001: 7), reporting 
is an important element and therefore universities submit an account of the achievement of 
objectives in their annual reports. In this way, they also provide statistical data for the KOTA 
database maintained by the Ministry. 
In the performance agreements, both the Ministry and universities commit themselves to attain 
certain objectives “in greater detail” (OKM 2001: 8) which are measured in the numbers of degrees 
in each field of study, development projects and level of funding (Treuthardt and Välimaa 2008: 
612). The most important output elements in the universities’ funding model are the annual average 
numbers of master’s and PhD degrees to be awarded during the contract period (Aarrevaara and 
Höltta 2007: 201). Other targets also concern, among other things, the number of students studying 
abroad, the foreign students admitted to complete full Finnish degrees, the development of the 
student selection and the student counselling procedures, the universities’ social services, the 
development of human resources and occupational effectiveness (Treuthardt and Välimaa 2008: 
612). Institutional profiling is also part of the agreements, although they are based on proposals 
made by the universities themselves (Hölttä 2003: 63). Thus, the management by results policy 
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instruments were based on contracting between the Ministry of Education and universities, 
accompanied by a funding model linking the agreed goals (Aarrevaara and Höltta 2007: 201).   
Within this framework, universities have autonomy to create their own translations of the 
management by results model of governance (Treuthardt et al. 2006: 212). However, Salminen 
(2003: 64) criticises the way in which results are targeted and controlled for being highly ‘technical’, 
based on setting numerical targets. Aarrevaara and Höltta (2007) directly connect this steering model 
with NPM: 
“This set of goals, agreed in the late 1980s and early 1990s for the development of government 
steering instruments for the higher education system was in line with the ideas of NPM and the 
corresponding measures were developed in all sectors of public administration in Finland” (2007: 
201).  
 
In fact, as the authors explain, the master’s and PhD’s degree goals are aimed at reflecting and 
measuring the educational and research productivity of universities (2007: 202). 
Certainly, at the late 1980s and during the 1990s, the governmental steering approach to higher 
education and the political atmosphere had changed, based on the Higher Education Development 
Act 1987-1996 and the University Act of 1997 (Hölttä 2000: 468), which was promulgated on the 
1st of August of 1998. As an example of these new times’ changes, increased accountability began 
to be demanded from the universities (Treuthardt et al. 2006: 211). Salminen (2003: 64) refers that 
accountability criteria at universities are the same as for any public institution. As such, rectors, 
deans, heads of departments and administrative staff (technostructure) are accountable for their 
performance and increasingly more they are empowered or stimulated by the use of mechanisms as 
performance-relayed salaries (ibid). Pressures towards more performance-oriented behaviour at the 
individual level started to increase when a performance based salary system was introduced in 2005 
(Aarrevaara and Hölttä 2007: 202). This performance-related salary system replaced a system that 
guaranteed equal salaries to all members of the academic community who were at a similar level or 
position in the academic hierarchy (ibidem). The requirement that universities’ and polytechnics’ staff 
work to performance targets and output objectives has been another trend in Finnish higher 
education, which reflects NPM practices. In Finnish HEIs, this trend was translated in an increasing 
number of “project researchers”, i.e. academics who have been appointed for a certain fixed period 
only to carry out a specific research or development project (Välimaa and Neuvonen-Rauhala 2008: 
84). Furthermore, the impact of this new government steering model of management by results is 
visible in the reduction in the ratio of teaching staff to the number of academic degrees awarded 
(Aarrevaara and Seppo Hölttä 2007: 207).  
Aarrevaara and Hölttä (2007) explain that after the administrative reform of Finnish universities 
in the 1970s, the power of administrators has increased and the role of the rectors shifted. Whereas 
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in the previous steering model rectors had a traditional role with little decision-making or managerial 
power, in the management by results system, “(…) the rector represents the university in the 
negotiation on the performance contract, signs it and is responsible for its implementation at the 
institutional level” (2007: 202). The universities were also able to nominate representatives of the 
external society to their governance bodies (Hölttä 2000: 465). But, until the latest Universities’ Act 
(558/2009), universities have not made much use of this possibility, mainly due to the years of 
centralised control. Only at the national level, the advisory role of stakeholders has increased, 
especially those from industry and business, both in permanent structures and in ad hoc committees 
and working groups (Hölttä 2000). 
Concerns with quality also started to emerge at this stage. Treuthardt et al. (2006) explain that 
until the end of the 1970s, ‘quality’, as a concept, did not exist in policy discussions at system level, 
probably because quality was perceived either as something irrelevant or a self-evident feature in 
higher education. But, during the 1980s, it started to be seen first and foremost as a competitive 
factor in higher education policy. In parallel (or consequently), continue the authors, in order to 
improve quality, resources had to be ‘reorganised’ or even ‘liberated’, while from the point of view 
of the academic community, it seemed that quality had to be improved while resources were cut 
(2006: 212).  
The change in the steering system is well illustrated in the 1997 University Act, and has further 
enlarged universities’ autonomy in internal matters by delegating many matters previously regulated 
by separate Acts and Decrees to the universities decision-making bodies (OKM 2004: 8). The role 
of the Ministry of Education is “restricted” to strategic plans and target setting, as well as monitoring 
the overall performance of the universities (Eurydice 2000: 462). 
The introduction of the lump sum budgeting system set the beginning of the development of 
financial autonomy (Aarrevaara and Hölttä 2007: 203). The new act promoted a loose legislative 
framework leaving much room for each university as regards decision-making, and emphasising 
university management. With the new steering system, evaluation has become an important element 
of the process. With this University Act, the idea of educational equality became a visible reality as the 
legislation stipulated that education leading to a degree in Finnish universities is free of charge 
(Hölttä 2000: 469). And, in fact, the pursuit of an equal and fair educational system (at all levels of 
education) is still cherished in the country, being one of the Finnish (higher education) educational 
hallmarks. 
Concerns with quality were high in the political agenda and in a relatively short time, the first 
experiments on systematic evaluation were conducted, in a way that evaluation became 
institutionalised in the Finnish higher education system (Treuthardt, Huusko and Saarinen 2006). 
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FINHEEC was established by the Decree 1320/1995 and quality “became a solution to problems 
of higher education, such as requirements of internationalisation and student flows” (2006: 212). At 
the same time, the former advisory body to the Ministry of Education, namely the Higher Education 
Council, was abolished76 (Hölttä 2000). Since the mid 1990s there has been a steady increase in 
institutional evaluations in Finland: “Every Finnish university has conducted an evaluation of its 
operations and activities, usually involving a total evaluation, where self-evaluation plays a central 
role” (Treuthardt et al. 2006: 214). Since the 1996 reform of university funding, self-evaluation was 
required by law in educational institutions at all levels (ibidem).  
It is important to refer that one of the main drivers for change in Finnish higher education was 
the joining to the EU in 1995, as this has been seen as a natural step towards a more accountable 
and transparent mode of higher education (Aarrevaara 2012: 86). Additionally, and similarly to what 
happens in Portugal, governance and administrative changes in Finnish HEIs were largely 
implemented by means of top-down policies that were significantly influenced by international 
organisations, such as the OECD and the EU (Kallo 2009; Kauko 2011). Or, as Rinne (2004) states: 
Finnish higher education policy “is no longer very national nor very Nordic, but more and more 
EU and OECD-like” (2004: 127).  In fact, the author is critical regarding to the shift of policy-
orientation that Finland suffered since its entrance in the EU: from the traditional state-centred 
welfare policy towards more market-driven policies. Rinne goes further in his arguments by saying 
that small nations like Finland are not fully able to carry out their own independent foreign, domestic 
or even educational policy (Rinne 2004: 95). 
Also part of NPM efforts, a structural development programme was introduced in 2006 with 
the purpose of concentrating higher education into larger units by merging institutions, while 
avoiding overlapping of study programs. This Action Plan will reduce the number of Finnish HEIs 
from 20 universities and 26 polytechnics to 15 and 18 respectively. Later on, following OECD 
(2009) recommendations for providing Finnish HEIs with more autonomy and a more 
entrepreneurial character, the country went through legislative changes in 2008-2009, resulting in 
the New Universities Act (Yliopistolaki 558/2009), which came into force in 2010. It can be thus said 
that the most managerial values in Finnish higher education are efficiency, result orientation and 
goal rationality. In the words of Rinne (2004): 
“The new principles of entrepreneurialism, managerialism, competition, funding by results, 
continuous assessment, top unit policy, contracting and fighting for external funding have totally 
changed the old landscape. The ‘enterprise university’ has almost totally occupied the field of 
higher learning” (2004: 127-128). 
                                                 
76 Hölltä (2000: 468) refers that the Higher Education Council was established during the period of  the I 
Development Act (1967-1986) to coordinate the development of  the system and it was a central permanent 
governance body between the universities and the Ministry of  Education. 
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Finnish HEIs have absorbed the private sector commandments quite well, especially in what 
concerns to human resources management, marketisation and commercialisation and transfer of 
scientific knowledge and economic exploitation of research and development. In fact, as Välimaa 
and Hoffman (2007) stated, the marketisation of knowledge, both in research and teaching, 
represents a major social force in Finnish higher education dynamics77, rooted in “(…) the strong 
expectation that the state should play a key role between society and market” (2008: 274). The third 
mission of universities – ‘service to society’, implies a closer connection between research and the 
worlds of industry at local and regional levels (2003: 67). 
In sum, the 1990s marked a changing point, or a continuation strategy in Finnish higher 
education and government steering policy, where the government still has an important role “(…) 
in the process of building up a comprehensive research and educational infrastructure for the nation 
and its industries” (Aarrevaara and Hölttä 2007: 206). The aim was to align HEIs research with the 
national efforts of increasing the competitiveness of Finnish economy. However, this emphasis on 
competitiveness and effectiveness also brought an increasingly unequal division of resources, “(…) 
as it is considered desirable to favour ‘diversity’ and ‘giftedness’ and to open up new pathways for 
the best human capital and centres of excellence, i.e. for those with special gifts and inclinations” 
(Rinne 2004: 95). 
Aarrevaara and Hölttä (2007: 209) explain that, although the higher education system has 
become more market-oriented, the system (as well as the academic profession) is changing more 
due to government policy and steering mechanisms rather than external forces. According to 
Aarrevaara and Hölttä (2007: 207) in Finland, the idea of a welfare society is still present in the 
development of the system, although the goal of equality has been replaced by the welfare goals of 
a knowledge economy based on the competitiveness of high technology production. In Portugal, 
the idea of a welfare society was never really present as it was in the most preeminent European 
countries. And, especially since 2007, when the economic crisis triggered (a bit) all over Europe, and 
the (short-run) aims for the system has been its survival by means of severe cutbacks in HEIs daily 
operations, this ideal has been deconstructed at all operational levels. 
Although Finnish HEIs have been gaining more autonomy, until recently, the main reforms in 
the system were started by the Ministry of Education, a fact reflecting the strong position of the 
                                                 
77 Välimaa and Hoffman (2008) refer that the idea and construction of  the knowledge society 
has been taken seriously in Finland. “The Finnish Ministry of  Education set up an expert 
committee to prepare a national strategy for education, training and research in the Information 
Society (or rather Knowledge Society, because the words information and knowledge are 
synonymous in Finnish) in 1994. It set the objectives for the national development plan which 
was implemented in January 1995” (2008: 273). 
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Finnish Ministry (Välimaa 1995). Furthermore, and despite the latest developments, the government 
is still the most important funding body for higher education. Also the Finnish Council of Rectors, 
when compared to its Portuguese counterpart, has a more ‘unlit’ role, with no significant/relevant 
political action. Nevertheless, differences among these ‘buffer organisations” (between the 
government and HEIs) should be framed and understood in the light of the countries cultural 
specificities. Considering the present situation, it seems reasonable to expect a more politically active 
role from Portuguese HEIs from Finnish institutions. 
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V  
Methodology and Operationalisation 
 
“No one approach can produce all relevant ‘truth’, that 
different theories and methods are associated with different ‘truth 
effects’ and all truths are partial truths, and that we are not so rich in our 
understandings of comparative education that we can afford to neglect 
the insights of a range of approaches” (Marginson and Mollis 2000: 22).  
 
 
Throughout the dissertation, a reflection has been developed upon the concepts, contexts and 
theories considered most appropriate for the understanding and conceptualisation of the object of 
study. 
Based on the conceptual and theoretical framework, this comparative study analyses 
Portuguese and Finnish HE systems and investigates how such disparate countries react to similar 
pressures to change. The processes of policy change studied here – the Bologna process and pieces of 
legislation aiming at changing HEIs governance – are also analysed through the perceptions that 
different actors have in both countries   
It is not in the aim of the study to assess whether these reforms have reached or not the 
intended outcomes… That would be an investigation that goes much beyond the aims, scope, time, 
funding and capabilities of this research project. However, it is possible to gather solid enough 
evidence to enlighten the factors and processes that explain convergence and divergence, similarities 
and differences between both HE systems paths and choices and how these countries behave in 
terms of design and implementation of HE policies. In sum, questions about policy making, such 
as how HE policies are designed, how key actors interpret and accommodate them and what 
explains differences in behaviours are aspects that fit the scope of this research. 
The interest in this topic emerged from the changes that both countries have been undergoing 
in the last decades within their HE systems, more specifically in their governance and management 
structures, and which became particularly evident after the introduction of the Bologna process and, 
later on, with the drafting of the new legislation which allows both Portuguese and Finnish HEIs to 
be transformed into public foundations operating under private law. These new legal frameworks 
owe much of its guidelines to the “inspiration” provided by the OECD reviews of both Portuguese 
and Finnish HE systems. It can thus be said that, through different strategies and at different paces, 
both the Bologna process and NPM push universities to be more competitive, converging in their 
methods to attain the desired objectives. In fact, the concept and role of the University has been 
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changing and challenging as the contexts and environments where HEIs operate. This is also what 
sparks interest in this theme as a research object. 
The chapter starts by briefly reviewing the conceptual and theoretical choices taken so far. It 
then introduces the discussion on the methodological counters of the research design, namely the 
rationale for choosing a qualitative methodology which is materialised through a comparative 
“case(s) study(ies)” with different dimensions of analysis; the motivation and interest on both 
Portuguese and Finnish HE systems; the time frame (period) of the study and scope of analysis; the 
instruments selected for data collection, and the strategies used to deal and treat all the information 
that was gathered. In sum, this chapter grounds and reasons the methodological research approaches 
believed to better answer to the research problem and subsequent research questions. 
Firstly, the literature review and conceptual analysis developed in this study starts to 
contextualise the forces and drivers of convergence of HE at the global, European and international 
levels of action. In parallel with the increasing globalisation, internationalisation and 
Europeanisation of HE, of which the Bologna Process, the Lisbon Strategy and the subsequent use 
of the OMC are the most visible changes of these dynamics, it is also included the massification of 
HE as factors speeding up change in European HE. Due to the use of soft law policies as the OMC 
and the action of international organisations as the OECD, nation-states are compelled to catching 
up regarding education performance in order to not being labelled as ‘laggards’ (beta-convergence). 
Consequently, the Bologna process through the establishment of the EHEA and the ERA, works 
as an instrument for HEIs modernisation and professionalisation, stocking national reforms. In this 
scenario, the nation-state is gradually loosing its preponderance to the EU arena (and other 
international organisations), which is gaining increasing legitimacy and leverage on issues where 
previously it had no domain, such as educational policy. This redistribution of responsibilities 
culminates in a complex network of actors and several levels of governance. In fact, the Bologna 
documents highlight the notion of HE as a public good and a public responsibility, also creating 
pressures for searching “good” governance in the sector (Zgaga 2006).  
As such, the conceptual analysis followed the importance attributed to the process of 
governance and how this has been shifting in the last decades. A reflection on the changes of 
governance modes and ways of looking at governance was necessary to understand how changes in 
the public administration sector have been passed and extended to the HE sector. In this sense, the 
market ideology and concepts that are generally identified as the NPM represent therefore a new 
model of public governance. This analysis already remits us to the national level of action, as well 
as to the divergent factors affecting both the Portuguese and Finnish HE systems. As it was 
described and as it will be studied in the following chapter, this new paradigm of administrating the 
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public sector had and has a different impact and acceptance in both countries. This makes necessary 
to broaden the assumptions about the possible reasons (in addition to the Bologna process and 
changes in governance) that trigger reforms not only at the system level but also at the institutional 
level. Thus, the different degrees of intensity with which NPM manifested in each country are then 
visible in the pieces of legislation enacted by both Portuguese and Finnish governments reforming 
governance of their HEIs. 
Theoretically, the study draws on the institutional perspective, mostly on the new-
institutionalism stream as theoretical basis for understanding the way institutions shape the 
behaviour of their members, how institutions interact with their environments and actors 
appropriate institutional and professional norms, codes, and how actors cope with change.  
The literature review of these distinct but complementary fields of study not only elucidates on 
the factors that allow for changes in HEIs governance and management to happen, but also to 
understand how they relate among themselves and how they impact the academic community in 
general. Viewed from this perspective, it can be said that the Bologna process represents just another 
piece of the conundrum of HE dynamics. Indeed, not only HE scholars, but also researchers from 
other disciplinary fields have examined the impact of the Bologna declaration in their scientific 
fields. Although, most of their analysis relate mostly with the academic and pedagogical aspects of 
the process, flexible learning paths; recognition processes; issues related with quality, mobility, the 
attractiveness of the EHEA, i.e. aspects related with the first stage of the Bologna Declaration (Witte 
2004; 2006).  
With respect to the link between NPM, the Bologna process and governance changes, the 
number of studies decreases significantly, and mainly relates with aspects concerning to university 
autonomy, strategic partnerships and cooperation initiatives (between other HEIs, at home or 
abroad, and with industry and other enterprises) and quality assurance issues (e.g. EUA studies). 
The word governance seldom appears in Bologna official documentation, at least in the documents 
concerning the first stage of the process (1999-2010). One of the possible explanations for the 
“scarcity” of studies in this topic lays in the difficulty of interlinking the Bologna process with 
institutional governance aspects, since there is no specific line of action which explicitly refers to 
changes in governance and management of HEIs. In addition to this, there is the fact that the 
Bologna declaration is a voluntary commitment of each signatory country to reform its own HE 
system and therefore, at least formally, the reform is not (coercively) imposed upon national 
governments or universities. 
Bearing this brief background in mind, the task is to know the “why and how”, or, by other 
words, to find a train of thought capable of ground and reason the methods used to develop the 
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work which will answer to the research problem and questions defined for this study. The following 
subsection revises the research problem and subsequent research questions and explains the 
methodological process used. 
 
 
5.1 Research Design – The Methodological Process  
Throughout the following sections of this chapter, the methodological procedures and choices 
adopted in this study in order to answer to the research problem and research questions will be 
described and justified. 
  
Research Problem: How do different national HE systems and HEIs implement similar political 
changes as the Bologna process and governance reforms? 
R. Q. 1 - How did different national HE systems and HEIs in Portugal and in Finland cope 
with similar external pressures as the Bologna process and the NPM? How both policy processes 
have been designed and implemented in both countries? 
 
R. Q. 2 - Which major changes happened within the organisational structure of HEIs? How 
HEIs change their governance and management practices to cope with external pressures?  
 
R. Q. 3 - Is it possible to evidence changes in the way work is organised within HEIs? And in 
the way decision-making processes are taken? How these external pressures influence the way 
academic work is carried out (and in the way academics participate in decision-making practices)? 
 
To answer these questions it is necessary to study the research objects by stages, while never 
loosing sight of  their complementary and interconnectedness, as well as the heterogeneity of  the 
countries to be compared. This means that after defining the policies that would be picked as 
examples for analysing how change is accommodated in both HE systems, it was necessary to fully 
study and grasp them. Thus, by engaging in a deep analysis of  both the Bologna process as well as 
the latest governance reforms in Portuguese and Finnish HEIs, e.g. the contexts that gave birth to 
these processes, as well as the national characteristic and HE systems specificities, the actors 
involved, the mechanisms used to implement change, by listening to “the voices of  the 
practitioners” (Pollitt 2003: 26), and to revise useful conceptual and theoretical frameworks, the 
study already pursuits an empirical research objective, underlying all the research questions and 
giving enough leeway to explore the research problem. However, only after being completely 
familiarised with these scenarios, it is possible to move forward, and to understand changes and 
processes at the level of  basic units of  HEIs.  
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This was necessary to support the research design, which ultimately aims at elaborating a 
comparative analysis, built through the study of other smaller case studies. In turn, these intend to be 
an analytical tool in which the individual case studies can be compared in order to operationalise the 
different purposes of the research. Thus, the initial theoretical and methodological choices should 
be able to answer the question “what do we want to compare and why?” According to Bray (2005: 
45-46), these questions are essential in comparative education, which “should play a very different 
role in the era of globalisation”.  
The data was collected, organised and interpreted bearing in mind the individualities of each 
country. In a study with such cultural sensibility and especially during the times the empirical data 
was collected, this is a task of paramount importance. As reminded by Neave (2001):  
“There is a tendency in comparative higher education to concentrate on analysing the function of 
institutions and the mechanisms of educational and administrative procedures as if these processes 
may the more easily be grasped by stripping them away from their cultural, political and historic 
settings” Neave (2001: 46). 
 
It is thus based on the results obtained with these within-cases analysis, covering both internal and 
external governance aspects that the factual basis for the comparative framework will be obtained. 
Consequently, it will be possible then to position the differences and similarities of each country in 
order to be mapped in the dimensions of analysis, which focus on the international, national and 
institutional level of analysis. Additionally, and as referred by Witte (2006), Marginson and Mollis 
(2001), during the whole research process it was acknowledged and strengthened the importance to 
leave sufficient leeway for countries’ specific characteristics. In fact, one of the main “added-value” 
aspects of this study lays in the cross-case comparison of  the dimensions elaborated through the 
content analysis phase. Thus, the research design is based on the interconnectedness of the different 
methodological steps of comparative and case study methods.  
Välimaa (2008) summarises the richness of comparative of HE in the following paragraph, 
which totally applies to this study: 
“One of the benefits of a comparative research is the fact that comparative interest in knowledge 
challenges us to change our intellectual perspective. It is, indeed, useful to try to understand one’s 
own (familiar) higher education system from the perspective of other systems, or to seek to 
understand other systems of higher education from the perspective of one’s own system. A real 
cultural challenge for a higher education researcher is trying to be culturally sensitive in order to 
be able to recognise not only things that are different (and easy to see), but also to try to learn 
about things that one assumes to understand because of their (seeming) similarities” (2008: 153). 
 
 
5.1.1 (Individual) Case Studies 
Yin (1994: 1) refers that a case study is the preferred strategy when one wants to answer to 
“how” and “why” questions, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus 
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is on contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. According to Yin, and considering 
the nature of the research object, a case study approach seems to be the most appropriate strategy 
to support and guide this research. A quick review to the research problem and research questions, 
confirms Yin’s strategy. However, the case study approach is used here mostly with the purpose of 
organising the data by specific cases (dimensions) so that these can be in-depth studied and 
compared. The smaller case studies (as the researcher calls these dimensions of analysis) are the 
building blocks of a thorough within case analysis. Thus, as a unit of analysis, a case (or the cases) 
is usually determined during the design stage and becomes the basis for purposeful sampling in 
qualitative inquiry (Patton 2002: 447). Nevertheless, Patton (2002) and Yin (1994) referred – and 
confirmed throughout the data collection and analysis stages – new units of analysis emerge during 
the fieldwork or from the analysis after data collection. In this way, the case study can be seen as 
either the process of analysis or the product of this analysis or even both (Patton 2002).  
Throughout the research process, and using Patton’s terminology, layered case studies were 
constructed, which have the main advantage of building larger case units out of smaller ones. The 
following schema, based on Patton’s (2002) model, shows possible analysis layers according to the 
object of study and research design. As seen in the scheme, the possibilities and paths of analysis 
are diverse. 
When analysing the information gathered, a very simple methodological principle was followed: 
starting from the general to the particular level. This does not mean that there is any special 
“hierarchy of importance” with respect to the data. Due to practical reasons and to follow a logic 
sequence, some small case studies were carried out simultaneously. This is a recurrent phenomenon 
when doing social research: qualitative analysis may occur in conjunction with data collection 
(Blaikie 2000: 232) and therefore, it might be difficult to accurately divide the stages and frontiers 
of both processes. In fact, also Glaser and Strauss (1967: 2) stated that in sociological research 
generating theory goes hand in hand with verifying it. 
As can be seen in figure 10, by approaching the research object through layers, there is always 
possibility of combining and analysing at the same time smaller or individual studies into separate 
and national studies. As Stake (2000) refers: “We may simultaneously carry on more than one case 
study, but each case study is a concentrated inquiry into a single case (2000: 436). Thus, it is the 
researcher’s main responsibility to do justice to each individual case, once that everything else will 
depend on that (Patton 2002). Furthermore, “to explain a phenomenon is to stipulate a set of causal 
links about it” (Yin 1994: 110).  
Figure 10 - Case Study: Layers of  Possible Analysis 
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Source: Adapted from Patton (2002: 448). 
 
This is why, the previous chapter introduces each country’s situation before these reforms were 
established, and then the developments each HE system has been through, always leaving room and 
relevance for each country specific characteristics, in order to follow what Patton said: “The case 
study should take the reader into the case situation and experience (…)” (2002: 450). Nevertheless, 
although, on one hand the researcher has the possibility to focus on a specific case and identify the 
various interactive processes related with the main case study, on the other hand, the need to bring 
the reader into the exact context might require that the observation and data collection periods will 
extend for a long time. The little chance of obtaining generalisations, as well as the existence of 
several techniques of data gathering (e.g. document analysis, interviews and observation) are also 
presented as limitations of this type of methodology. However, when doing qualitative research and 
analysing change processes, especially HE changes that emerge from unique reform processes at the 
international level, and pieces of legislation that aim to be also fit for a specific country and/or 
situation, the purpose of legitimising research by means of the generalisation events, the 
representativeness of samples seems to be extremely challenging, at best. Sayer (1992) is 
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straightforward about the critics of case studies and their ability to create towards generalisations: 
“what causes an event has nothing to do with the number of times it has been observed to occur 
and nothing to do with whether we happen to predict it” (1992: 110). However, on this, also 
Flyvbjerg (2004) points to the “problematic” use of the case study approach as a research method, 
considering such diverse and even opposite views:  
“You cannot generalize from a single case’, some would say, ‘and social science is about 
generalizing’. Others would argue that the case study may be well suited for pilot studies but not 
for full-fledged research schemes. Others again would comment that the case study is subjective, 
giving too much scope for the researcher’s own interpretations. Thus the validity of case studies 
would be wanting, they argued” (2004: 420).  
 
As mentioned above, more than discuss the validity, or the advantages and disadvantages of using 
a case study approach rather than other research methods, this chapter explains and justifies the 
reasons why, bearing in mind nature of the questions to be investigated, a case study research 
method was preferred. In fact, the case study method is applied in this dissertation beyond its 
potentialities of a specific method. As evidenced through Figure 10, the case study method not only 
grounds and reasons the work, but it also structures and enhances the research process as well as 
data collection and analysis through which answers to the research questions emerge.  
 A “representative” sample of the study object was then chosen, by selecting in each country 
different types of institutions: a university and a polytechnic, where professionals with different 
roles were interviewed. 
 
 
5.2 Rationale for a comparative research approach – Why to compare 
 
The aforementioned statement of Välimaa (2008: 153) – on the benefits of a comparative 
research and how it challenges us to strengthen our intellectual perspective – summarises, in a 
general way, the main reasons that led to the choice of a comparative design, build up 
methodologically through several case studies. Nevertheless, though the Bologna process represents 
the starting point concerning the interest for the research topic, this study is developed taking into 
account the evolution of both HE systems before the implementation of the Bologna declaration 
until the final stage of the doctoral studies (beginning of 2015).  
The temporal expression “before Bologna” refers to a certain period of time, difficult to 
determine, but which is appropriate to consider its beginning in the early 1980s, when, as seen 
before, European HE has come under pressure to change substantially.  
Following Välimaa (2008), and personally speaking, I would say that the greatest richness and 
complexity in trying to study the Bologna process and its relationship with other change phenomena 
is its multiplicity of levels and actors and their inseparability of a global context in which HE systems 
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operate. The value of a multi-level and multi-actor analysis represents thus a challenge, and 
simultaneously an asset for this study.  
Methodologically, comparison appears naturally as the most appropriate approach to this type 
of research: a comparative design with case studies covering HE changes and factors of convergence 
in both Portugal and Finland. However, this study is far from the main practical role of comparative 
education identified by Marginson and Mollis (2001), namely “(…) to provide technical support for 
hegemonic policy strategies of convergence, imitation and homogenisation, whereby different 
national education systems are pushed towards global models based in idealised representations of 
‘Western’ (and mostly American) education” (2001: 581). Being aware of the complexity of different 
national settings, the researcher is also acknowledged with the fact that comparative research 
requires the analysis of several aspects that cannot be strictly controlled as a perfect research designs 
calls for (Teichler 1996: 462). Nevertheless, by using comparison as an analytical tool, it is possible 
to understand further, beyond what is immediately perceptible78. As Mark Bray (2005) wrote, 
comparative education research relates to cross-national analyses, encouraging its participants to be 
outward looking and responding to changes at a global level. As such, this study is identified with 
what Marginson and Mollis (2001: 587) consider an “agnostic position on the relationship between 
sameness and difference”, considering that these two opposites cannot be absolute once it would 
demise the potential for meaningful comparison. Therefore, the methodology chosen to conduct 
this research should be oriented towards the interpretation of differences and similarities in a wider 
set of changing contexts. 
This chapter does not aim to go deeply into the history and evolution of comparative education 
as a scientific field of study and method of inquiry, although it relies heavily on the works of Bereday 
(1972), Schneider and Schmitt (1998), Marginson and Mollis (2001); Flyvbjerg (2004), Ferreira 
(2008), Silova (2009) and Cowen and Kazamias (2009). Moreover, as Altbach (1985: 2194) argues,  
“there is no widely accepted discipline of comparative higher education with a specific 
methodology. Indeed, the term ‘comparative’ is often misused in that it is applied to the study 
of educational phenomena in at least one country by a national of a different country”. 
 
However, there are some notions that need to be clarified. First, what is meant by comparative studies 
and a comparative approach/method? As the word itself denotes, comparison implies the existence of 
contrast and difference, variation of a particular object over another, which in turn also implies the 
existence of a certain level of similarity. The definition of comparative studies by Goedegebuure 
and Van Vught (1996) goes in line with the object of study and complies with the nature of the 
                                                 
78 “If  I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of  giants”. Since this statement appeared in a letter that 
Isaac Newton wrote to a fellow English scientist, Robert Hooke, dated from 5th February in either 1675 or 1676, 
this quote has been attributed to Isaac Newton, though there is no arguing that it is originally written by himself.  
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questions to be investigated: “(…) studies using comparable data from at least two societies (Armer 
1973, p.49) or as a form of multilevel research (implying comparative analysis both within and across 
systems) (Przeworski and Teune 1970, pp.50-51) (1996: 371)”. By being a multi and interdisciplinary 
field of study, comparative (higher) education research demands a certain ability of spatial learning 
and that the researcher embraces a holistic view in the description, interpretation and conclusion 
research process (Ferreira 2008). In this way, and as highlighted by Bray (2005: 37), while 
comparative education provides a valuable meeting point for disciplinary perspectives, it also 
increases the potential for confusion. This remit us for an important point highlighted by Välimaa 
(2008: 143): the fact that comparative research is often normative not only because there is no 
“authority” to define what is “a good” comparative research, but also “because the idea of 
comparison easily turns into the idea of competition, when the research outcomes are interpreted 
to the common public – or the policy makers”.  
These perspectives relate with the advantages of comparative studies praised by several authors 
(Bereday 1972; Rothblatt and Wittrock 1993; Schneider and Schmitt 1998; Flyvbjerg 2004; Välimaa 
2008), namely the fact that they enable to define and even prioritise different dimensions to be 
studied, making it easier to understand their social dynamics (Välimaa 2008). In this sense, it is also 
possible to extend the comparative analysis to other sectors and, for example, to determine the 
success and failure of certain policies applied to public sector services. As such, the comparative 
method is a tool for analysing several dimensions in order to identify similarities and contrasts in 
relation to a specific issue (Rothblatt and Wittrock 1993), as for example, the analysis of recent 
developments in the EHEA. Rothblatt and Wittrock (1993) referred that “(…) by merely posing 
the question does focus attention on comparison, and this in turn leads us toward new questions, 
new puzzles, new sequences, and perhaps new data” (1993: 7). This sentence summarises well this 
research process – common in social sciences. 
“Generally speaking”, this study is guided through the comparative method explained by 
Ferreira (2008), which basically coincides and gathers Bereday’s and Noah and Eckstein (1969) 
contributions to comparative methodology. The expression “generally speaking” was purposely 
used here because there are steps of both methods (Bereday’s and Ferreira’s) that were not followed, 
e.g. the guiding hypothesis for the collection and presentation of proven facts. According to Ferreira 
(2008), Bereday developed the most important comparative method in the history of comparative 
education.  
Ferreira’s method is constituted by three main stages: pre-descriptive, descriptive and 
comparison phases. Briefly, the pre-descriptive phase pays primarily attention to the identification 
of the (research) problem, to the formulation of the first hypotheses and the delimitation of research, 
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including this part the definition of the object of study, concepts, fields of study or cases to study 
(inter or intra-national comparisons) and research methods. Later, during the descriptive stage, it is 
time to collect and present the data to be interpreted and then to draw analytical conclusions. The 
third and last phase, the comparative moment, consists in developing the comparative analysis by 
combining the information gathered with the analytical conclusions and then to elaborate the final 
comparison.  
That being said, the dimensions of both HE systems that aimed to be analysed were identified, 
and these are the cases studies of this research. However, and as already mentioned here, it is 
challenging to completely and accurately assess the impact of HE reforms. By our own research 
experience, and as Carvalho (2009) referred, it is not always viable, theoretically and empirically, to 
separate these reforms from other changes which occur simultaneously in the same political, 
institutional and organisational environment. However, there are advantages of focusing also at the 
institutional level, considering the specific nature of HEIs, namely their bottom-heavy character 
which allows for some stability. Despite the increasing globalisation and internationalisation 
character of HE, universities still hold permanent characteristics and seek for long-turn stability 
(Oliver 1991). Nevertheless, even if there are different and opposite “theorisations” of globalisation, 
as Marginson and Mollis (2001) explained, the analysis of its effects is fundamental when developing 
comparative international studies in HE once globalisation has created “a new geopolitical 
cartography that traces the flows of global effects and the patterns of imitation, difference, 
domination, and subordination in education policy and practice” (2001: 612). Furthermore, as a loop 
which is in continuous movement (rotation), globalisation cannot be dissociated from the neo-
liberal ideology and from the “markets” where entrepreneurial universities perform their activities 
(Douglas 2005), and where individuals became more competitive for resources, jobs, income and 
security (Clarke and Newman 2000). In this way, comparative education can and should play a very 
different role in the era of globalisation (Bray 2005: 44). Nevertheless, whether on one hand 
international comparative research in the HE field (and in other academic areas, very often applied 
as social sciences and/or soft disciplines) has known both qualitative and quantitative development, such 
improvements were not attained without setbacks. Based on Teichler’s (1996) work, the following 
table summarises the main methodological and practical issues when doing comparative research 
on HE. Particular attention was paid to those problems experienced by the researcher. 
 
Table 11 - Methodological and Practical Issues of  Comparative Research on HE 
 
Methodological Issues 
 
Practical Issues 
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Source: Adapted from Teichler (1996: 449). 
 
One of the first and most obvious problems immediately pointed out by researchers are the 
language barriers (Bereday 1972; Teichler 1996). Unless the researcher is familiar with the languages 
of those countries he/she aims at comparing, he/she will certainly encounter difficulties when 
gathering and analysing data and carrying the empirical part of the project. This was in fact one of 
the problems faced when the researcher moved to the Finnish arena, academically and physically 
speaking. Therefore, when doing international comparative research on countries with such 
different languages, it would not be correct and/or appropriate to choose one of them (which 
obviously would be my mother tongue) to write this dissertation. English is thus the language of 
(international comparative) research. 
Teichler (1996) also affirms that the language barriers also imply another limitation when doing 
research on comparative international education, namely the fact that it takes more effort (temporal 
and financial) and more problems in acquiring sufficient field knowledge. One needs to spend time 
and money to move to the countries one aims at investigating. In addition to this, when carrying 
out international comparative studies instead of a study focusing on one single (and home) country, 
additional costs, time and personal efforts have to be borne to overcome the language barriers and 
the lack of information (Teichler 1996). Thus, despite these difficulties, which factors motivated a 
comparative study between such disparate corners of Europe as Portugal and Finland? 
 
 
5.2.1 Countries Selection – Why Portugal and Finland? 
 
Being comparison the main concern and asset of  this dissertation, the choice of countries was 
guided by academic, pragmatic and factual reasons, as well as by personal aspirations.  
Qualitative methods are predominantly used. The case studies analysis seeks more for analytical 
generalisation rather than statistical representation, despite the study focus only in two countries. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage that some of the conclusions discussed here could be 
 
- No different logic from research within a 
country 
- Indispensable for study of macro-societal 
phenomena 
- Most successful if starting off from a semi-
structured set of assumptions 
- Comparative approach challenged by world 
system and Internationalisation 
 
- Language barriers 
- Other barriers to acquisition of field knowledge  
- Higher costs and efforts  
- Funds provided only if relevant for political 
issues 
- Problems in the collaboration of international 
research teams 
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extrapolated to other HE systems, at least for those which are undergoing similar changes. Naturally, 
it would be very interesting and fruitful to extend the analysis to other countries, not only European, 
but also to other parts of the world, and with other political and historical traditions concerning 
their systemic HE organisation (Humboldtian, Napoleonic and Anglo-Saxon models). Anyway, in 
addition to the reasons for choosing Portugal and Finland that will be explained bellow, financial 
and temporal issues have also determined the choice. Thus, it was aimed to establish the best 
possible balance between relevance and depth of analysis within the available time frame. As such, 
whether it seems obvious why, as Portuguese student, I have become interested in Portuguese HE 
developments; the same may not be so evident with respect to Finland.  
After six months of experience as a student in the University of Tampere (Finland) as an 
Erasmus Mundus student of HE studies, and having studied before in the University of Oslo 
(Norway), I became genuinely curious and attracted by the Nordic experience and attitude towards 
HE. For many years, Finland has been an educational leader and the good student of the EU. Being a 
HE student, and HE policy the core focus of the research object, it became very clear for me that 
this academic journey needed to be pursued also in Finland.  
Simultaneously, the interest lays on how such different countries, not only geographically but 
also with completely distinct socioeconomic structures, ended up developing similar HE systems in 
terms of organisation and structure, resulting in the approval and adoption of similar policy 
initiatives concerning governance and management practices of their HEIs. Among these initiatives, 
there are two aspects related to the organisation and origin of the reforms of these systems that 
sparked my interest in comparing Finland and Portugal. The first concerns the fact that both 
Portugal and Finland have a binary structure, which used to confer longer 1st cycle degrees, despite 
the two-cycle degree system has been first adopted in Finland (in 2005) and later in Portugal (in 
2007). Another aspect is that, in addition to the Bologna process, and as mentioned above, the latest 
reforms of the HE sector were strongly promoted by OECD (and ENQA) recommendations. Thus, 
although it can be argued that the Bologna process represents just another booster for reforming 
the sector, taking into account the increasing globalised and Europeanised environment where HEIs 
operate and where managerialist ideologies have been playing an important role, it was the unfolding 
of the Bologna process and the latest HEIs governance reforms that led me to the formulation of 
the research question. Furthermore, the interaction of the actors involved at the different levels 
(supranational, international and national) that the Bologna process entails within different contexts 
represents a challenge and simultaneously a personal interest. This personal motivation is also 
incited by the particularity of certain differences of both countries: Portugal and Finland are small 
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countries, with significant contrasts in the number of inhabitants and climate. In addition to 
demographic and geographic factors, one can say that they have ‘walked’ opposite economic paths.  
“During much of the 1990s, economic growth in Portugal was above the EU average but 
developments in the 2000s led to a situation whereby it is now receiving support from the IMF 
and the European Financial Stability Facility and is undergoing drastic budget cuts. As for Finland, 
it has been described by a major online business information service as one of the EU’s best 
performing economies whose “... banks and financial markets avoided the worst of the global 
financial crisis” (EUbusiness 2011)” (Kauko and Diogo 2011: 117). 
 
It is also quite interesting the fact that Finland is a bilingual nation and two universities teach 
predominantly in the Swedish language. With such differences it is (personally) surprising how HE 
in both countries is going through such reforms, whose outcomes are still difficult to foresee.  
 
5.2.2 The Selection of HEIs  
Four HEIs were chosen for the study and inclusion in the institutional interviews: one 
polytechnic and one university in each country. The Portuguese university became officially a 
foundation in 2009 and integrates a polytechnic. As such, it can be used to reflect two different 
types of governance models: before and after RJIES. The Finnish university is a public corporation. 
These institutions were chosen based on their size, functional type, year of establishment and 
regional location. Thus, the institutions chose are middle-size institutions, relatively similar in terms 
of number of students and staff, which provide comparable educational and training programmes. 
The Finnish University is a typical of  multi-disciplinary and medium-sized research university 
in Finland. It has a traditional organisational structure around seven faculties and ten departments. 
There are about 15,000 students and about 2700 permanent staff  members in the university. It has 
a total income of  211 million euro. 
The Finnish polytechnic defined its expertise areas in in 8 different fields of study, which are 
trained in its four units: the School of Business and Services Management, the School of Health and 
Social Studies, the School of Technology and the Teacher Education College. There are about 8500 
students from over 70 countries. In November 2013, this polytechnic was awarded the first place 
out of 4500 HEIs in Erasmus excellence by the EC. It was granted the title of the most international 
HEI in Europe. This Finnish polytechnic (which also calls itself as University of Applied Sciences) works 
as limited company society (Ltd.) and operates in accordance with the Polytechnics Act and its own 
Administrative Regulations and Ordinances. 
 
The Portuguese University is exceptional in its organisational structure: not following a 
traditional faculty arrangement, basic units are organised around university departments (16) and 
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polytechnic schools (4) in a matrix structure. The polytechnic is considerably smaller than the 
university, which explains fewer interviews from this subsystem. Departments have similar levels of 
scientific and pedagogical autonomy as classical faculties. However, with respect to administrative 
and financial issues, their autonomy is more restricted, being under university’s central 
administration (Diogo and Brückmann 2015). There are about 14 400 students, plus circa 222 of 
foreign students, 984 Professors, and 692 non-academic staff. In average, this Portuguese university 
has 155 of its students studying abroad, mostly in Spain, Poland, Italy, Czech Republic, Brazil and 
United Kingdom. 
The selection of these institutions to develop empirical work was information-oriented (Patton 
2002), meaning this that they were chosen based on the researcher’s expectations about their utility for 
the research object. Also pragmatic reasons led the choice of the institutions. 
 
5.3 Period Studied and Scope of Analysis 
Having the signature of the Sorbonne Declaration as a starting point of the research interest, 
other aspects needed to be taken into consideration to set the time frame of the study. Indeed, with 
respect to the implementation of the Bologna process, it is acknowledged that this happened at 
different speeds and with different priorities in each signatory country, according to its historical 
and social backgrounds, and therefore, according to the guidelines set by different governments. As 
Witte refers (2006) “A multi-national process does, of course, not begin on a tabula rasa in the 
nations analysed but builds on the respective institutional legacies and histories of debate” (2006: 
106). Ultimately, the implementation process is determined in accordance with each nation-state’s 
model of governance and the type of relationship the government maintains with HEIs. It is in fact 
interesting to observe that although the OECD and the EC reports present Portugal and Finland as 
exemplary countries in the implementation of the Bologna’s guidelines, several studies and surveys 
carried at the institutional level show a less “successful” picture and highlight various difficulties 
and barriers in the implementation process. This political, cultural and historical mismatch is also 
responsible, in a similar way, by the fluctuation in the intensity in which both countries applied 
managerialist policies in their HE systems. Thus, by considering the influence of NPM framework 
in the governance changes of HEIs, the study could not be confined to the beginning of the period 
to be studied to the signature of the Sorbonne and Bologna Declarations. Furthermore, even if, 
hypothetically, NPM would be left outside this research, in terms of the period to be studied, one 
would always have to go back to 1988, when the Magna Charta Universitatum was signed, and therefore 
this also represents a time prior to the Bologna process.  
 251 
In this way, and in order to ensure comparability and consistency when gathering the data, as 
well as to be as faithful as possible to the object of study, common dates were defined for the 
assessment of the dimensions to be analysed in both countries. In order to avoid being exaggeratedly 
rigid, the starting date of this study is located in the early 1980s and the end of it in 2014/beginning 
of 2015. However, if on one hand, due to pragmatic reasons, the last two decades will be devoted 
more attention, because the researcher considers this period as “sufficient enough” to provide with 
faithful and effective background of policy change and to assess some outcomes of current national 
and institutional reforms; on the other hand, there are events prior to this date which need to be 
mentioned once they are central for the understanding of the evolution and development of both 
HE systems. Examples are the 25th April of 1974 in Portugal, which marks the end of the 
dictatorship and consequently a new stage for the development of the HE sector in the country 
(creation of the polytechnic subsystem and of the particular and cooperative HE); and when Finland 
joined the EU in 1995, the establishment of the vocational system in the 1990s, etc. 
The need to frame a historical and cultural perspective in this study goes much in hand with 
two important factors which need to be born in mind throughout the research process and which 
also relate with the scope of analysis. First, not all policy changes that took place during the period 
of analysis refer to, or aimed at changing institutional governance structures and decision-making 
procedures. Nevertheless, the points analysed in the dissertation, all of them (in a more direct or 
indirect way) relate to changes in external and internal governance. 
The second aspect one needs to remember has already been widely discussed here, namely the 
fact that not all changes which happened in terms of institutional governance and management took 
place in the context of the NPM and the Bologna process; they rather should be understood beyond 
these frontiers. Indeed, this (methodological) tentative to theoretically and empirically separate or 
assess changes caused by the Bologna process or changes coming from other directions represents 
one of the main challenges of this study. And, again, this also explains why it is not possible to 
completely and accurately assess the impact and success of reforms in HE systems.  
Thus, by analysing the research topic by layers, and during the first stage of the research process 
(pre-descriptive) it was assumed that, in general, European HE systems (and more specifically, the 
Finnish and Portuguese ones) underwent unprecedented changes in the period between 1980-2014. 
Thus, after explaining change at the system level, and external governance (R. Q. 1), the analysis 
narrowed to the institutional arena, namely changes in the way HEIs are steered (governing bodies 
and governance instruments; changes in the organisational structure), how these external pressures 
influence the way academic work is organised and how or whether working conditions are affected 
by these processes (R. Q. 2 and 3), while simultaneously analysing institutional responses to 
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governmental decisions. In sum, there is an underlying analysis to the international influence in 
institutional level governance.   
 
5.4 Data Collection 
Throughout this part the sources of data used will be described and explained how and why 
this typology of data collection was preferred.  
Due to the nature of the object of study, the great majority of information comes from 
qualitative sources – primary, secondary and tertiary. As reported by Marginson and Mollis (2001: 
23), qualitative case studies are better at identifying and producing diversity. In a smaller scale, 
quantitative data was also used, mainly gathered through international sources (OECD) and national 
ones (DGES; GPEARI), and through online databases and websites (e.g. the prosperity index 
website). 
Literature review, document analysis and semi-structured interviews were the most important 
data sources during the research process. These three methods of data gathering complemented 
each other throughout the research process and were used at different time periods, although 
document analysis was often used in parallel with the data extracted from the interviews. The interest 
on the Bologna process dynamics emerged in early 2008, when the researcher was still attending the 
European Master Programme, but it was in the beginning of the Doctoral programme that the 
researcher started to collect information on the topic, i.e. from September 2009 from September 
2014. Nevertheless, and as one might expect from an European master programme in HE, since 
the 2007 Fall, the researcher necessarily had to start to get familiar with different HE systems’ 
dynamics, and got specifically interested in those changes advanced with the Bologna reform. This 
interest also stems from the fact that the researcher had completed a (four years) bachelor degree in 
the year before the formal implementation of the Bologna process in Portugal (2007), and therefore 
she has accompanied some of the discussions related with the theme, namely those involving the 
operationalisation of the binary structure of the system and the employability of Bologna graduates. 
Thus, while from November 2009 until quite recently (2014), the researcher tried to obtain as much 
knowledge as possible of both Portuguese and Finnish HE systems, she has simultaneously worked 
on the chapters devoted to the conceptual and theoretical framework and those related with 
Europeanisation and the Bologna process specificities. From December 2010 to July 2012 it was 
the time when interviews were conducted. Thus, it can be said that the comparison process started 
unconsciously and informally. 
The rationale for using qualitative methodology lays on rational and pragmatic factors, such as 
the nature of the research topic (in this case, exploratory research) and its context, the kind of research 
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questions, the expertise and personality of the researcher and the researcher’s time and budget 
(Blaikie 2000: 227). Moreover, although comparative studies on HE are multi-disciplinary, 
constituted by quantitative and qualitative methods, qualitative research aims at understanding: it 
answers primarily to how questions (ibid). This reinforces the use of the case study type of approach 
as explained by Yin (1994). Also, there are certain aspects, such as perceptions, values, thoughts and 
intentions that one can not measure with quantitative techniques, as Einstein would say: “not 
everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted” (n. d). Thus, the 
combination of the qualitative methods used here allows for data source triangulation and thereby 
it facilitates comparison of the several findings through the different sources. This is of particular 
utility considering the qualitative nature of our object of study, which allows for an overlap of 
qualitative analysis and data collection, and vice-versa. In this way, and according to the fundamental 
stages defined by Noah and Eckstein (1969), until now, the researcher has already identified the 
problem and formulated the research questions, the concepts and dimensions of study have been 
defined, the HE systems the researcher wants to analysed have already been selected and studied, 
and all the data collected was treated.  
Nevertheless, the use of the case study approach as a method of inquiry is not consensual and 
it has been object of academic controversy in HE research (at least). In fact, there are several ways 
to approach case studies and multiple case studies, a fact that represents both a strength and a 
weakness (Yin 2003; Tight 2012). For example, Tight (2012) excludes the notion of case study as a 
methodological option in contemporary HE research. Among other reasons, Tight (2012) points to 
the lack of methodological clarity, fuzziness, scanty empirical evidence, etc. as main flaws of the 
case study approach. 
This is also why I would like to reinforce the idea that what I call here as a case study approach 
mostly refers to the notion of information collection and treatment, in order to organise the data 
according to the cases – themes – to be researched. This means that the main priority and task is to 
produce a solid analysis and reflection of the questions posed here – more than entering into a 
discussion on the possible or hypothetical vulnerabilities and limitations of methodological 
approaches.  
The following sections will be thus devoted to the steps that are missing, namely the data 
treatment and interpretation of the case studies. These consist of all the information one has about 
each case: documentary data, interviews, observations, impressions and statements of others about the 
case, and contextual information (Patton 2002). 
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5.4.1 Document Analysis and Literature Review 
One of the most important data sources throughout the research process came through an 
extensive document analysis and literature review. This was indeed an indispensable stage of this 
inquiry, considering that it was necessary to gain further insights on the international and European 
contexts that grounded the Bologna declaration, as well as the contexts that paved for drafting 
national legislation on the legal framework of HEIs as a means to better analyse the implementation 
process and further consequences in the national HE systems. In turn, there was also need to get 
acknowledged with HE reforms and developments since the early 1980s. As such, and according to 
the classification provided by Blaikie (2000: 183-197) primary, secondary and tertiary data were 
gathered and analysed for the purpose of this study. Simultaneously, in order to make it easier for 
the organisation and classification of all the information gathered and consequently to access to it 
easily, the researcher has categorised it in two main and general groups: international and national. 
These general groups were subdivided into national groups: Portugal and Finland.  
With respect to the document analysis, secondary and tertiary sources were gathered, and these 
were used, as mentioned before, “by stages”. Thus, a multitude of published academic texts as well 
as policy-related studies approaching developments on HE since the early 1980s, and then, more 
specifically, studies related with the object of study were reviewed in order to understand the 
systems, aiming at analysing their organisation and evolution, the shape and weight of the state in 
HE policy formulation and how this influences governance procedures at the institutional level. A 
wide range of documents related with the Bologna process was also analysed. In fact, when it comes 
to the Bologna process, the complexity and quantity of documentation immediately increases. The 
international data analysed were, first of all, the documents that helped to clarify the origin and 
evolution of the Bologna process, as well as other reports and monitoring data on the process. More 
at the the European level, the range of data varies from since the Ministerial Meetings 
Communiqués, BFUG reports, international associations as the EUA, ENQA, EURASHE, 
European research centres studies, policy intention documents as the Magna Charta Universitatum; the 
Sorbonne and Bologna Declarations; the 2000 Lisbon Strategy data and strategic documents, all the 
two-years Communiqués, and all the EC reports and recommendations to achieve the Commission’s 
agenda; etc. At the level of HEIs, national and international reports were collected as well as HEIs’ 
strategic plans and statutes, and surveys and monitoring data on the process.  
This analysis was also accompanied by an extensive study of the legislation of both HE systems, 
government white papers, position and consultation papers from different stakeholders (e.g. 
MCTES, SNESup, CRUP, CCISP, OKM, FINHEEC, CIMO, UNIFI, ARENE, etc.), national 
reports written by both international and national bodies, reports of national advisory bodies, official 
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documentation of parliamentary negotiations, institutional mission statements, and other formal 
stakeholder consultation documents. Some of this information was later complemented (and 
contrasted) with more quantitative and statistical data from the OECD, DGES, GPEARI, OKM, 
KOTA, CIMO, among other international and national bodies. In parallel, a press dossier was 
prepared where newspaper and media clippings and other information related with the topic 
considered interesting and enriching has been gathered. The press dossier was developed for 
personal use in order to keep the researcher always updated about the way social media, e.g. news, 
documentaries, etc., both in Portugal and in Finland treat and look at the HE sector, especially the 
reforms related to the Bologna Process and institutional governance and management changes in 
these countries (cf. Annex nr. 2). 
Through the analysis of this data it was possible to reconstruct and track both Portuguese and 
Finnish policy processes and policy maker’s initiatives with respect to their participation in the 
Bologna process and their position towards the latest legislative reforms; to analyse the evolution of 
their regulative frameworks and governance structures, as well as to understand the coordination 
mechanisms among all these policies. This, in turn, contributed to strengthen certain aspects of the 
theoretical framework while simultaneously diagnosing and opening the way to preferences and 
perceptions of the key actors interviewed of both HE systems, namely those operating at the system 
level. 
All these data were later compared and supported by the semi-structured interviews and also 
by the personal experience obtained through the period spent in Finland (which all in all was 3 years) 
and the time and life as a Portuguese citizen living in Portugal. This provided the research with 
empirical evidence on implementation challenges, realities and expectations. 
 
5.4.2 Interviews 
Although the document analysis is extremely important and essential for a better understanding 
of the issues here at stake, this study would lack authenticity, validity and reliability if the researcher 
did not seek the perspectives of those who were behind the reforms, those who implemented and 
carried them, in sum, the key actors of both Portuguese and Finnish HE systems. As Pollitt (2003: 
26) referred, it is determinant to listen “the voices of the practitioners”, once these occasionally 
contrasted with official pronouncements, or other voices. As such, semi-structured interviews are 
our primary source of empirical data and therefore represent one of the most important sources of 
information for the dissertation.  
Due to the nature of the research topic, and also bearing in mind the time available, semi-
structured interviews were conducted, where a set of pre-defined questions (interview guideline) 
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were asked to all interviewees in order to best compare their views and ease the analysis of the 
interviews’ content. Nonetheless, additional questions were raised during the course of the 
conversation, or some were skipped. The interview guideline was organised in two main groups of 
questions: the Bologna process and governance and management changes that followed from the 
RJIES and the New Universities Act. Thus, for the purpose of this study, and as can be seen in table 
12, key actors at both the system and institutional levels were interviewed, allowing for a variety of 
perceptions, preferences and capabilities. In total, 61 interviews were carried out: 32 in Portugal and 
29 in Finland.  
 
Table 12: Interviewed Key Actors in both Portuguese and Finnish HE Systems and 
Institutions 
 
These actors were chosen due to their roles and degree of involvement in the study object: the 
Bologna process and the University reforms driven by the Yliopistolaki 558/2009 and the Law 
62/2007. At different stages, they lived in loco the evolution of their HE systems, the most 
challenging changes of the Bologna framework, the latest developments of the new legal framework 
for HEIs, etc. One considers them to be key actors (or stakeholders) because they are able to provide 
information on the way HEIs responded to the different legislation and on the consolidation of the 
reforms. Nevertheless, one should remember that what it is aimed to gather with interviews are 
actors’ perceptions, which vary according to the role they have. As an example, ideas about the 
results achieved so far or about a hypothetical mismatch between objectives and outcomes might 
have different interpretations among interviewees. As Patton (2002) clarifies, “(...) the purpose of 
interviewing is to allow us to enter into the other person’s perspective (...)”, once the interviewer 
assumes that these perspectives are “(...) meaningful, knowable and able to be made explicit. 
Therefore, we interview to find out what is in and on someone else’s mind, to gather their stories 
(...)” (ibid: 341), once the purpose of qualitative interviews is to capture complexities of the 
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interviewed individual perceptions and experiences (ibid: 348). And that it is why “(...) this openness 
distinguishes qualitative interviewing from the closed questionnaire or test used in quantitative 
studies” (ibid: 341).  
The advantage of an interview guide (see interview guideline in Annex nr. 3) is that, as Patton 
(2002: 243) explains, it allows for a better time management once it sets priorities. In Portugal, the 
interviews were held in Portuguese, thus all the translations in this document are responsibility of 
the researcher. In Finland, as the researcher cannot speak Finnish fluently, the interviews were 
conducted in English.  
In order to test the theoretical assumptions, to develop analytical focus (Yin 1994), and test the 
interview guideline, three pilot-interviews were carried out to three different institutional actors, 
belonging to different Portuguese HEIs (in December 2010). Because the pilot study interviews 
were integral to the development of the analysis, they have been included in the cross-case analysis 
of this study (Yin 1994). This pilot phase was also crucial to optimise the interview guideline by 
slightly changing and improving it. Some questions were removed; mostly open questions, in order 
to make the interview guideline shorter and more focused. 
The interviewees are listed according to the respective country and within this, according to 
the level of action where they operate, system and/or institutional, and then according to the 
institution where they belong and according to their main position or role.  
All interviewees were previously contacted by e-mail in order to easily manage the interviews’ 
schedule and availability of the interviewees and to match it with the temporal and geographic 
availability of the researcher. System level interviewees were contacted firstly by the researcher’s 
supervisors, and only up confirmation of their interest and their availability the interview was 
arranged with the researcher. Institutional level interviewees were directly contacted (by e-mail) by 
the researcher. They were chosen bearing in mind the aims of the research object, which means that 
they should have been working in a HEI for at least 10 years, or being familiarised with the HE 
context. It was decided that institutional level interviews needed to be carried out at different 
departments – e.g. physics, languages, engineering and social sciences – in the same countries with 
the objective of grasping different disciplinary fields realities, with different academic staff’s 
ambitions and concerns, and diverse organisation of knowledge and science. As Välimaa et al. (2007) 
referred, (different) disciplinary cultures provided the basis for understanding and taking into 
account the cultural variety in academia. Only one interviewee (in Finland) asked for the interview 
guideline beforehand, although the main contents of the research were explicitly stated in the request 
email. After deciding on the disciplinary fields, and after the first interviews to top-management and 
middle management actors, the research used a technique of snowball type, i.e. already interviewed 
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actors were asked whether they could indicate academics/lecturers and other relevant people they 
consider that would be able to answer to similar questions. Interviewees were also asked whether 
there were any other topics that should have been approached or whether they wanted to suggest 
or criticise the study and the interview. This proved to be a very fruitful way of gathering volunteers 
for the interviewees.   
The great majority of interviews in Portugal were carried out in a very formal and somehow 
official environment, somehow evidencing a hierarchic relationship between the interviewee and the 
interviewer. A more relaxed atmosphere was experienced when interviewing Finns. Cultural aspects 
may shed some light to these differences.  
In addition to their countries, and the level of analysis (system “S”), institutional actors were 
classified according to their role and type of institution they work in (Table 13). The perceptions 
quoted alongside the following chapters (findings analysis and discussion and conclusions) aim at 
clarifying on the type of institution – University (U) / Polytechnic (P) – interviewees work, and on 
the main role they perform. The following identification is used throughout the text:  
 Actors’ countries: Finland (F)/Portugal (P);  
 Level of  action: system (s)/institutional: Universities (u) /polytechnics (p). Institutional 
actors were classified according to their role: 
 Top-management actors (Utm/Ptm): rectors, vice-rectors, pro-rectors, Polytechnics’ 
presidents and external stakeholders in both subsystems; 
 Middle Management actors (Umm/Pmm): Deans; Heads of Departments and Polytechnic 
Schools; 
 Academics (universities)/Polytechnics’ Lecturers (Ua/Pl), and  
 Administrative staff, also designated as (part of) the technostructure of the HEI (Ut).  
 
The numbers placed before the letters (which refer to the country and role of  the interviewee) 
indicate different interviewees. Some actors may “accumulate” more than one role: for example, a 
top management actor who works in close cooperation with the Ministry and lectures at the 
university. These interviewees are identified with a *, however, only their main activity is explicit. In 
this way, a citation coded as “3FUmm” means that this is the perception of  the third Finnish middle 
management interviewee, working in the university. The code “1Ps” stands for the first Portuguese 
system level actor interviewed.  
All interviews were anonimised due to ethic questions. Most of  interviewees in both countries 
immediately asked about this and only agreed on conceding an interview based on guarantees 
regarding anonymity. Thus, after the first complete transcriptions, interviews were then edited for 
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clarity, i.e. removal of redundancies and repetitions, hesitations and national/regional expressions. 
I called this, the “clean version” of interviews. In addition, all the names, places, gender, links and 
every reference that could identify an interviewee, the institution where he/she works, or any other 
information that would eliminate interviewees’ anonymity, was removed.  
 
Table 13 – Interviewees’ anatomy 
Finnish Interviews Portuguese Interviews 
 
 
 
 
Women 
13 
System Level 3  
 
 
Women 
10 
System Level 0 
Institutional 
Level 
TM roles: 1 U 
MM roles: 5 (3U + 2P) 
Academics: 2 
Lecturers: 2 P 
Technostructure: 0 
Institutional 
Level 
TM roles: 1 U 
MM roles: 5 (3U + 2P) 
Academics: 0 
Lecturers: 1 
Technostructure: 3 
 
 
Men 
16 
System Level 3  
 
Men 
22 
System Level 6 
Institutional 
Level 
TM roles: 4 (3U + 1P) 
MM roles: 4 (2U + 2P) 
Academics: 4 U 
Lecturers: 1 P 
Technostructure: 0 
Institutional 
Level 
TM roles: 5 U 
MM roles: 3 (1U + 2P) 
Academics: 4 U 
Lecturers: 1 P 
Technostructure: 3 
 
 
The universe of interviewees is quite diverse, and a simple look at its composition allows for 
some depictions already. First, a note should be included to refer that neither in Portugal nor in 
Finland it was possible to interview administrative staff, i.e. non-academic staff (technostructure) in 
polytechnics. In both countries, possible interviewees referred that they did not know much about 
the Bologna process or any other HE reform. As such, and due to their perceived irrelevant position 
in the institution, they felt they could not be of help in the research process. Some of the people 
contacted also referred that they started to work in the institution recently and therefore they did 
not feel comfortable to answer some questions or even to ask their bosses (top and middle 
management actors) for some time to participate in the interviews. In the researcher’s viewpoint, 
this already denotes the nature of the type of institution and differentiates universities’ and 
polytechnics’ institutional mission. 
Secondly, immediately one observes a gender (im)balance issue in this table. Finnish HE, at 
least through the numbers of these HEIs, reflects a higher gender balance among system level actors 
and the faculty than Portuguese HE. The most striking differences relate to top-management 
positions, either at the system and institutional levels. The number of Finnish women interviewed 
is higher in Finland than in Portugal, where more interviews were conducted, and 4 of them perform 
their jobs at the system level of action. The same roles are carried by men in Portugal. Curiously, at 
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the institutional level, the number of women in top and middle management positions is exactly the 
same both in universities and polytechnics. However, this should be read with attention, considering 
that the interviewees’ sample is random and it was not investigated how gender balance works (or 
even if it exists) in both HE systems. Interesting is also the fact that the roles that 3 Portuguese man 
perform at the university technostructure are performed by woman in the Finnish university. Again, 
although this is the reality in the institutions where the interviewed actors work, this study does not 
have enough information to extrapolate this reality to all Portuguese and Finnish HEIs. 
In average, interviews lasted around one hour, with exceptions exceeding up to one hour and 
a half or not more than 20 minutes. All of them were taped with previous actors’ permission and 
the researcher took notes during the process. Immediately after the interviews the researcher took 
some notes of aspects (and even expressions, attitudes, e.g. some resistance to answer some 
questions, more or less enthusiasm with certain topic), consider(ed) relevant and clarifying as these 
also work as an additional source of information. All of the interviews were entirely transcribed in 
order to easily organise and categorise the answers and to access them whenever it was necessary, 
once these are the basis of actors’ perceptions. Altogether interviewees to Finnish actors took 29 
hours and 11 minutes and they correspond to 237 pages of transcriptions. Interviewees to 
Portuguese actors took roughly 29 hours and 310 pages, which makes a total of: 58 hours and 547 
pages of transcriptions. The mismatch between the length of interviewees and the number of pages 
used to transcribe them may be attributed – besides cultural factors – to the fact that Portuguese 
interviewees talked faster as they were using their mother tongue. 
As awkward as it may seem, after the three pilot interviews conducted in Portugal, the rest of 
interviews was carried out first in Finland and then in Portugal. This happened because the 
researcher was granted a Finnish scholarship from CIMO, from January 2011 to May of that same 
year. Thus, this first round of interviews provided me with some experience, helping me to confirm 
and/or rethinking key issues, assumptions, events, time frames, and actors in the respective policy 
processes aimed to be investigated. The second round of interviews had obviously to be easier to 
conduct, once I was already prepared for eventual reactions to certain questions, they were done in 
Portugal and conducted in my mother tongue. In the Fall 2012, I went back to Finland, allowing me 
to corroborate some perceptions as I was given the opportunity to (informally) talk with some of the 
prior interviewees about this study and its progress. 
The fact that I conducted interviews first in Finland and right at the beginning of  2011 had 
some consequences and implications in important methodological and conceptual choices. After 
carrying the total of  61 the interviews, and as the research process evolved and the study object 
became more and more defined and narrow, it was clear that some decisions had to be taken in 
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terms of  redefinition of  research assumptions, research aims and data analysis. As mentioned earlier, 
and fortunately, there was enough data to provide the study with validity and accuracy. In this way, 
considering that the New Universities Act only applies to Finnish universities and not to 
polytechnics, as it happens in Portugal, and considering that the Portuguese university chosen 
integrates 4 polytechnic schools, it was decided to leave aside the comparison between both types 
of  HEIs concerning the object of  study – as initially planned and aimed at. Thus, although not 
completely, polytechnics’ interviewees perceptions were neglected and the main focus lay on how 
Portuguese and Finnish universities reacted to policy changes. However, this decision does not 
withdraw validity to the research outcomes. It indeed made the research process more focused and 
clear, it continues to enlighten about the main purpose of  the study. This is so because the 
polytechnics in Finland are quite recent and therefore they were born almost at the same time as the 
Bologna process and also because the New Universities Act does not apply to this type of  
subsystem. 
Interesting is also the fact that, during the interview process to Finnish polytechnics’ actors, 
the researcher was frequently reminded that “In Finland we don’t use the term polytechnic; it is 
Universities of  Applied Sciences, the old name is polytechnics, you should pay more attention to this” 
(1FPmm).  
A final note to refer that neither “supranational actors” nor students were interviewed. 
However, during the interviews, in order to understand actors’ perceptions on the involvement and 
importance of the European level on the governance and management of HE systems and 
institutions, national and institutional governance, the researcher approached the topic “relationship 
between the State, HEIs and the EU.  
Initially, when the research project was drafted, it was intended to complete the empirical part 
of the study with direct observation in departments and faculties meetings as a means to understand 
the most significant changes in terms of work organisation, performance of the actors’ roles and 
even to assess the degree of importance attributed to each topic mention.  
As the name itself suggests, direct observation is a method based on visual observation, which 
directly appeals to the researcher’s sense of observation. The main rationale for using this strategy 
lays on the idea that direct observation methods are the only methods of social research able to 
capture behaviours in the exact moment when they occur, without the mediation of any documents 
or witnesses (Quivy and Campenhoudt 2008), although it was not aimed at directly intervene in the 
reality observed. Through other types of methodology, and as Quivy and Campenhoudt (2008) 
referred, the situations and events’ analysis is reconstituted based on actors’ statements and ideas 
(e.g. interviews) and/or by the evidence left in documents by those who, directly or indirectly, 
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witnessed those events. The researcher also hoped to take advantage of one of the greatest benefits 
of the non-participant direct observation technique: spontaneity, once that the researcher 
apprehends situations and behaviours exactly in the moment they happen, without existing any 
interference of the observer.  
Motivated by building a research methodology as complete as possible, it was hoped to apply 
this technique in the Languages and in the Physics departments of both universities. The rationale 
for choosing both these units lays on two important aspects: first, because they represent different 
disciplinary fields, with different ambitions for their development. Second, since the researcher does 
not speak fluent Finnish, and the main working language within these departments is English, it 
would be easier to understand the aspects discussed at the meeting’s agendas. Although the language 
barrier would not be a problem in Portugal, the choice of similar departments would ease the 
comparison, namely the aspects to compare (observation camp) and eventually to allow for 
extrapolation of some findings. Nevertheless, it was not possible to apply this technique. At the end 
of each interview with an institutional actor, the interviewer asked if she could attend at least two 
meetings at the faculty and/or department level with the objective to complement and improve the 
research design of the study. Only two institutional actors (a Dean and an academic) were willing to 
talk with their peers to facilitate the process. However, after the interview, these same interviewees 
contacted the researcher to inform that their peers did not approve her presence in these meetings. 
Although it was not possible to establish a comparison with respect to the findings obtained 
with direct observation, the researcher tried to apply this technique in Portugal, hoping that cultural 
and language barriers would not be a problem. Portuguese institutional actors behaved in a very 
similar way to their Finnish counterparts: they were not enthusiastic with the idea and they did not 
approve the observation of any meeting and/or departmental reflexion or discussion moment. 
 
 
5.5 Content Analysis Categories 
Qualitative analysis knows several varieties and processes, of which content analysis is probably 
one of the most used and applied in social sciences research, though it is not easy to define what is 
really meant by this technique. It usually refers to the analysis of texts, e.g. interview transcripts, 
diaries, or documents, rather than observation-based field notes (Patton 2002). In a similar view, 
Albarello et al. (1997: 157) define a “content” by something one can express in texts and speeches, 
namely the “sense”, or, in other words, the “different ways of seeing things”, the types and systems 
of perception.  
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The researcher chose to apply content analysis instead of discourse analysis because what we 
want to analyse are perceptions rather than subjectivity, interviews instead of media communications 
or news, and discourse analysis rests on the assumption that language does not represent reality, but 
it contributes to the construction of reality, and social reality in particular (Schreier 2013: 45). 
According to Schreier (2013), qualitative content analysis is a method for describing the meaning of 
qualitative material in a systematic way; suitable for data that one has collected her/himself. This is 
done by assigning successive parts of the data collected to the categories of the coding frame. “This 
frame is at the heart of the qualitative content analysis, and it covers all those meanings that feature 
in the description and interpretation of your material” (2013: 1). The fact that this study relies much 
on the perceptions collected with the interviews that were conducted by the researcher led to the 
choice of this technique. Table 14 summarises the fundamental differences between these two 
techniques: discourse analysis and content analysis. 
As Margit Schreier (2013: 47) refers, content analysis, unlike discourse analysis, does not make 
any assumption about the nature of language, social reality, and how the two are related; at least it 
does not do so explicitly, an exercise that would not be useful for answering the research questions 
of this study.  
 
Table 14 - Differences between discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis. 
 
Discourse Analysis Qualitative Content Analysis 
 
- Based on constructivist assumptions 
- Descriptive or critical 
- Focus on processes 
- Analysis of what is and what is not there in the 
material 
- No assumptions about reality or implicit 
realist assumptions 
- Typically descriptive 
- Focus on states  
- Analysis of what is there in the material 
 
Source: Adapted from Schreier (2013: 47).   
 
Content analysis consists in the separation of the idea of “content” from the idea of “text” 
or/and “discourse”. As such, one of the competencies needed when doing this type of work is, as 
Patton (2002) highlights, the ability to recognise patterns or themes, i.e., to see patterns in seemingly 
random information. The process of searching for patterns or themes may be distinguished whether 
one is looking for patterns or themes, although there is no “hard-and-fast” distinction of these terms 
(2002: 23). According to the author, “The term pattern usually refers to a descriptive finding, (…) 
while a theme takes a more categorical or topical form” (ibid). 
In this content analysis, the researcher predominantly tried to look at descriptive findings 
according to the issues aimed at analysing, therefore the search was for patterns and categories. In 
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parallel, it was aimed to analyse changes regarding the conceptualisation of a specific object of study, 
namely changes concerning modes of governance, working conditions, decision-making processes 
and power relationships, etc.  
This type of methodology is thus related with inductive analysis, when findings emerge out of 
the data through the researcher’s interactions with all the information gathered; a process which 
characterises qualitative analysis in the early stages. This process is also related with grounded theory 
(Glasser and Strauss 1967). As explained by Glasser and Strauss 1967, when the researcher becomes 
so immersed in the data – being grounded – so that embedded meanings and relationships can emerge, 
and the resulting analysis grows out of the groundedness. In fact, drawing on grounded theory 
teachings (Corbin and Strauss 1998), in depth field research was conducted in order to let “the data 
speak for itself”. Nevertheless, as the researcher moved forward in the research process, data 
analysis became more deductive, as the information is analysed according to an existing framework 
(Patton 2002). As a matter of fact, after patterns and/or categories have been identified through 
inductive analysis,  
“(…) the final, confirmatory stage of qualitative analysis may be deductive in testing and 
affirming the authenticity and appropriateness of the inductive content analysis, including 
carefully examining deviate cases or data that don’t fit the categories developed” (Patton 2002: 
453). 
 
This also represents ne of the advantages of this type of methodology as remembered by Schreier 
(2013). As the research questions already specify the angle from which data will be observed, if other 
important aspects strike the researcher during the analysis, it is possible to change the coding frame 
and these aspects as well. 
Interviews were fully transcribed (including actors’ expressions and personal observations 
regarding the moment of  the interview and the interviewee him/herself) right after the interview 
was done. Empirical data was then analysed through thematic coding with the help of  qualitative 
data analysis software Atlas.ti 7. In practical terms, coding refers to the process of  assigning 
categories, concepts, or “codes” to segments of  information that are of  interest to the research 
objectives (Atlas.ti 7 2014). From a methodological standpoint, codes can also be “key words” and 
they capture meaning in the data, once they are “used as classification devices at different levels of  
abstraction in order to create sets of  related information units for the purpose of  comparison” 
(2014: 17). In sum, codes classify an often large number of  textual or other data units. 
When the interviews were assigned to ATLAS.ti, only the “clean version” of the interviews was 
uploaded. By clean version I mean the documents created after the interviews’ transcriptions, where 
only the interviewee words were registered, without repetitions, or any personal comments.  This 
was so due two main reasons: first, we have systematically obtained and analysed data. Thus, since 
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the moment interviews were carried out, the content analysis has been done in parallel: main 
categories and themes had been identified and the research ground has been growing in complexity 
but also in clarification and definition. Thus, when the interviews were studied through ATLAS.ti 
7, they had been already subjected to several readings, analyses. The second reason for this is that 
due to the amount of interviews and the richness of all the content, all this data assigned to the 
software made it slower, as well as the whole computer. 
Based on the literature review, the theoretical framework, and the analysis of  legal documents, 
three main dimensions of  analysis were elaborated (Schreier 2012). Table 15 puts in perspective the 
final qualitative content analysis framework, which was obtained after an intense poll and mapping 
of  all the themes that emerged from the interviews (see Annex nr. 4).  As it was advised by Margit 
Schreier (2013) on applying qualitative content analysis, this list of  the themes that spoke out from 
the interviews was important to filter and prioritise what were the topics that would be included in 
the final content analysis grid.  
The dimensions of  analysis created roughly correspond to the HE governance dimensions of  
Schimank and Lange (2009) explored in the theoretical part of  this study. Indeed, the richness of  
the empirical data gathered all these elements, eventhough for the purpose of  this research (and 
because choices had to be made), the focus is on the first four dimensions: State regulation, 
Stakeholder Guidance, Academic self-governance and Managerial Governance. 
 
Table 15 - Conceptual and Data Driven Content Analysis Table 
I DIMENSION: National Reforms within an International Perspective 
 (change at the system level) - State Regulation 
I Category:  
Internationalisation at Home: implementing the Bologna Process in Portugal and in Finland 
Themes for Portugal and Finland 
1. Context, processes and mechanisms of policy implementation of the Bologna Process in Portugal 
2. Context, processes and mechanisms of policy implementation of the Bologna Process in Finland 
 
II Category:  
Reforming at Home: Implementing the RJIES in Portugal and the New Universities Act in Finland  
Themes for Portugal and Finland 
1. Context, processes and mechanisms of policy implementation of the RJIES 
2. Context, processes and mechanisms of policy implementation of the New Universities Act 
 
II DIMENSION: Institutionalisation of NPM ideology and practice (Change at the 
Institutional Level) - Stakeholder Guidance, Academic and Managerial Governance: 
Internal Governance. 
I Category:  
Structures and Processes: Institutionalisation of NPM ideology and practice 
Themes Portugal and Finland 
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1. Transformations in the organisational structure – The Portuguese Case 
          Public Foundations under Private Law 
2. Transformations in the organisational structure – The Finnish Case 
3. Changes in Portuguese Universities’ Governance Model 
          (Re)composition of Governing Bodies and Election procedures – The Portuguese Case  
4. Changes in Finnish Universities’ Governance Model 
5. Academic Careers and Working Conditions  
          The Finnish Case 
          The Portuguese Case 
 
III DIMENSION: Understanding and Conceptualising Change 
I Category: Conceptualisation of Change  
Themes Portugal and Finland 
1. Significance attributed to the Bologna process and to the new legal framework for 
Portuguese and Finnish HEIs 
2. Different Cultures + Same Roles = Different Perceptions? 
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VI  
National and Institutional Reforms 
 
The third part of  this work is devoted to analyse and discuss the data collected in order to 
answer to the research questions posed in the previous chapter and that guide the course of  this 
research. 
One should remember that this analysis of  changes in Portuguese and Finnish HEIs assumes 
that in the last decade, these were strongly spurred by the Bologna process and legislative and 
governance reforms. In parallel, these HE dynamics are included in a broader scenario of  change 
in the public administration sector, of  which NPM is highlighted. In this way, and briefly put, the 
research sheds light on how global and international trends combined and embedded in national 
policy changes, affect(ed) both Portuguese and Finnish HE systems. This follows Bleiklie and 
Kogan’s view (2006: 11) on policy change – as a result of  international influences and national 
processes. In fact, this first dimension represents the amalgamation of  several categories and 
underlies the whole research process. It focuses on the system level – the relationship between the 
state and HEIs, whereas the second dimension reflects action at the institutional level. The third 
dimension of  analysis comprises actors’ perceptions on change, namely how do they conceptualised 
it and how do they measure the degree of  interference or/and impact of  both processes in their HE 
system and HEI. 
More specifically, this study clarifies on how change through these political processes is 
interpreted (i.e. how it is planned and implemented) by HEIs in both countries and why there have 
been similar reform processes in such different countries and HEIs. Additionally, it sheds light on 
the changes that have been happening at the institutional level in terms of  governance and 
management practices. 
The analysis and discussion of  the data collected through the interviews is presented here as a 
mapping process to answer the main research questions. This process is structured around its main 
guidance tools, i.e. the three main dimensions of  analysis: i) national reforms within a 
global/international landscape; ii) institutionalisation of  NPM ideology and practice, which analyses 
changes in institutional governance and management, and in the academic career, and iii) 
understanding and conceptualising change. Throughout this chapter these dimensions are analysed 
at the level of  individual categories and themes that structure the content analysis grid (Table 15). 
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I DIMENSION 
National Reforms (with)in an International Landscape: 
Change at the System Level – State Regulation 
  
The dimension related to the national reforms in both HE systems emerges from a set of  
categories and themes elaborated through several data sources, namely from literature review, the 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks and the empirical data obtained with the interviews. Being 
such a complex dimension, which encapsulates both latest and most significant reforms in both 
countries – the Bologna process and the RJIES/New Universities Act – the data is organised around 
three categories. Briefly put, through this analysis, light will be shed on the relationship between the 
state and HEIs in both countries, which actually is an aspect that pops up frequently and underlies 
all the categories of  analysis. 
 
 
1. Internationalisation at Home: implementing the Bologna 
Process in Portugal and in Finland 
 
It was discussed earlier in this dissertation (chapter I) that concepts like globalisation and 
Europeanisation offer explanations for similarities of practices and reforms in HE systems. The action 
of international organisations such as the OECD was also reported as crucial for “(…) creating, 
legitimising or ignoring impetuses for national reforms” (Kauko and Diogo 2011: 118). In addition, 
it is argued that NPM ideology and practice was also disseminated by international organisations’ 
agendas (e.g. OECD, EC, etc.), offering explanation for similarities in national HE policies. 
However, the processes of globalisation and Europeanisation tend to overlook the importance of 
local factors and actors (Santos 2004; Enders 2004; Pereyra 2008). Examples of these localisms are 
the economic contrast of both countries, historical and cultural specifics as well as structural 
characteristics of political-administrative systems, which may explain differences in policy design, 
implementation processes and national outcomes.  
At the system level, Portugal and Finland are examples of countries that have embarked on 
changes supported by an international context which otherwise would be difficult (and even sluggish) to 
undertake. In fact, it is this capability to promote change or reorganise various HE systems, which 
sparked interest in studying the Bologna process, considered one of the most far-reaching reforms that 
has taken place in the history of the European University (Neave and Maassen 2007: 138-139). At the 
institutional level, the literature suggests a move from a model which blends traditional (collegial) 
norms and values with managerial elements, which can be seen by the increasing presence of external 
stakeholders in HEIs’ governance bodies, the centralisation of decision-making processes, 
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professionalisation of management, emphasis on performance measurement and bibliometric 
indicators, etc. (Deem 2001; Carvalho and Santiago 2010; Magalhães et al. 2013; Diogo 2014).  
In order to understand how such different countries implemented similar HE policies and the 
approaches used, it is necessary to understand the nature of the policy process (policy formulation 
and implementation). The analyses start with the Bologna process and then a similar analysis follows 
for the new legal frameworks for HEIs in both countries.  
This category encompasses several themes once it addresses the whole political process 
(background for change, policy formulation and implementation) of  the Bologna process in both 
countries, as well as its operationalisation. In this way, the analysis starts to focus on how this reform 
was organised and implemented at the system level. After being aware how actors perceived these 
dynamics, and the nature of  the process, the analysis then focuses on the significance attributed to 
Bologna and how different attitudes towards the process impacted (differently) on the 
implementation and institutionalisation of  the Bologna process at the institutional level.  
 
1.1 Political organisation of the Bologna process in Portugal –Context, 
Processes and Mechanisms of Policy Implementation 
 
Starting officially in the academic year of  2006/07, the implementation of  the Bologna process 
in Portugal was, from the beginning, a long and controversial process. Since 1995 until November 
2015 there have been nine different Ministers in charge of  HE in Portugal, which may condition 
the way the system operates. Adjusting the legal framework to the Bologna declaration required a 
change of  the Education System Act passed by Parliament, which defined the type and length of  
degrees each HEI could award (Veiga, Rosa and Amaral 2005: 95). This only happened in 2005 
when a new government came into office (XVII Constitutional Government) with a clear 
parliamentary majority and was able to amend the law.  
Law 49/2005 passed by the Parliament on the 30th of  August introduced important changes in 
the Education System Act, allowing for the adoption of  the Bologna organisational model 
composed of  three cycles of  studies and it emphasised the transition from a traditional teaching 
paradigm to a student-learning paradigm. 
During the period before the passing of  Law 49/2005 there were several public discussions 
concerning the interpretation and the implementation of  the Bologna objectives by different 
stakeholders (e.g. DGES, people in charge of  central administration bodies, CCISP, CRUP, SNESup, 
etc.). On the one hand, the government passed legislation to introduce the ECTS system and the 
compulsory use of  the Diploma Supplement, and appointed specialised task forces to work on the 
implementation of  the law (Veiga et al. 2005: 95). On the other hand, in the absence of  legislation 
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or guidance from a superior level, Portuguese HEIs, aware of  international trends and developments 
performed by their European counterparts that had already implemented the Bologna process, 
became quite desperate with the delays of  governmental regulation. This was not a smooth process, 
a fact that was easily acknowledged by the great majority of  the interviewees, including system level 
actors. 
“This happened without an appropriate involvement of institutions and individuals working within 
HE; it happened much from the outside to the inside. New laws, very strict guidelines were created 
and then institutions uncritically took those and did something (6Ps*). 
 
A note should be included to mention that only public universities had the autonomy to do these 
initiatives. As a matter of  fact, previously to the Bologna process, the Portuguese university of  this 
case study initiated a curricular reform by internal initiative in 1998. It consisted of  an exercise titled 
Rethinking Curricula where institutional actors from different disciplinary fields and with different 
roles gathered to think on how the university should be organised for the forthcoming changes, 
how one should be looking to HE, its governance and challenges. The process of  internal renewal 
lasted about 4 years (up to 2002) and, due to its usefulness, it was considered the precursor or, in 
the words of  one of  its leaders, “a healthy anticipation of  the current implementation of  the 
Bologna process in this institution”. Institutional actors, especially academics and administrative 
staff, shared these feelings. 
“We had already spent several years debating the competences’ issue, what in fact students need 
when they finish a degree… So we had already done this reflection on what young people need to 
be employable, competitive, to live their working life after leaving the university” (4PUa).  
 
Simultaneously, and although the Rethinking the Curricula project provided some leeway to introduce 
change at the system level, interviewees were also aware of  the different types of  imposition, i.e. the 
different sources and directions moving change: 
“In the case of this university, we had gone through somewhat similar experiences with what was 
called ‘rethink the curricula’ and therefore there was already the experience of thinking transversely 
the entire university and how to introduce changes in the training we provide. The university had 
already made those experiences, and I think this brought new dynamics, also as a result of previous 
ones. We already had what we’ve called the ‘first common year’ in which the bulk of training was 
uniform for sciences and engineering. And then we had this process of revising the curricula. The 
big difference is that the other ‘projects’ were completely internal but the Bologna process was an 
external pressure both in terms of timing, comparison with other universities, etc. (3PUt). 
 
“Implementing Bologna in the Portuguese system represents a reconstruction of HE in Portugal, 
but a restructuring which was not only dictated by our desires or according to what we thought” 
(5PUa). 
 
“The process had a very European beginning, then it became very much nationalised and then 
even very much localised because ultimately, and as it would be expectable, universities were the 
ones that implemented the process” (1PUa*).  
 
It would be expected that such previous advancements in the curricular organisation and 
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institutional mission of  the university would make it easier to implement a major reform like the 
Bologna process, or at least make it “less painful” to accommodate change in this university than in 
other institutions, once the staff  was already aware of  somehow similar processes. However, when 
the official implementation of  Bologna arrived, it seems that 
“(…) all of that [previous institutional changes] was forgotten. We have here an excellent case of 
an university that did things in time, that had a Vice-Rector steering the process, that had the 
involvement of all departments and which had a decentralised structure and then, these things 
from the outside came to the institutions, and one made what we have now. And it’s worth to 
check if what we have now is anything better than what we had before. So I don’t think we have 
been sufficiently autonomous to say: ‘this is what we have to do, so give us now some time for us 
to organise and see how we will do it here, and do it well!’ No, what happened is that we picked 
up all those things and quickly implemented them (6Ps*). 
 
These quotations seem to reveal that even before HEIs in Portugal being submitted to coercive 
pressures to implement Bologna, they have started the process on their own. This may be classified 
as normative isomorphism since academics were aware of the European discussions and trends. 
Therefore, the role of academics and other professionals within the academia from different HEISs 
ended up creating or accelerating developing (some) pressure and information for change that was 
not only imposed by the state, but also by professionals. 
The implementation of the Bologna process in Portugal gained a new breath in March 2006, 
after the government passed the Decree-Law 74/2006 dated of 24th March, creating the necessary 
legal framework to adapt the old study programmes according to the Bologna degree structure. The 
government opened then a call for HEIs to submit their proposals adapting former degrees to the 
new degree structure. Around 1500 proposals were presented, which came as a surprise to the 
Ministry as it expected that only in exceptional cases, proposals would be submitted (Veiga and 
Amaral 2009). This is so because, although the formal deadline to implement the Bologna degree 
structure ended in the academic year of 2009/2010, the time stated in the legislation to adapt the 
old study degree structure to the new one was two weeks. An actor, operating at the system level, 
provides a summary of this process: 
“In Portugal things happened like this: a diploma was created to change the configuration of the 
study cycles and institutions - in a very short time – had to make the changes and register the study 
cycles according to what the law imposed (...). And institutions, in fact, did it very quickly. And it 
was a relatively ludicrous process because the diploma was published, giving a deadline to HEIs 
that ended before the legislation entered actually into force because everything had to be 
completed rapidly! (…) Of course this was made, assuming that HEIs had their homework done, 
and therefore this would be a mere formal aspect: deliver to the Ministry what was already done. 
And after this was done, in a very much Portuguese way, the Bologna process was done, period. 
Basically it was reduced to the reconfiguration of the courses and study cycles, and definitely the 
Bologna process is not this” (3Ps). 
 
However, these different but parallel periods – the government open call stated in the DL 74/2006 
to submit proposals and the formal deadline for implementing the new degree structure – created 
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an environment of  tension and somehow contradictory opinions… This is, in fact, pointed as one 
of  the most nonsense aspects in the way the process was executed and it was highly criticised by all 
interviewees, including some system level actors who even ridiculed the fast speed that the legislation 
obliged institutions to rearrange their degrees’ structure. Nevertheless, it is also important to 
remember that these perceptions reflect interviewees’ views, which are naturally biased by their role 
and also their political assumptions and preferences. 
“It was too hasty. Everything was publicly announced not even within a month time, so then 
everything had to be rushed. In the first 2 years, during the adaptation of the study cycles to the 
DL 74/2006, institutions didn’t have time to organise. In some cases, they sent only the first page 
of the process because they knew that according to the administrative code, the DGES could not 
reject linearly the processes and there had to be a dialogue and time for hearing the stakeholders. 
So the processes could be completed in this phase. Yet, there were some restrictions in the law 
(…), things that were left for the A3ES [Quality Agency] to do later on. We were waiting for an 
Agency that came too late because, in practice, the Agency only started to work in 2010. So, there 
was a 4-years interregnum in which, even if the DGES would like to intervene, it couldn’t do 
anything properly” (4Ps).  
 
This is an example of  a somehow contradictory view of  the process. The interviewee refers that 
during 2 years, HEIs did not have the time to organise their proposals, which somehow confirms 
the previous interviewee (3Ps) who states that HEIs did not have their homework done and assumes 
that 2 years time is not enough for some institutional organisation... Then, it continues the discourse 
saying that although the degrees’ adaptation process could not be totally rejected, even if  it was 
incomplete, there was time to conclude it later on, although there were mechanisms in the law which 
could restrict the adaption process, while simultaneously states that the DGES could not intervene 
at all… Such contradictory ideas can also be explained by the temporal distance between the years that 
have passed since these events have happened and the time interviewees were conducted, i.e. 
interviewees’ discourse is now somehow twisted.  
However, national academics and administrative staff  share similar views with respect to the 
first stage of  the implementation process at the institutional level. These perceptions already take 
into account the previous curricular changes in the institution where actors work: 
“HEIs didn’t have the time to organise aspects related with specific contents because there was a 
hellish bureaucracy. There was the need to answer to the DGES, which in turn didn’t know how 
to handle this situation, as it was inundated with thousands of processes. There were so many 
programmes that there weren’t enough evaluation committees or experts to analyse the processes, 
one only had time to check if the forms were completely filled. (…) There were preliminary 
preparatory documents and several meetings... The Ministry’s auditions came with concrete things 
to discuss, and institutions feared much what was going to happen. (…) These problems [related 
to teachers’ training, for example] were highly discussed because they were also very controversial, 
but it was an internal discussion. Each institution then solved things differently...” (5PUa). 
 
“There was in fact an imposition. Also because there was not much time for HEIs to adapt their 
courses. (…) Then the process became a race between institutions even if it wasn’t an obligation, 
although institutions have chosen that route” (6PUa*). 
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“The initial phase was very troubled because the entire legislative process and the adaptation 
deadline of the programmes was done under a lot of (time) pressure” (1PUt). 
 
Thus, again, it can be seen that the common discourse is that HEIs did not have enough time to organise 
themselves, it is also acknowledged that nothing forced institutions to make the adaptation process in 
such a hurry. What happened is that they feared to lose competitive advantages if  they would not 
follow the Ministry guidelines as soon as possible. Furthermore, as it will be perceived alongside this 
analysis, top management and middle management actors tend to be more critical about their own 
performance regarding this subject. 
Another factor that helped to increase confusion and discomfort between the relationship of  
the government and HEIs was the fact that when the legislation was passed, the Ministry only 
approved the proposals that were in line with the patterns that it believed to be more appropriated. 
At the institutional level, as it was perceived during the interviews, this meant frustration, once 
institutions felt their efforts during the preparation time were not valued.  
“The process was absolutely top-down. It was coercive, bureaucratic and normative, although this 
is not necessarily bad. At the beginning, it only pretended to actually happen, but it didn’t. I mean, 
we’ve changed everything: we’ve changed the study cycles, we’ve adapted the training and 
programmes according to ECTS, skills, etc., on paper all those things happened, but in reality they 
didn’t, yet. In fact – and this is the downside of Bologna – the essence of the reform remains to 
be done” (4PUtm). 
 
“There was a lot of confusion. People didn’t understand quite well what they should do, because 
despite all the literature and guidance documents, there were many regulations, information, but 
there was a lack of… ability to organise all this information in a useful manner by the people who 
could really take the reins of this process. There have been advances and setbacks for a long time. 
It was a very complex process. (...) I remember certain meetings about the reformulation of the 
courses that were rather grim. It wasn’t smooth at all” (5PUa). 
 
And this is also the general perception of  system level actors, including the former head of  CRUP: 
“After all the work institutions had in preparing the proposals to change the programmes, the 
Ministry only approved those which were in accordance with its patterns, according to its own 
judgment. If this was the purpose, it should have been agreed in advance, before launching 
institutions in this stressful and unnecessary process, which was totally inconclusive and a waste 
of time” (Ps 2009).  
 
These findings confirm Veiga and Amaral (2009) conclusions on the fact that HEIs made an attempt 
at the fast implementation of  the new system, considering that Bologna-followers would have an 
advantage over Bologna-laggards in the competition for students. Indeed, this situation impelled the 
researchers to admit the hypothesis that the implementation process “... corresponds to 
implementation ‘in form’ rather than ‘in substance’, thus softening tensions between the European 
and the national and local levels” (2009: 58). Curiously, and although the paths of  both countries in 
implementing Bologna are different, Finnish system level actors admitted that, regarding the re-
adaptation of  the programmes, deeper and effective reflections and actions are needed:   
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“Now it’s maybe the most important development target are the curricula, especially from the 
point of view of learning outcomes and students’ centred-learning, because most people think that 
we changed the curricula, developed and improved it and so on. But I think mostly, what we did, 
was writing it in a new way. There weren’t actually real changes, and now I think we should look 
again at the curricula and also assessment of learning, I think” (5Fs*). 
 
On the other hand, and as Portuguese interviewees also recognised, both at the system and 
institutional levels, despite the level of  autonomy universities have, and the initiatives taken to not 
become the “Bologna laggards”, there was a lack of  institutional initiative compounded by fears and 
longings when it came to take action on the implementation process.  
“(…) universities, at least some of them, waited, as usual, for the central power to decide. But the 
central government takes a long time to decide, and, as there was an initial target for 2010, and 
also a government commitment, it is obvious that then, everything had to be done by all means… 
This means that there were decisions taken at the central government level and universities had to 
conform with those because they hadn’t done the homework they should. In my opinion, 
universities should have worked together in order to have realistic proposals to present to the 
Ministry so that they would be seen as a coherent set” (2PUmm). 
 
Assuming (Portuguese) HEIs as an institutional field, these data shows that there was a 
weakening of  the institutional field, considering that there was not a concerted and organised 
position from HEIs. Interviewees had the feeling that universities were not able to organise their 
institutional field in a way that could be translated in a common and useful answer to this specific 
external pressure. In fact, one can raise the hypothesis that an increasing competitive environment 
turns the recognition of  the field less clear, a situation that, in turn, represents an obstacle to the 
definition of  political initiatives from the bottom to the top. Another possibility explaining this 
weakening of  the institutional field and dependence of  the government actions may be related with 
past experiences and with the previous knowledge academia professionals have concerning HE 
policy design and implementation, as most of  them reported that their views were not taken into 
account. This hypothesis corroborates the fact that some academics even feel that there were no 
negotiations at all, and everything regarding the main topics on the Bologna agenda were already 
(pre)decided. For example, with respect to the length of  the new study cycles, some interviewees 
feel that the debate whether the standard new model would be 3+2 or 4+1/2 was a “waste of  time”, 
once there were already enough “signs” pointing to the common main trend of  3+2. 
“I think the worst part was when the Ministry, and working groups, etc., insisted on constant 
discussions about whether the new degree model should be 3+2 or 4+1 or whatever! By that time 
the discussion was practically irrelevant, it didn’t make sense anymore because it had already been 
stipulated the 3+2 in the majority of European countries! (...) The truth is that there is a part of 
Bologna that was rarely focused… Well, now one understands this better because of the crisis, 
which relates to the economic side, because if I want to increase mobility, I need a currency. So, 
faced with the economic crisis and unemployment, if I want people to leave the economic crisis 
and make them going from one place to another, I have to ensure mobility with more or less 
understandable mechanisms all over Europe, a system with simple references and which 
simultaneously gives information on the capabilities and skills of people. And this is the basis of 
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Bologna; it came with the Euro package and all these EU things!” (2PUa)  
 
Interesting is that similar to Portuguese academics, some of  Finnish interviewed academics and 
middle management actors gave similar answers about the lack of  discussions and decision-making 
power at the level of  basic units: 
“If there were negotiations at all, they happened at a very top-level, I mean between the 
government and universities’ top management, particularly rectors, because below that, even with 
the unions, professors, disciplinary groups, it seems to me that nothing happened. I might be 
wrong, but I know that there weren’t many negotiations, which means that this was a very top-
down process. I have nothing against top-down processes as long as they are informed by a 
bottom-up flow. But when this bottom-up flow doesn’t exist, it turns out to happen what we have 
now: an imposition that came from above and order us that ‘from day x you must have a 
completely new philosophy in terms of the teaching-learning process, different evaluation 
structures, a new degree system, students have to get used to new methods, etc.’ So this leads me 
to think that everything was done off the cut which means in terms of implementation, we are 
very far from the Bologna process goals” (1PUa*). 
 
A similar perception is pointed by a Finnish academic with middle management functions: 
“I don’t think there was much dialogue. As far as I can remember, I don’t think I’ve been involved 
or our department has been involved in any kind of discussion about the process. (...) I think that 
like many reforms in Finland there is more a feeling of imposing the reform and not sort of 
engaging people in a dialogue, or if there is dialogue it is a kind of faced-value dialogue, like “ok, 
we basically made the decision already, but let us hear your views and ideas.” (3FUmm). 
 
Thus, institutional interviewees melancholically mentioned that despite all the endeavours 
institutional staff  developed towards the implementation of  the Bologna process, it would have 
been beneficial to work more in collaboration with each other. In this way, some interviewees 
believed they would have been more powerful to negotiate and/or adjust their proposals with the 
Ministry’s views. This reflection upon HEIs behaviour also explains the weakening of  the 
institutional field mentioned above. Nevertheless, and reminding that perceptions vary according to 
the time frame when questions were asked and also according to the role interviewees have, since 
2008, several developments had occurred in the Portuguese HE system, involving stakeholders such 
as professional orders and unions. Currently, even if  some interviewees replied that there were no 
negotiations and/or debates, and that everything was discussed already when change came to be 
implemented at the institutional level, it is acknowledged that there were several trials of  strengths 
about the length and organisation, and even the nomenclatures of  the study cycles, such as Medicine, 
Dentistry, Veterinary Medicine, Law, Architecture and Pharmacy. For example, the length of  the 1st 
cycle of  a Law degree is 4 years (8 semesters) and comprises 240 ECTS. Thus, on the other hand, 
there were also some institutional level actors from both subsystems who recognised that although 
it was not an easy reform, there was room for public hearings and negotiations. 
“It wasn’t easy at all. But I think there was an exchange of ideas. Yes, there was an exchange of 
ideas and hearings and proving that is the fact that actually for some courses, this [Bologna] was 
done quite easily, changing the old bachelors (licenciaturas) to courses of 3+2: bachelor + master. I 
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do think that there was that kind of deliberations at the national level because there are courses 
that due to their specificity, such as medicine and some engineering, a different framework had to 
be respected and I think that there was that kind of openness” (2PPmm). 
 
In parallel with the discussions on the restructuration of  the degree structure, as well as the other 
Bologna’s objectives, and also due to the uncertainty climate regarding the question of  the 
operationalisation of  the binary system, one could observe from the polytechnic subsector attempts 
to redefine their academic functions, thus becoming more similar to universities.  Indeed, as Amaral 
(2003) concluded from the results of  a national public inquiry run for the MCTES, and after a 
number of  seminars and meetings with the heads of  HEIs and professors, it was even proposed 
that the distinguishing factors between the two subsystems should not exist. This distinction should 
rather be based on each institution’s strategy and on its scientific and technological capacity. Thus, 
the dominant discourses proclaimed that both subsystems should be transformed into a single 
system. Within this unitary system, the distinguishing characteristics of  HEIs would be their ability 
to provide training more focused on the transmission and creation of  knowledge (regardless of  its 
practical or theoretical character) or on their more vocational orientation. Nevertheless, when 
confronted with the hypothesis of  breaking the current organisation of  the system, this 
restructuration was seen as a mistake comparable to what happened in the 1970s, when the industrial 
and commercial schools were abolished (Gonçalves et al. 2003). Other suggestions on the length of  
studies and the type of  degrees that HEIs could award were made, leading to the conclusion that it 
was difficult to reach consensus among all types of  institutions with respect to the implementation 
of  the Bologna system (Diogo 2009). Veiga and Amaral (2009: 57) explained that, at a time when 
considerable academic drift was perceived in the polytechnic subsystem, it was necessary to carefully 
analyse the compatibility of  the binary system with the two-tier degree framework, because the 
binary structure was endangered. Nevertheless, as the authors refer, “(...) when the legislation was 
finally passed it became clear that the government had aimed to preserve, or even reinforce, the 
binary system. This Ministerial decision was strongly influenced by the 2005 OECD 
recommendations, which attested that the system should consolidate its binary nature. Figure 1 
schematises the implementation of  the Bologna process in Portugal, focusing on its political 
organisation. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Political organisation of  the implementation of  the Bologna process in Portugal 
 
 
 
 278 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Not only was the Bologna process used – at least until today – to strengthen the binary 
divide of  the Portuguese HE system. At the institutional level, several examples of  the 
instrumentalisation of  the Bologna process were given by interviewees, namely by academics and 
middle management actors. For example, at the Languages Department, Bologna was used to “(…) 
restructure de department due to one main reasons: this department was among the first ones in 
Portugal to train teachers and providing this kind of  diploma” (4PUmm). As such, the department 
used the debates on the degrees’ reorganisation and their content, the discussions on the need to 
establish closer connections between the university and the civil society and the outside world to 
create new interdisciplinary programmes (e.g. Languages and Business Skills; Languages and 
Editorial Studies; Languages and Specialised Translation). In this way, the existence of  a trading 
currency usually identified as the credit system is pointed as a facilitator of  aspects such as mobility, 
transparency, organisation and building up of  the curricula, and also of  institutional and 
programmatic accreditation. Some academics and top-management actors expressed these views 
“I used to say that Bologna uses bricks of a certain format to facilitate the construction I want. By 
that time [implementation process] one debated whether the disciplines should have 5 or 4 ECTS 
or 7... No! It’s not like this! The ECTS can be constructed according to what I want: I lecture these 
contents, I suggest the workloads that I believe to be suitable for what I lecture, and it’s not the 
other way around! I can say that Bologna created a simple way of building things and I think there’s 
a big advantage on that” (2PUa).  
 
“Without the ECTS system, accreditation and certification processes wouldn’t be that easier, 
right?” (4PUtm*). 
 
Moreover, the process was also appropriated by the professional associations/orders and academics 
who feared loosing their discipline or the prestige associated to it when translating students’ workload 
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to ECTS. By other words, during the curricular organisation, it could be noticed a competition 
among academics which aimed at maintaining the traditional concepts of  their disciplines in order 
to ensure the continuity of  their jobs and to make the new Bologna bachelors similar to the old 
ones in order to facilitate adaptation. In parallel, one could also observe how professional 
associations represented the interests of  their professions by adapting their statutes to maintain 
and/or upgrade the necessary requirements for the practice of  different professions. Most 
professional associations in Portugal required a licenciatura degree, which used to last 4 or 5 years 
(before the implementation of  the Bologna process) in order to have admission to the professional 
order and therefore be able to exercise the profession. To maintain the demand level prior to the 
Bologna process, these bodies had to reduce the requirements to access the association or to make 
amendments in their statutes, replacing the licenciatura degree by the master degree. As the great 
majority of  professional bodies believed that the minimum requirements should be maintained, it 
was necessary to find a compromise between the old and the new models. This is why most of  
(liberal) professions require the master degree to access the professional association and 
consequently to practice the profession. Nevertheless, besides all the hastiness in which the process 
was translated at the institutional level, interviewees criticised other aspects where Bologna was 
(mis)used for national agendas, as for example, to introduce more unhealthy competition in the 
system and within and among HEIs worsening the working environment, the use (and abuse) of  
instruments to measure almost everything, as curricula comparability, students and faculty workload, 
as well as the (dis)prestige of  certain disciplines in favour to others, etc.  
 
1.2 Political organisation of the Bologna process in Finland – Context, 
Processes and Mechanisms of Policy Implementation 
 
Based on interviewees’ perceptions as well as on the literature review, the implementation of  
the Bologna process in Finland, although not always easy and/or uncomplicated, was still smoother 
than in Portugal. One of  the possible reasons explaining this difference of  experiences relates to 
cultural aspects of  looking at political changes through a perspective of  continuity and evolution 
rather than revolution (cf. chapter III). Another possible rationale relates to the previous reforms 
that the Finnish HE system has been through in the 1970s and 1990s (cf. chapter IV). In this way, 
although there have been important changes introduced with the Bologna process, generally 
speaking, its degree of  novelty is not perceived as being particularly high as portrayed by the 
Portuguese respondents.  
It is also a fact that both countries put different emphasis in the changes imposed by the 
Bologna process. For example, a central aspect of  the 1999 Declaration that was (and still is) given 
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more attention in Portuguese HE than in the Finnish panorama was “(…) the transition from a 
passive education paradigm based on the acquisition of  knowledge to a model based on the 
development of  competences, both generic – instrumental, interpersonal and systemic – and 
specifically associated with the training area, where experimental and project components play an 
important role” (DL 74/2006: 2243). The emphasis placed in this aspect of  the Declaration should 
be understood in the light of  different national teaching and learning traditions, as well as differences 
in the profiles of  Portuguese and Finnish students. Furthermore, as Välimaa et al. (2007: 48) refer, 
among the objectives stated in the Prague (2001) and in the Berlin (2003) Communiqués, only two 
of  the original national policy concerns – the two-cycle system of  degrees (including changing the 
structure and content of  curricula) and the mobility of  students – have remained on the national 
political agenda of  the Bologna process. In turn, the idea of  QA and assessment procedures as well 
as the development of  evaluation practices have been in force in Finnish HE since the mid-1990s 
(Saarinen and Ala-Vähälä 2007), being revitalised after the Berlin Communiqué (Huusko 2006). In 
fact, a middle management actor (responsible for the implementation of  the QA system in two 
different Finnish universities and who has not teaching duties) stated that at the beginning of  the 
Bologna process, the QA system was not a priority and it was actually pushed aside for a while, 
coming up only few years later when universities realised that they still had that task to accomplish. 
“I think it [the QA system] wasn’t very much connected to the Bologna process itself but it was 
something that had to be started because we had the national guidelines – that came from the 
European guidelines – to make QA. Although I have to say that when I started here to develop 
the QA framework, something had already been done before, but we were quite few at the 
beginning by that time. And (…) I had to ask them how strict they have been reading the Bologna 
process and whether they noticed that there was also a QA system to implement (…) In Finland, 
we have a large scope for the QA. It’s not just education, it’s wider, (…) it’s not only Bologna, 
but something that develops all over the university: not only education, but also research, 
management, leadership, and this third task of innovation and interaction with society. So, it 
concerns to all this and with the process of auditing, checking the QA system, all these areas. And 
this is why in my opinion, the QA system it is not only connected with the Bologna process” 
(4FUmm). 
 
This was also the perception of  one system level actor. 
“One very interesting result was that the institutions don’t connect the Bologna process and QA 
almost at all. We were very surprised because of course the most important fact behind this 
Finnish audit model is this Berlin Communiqué from 2003 and the Bologna Process, but in 
practical work, people don’t connect the QA frameworks with the Bologna process (5Fs*). 
 
Few references were given to the topic of  quality, and actors tended to associate the focus on quality 
(improvement) more with one of  the rationales behind the process of  merging institutions than 
with the Bologna guidelines. As a mater of fact, initially, and such as it happened with most of the 
signatory countries of the Bologna declaration, the priority with the establishment of the process in 
Finland was the adoption of the new two-tier degree structure, as well as changing the content and 
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structure of the curricula. This way of prioritising the different aspects of  the Bologna declaration, 
or, by other words, the weight assigned to the different objectives of  the process, evidenced a 
stronger institutional field in Finnish HE system when compared to the Portuguese HE system. 
This fact is also explained by the way Finnish politics work, as analysed in chapter IV and as the data 
that will be presented here attest. 
It is also important to remember that in Finland the adoption of the new degrees system has 
been facilitated by previous reforms in the system. Between 1994 and 1997, it was reintroduced a 
new degree structure to most of the university fields of study, based on two main cycles: a three-
year 1st cycle university degree (kandidaatin tutkinto) – the lower academic degree, and a higher 2nd 
cycle university degree (maisterin tutkinto) – the higher academic degree, which takes another two 
years to complete after the lower academic (1st cycle) degree (Universities Act 645/1997). The 
revision of the degree programmes was made, based on evaluations carried out by universities and 
the Council for HE (Knutell, 2002). The aims of this revision were to reduce graduation times and 
make degrees broader, more flexible and internationally comparable (Eurydice 2000: 466-468; 
Knutell 2002).  
It should be noticed that even before the implementation of the Bologna process, bachelor 
level degrees were not valid for the labour market, and the majority of students went directly to the 
master degree (FMEC 2013). As explained by Knutell (2002), due to the especial nature of the 
Finnish labour market, degree students in most fields of study pursue a master degree right after the 
bachelor. The master degree was (and still is) the minimum required degree to access to most 
professions in Finland, e.g. public sector positions (Knutell 2002; Sahlberg 2010). As a matter of 
fact, there are contradictory opinions regarding the usefulness of the bachelor degree as a certificate 
for the labour market. This divergence is connected, on the one hand, with the (lack of) 
employability of students having only a bachelor degree and, on the other hand, with the skills and 
expertise required (and expected) by the Finnish labour market and society (Knutell 2002; Välimaa 
et al. 2007; Sahlberg 2010). Easily put, possible explanations for the debate on the pertinence of  the 
bachelor degree as the starting point for the working life relate to the increasing competition 
perceived by students who feel they should acquire the maximum possible skills in order to be better 
equipped to compete in the labour market. Additionally, as referred by some interviewees, it would 
not be normal or even desirable that, after having achieved a tradition in which most students reach 
a certain level of  education (the master degree in the Finnish case), to retreat to the bachelor degree. 
As the system expands and becomes universal, it is expectable that the average level of  education 
of  a society moves forward instead of  stepping back – as it was also declared in the Lisbon strategy. 
In this sense, except for the purely economic side, the Bologna model does not comply with the 
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Nordic model of  HE. By other words, regardless of  supranational policy, and international 
influences, the Finnish case shows nation-states’ traditions and cultures have been more powerful 
or stronger in the development of  HE policies. In parallel, or consequently, it was explained that, at 
the level of  the basic units, training is still thought and organised with this tradition in mind, i.e. the 
bachelor degree is planned in continuation/alongside with the master degree.  
“I would say that they haven’t fully achieved the two-tier degree system because when we enrol 
students, we still enrol them to pursue both the bachelor and the master degrees. And when I talk 
to the faculties, they are not even trying to make the bachelor degree an independent degree in the 
sense that it could be the final degree. They still don’t see it in that way. The Ministry has recently 
started to talk about the possibility of making the bachelor degree as the final degree (…). Even in 
those countries where the vast majority of students have just got their bachelors, the portion of 
students who continue their studies to the master degree is enormous because the more universal 
HE becomes, the more important is for a larger number of students to get something more than 
the basic degree. (…) So the idea of suddenly saying, “the bachelor degree is quite sufficient, don’t 
continue your studies, go home and start working”, that is against what is really going on” (3FUtm). 
 
“What happens is that the bachelor and the master are somehow mixed up and when people are 
doing their bachelor they are already preparing or thinking and taking courses for their master and 
so on. In Physics, this bachelor degree has no value at all. If you go to the working market, this 
has no value, and people always have to do the master. (…) There’s little value now in the bachelor, 
I’d say, no value” (1FUmm). 
 
Interesting enough is that these opinions were quite consensual among all institutional level actors, 
namely those in favour of  the Bologna process, i.e. top-management and middle management 
interviewees: “the 3+2 degree model did not fit well in areas where the former master degree was 
scheduled for 4 years, like in business and economics” (2FUtm). In turn, interviewed Deans, 
confessed to fear that master degrees will loose importance and meaning if  bachelor degrees start 
to be appreciated/valorised. At the same time, they doubt whether the labour market will accept them:  
“One risk of giving such emphasis to the bachelor level is that we are a bit afraid that the master 
level will maybe lose its status, because we’ve always been regarded as a country which appreciates 
a longer and more comprehensive education. (…) We really appreciate real and qualified studies. 
A qualified profession must have longer studies, also the master level” (2FUmm). 
 
These data show that even after some years have passed since the declaration was formally 
implemented in Finnish universities, bachelor degrees are still “worthless” in the labour market 
without a master degree, and Bologna did not change this reality. At least, the picture at the national 
level continues to be the same as it was before the declaration. In turn, the reality of  Finnish 
polytechnics’ degrees regarding this issue differs substantially from Finnish universities. 
Polytechnics’ graduates tend to find a job after finishing their bachelor. Moreover, applicants to 
polytechnics master degrees’ need to hold a bachelor followed by at least 3 years of  relevant work 
experience (FMEC 2012). 
“But this is a problem for research universities. The bachelor programmes of universities of applied 
sciences are different, are very employable” (5Fs*). 
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The excessive graduation time to complete studies has been one of  the traditional concerns of  
Finnish HE, particularly in universities (Välimaa et al. 2007: 46). It was believed that by reducing the 
length of  degrees, students would easily complete their degrees and leave universities sooner. In 
fact, according to most of  Finnish interviewees, this is a problem that “has been around forever” 
despite efforts to shorten the time for Finnish students to complete their studies. However, in 
practice this did not happen yet, which denotes one of  the flaws in implementing the Bologna 
process in Finnish HE, as it did not encourage students to take (only) the bachelor degree, as 
interviewees referred: “So this has been one of  the things that has been constantly under attack, but it 
hasn’t really changed yet” (1Fs).  
In addition to the prolongation of  studies, other problems could be identified in Finnish HE, 
namely the high dropout rate from HE and the transition from HE to work. Dropping out of  HE 
has been considered a problem both at the system and at the institutional levels (Välimaa et al. 2007: 
46). The authors explain that this hinders social reproduction of  society through education and 
increases competition for students amongst HEIs. Again, Bologna was seen as a tool that would 
help to decrease the number of  dropouts because the chance of  students receiving a HE degree 
would increase. 
Another problem identified in Finland by the time of  implementing Bologna was the need to 
optimise transition from HE to the world of  work. The new two-tier degree structure would make 
it easier to move from HEIs to the working life (Jussi Välimaa, Hoffman, & Huusko, 2007). Again, 
this is an aspect interrelated with the prolongation of  studies and with the employability of  
university students holding a bachelor degree “only”. Finnish system level interviewees 
acknowledged that this problem is not solved yet, which might be due to the fact that 
“There is this tradition of having a masters degrees. Everybody has to have a master degree and it 
hasn’t changed. And I don’t think it depends only on the employers: it is such a stronger tradition 
that even the bachelors themselves don’t believe they are employable in the society” (5Fs*). 
 
It was also believed that the new degree structure, combined with the modularisation of  studies and 
comparable degrees, would enhance the objectives of  lifelong learning as well as increase mobility 
of  Finnish students. Traditionally, the mobility among Finnish students has been lower when 
compared to other (32) countries (Eurodata 2006).  Only recently, the number of  Finnish students 
going abroad for a short-term mobility programme and/or for doing a whole degree has been 
increasing (Eurodata 2006; CIMO 2013). Based on the empirical data collected, is it possible to say 
that the main reason explaining low mobility of  Finnish students relates to their age. Finnish 
students enter a HEI at an older age than their European colleagues and, as mentioned above, they 
tend to take a longer period to complete their studies. Many of  them have already established 
emotional and professional relationships, making it harder to go abroad. As these patterns are 
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changing, mobility is increasing. However, other factors need to be taken into account when 
analysing this subject. The 2005 Eurostudent report refers that students of  engineering are less likely 
to complete a study-related period abroad than students of  humanities and arts disciplines (2005: 
151). Factors as foreign language skills have also a strong influence on the international mobility of  
students, as well as supporting funding mechanisms and parents’ educational background. 
A note should be included to refer that not always the increase or decrease of  mobility is 
connected to the Bologna process: since the medieval university, academics and students had been 
spending periods abroad. Some interviewees also pointed to the “Bologna prior context” which 
enabled exchange periods: 
“I don’t think so, because the foreign students coming to our department are not the result of the 
Bologna process, it’s the result of ERASMUS exchange, which already existed before Bologna. So 
I don’t think Bologna has increased the number of students. We always had a relatively fair number 
of exchange students in our department but very few come here to do their whole degree” 
(3FUmm).  
 
Thus, as the authors explain, faced with HEIs’ resistance towards the idea of  the Bologna process, 
i.e. in order to facilitate the implementation process, the FMEC promoted Bologna as the solution 
for the problems of  the national HE system, thereby pacifying institutions’ resistance. This initial 
step was necessary as Finnish academics and universities initially took a fairly negative view of  
Bologna, contrary to polytechnics, which took a positive stance on the process from the outset 
(OPM 2013). The following quotation of  a system level interviewee illustrates the initial path of  the 
Bologna process in Finland:  
“Well… the first reaction to the Bologna process was very negative here in Finland when the 
Ministry signed the Bologna declaration. So, at the Ministry, we thought that if this is the way 
HEIs, universities and polytechnics feel, then we do not insist, we will not go on implementing 
the Bologna reforms. But then the situation or the atmosphere within the HE community changed: 
universities said they want to be among the first ones in implementing the Bologna declaration, 
and this has happened quite quickly after signing the Bologna declaration” (2Fs).  
 
Although there is some variation in the degree of  enthusiasm to describe the acceptance of  the 
Bologna process in the country, there is overall consensus among system level interviewees about 
the developments on this. By other words, despite initial negative reactions, there was a “positive 
evolution” with respect to the way Bologna was initially perceived and then accepted.  
“The [Bologna] process was so positive mainly when it comes to internationalisation, quality and 
mobility. I think these were the main points for the Finnish HE system” (4Fs*). 
 
“When it came to the implementation of the Bologna process, we saw many advantages. I think it 
was done in a very close cooperation with the universities. Universities could kind of jump in the 
process. I don’t think there was any reluctance, at least regarding to the universities’ leadership. At 
this stage, they welcomed very well the ideas of the Bologna process (…)” (6Fs*).  
 
“Finland has implemented all the Bologna things quite quickly and it has been willing to be in the 
first row of the European countries doing the Bologna thing” (1Fs). 
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It can be said that such positive views on the process are very likely to happen when they come 
from system level interviewees. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that when actors perform more 
than one role, being these either at different levels of  action (e.g. system and institutional) or with 
different tasks (e.g. top-management and academic), their perceptions tend to be more critic and 
contain a mixture of  positive and negative aspects. In fact, it was mentioned previously that 
somehow similar to Portuguese interviewed academics, some Finnish actors feel that mostly, at the 
first stage of  the process, the reform happened only “on paper”. 
“I think there as a certain lack of information, because there were rumours about certain things 
we were not sure about. There was definitely some lack of information, at least at the department 
level. I’m not sure who was supposed to inform us more about that. Should have been the Dean? 
I’m not sure about that but I think there was some lack of information” (1FUa*). 
 
However, this view contrasts with other actors’ perceptions, namely from middle-management 
representatives: 
“I think they gave us the first documents about all the stuff they got and introduced us the idea 
about what we should do. That was how our Rector made the decision that we should have our 
own working group at the university. One of the Professors of Applied Linguistics was the leader 
of the group and I was the secretary, and there were members from different departments of the 
university, there were students members of the student union, and there were about 10 people in 
that working group. We made all kind of little seminars, forwarded the information to the faculties 
and departments, and then we said what we should do and what kind of things we should prepare. 
It went by little steps. (…) Our Minister of Education was quite clear in all those documents and 
I think the departments and the faculties accept them quite easily. We were quite prepared for the 
reform, I can say that” (5FUmm).  
 
At the institutional level, the perceptions reported by interviewees both at top and middle 
management positions, with rare exceptions, do not differ significantly from what system level 
interviewees mentioned about the organisation of  the process, and/or even about the process itself.  
“I have the feeling that Finland wants to be the ‘good student’, sort to say; I mean, make these 
European programmes a reality, very quickly and before everyone else. I know that in some 
countries this process has been progressing much more slowly. In Italy I have doubts if this has 
ever started! But somehow we did it in a very short period of time, very quickly and very effective. 
It was organised very effectively by the Ministry and the universities also did it very quickly 
because the Ministry required that. So, all in all, it was done quickly and effectively and that was 
well done, I think” (1FUmm).  
 
The difference in perceptions between Finnish and Portuguese actors about (the 
implementation of) the Bologna process is also related to the degree of  change assigned to it. 
Generally speaking, the level of  novelty – or the degree of  change – induced in the Finnish HE 
system and Finnish HEIs was perceived lower and more positive than in the Portuguese HE system. 
This is the overall perception of  the faculty staff, regardless their knowledge field.  
“The Bologna process was nothing really that new (…) for us, it was more or less formalised at 
the European level, but we already had some elements of it in our structure” (1FUtm). 
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“What happened was that every Physics department in Finland has created their own version of 
the thing, but then we had a responsible person and we had a few meetings to see if we could get 
some ideas from each other, how could we compare. And what we have found out was that, 
especially when it comes to the major subjects, what we ended up with was very similar” (4FUa*). 
 
It is interesting to see that both Finnish and Portuguese interviewees affiliated to Physics have very 
similar views and their perceptions on the (big) changes (or their lack) in the reorganisation of  
Physics’ degrees, programmes curricular and are quite identical. This means, that the degree of  
novelty of  the process also depends on the scientific field.  
“With respect to the licenciaturas I have some trouble saying that it was a big change. (…) The 
names are just different now: in the past it was called the bacharelato plus the licenciatura and now 
is the licenciatura [bachelor] and master. Whatever one calls it, the truth is that we didn’t came up 
with great things… Besides, I’ve done my degrees years ago and things haven’t changed much... 
(2PUa). 
 
“What underlined most conversations about the restructuring of the programmes was not so much 
the change on the transmission of knowledge. Rather, the idea was essentially how to preserve the 
volume of my supply with this change because otherwise I can have problems, considering that 
having fewer students means having fewer teachers, or to distribute less hours, so then I’ll have 
major difficulties in justifying the current size of my unit” (3PUa*). 
 
The “fast speed” described by interviewees regarding to the way the process was conducted by the 
Ministry goes in line with the literature review on the willingness of  Finnish HEIs in implementing 
the ideas of  the Bologna process and on the central role of  the FMEC in this process: 
“In Finland, the Ministry has been in a very central position during this process. At least in the 
last 5 or 6 years of the Bologna process, the Minister of Education has been the most active actor 
of this process here in Finland” (4Fs*). 
 
In 2002, Knutell referred that the development of  the implementation process has been so fast that 
the ‘opposition’ has not been able to raise any critical comments, only perhaps to some individual 
issues. Such a straightforward and rigid steering of  the process led the author to conclude that in 
Finland “(…) the Ministry of  Education may be the only institution which has an overall picture of  
the development so far and the situation today as well as the measures or strategies to be adopted 
in the future” (ibid). Thus, with respect to the political organisation of  the process and the 
relationship between the Ministry and HEIs, top and middle management interviewees confirm the 
data retrieved from the literature review. These actors summarised this interconnection between the 
FMEC and HEIs straightforwardly: “In short, supervised by the Ministry using a stick and carrot-
mechanism on universities” (2FUtm). Ironically, or in a somewhat provocative tone, Knutell (2002) 
wonders whether Finns should be thankful “(…) that there is at least one institution knowing to 
which direction we are steering our boat and what is awaiting us?” (Knutell 2002).  
The connection between Finnish HE and European HE was alive during the first momentum 
of the process (Välimaa et al. 2007: 47) and it was also visible during the interviews carried out in 
2011.  
 287 
The new degree structure was implemented in all study fields in August 2005 and divided the 
former master’s level undergraduate degree programmes into separate bachelor’s and master’s 
degrees, i.e. the 1st cycle ending with the award of a bachelor degree that is supposed to be relevant 
to European labour markets, and the 2nd cycle consisting of masters degrees. There are two 
exceptions of this model: medicine and dentistry, which kept a one-tier structure79 (Hörkkö 2004). 
The national credit allocation and accumulation system in universities was replaced by a system 
based on the principles of the ECTS, namely a comprehensive analysis of the syllabus. The 
introduction of the concept of a standardised study week in the 1970s as a unit to measure the hours 
that students need for their studies (Välimaa 2005) simplified the implementation of ECTS. 
To sum up, the challenges of adapting the Bologna process into the Finnish HE reality were 
threefold: to make changes in national legislation, to change both the content and structure of 
curricula and to create national and institutional systems of accreditation (Välimaa et al. 2007: 48). 
This happens under the new HE and research policy in Finland (the national and regional innovation 
system) that goes in line with the internationalisation of Finnish HEIs and it is closely linked with 
the creation of the EHEA and the ERA (Aarrevaara and Hölttä 2007: 204). 
With respect to the new degree structure, it is interesting to see that according to interviewees’ 
perceptions, it seems that Bologna allowed reflections about the importance, content and purpose 
of the 1st cycle of studies. An analogous process could be evidenced in Portugal, as attested by the 
Portuguese university of this case study, where an exercise to reformulate the curricula and their 
content was carried out prior to the implementation of the Bologna process. However, purposes 
(and even impacts) were different for both countries, considering that as for the Finnish HE system 
and Finnish society, the universities’ bachelor degree is considered “useless” or of little value without 
the master degree: 
“It was in the Bologna circles that we started to talk about the importance of the 1st cycle of 
studies and then emphasised the degrees and credits earned at all types of HEIs have the same 
value. The institutional profile and mission may be different, but for the students they have equal 
value and should be also valued in the labour market. So, it has brought to the Finnish discussion 
the notion that it shouldn’t be so important where you have earned your credits because they are 
equal in value, no matter what is the mission of your institution” (4Fs). 
 
This was confirmed by several academics that linked the traditional degree system with the lack of  
national and international mobility. As the great majority of  institutional level answers confirmed, 
Finnish students still tend to spend many years at the university before entering the labour market. 
                                                 
79 This one-tier structure includes the degree of  licentiate (lisensiaatti), i.e. in order to exercise the profession one 
needs to have the license to do it. This license is a degree, which corresponds to 6 years of  study (at least) and therefore 
it is above the master’s degree because it requires more study time than the bachelor and master degrees together. 
It was an exception before the Bologna process (as Finnish students are required to have a master’s degree to 
exercise the majority of  professions) and it continued like this up to the present. 
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Once again, Bologna has not yet fulfilled this national purpose of  reducing the prolongation of  
study times in Finnish universities. 
At this stage, two important aspects should be remembered. One relates to the international 
and national context where the Bologna process (and later on the New Universities Act) was 
implemented. The second, interlinked with this background, refers to the way the process was 
nationally organised and implemented.  
Finland joined the EU in 1995 and in 1999 had its first EU presidency, a fact that coincided 
with the signing of the pan-European Bologna Declaration. This proximity of events created a kind 
of EU fever, stimulating the Europeanization of Finnish HE. The expression “EU fever” is purposely 
used here with the intention of describing Finnish interviewees’ enthusiastic discourse on the 
importance and idea(l)s of joining the EU for the country and more specifically, for the HE context. 
This enthusiasm, expressed by the great majority of Finnish actors should be framed alongside with 
the political past of the country as well as the importance of external politics for the sector. As 
system and institutional level interviewees described, these events created the perception that signing 
and implementing the Bologna agenda would be a step forward in confirming the Finnish presence 
in the EU: 
“This is the Finnish common way of doing things. As you know, we have been very eager in being 
the good students. At the beginning of the 1990s there was a big depression in Finland and after 
this change, Finland tried to enter the EU. It was not because of the EU, but there was a kind of 
connection, or at least in some basic ideas. So we think it was very important and we welcomed 
very well this Bologna process in Finland. (…) It confirmed our EU membership” (4Fs*). 
 
“Finland wanted to become a true member of the EU because of our political past. Bologna was 
also used as a tool to confirm our entrance and membership in the EU” (3FUtm). 
 
“I think in Finland they welcomed it, because most of the people, especially higher educated people 
were very eager to join the Bologna process and the EU and I believe that the attitude of HEIs 
and of the administration of HEIs was very positive” (1FPmm). 
  
This data suggests that Finnish HEIs looked at the Bologna process as a way to reorganise their 
institutional field. In fact, this reorganisation of  the Finnish institutional field was followed by the 
OKM educational policy of  creating an internationally recognised high profile for HEIs (Pietilä 
2014). Finnish HEIs are encouraged to pursue focus and differentiation strategies and to reallocate 
resources to achieve a high profile and differentiate activities to meet regional need (Kettunen 2015). 
This positioning strategy that followed the implementation of  the Bologna process also shows that 
the process was seen and used as an opportunity for institutions to be framed by the supranational 
level also. By other words, the institutional field no longer operates exclusively at and for the 
institutional level, but is increasingly seen at (and by) the supranational level, with other actors and 
governance levels. And, as a matter of  fact, this behaviour of  using the Bologna process to 
reposition the institutional field does not differ much from Portuguese HEIs – at least the main 
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rationale for doing it: to enhance HEIs attractiveness at the international level and to improve their 
quality. This homogeneity of  behaviour within the HE sector tends to be translated in the emphasis 
of  research excellence, accelerated by national and institutional evaluations, benchmarking and 
funding schemes (Pietilä 2014, cf. chapter III). 
Additionally, it should be noticed that this environment for change was spurred by the EC and 
its Communiqués, urging HEIs to modernise (e.g. European HEIs are lagging behind their American 
and Asian counterparts; pressures to increase links with society and cooperation with business and 
industries; the need to be more transparent and accountable to civil society; etc.). This was referred 
by some interviewees who acknowledged the instrumentalisation of  the Bologna process for multiple 
purposes. When asked about the significance of  the process – and how this has been evolving up 
to the present, it was clear that it works as a lever to promote change and as an instrument for 
Europeanization of  HE: 
“The Bologna process was an instrument for the Europeanization of HE, so it’s there, together 
with the Lisbon agenda that introduced the knowledge triangle and modernisation of European 
universities, and now there are similar processes in all European member states. (...) As the EU 
cannot force anything, Bologna was important to achieve a voluntary commitment among member 
states and initiate a climate of reform” (3Fs). 
 
It seems thus that the European level served as a legitimisation source for implementing and 
accepting change at the national level. Nevertheless, other important events in the development of  
the Europeanisation journey of  Finnish HE which seem to be forgotten by stakeholders were 
remembered:  
“Tuning projects were important, of course. And I think that the Tuning projects are not very 
well known in Finland; people don’t know they have had a great influence in the Finnish HE 
system. I can see things that have come from the Tuning project, but there are still people who 
don’t know where they came from. For instance the influence on general skills, it came from the 
Tuning project, there are things that they are not really new. And the emphasis we put today on 
general skills comes from there, for example” (5Fs*). 
 
It is difficult to say with certainty which factors inspired Finnish politicians in the 
implementation process; whether it was this international environment or external influence that 
inspired Finnish politicians and main stakeholders to organise the implementation process 
differently. As mentioned in chapter IV, the traditional way of  policy-making in Finland, i.e. the 
common approach to establish change in the system, is to associate the intended reform to a 
common national goal, which is implemented through experiments carried out in one or more 
institution of  HE (e.g. the establishment of  the polytechnic subsystem in the mid-1990s). All 
experiments are then supported by follow-up studies (Jussi Välimaa et al., 2007). Nevertheless, we 
believe that implementing Bologna required a new political design, perhaps due to its international 
character. Being a document signed by several countries, committed in achieving common 
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objectives, should not leave much room for experimentation (Diogo 2014a). Furthermore, the 
FMEC had already had a past experience in the 1970s of  reformulating the degree system that did 
not grant the acceptance and/or sympathy from the academic community (cf. chapter V).  
Figure 11 - Political organisation of  the implementation of  the Bologna process in Finland 
Source: Adapted from OKM website (2015) | *Data gathering and evaluation methods80 
 
Thus, bearing in mind the historical path of  Finnish HE, it is easier to understand the process of  
policy design and implementation, either from the government’s side, and/or from HEIs’ viewpoint. 
A scheme of  the implementation process of  the Bologna declaration interlinking both the 
institutional and system level actors could be simplified as figure 11 shows. 
Briefly put, the implementation of  the Bologna process was based on three main methods: 
national committees nominated to prepare changes in legislation, national seminars on the Bologna 
process, and national coordination groups to make national curricula plans for each discipline 
(Välimaa et al. 2007: 48). One can say that the first two methods – national groups to prepare 
amendments in the legislation and national seminars about the process – did not differ much from 
                                                 
80 Data gathering and evaluation methods consisted of: i) preliminary study on existing research material on the 
degree reform done by the Student Research Foundation – Otus; ii) survey on the implementation of the degree 
reforms where all universities (17) and polytechnics (25) participated; iii) field specific questionnaire (23 faculties 
and 28 selected fields of study in polytechnics); iv) 67 themed interviews; v) evaluation report published by 
FINHEEC publication series; vi) and international analysis done by a group of international experts appointed by 
FINHEEC. 
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the Portuguese procedures regarding the homologous situation. Nevertheless, it was this last 
approach, the national discipline-based coordination groups that made the national organisation of  
curricula for each discipline, which seems to have won public sympathy, at least, from system level 
actors and top-management respondents:  
“And then we developed, I think, a very good method of implementing the Bologna process 
concerning the degrees structure and the curricula development. We gave some extra funding for 
specific fields of academic groups. It was up to the universities themselves to make the Bologna 
reform happen and that was a very good process. So we always had a Dean responsible for the 
whole discipline in Finland, or by the whole disciplinary area, like Humanities, Medicine, 
Engineering, etc. There was this big group of people and they got some money from the Ministry 
and we laid some national rules or guideline for the implementation. But otherwise, they were 
very free to do what they saw best for their specific field” (2Fs).  
 
Again, when contrasted to the academic degrees and curricula reform of  the 1970s, when academics 
had no power in deciding on crucial aspects of  the system and everybody resisted to this reform, 
the large majority of  the respondents praised the FMEC for the original organisation of  the 
implementation process:  
“But the most important, I think, it was the organisation of the implementation process with these 
coordination groups. We have a very strong tradition of using all kind of working groups in HE 
reforms, but in former reforms, the Ministry appointed the working groups. But this time, they 
only appointed the national coordinators, like me. The coordinators had very free hands, and the 
representatives of the Ministry didn’t take part in the coordination at all. So it was a very wise 
decision from the Ministry. It was the first time that this kind of reform was organised in such a 
way. National coordinators had the money and the freedom to do what they thought it would be 
better for the system (…). We could feel that we’re doing it by ourselves and for ourselves” (5Fs*). 
 
“I think it has been quite a smooth process, (…) looking back how to the decisions that have 
been made in our faculty, I don’t see that big problems” (2FUmm). 
 
With respect to this point, a main different feature between both countries refers to the financial 
resources assigned for the implementation process. Thus, whereas the “Finnish Ministry of  
Education has directed earmarked funding for nationwide field specific projects to facilitate the 
transfer to the new degree structure and promote universities’ cooperation in implementing the 
reform” (Hörkkö 2004), Portuguese political coordinators, academics and administrative staff  
worked in a “voluntary” basis for the new organisation of  the system. Some Portuguese system level 
interviewees also acknowledged this fact:  
“What didn’t happen in Portugal that happened in Finland is that associated with it [more 
accountability and transparency] there was a financial envelope. The main difference is not so 
much in the processes, but rather in the fuel. I mean, I would say that what happened was that 
the tools to effectively introduce innovations did not exist. This is like having a very well equipped 
sailing boat but not much wind, isn’t it?” (2Ps*).  
 
“Institutions try to answer even with budgetary constraints, but there are no miracles… so what 
happens is that the lack of funding makes it harder to achieve the desired objectives and achieve 
them with quality, with the quality that we think such a project can and should have” (2PPmm). 
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“We also got some money from the Ministry, so for instance, I had a full time secretary for 2 
years, an assistant, a full time worker who was coming from university management, so she knew 
this field and she was very effective and then I myself could decide how to collect the working 
group and how to organise the implementation” (5Fs*). 
 
 It is also interesting to notice that interviewees in both countries were consensual about the 
importance of  the Bologna process for the polytechnic subsystem: 
“Polytechnics won with Bologna because they won the possibility of conferring Masters’ degrees, 
they can confer Masters’ diplomas. Therefore, polytechnics were re-qualified. The profile of an 
institution of HE is also defined by the type of degrees it can confer. And, with the Bologna 
process, polytechnics gained the possibility of creating and assign 2nd cycle programmes and 
confer Master diplomas” (6Ps*). 
 
This is also the overall idea of  most of  institutional level interviewees, although this is a very 
sensitive question in the Portuguese HE panorama and it should be tackled more carefully. 
In the Finnish case, this importance attributed to polytechnics is also spontaneously connected 
with the EU fever. The idea of  belonging to the EU, combined with European trends, were crucial 
aspects for the creation and development of  AMKs.  
“Everybody was so full of this idea [belonging to the EU], especially in HE. (…) By that time 
there was a very strong political support that we should have this kind of professional institutions  
[polytechnics] in Finland. Maybe the background was the depression in the beginning of the 1990s 
and of course this idea that we should have more and better innovation, new ideas” (4Fs*). 
 
“Polytechnics were building their recognition as a new institutional type of HE. The majority of 
polytechnics were created in the 1990s and by that time nobody understood them as institutions 
of HE. Now they have become more like universities and I think the Bologna process kind of 
integrated polytechnics in a joint European structure, with more opportunities to be recognised 
as HEIs, regarding their status. I think the Bologna process was more important for polytechnics 
and now they have the right to give degrees comparable to universities, bachelors and also master 
degrees that are also classified and recognised in a European setting, and this didn’t happen before. 
So, I think Bologna gave to polytechnics even more new opportunities than it gave to universities” 
(6Fs*).  
 
The implementation process of  the Bologna declaration also enabled to perceive differences 
in institutions’ internal dynamics and establish a correlation between their willingness to change, 
their leadership and governance models and the capacity of  central administration to make 
decisions. Finnish interviewees referred that when universities are strongly centralised (e.g. the 
University of Helsinki), and although there were national coordinator groups for each study field, 
these institutions made “their own” implementation process. On the other end of the spectrum, 
when institutions have more loosely steering procedures, faculties and departments ended up 
following the coordination groups’ recommendations. As such, different results among groups were 
pointed out: some went further in their reforms, looking at the process as windows of opportunity 
to enhance additional objectives besides those demanded by the Bologna declaration, but in other 
disciplinary fields, only minimum efforts were made. It was also referred that, some disciplinary 
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areas are easier to adapt (Physics) and rethink than others (Languages) – e.g. soft disciplines vs. hard 
disciplines. 
Taking the implementation of the Bologna process as an example of HE policy design and 
implementation, it is possible to say that, although with different weight, the government still holds 
a central position allowing top-down implementation processes. In fact, the Bologna process itself 
allows for certain freedom of manoeuvre, i.e. freedom in interpreting and picking the most useful 
and/or important aspects for each HE system and institution. Additionally, this data also attests 
that policy design differs from policy formulation and implementation – at least at the national level 
(Ball 1998), and also at this level of analysis, “policy-making is a process of bricolage: a matter of 
borrowing and copying bits and bits of ideas from elsewhere” (Ball 1998: 126). In turn, this process 
of looking at the neighbour and applying those solutions, policies and/or practices that seem to be 
more successful not only contributes to increased convergence, but also to isomorphic patterns of 
action. 
Simultaneously, this analysis also reveals some incapacity to mobilise the institutional field 
(composed by Finnish and Portuguese HEIs) due to an increasing competitive environment. 
Nevertheless, and despite international competition both at the national and institutional levels, 
there was room and opportunity for some initiatives based on professionals’ acknowledgement and 
perceptions on what should be done in order to steer the process and maintain their disciplines 
and/or working place – the normative pillar based on survival strategies. The predominance of the 
normative code in the implementation of the Bologna process at the institutional level is also 
explained due to the incapability HEIs demonstrated (mainly Portuguese HEIs) to deal with such 
competitive environment in an autonomous way. As such, professionals followed the models and 
trends they thought to be the most appropriated for the environment where they work. 
 
 
2. Reforming at Home: Implementing the RJIES in Portugal and 
the New Universities Act in Finland 
 
2.1 Implementing the Law 62/2007 (RJIES) in Portugal   
In analysing the implementation process of  RJIES, both international and national contexts 
appear extremely interlinked in explaining change. It should be mentioned that the interviews were 
conducted in 2012 and several aspects need to be born in mind, namely an environment of  deep 
economic crisis in which the country emerged and which created a propitious scenario for change81. 
                                                 
81 In 2011, Portugal received external economic support provided by three entities: the 
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In fact, it is not even possible to isolate the political and economic context of  implementation from 
the law itself  and its developments – a fact that was frequently mentioned by interviewees. 
“Both things [the law and the crisis] are inseparable, and therefore the interesting aspects that the 
law might have brought up, were cancelled by the crisis, because a number of issues that are there 
involve money (…).” (1PUmm*). 
  
“(…) the conclusions that we will end up to obtain, will be difficult, because we will not be able to 
separate them from the social problems linked eu pro the context of the financial crisis and 
unemployment” (4PUmm). 
 
In this way, when analysing the political implementation of  RJIES, its unfolding at the institutional 
level, as well as actors’ perceptions on these themes, the national context of  economic crisis is 
constantly underlying this analysis. It is challenging to assess how this process would have developed 
whether national circumstances had been different. By other words, assuming and sharing some 
interviewees’ views on this subject, it is possible to say that such an environment speeded up change 
and/or its acceptance, as well as academic concerns.  
“It is obvious that during crisis moments, situations get complicated, but also opportunities for 
change are created. People in situations of need are more willing to change and that needs to be 
taken into account to do the necessary changes” (4Ps). 
 
The Bill (Draft Law) announced the national reform as an unprecedented opportunity for HEIs, 
which would take place in parallel with the modernisation of  knowledge societies (Government of  
Portugal 2007). Subsequently, and taking advantage of  the reform environment that the Bologna 
process sponsored in the country, the new legal framework for HEIs was approved, entering 
officially into force in 2008. It should be remembered that contrary to RJIES, the last legal 
framework of  similar nature was adopted unanimously in 1988 (University Autonomy Law). Law 
62/2007 establishes then the new legal framework of HEIs, specifically governing their constitution, 
attributions and organisation, the duties of their various bodies, institutional autonomy and the 
supervision powers of the State (Law 62/2007). Among the governance and statutory changes 
enacted by the Law, universities were given the choice to either remain public institutes or to become 
a public foundation operating under private law. 
Such as it happened in the past with the support of  the WB in the development and expansion 
of  the national HE system, the new legal framework for HEIs (Law 62/2007) was also inspired by 
OECD’s “instructions” and its neoliberal agenda (Amaral and Neave 2009b). Also other 
international organisations were consulted such as ENQA. System level interviewees as well as 
actors with management positions (rectors, heads of  departments, some academics) acknowledged 
the direct influence of  OECD in the developments of  the Portuguese HE system, who mentioned 
                                                 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), the Security Financial Stabilisation Fund 
(SFSF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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to the organisation’s reports as a legitimisation source for reforms, referring not only or specifically 
to the RJIES: 
“Here in Portugal is evident that there is a direct influence when Portugal makes changes based 
on studies of  committees and/or groups of  organisations such as the OECD. (…) We have a 
great tradition in Portugal to make educational changes based on OECD studies, so it’s nothing 
new. It doesn’t mean that alongside with those studies, we don’t have documents and national 
contributions too. But when one has to make and legitimate changes, those that appear in the 
table for reference and discussion are the others, and this is very common here…In fact, the latest 
changes we made are much based on the OECD report” (6Ps*).  
“Almost all the reforms of  the former Portuguese HE Minister are dictated by OECD studies” 
(1PUtm). 
Some interviewees, and very specific ones, acknowledged the role of  the OECD in the national 
educational system. As earlier mentioned (chapter IV), the importance of  the OECD was decisive 
to break the insulation of  Portugal by requiring regular detailed reports on the national economic 
and educational situation, which brutally showed how far Portugal was from other countries 
(Teodoro 2000: 54). However, the normative framework within which OECD operates, mainly 
economic driven in its nature, combined with a managerialist government, led to the elaboration of  
a law which, in the opinion of  the opposition parties, will disaggregate the public HE system while 
simultaneously privatising it, regardless the type of  government in power.  
Being the exception rather than the rule in the landscape of  European universities, the 
foundational model of  governance for HEIs, as well as other changes in HEIs’ governance are 
pointed as clear examples of  the OECD influence, as proposed by the organisation in the 2006 
report, requested by the government at that time. In this way, interviewees referred to this compliance 
and even subversion to the financial system and compared the economical interest in implementing 
RJIES with the Bologna process:  
“In order to save resources, the objectives of  the Bologna process were twisted. And such as it 
happened with Bologna, the rules that dictated RJIES were purely economist” (4PPmm). 
It was argued, and visible during the interviews that the RJIES was an outcome of  different wishes 
of  two strong forces: the government, namely the previous Minister of  HE, and (some) institutional 
leaders. Most of  interviewees, both in universities and polytechnics, mentioned to this duality of  
interests, i.e. these two poles of  actors, in changing the system. Interesting is the fact that more than 
one decade ago, Amaral (2003a) organised a survey – requested by the government, Consolidation of 
HE’s Legislation: An Appraisal and Revision. In 2012, these quotations (still) validate and reinforce the 
findings of  this survey, where academics supported a more efficient governance model, and students 
views were more conservative, in favour of  collegialism. 
“There was already a concern in civil society to change the way universities were managed (…) 
but there was a political will and the former HE minister had a key role in this, because then the 
process was politically imposed. It wasn’t possible otherwise” (2Ps*). 
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“The perception I have is that the RJIES really reflects some need for change by some institutional 
leaders” (2PPl). 
On one hand, HEIs felt the need to have greater autonomy to manage their educational and 
scientific tasks more effectively and/or at least in a less bureaucratic way - a need that became 
mandatory and obvious during the unfolding of  the Bologna process; and, on the other pole, the 
government aspired to cut on public expenditure and by decentralising it aimed (and still does) at 
steering at distance. 
Frequently interviewees, regardless of  their role or type of  HEI, referred to the role and 
charisma of  the previous Minister of  HE as central for the success in implementing the reform, which 
was imposed: 
“The RJIES was clearly imposed by the Government, it was top-down without any doubt. It was 
the Government! In fact, I can even tell you this more specifically: it was clearly the Minister 
Mariano Gago, for better or worse” (2PUtm*). 
“The RJIES itself, and I think that is something noticeable in most of  the activity of  the Minister 
Mariano Gago, he had certain ideas and tried to implement them (…). But the initiative came 
from outside the institutions, definitely” (3PUt). 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the merit of  the reform is not only due to the former 
Minster of  HE; his initiative was also based and supported on pressures from external organisations. 
In fact, what one could observe was a coercive isomorphism from international organisations to 
national HEIs. In sum, in a competitive arena, stronger institutions try to control or overpower 
smaller institutions to pass their ideology and objectives. And, again, because national institutions 
were also aware of  international trends, and faced with such pressures, did not want to lag behind.   
In addition to the OECD credo of  producing human capital for the global labour market, discourses 
spread by the EC and its Communiqués urging HEIs to modernise and change their governance 
structures and management procedures, provided legitimacy for reform. As such, most Portuguese 
interviewees look at these external pressures as leverage for drafting more entrepreneurial legislation, 
which does not need to be necessarily bad considering the challenges HEIs currently face, e.g. the 
progressive complexity arising from an increasingly diversified population attending HE, the 
increasing internationalisation of  the sector, the need to ensure teaching and research quality 
assurance mechanisms, etc. In turn, while all these changes demand more and better qualified 
resources, the civil society also started to pay more attention to what HEIs do and to the way they 
use these resources, namely whether these are efficiently used and/or these could be reduced. This 
increasing environment of  lack of  trust in HEIs, or questioning environment, as some interviewees 
called it, seems to be, in the actors’ mind, the main rationale for change: 
“This created a kind of  questioning environment around HEIs: whether they are being well governed 
and managed, whether the resources are being well use. This, in my opinion, was more important 
for change things than the Bologna process” (6Ps*).  
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Towards this background, and although interviewees acknowledged there was a propitious 
environment for change to happen, traditionally, the implementation of  HE policies in Portugal 
happens mainly through top-down processes and legislation tends to be (coercively) imposed to 
HEIs. As it can be understood by the aforementioned citations on the critical role of  the previous 
Minister of  HE in implementing change, the RJIES was imposed to HEIs, although both 
institutional leaders and faculty members acknowledged the need for change. Nevertheless, or 
because of  that, it was a smooth imposition process due to several aspects, of  which we highlight: i) 
a parliamentary majority held by the socialist party by that time, ii) the external support provided by 
the OECD suggestions and recommendations, as well as the EC discourses on HEIs’ modernisation 
iii) and also due to general perceived need and will to change the national HE panorama and HEIs 
modus operandi.  
Bearing this in mind, one can say that despite the crisis, change was not (at least, not only) 
promoted by HEIs attempts to be more efficient and/or to be outstanding. In this context, the main 
drivers for change were international organisations that were able to exert coercive pressures to 
Portuguese HEIs to change and to moderniser according to these organisations’ guidelines and 
standards.  
All interviewees, regardless of  their (current and previous) roles, were consensual about the 
way RJIES was implemented and with the fact that the legislation is, in fact, a rupture with the past. 
“The RJIES is external to HEIs: there was a political will to change combined with circumstances 
that allowed for this to happen and obviously, with some art, to get the political support needed 
to make it happen. (…) The new legal framework was only possible because there were 
circumstances that allowed that, namely an absolute majority. Without that, it wouldn’t be possible 
to reach such an evolution. This rupture with the past was, of  course, also based on international 
opinions that supported the international movement of  what was considered politically correct 
(...)” (4Ps). 
The RJIES was then adopted despite pressure to amend it - all opposition parties voted against it 
and the disapproval of  the National Council of  Education (CNE), the faculty (professors) and staff  
unions, as well as student organisations and HEIs. The final law (which curiously was enacted in 
August, when most people in Portugal are on Summer holidays…), consisting of  185 articles, was 
only passed by the Assembly of  the Republic (the Parliament) after 74 amendments, and all authored 
by socialist deputies (although the other parties had presented 238 amendments)82. The former 
Minister of  HE denied that these changes have distorted the fundamental principles of  the new 
legal framework for HEIs. According to him, the changes resulted from the interest in listening all 
                                                 
82 Also the voice of  students was not taken into account. The 2007 President of  the Academic Association of  the 
University of  Lisbon, Tiago Pardal, referred that the Parliamentary Commission received 700 proposals from 
students, which were not considered for discussion. In addition, it was reported that in students’ opinion, 
Portuguese HEIs were quite passive towards the RJIES and the discussions were restricted to few people. 
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partners and create all the necessary conditions so that RJIES would not be a reform only in paper, 
but that it would actually happen and it would be implemented quickly. As such, the Minister said 
the government welcomed all the suggestions that seemed useful (LUSA 2007). This also explains 
the “smooth” acceptance and imposition of  the law… In fact, both public and private sectors’ 
representatives, universities and polytechnics, were listened by the Ministry. Even if  not all claims 
and wishes of  CRUP, CCISP and APESP were covered by the legislation, these interviewees referred 
that there was some dialogue between the Ministry and the representatives of  both HE subsystems 
and sectors - a vision that is contrary to academics’ perceptions. 
“We’ve always been heard. It doesn’t mean that what we have said has been accepted, but at least, 
the conversation existed” (3Ps).  
Vs. 
“The former Minister listened to those he thought he had to listen and I think the RJIES was 
imposed because the model that was presented, was almost ready. It was like this: ‘here it is the 
model and we are available for some cosmetic operations, but the essential is here and it’s not 
going to change’” (3PUa*).  
In fact, it is somehow striking to compare the perceptions of  some system level actors in 2012/2013 
(when the interviews were carried out), with data from the literature review done prior to these years 
and right after the RJIES entered into force. Initially, and as already mentioned, all opposition parties 
and stakeholders voted against the RJIES and expressed publicly their discontent with it. An 
exception, however, could be noted from the vocational subsystem, which showed more 
appreciation towards the new legislation and towards the way the process developed.  
 “The polytechnic subsystem was, globally, in favour. I can tell you we were listened and the CCISP 
provided some contributions to RJIES. (…) Overall, I think RJIES is ok and, apart for some 
exceptional cases, I do not see urgent need to change it. (…) There are two moments in recent 
years that I find extremely important for the polytechnic subsystem: one is the RJIES and the 
other one is the teaching profession career statute because not only these processes deepened 
each subsystem’s different missions, but they also provided the same dignity for them and this 
was crucial” (1Ps). 
This position can be understood when one bears in mind that in terms of  institutional autonomy - 
and social status, the polytechnic subsystem was in disadvantageous position when compared to the 
university subsystem.  
It was also interesting/curious to see that some system level actors and top-management 
interviewees expressed their contentment with the first version of  the law, regretting the fact that 
there was not enough courage to move the initial proposal further.  
“If  the initial project had gone forward, it would have taken more into account a greater 
participation of  the external society in HEIs’ management bodies. But then, there were some 
vested interests, so to speak, and the law became what it is, and in my opinion this was what was 
possible to do from the political point of  view” (4Ps). 
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These feelings were especially notorious from those actors who consider that the system really 
need(ed)s to change, namely by opening it more to society, and to make it more efficient and 
transparent. These were mostly the viewpoints of  system level actors and external members of  the 
university General Council (GC)83. In parallel, it was also perceptible that it is not possible to 
separate cultural factors from the way political processes are designed and implemented. Thus, some 
of  the criticisms to the legislation and to the way RJIES has unfolded are mainly and foremost critics 
to national politicians and to the lack of  perspectives the country presents. In fact, a common critic 
expressed by interviewees refers to the lack of  policies and action in defining what kind of  country 
Portugal should be and what type of  society the country aims at being.  
“We’ve been discussing the same problems for years and years and no one has courage, employers, 
trade unions, political parties, the Head of State, to stand up and say: ‘My dear friends, let’s make 
a deal: what kind of society do we want?’ And then we would develop a strategy to develop this 
society, but no one has courage…” (3PUtm*). 
 
Nevertheless, not all top-management actors tended to agree with the Draft Bill of  RJIES. 
Universities’ rectors as well as middle management actors and academics were strongly against the 
law as they considered it hazardous. Among the reasons pointed for this disagreement stand out 
changes in HEIs governance bodies, in the way institutional leaders are elected and in the 
redefinition of  their powers and duties, as well as changes in the funding dynamics and human 
resources management. A common example was provided by a top-management interviewee and 
other institutional level actors who mentioned the radical idea of  the previous HE Minister of  
dismissing all universities’ rectors and polytechnics’ presidents as soon as the RJIES entered into force. 
“I know what was in the Minister’s head, a person (…) who thinks that universities do not reform 
themselves, and therefore he typically imposed these changes. He actually imposed this with a 
growing financial asphyxiation to universities so that universities could not get too cranky about 
it. Yes! The RJIES was enforced, although it was changed before that (...). It had to! The first 
formulation of  RJIES [Bill] said that all Rectors and Polytechnics’ Presidents would topple84. 
Imagine this! It would be absolutely crazy to manage a HE system where everyone would topple! 
                                                 
83 Although the GC only existed after the new internal statutes were implemented, these views 
were extracted from interview data, which was conducted after the new governance model being 
enforced.   
84 The Bill initially anticipated that as soon as the RJIES entered into force there should be 
elections, i.e. new Rectors and Polytechnics’ Presidents were appointed by the GC members. 
However, an amendment approved by the socialist party allowed their election by secret ballot 
by the GC and the head of  the GC has to be now someone external to the University and not 
the Rector. The Law passed by Parliament did not allow Rectors to topple… In fact, the Rectors 
who were in office prepared the whole process of  RJIES, and elections came only after the law 
was in force and only when it was due time for that (i.e. the 4 years period of  Rector’s mandate 
finished). For example, the Portuguese university of  this study elected a different Rector than 
the one who was in power (the previous Rector did not apply again for a new mandate) and all 
the candidates were applying to the Rector position for the first time. (S)election procedures will 
be analysed in the section devoted to changes in institutional governance. 
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This shows quite well the Minister’s thoughts... There would be no interlocutors! I think it’s bad 
and a chaos to have a system where everyone changes at the same time! So this was one of  the 
things that changed and that I fought much for that to happen” (1PUtm).  
Thus, whether on one hand system level actors and top-management interviewees tended to praise 
the first version of  RJIES due to its boldness in imposing a whole new thinking of  institutional 
governance, on the other hand, some top-management actors (namely Rectors) felt quite 
apprehensive and worried with the first Draft proposal of  the Law. Not only would this oust all 
institutional leaders, with no apparent and stated advantage/positive outcomes, as it would also 
worsen the institutional environment during the changes period, creating uncertainty and leaving a 
gap in institutions’ top-management. Additionally, it is possible to say that Rectors could feel that 
their power would be slightly mitigated.  
Also academics were aware of  these political games and they expressed their “solidarity” with 
Rectors’ protests, as they believe that RJIES did not make a clear division of  the powers of  
institutional leaders and governance bodies. 
“The original version of  RJIES [Bill] was much more tough. The Minister played clearly against 
Rectors and universities. (…) He pressured universities with a ‘slimming treatment’ to compel 
change and then he imposed RJIES. He ended up to give up on certain things to please Rectors 
(…) and some other minor changes. In fact, the small changes he did are part of  those things that 
are put on the Draft Bill so that one can step back a bit and reach an agreement. I do think that 
Rectors were not happy at all with RJIES (…)” (2PUa). 
In the beginning of  this discussion, it was mentioned that interviewed academics felt that the RJIES 
was presented as a Law practically concluded, with no room for discussions and/or their (academics) 
feedback. However, interesting enough is the fact that while most of  institutional level interviewees 
complained about this constant imposition of  the legislation, they also referred that this might be 
the most effective (although not the most efficient) way of  introducing reforms in the system - 
mostly due to cultural factors. 
“These top-down processes naturally have some advantages and disadvantages. In a country like 
Portugal, where people spend too much time talking about things instead of  spending time doing 
things, this creates favourable conditions for top-down processes. Therefore, in a country with 
such characteristics, and all the instability, it’s necessary to do this sometimes. Otherwise, nothing 
will be done. But obviously there are also disadvantages, because many of  these processes that 
depend on the participation of  people, do not work because they are made without people’s 
willing and their involvement” (3PUa*). 
Partly, this goes in line with what external members referred about the lack of  direction and strategy 
for the country. This (apparent) loose mode of  governance, where it seems there is no continuity 
and/or collaboration among stakeholders, allows (more) easily for top-down processes of  policy 
implementation, steered mainly by one person (in this case, the former Minister of  HE), and 
strongly supported by international organisations. In his sense, one can say that academics are 
aligned with a more hierarchical and top-down management style similar to the dominant practice 
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in private management and also aligned with NPM principle of  giving more power to managers. In 
fact, it is possible to infer that some academics haver incorporated NPM values, a process already 
stated in the literature (Santiago and Carvalho 2006; Carvalho and Santiago 2010; 2015; Santiago, 
Carvalho and Cardoso 2015). The managerialism ideology already present in the discourses since 
the 1990’s (Santiago, Magalhães and Carvalho 2005) made management practices usual in the private 
sector, like performance assessment, acceptable and even expectable in HEIs. Later on, as the 
financial crisis started to be felt in a more intensive way in the country, the economic stringency 
environment facilitated this type of  doing politics in Portuguese HE.  
Overall, the academic community and national unions pointed to some positive aspects of  Law 
62/2007, which were common to those identified by the great majority of  interviewees. The fact 
that RJIES aligns the statutes relative to public and private institutions by updating legislation 
concerning public and private universities’ and polytechnics’ autonomy and fairer quality assurance; 
and the presence of  external members in HEIs’ governance bodies have been aspects complimented 
by interviewees. All system level interviewees were consensual about these topics. 
“Initially, we all applauded RJIES due to a very simple question: it placed public and private 
institutions in the same legal situation” (3Ps). 
“I have a clearly favourable opinion of  RJIES because I think it’s extremely positive to have 
external members in the governance of  universities. (…) This created in universities a much more 
intimate relationship with society and made the society much more attentive and aware of  
universities’ life. But this is a very global view and it’s going to be very interesting to see in 5 years’ 
time the impact this effectively had in the role universities have in society, because for me that was 
the great innovation of  RJIES” (2Ps*). 
These two changes that came with RJIES, and which define the same rules for public and private 
HEIs and the external participation in institutions’ strategic decision-making bodies, are the 
rationale that better explains why the polytechnic subsystem showed more sympathy towards RJIES 
than classical universities. However, another variable contributed for this acceptance, namely the fact 
that polytechnics’ leaders saw this legal framework as an opportunity to finally upgrade polytechnics 
legal and social status to the same level as universities.  
“The RJIES was crucial in contributing for a positive evolution of  the polytechnic subsystem, as 
it created a greater harmony within this subsystem and its schools. It provided also the same 
degree of  autonomy, both for the polytechnic and the university subsystems” (1Ps). 
Additionally, it should be mentioned that whereas the participation of  external members in 
universities governance bodies is still very recent, and therefore it is difficult to accurately assess 
their involvement in universities’ management, already in the 1990s, the Polytechnics’ Autonomy 
Law (Law 54/90) demanded 20% of  external stakeholders in polytechnics’ governance. In this type 
of  institutions, external members even participated in the election of  the president.  
Another positive aspect of  the law highlighted by system level interviewees and some 
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institutional actors relates to the fruitful discussion of  topics that usually are only talked in closed 
circles and which, frequently, are not taken that seriously. This was pointed as a factor that 
strengthened the institutional bonds between the academia and the institution where they work. 
“The RJIES brought to public discussion within HEIs ideas that were not discussed within the 
universities, such as the issue of  staff  performance assessment system, and the fact that both 
professors and students should be accountable for what they do. It is about students’ rights, the 
rights students have in having information on time, in being treated as an important part of  the 
institution, and it’s about the duties of  Professors with respect to this” (5PUa). 
One can say that underlying the different positive aspects pointed by interviewees is the 
hope/wish for increased autonomy, combined with adequate and/or sufficient funding. HEIs 
should be able to decide and perform their tasks as separately as possible from the state in order to 
decide how their mission is best achieved, while working independently with other institutions and 
companies both nationally and internationally. 
In turn, those who opposed the law invoked all NPM ingredients contained in the legislation 
for their discontentment – a fact which makes us wonder to what extent is Portuguese HE 
community ready or willing for a (stronger) managerial revolution… Opponents of  RJIES argued 
that the Law was motivated by a privatisation agenda and that it carried the risk of submitting 
institutions to private interests.  
Among the academic community, it was perceived a great discontentment with the law that 
mainly relates to the nature of  the document. The RJIES was perceived as too extensive, too 
cumbersome, too complex and too much prescriptive, not allowing HEIs to do anything without 
previous consultation and approval. This opinion was common to all interviewees, performing 
different roles. They expressed quite distressing views on the fact that they spend a lot of  time and 
energy in trying to understand and contextualise the RJIES with the national legislative framework, 
a fact that they relate with the social context and to the traditional way of  drafting legislation in 
Portugal. 
“The RJIES is completely wrong because it’s such a regulatory document that it’s even scary! The 
new legal framework should have 20 or 30 articles maximum. So I have this critic: is too long, too 
regulatory, too standardised, etc. Honestly, I think one missed the opportunity to do something 
simple, but quite oriented to allow for institutional responses, clear and transparent. We ended up 
with an ambiguous situation. Something was created, but without taking the idea to its final 
potentialities. We stood in that middle term situation that is very typical of  the Portuguese society: 
do not assume a rupture to do an adjustment, we have to consider those parameters, but we also 
need to consider that things might not be exactly like this… It’s that type of  language very 
characteristic of  the Portuguese culture, isn’t it?” (5PUtm). 
“I’m not a great expert in RJIES because like other laws and our legal tradition, it’s not easy to 
read, you almost need a lawyer to understand the implications of  those articles!” (1PUa*). 
Throughout the whole process of  interviewing Portuguese actors, there was a latent feeling of  
frustration and unconformity whenever the topic of  the traditional way of  doing politics in Portugal 
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popped up in interviewees’ discourses. On one hand, despite the negative aspects identified, 
interviewees tend to recognise the potentialities the legislation is expected to bring. However, on the 
other hand, this typical way of  organising HE political life hinders possibilities of  change and of  
easily engaging in reform processes.  
“I think the RJIES suffers from the same ills that all our legislation in general suffers: it’s too 
prescriptive. (…) It’s so regulative that everyone gets stuck. Now we are all equal, but we are all 
tucked inside a straitjacket! (…) I could say that in general the RJIES brought things that were not 
standardised and that should be, but it did this with so many details that it creates problems to us 
all – because it’s so demanding in administrative and procedural terms that have nothing to do 
with HE. Our legislation has always been a bummer! Since the beginning, and I think we could 
have improved with time, but I can’t see things getting any better! (…) The RJIES didn’t make 
our life easier…” (1PUmm*). 
 “I can tell you, for example, that RJIES didn’t take into account that there are universities that 
integrate polytechnics. And then, there are problems that had to be solved, namely the creation of 
a single Scientific Council in the university. Certain things cannot be followed by just reading the 
RJIES, it doesn’t leave much room of manoeuvre for the diversity of situations that exist in the 
country. It’s a law only thought for universities with faculties, clearly” (3PPmm).  
 
These perceptions are transversal to interviewees at both subsystems. Figure 12 summarises the 
decisive moments for drafting the Law 62/2007, as well as the main changes it brought for 
Portuguese HEIs. 
 
Figure 12 – Temporal Context of  RJIES and main changes brought by the Law 62/2007. 
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It should be mentioned that many of  the initial supporters of  RJIES, and more specifically 
top-management interviewees, have been changing their minds as time went by. This shift in the 
panorama is explained, mainly and foremost be the economic stringencies that were then imposed 
to the public administration and consequently to the universities. Therefore, interviewees referred 
how their expectations and hopes were dashed when they started to realise that many of  the 
flagships of  RJIES did not happen (yet) and might even never happen, considering the political and 
financial instability of  the country. 
“I followed the negotiations [of the RJIES] and I think they were positive. It was risky, but 
everything has a risk and I think it was a good thing in which we should take risks. I even think 
that internally this could have given us more strength and encouragement and it could streamline 
things in the university. However, what they announced to us, it didn’t happen. We are absolutely 
stagnated for almost two years. In these last two years, we feel like we’re in a bubble” (4PUmm). 
 
“I believe RJIES gives opportunity to university management to take advantage of potentialities 
and opportunities that didn’t exist previously, or were not sufficiently understood, or that were 
hindered by legal and contractual causes” (2PUtm*). 
 
A more optimistic view, although with some reservations, was expressed by system level 
interviewees. Again, the economically difficult situation in which the country finds itself  tends to 
be seen by this group of  actors as a time of  both opportunities and challenges. 
“The competition has always been there, right? We shouldn’t think that it’s a new thing. It’s natural 
that now HEIs have to organise better to catch resources from other sources than the state. And 
I think that’s good because it forces institutions to think differently on the way their internal affairs 
are conducted. Actually, sometimes these difficult times help people to organise themselves better, 
to work better, to make choices that they don’t do when they live in abundance. So, I don’t feel 
special alarms with this, but I do have some concerns. It worries me to not know how all 
stakeholders, not only HEIs, but also the society, the governments, how will they deal with the 
difficulties we are experiencing now? I’m concerned because I can’t see guiding lines emerging, or 
plans or paths… but this is necessary to happen, you know?” (6Ps*). 
  
In line with what other top-management actors feel, namely the interviewee 3PUtm*, the main 
problem in Portuguese HE (and one can extrapolate this to the Portuguese society) seems to be the 
lack of  a clear orientation and strategy for defining the main priorities and targets of  the system and 
the country. Ultimately, this situation is seen as a governance problem. 
 
 
2.2 Implementing the Yliopistolaki 558/2009 (New Universities 
Act) in Finland  
 
The Europeanisation context of  both Finnish and Portuguese HE systems allows for some 
similarities with respect to the sequence of  events that led to the emergence of  the New Universities 
Act in Finland and the RJIES in Portugal.  
In Finland, many changes brought about by the recent legislative reform had their roots in the 
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1990s. As mentioned in chapter IV, J. Välimaa (2012) describes this period as the “globalisation 
shock”, considering the profound consequences it had on the development of the Finnish HE 
system. Välimaa (2012b: 40) considers that the most profound international and global influences 
originate from the OECD, which has used its ‘soft power’ to initiate and guide policy debates in its 
member countries. 
Kauppinen and Kaidesoja (2013: 1) refer that between the mid-1990s and the 2000s, Finland 
witnessed a rapid structural transformation from an economy mainly based on resource-intensive 
industries to the most ICT specialised economy in the world, allowing for the development of “a 
new knowledge-driven capitalism” in Finnish HE. In turn, as HE policy became more closely linked 
to economic aims, universities gradually gained autonomy through Law 645/1997 of 26th July. The 
New Universities Act (Law 558/2009) replaced the Universities Act of 1997, further extending the 
autonomy of universities (OPM 2013). As a matter of fact, the degre of state interference in HEIs’ 
life, or, by other words, “the relationship between HEIs and the government is the core of  the new 
legislation” (4Fs*). 
Similarly to what happened in Portugal, also the OECD published an extensive review of  the 
Finnish HE system in 2006. Later on, during the time the law was drawn up over 2008-09, the 
OECD released a new review in 2009. The conclusions of the OECD review team were reminiscent 
of NPM style par excellence (Kauko and Diogo 2001: 125). The problems they identified were 
attributed to bureaucratic bottlenecks and a lack of entrepreneurialism (OECD 2009: 57-58). Hence, 
with respect to universities there were “pressures for more autonomy” in order to “become more 
entrepreneurial” (ibid: 105-106). To help to achieve this, the OECD offered recommendations and 
suggestions (ibid: 133; 108; 116). An example of the OECD’s recommendations relates to the new 
legal status for universities, which should be redefined as “Legal persons”, rather than as civil servant 
units. In gaining legal personality, universities were transformed to either public (non-profit) 
corporations or to foundations (ibid: 108).  
Mostly Finnish system level interviewees acknowledged these OECD’s reports as having 
(some) influence in the reform of the system. 
“What was also very important was the thematic review of the OECD in 2005/2006 of Finnish 
HE policy and the OECD really make some important recommendations” (3Fs). 
 
“OECD reports are not that much read among university staff but they have a big influence at 
the governmental level. There has been some discussion in Finland among academic people that 
the Ministry uses OECD reports to have more leverage” (5Fs).  
 
These views go in line with Kallo’s (2009) findings on the utilisation of  the 2006 OECD HE review 
of  Finnish HE policy reforms, concluding that the OECD’s legislative power is limited. However, 
the organisation has created what Johanna Kallo called “other effective forms of  soft laws”. These 
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are, for example, peer reviews, recommendations, and indicator studies combined with EU’s 
methods, which aim at steering the national level decision-making, HE agendas and future legislative 
reforms (Kallo 2009; Amaral and Neave 2009b). Although this information is subjective by nature, 
the frequency with which Finnish respondents mentioned the OECD and/or its possible influence 
in Finnish (higher) education reforms was certainly lower when compared to Portuguese 
interviewees. Whether we add to this fact the cultural and historic contexts of  both countries, as 
well as the analysis on changes in HEIs’ governance and management procedures, it seems fair to 
believe that the OECD influence in Portugal regarding to HE policies has been more substantial 
and more direct than in Finland (cf. Box 1). Several hypothesis can be put forward to explain this 
fact. Historical evidence shows a tradition of  the Portuguese government, driven by the WB and 
OECD recommendations as well as the EU carrot, in drafting HE legislation legitimised by and 
with the support of  these organisations. In fact, as stated by the OECD (2003), HE reforms has 
often substituted one form of  influence and control by government for another. Being a younger 
country than Portugal, and entering in the EU also later (in 1995) and for different reasons, this 
practice of  international influence in HE policies is not as old as it is in Portugal. Another possible 
explanation relates to financial issues. In Finland, the direct costs of  HE to an individual are much 
lower when compared to Portugal (OECD 2012), a fact that gives OECD leeway to exert pressure, 
recommendations and/or advice on this matter, as it happened in the 2007 OECD national review 
report where it strongly suggests an increase in tuiton fees for Portuguese studentes (OECD 2007: 
12; 120; 126, cf. Box 1).  
Easily put, the interviewees’ perceptions on the New Universities Act varied from proponents 
of  the law – system and top-management actors, and opponents of  the law: middle management 
actors and academics. This classification is drawn upon interviewees’ perceptions. However, this is 
a too linear conception of  HE policy making dynamics and relationships. The critics expressed by 
Finnish interviewees, namely middle management actors and academics were not so much directed 
to the new legislation but mainly to the way the process was conducted and to the uncertainty 
feelings it has been creating among the academic community. In fact, it is likely that due to this 
uncertainty also Finnish interviewees who perform more administrative activities – the university’s 
technostructure – seemed to not feel at ease in talking about the new legislation. It was visible the 
discomfort from non-academic staff  when this topic was addressed and, especially young members 
tried to demonstrate their positive views towards the New Universities Act and to the way it was 
implemented.  
The first association that technostructure’s interviewees attribute to Law 558/2009 is the end 
of  the civil servant status for university staff. Considering the strong steering capacity of  the Finnish 
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government, and the long tradition of  universities as the ex libris of  Finnish public institutions, it is 
not surprising that interviewees still feel confused with what this change might effectively represent 
to them. 
“I know that there has been working groups within the university working in the university law, 
and most important, regarding to the change that took place since the 1st of January of 2010 
onwards, the change of the status of the staff” (1FUt). 
 
With respect to the way the Law 558/2009 was implemented, and according to the Finnish Ministry 
of  Education website, the reform has been prepared in close collaboration with universities and 
stakeholders and it started in spring 2007. This corroborates most of  system level interviewees’ as 
well as Rectors and some top-management actors’ views who described the process as a “quite 
strong parliamentary system” (1Fs). 
“The process started sometime in 2007, I think, by the then Social Democratic Minister of  
Education. They made a study about suggestions to the proposal on how the universities’ reform 
could look like. The Minister had the input from (…) a very good study done by this preparation 
group who made the first proposal and the Minister was continuously informed by them. Then 
they made the proposal that was discussed in large meetings with the university’ leaders and with 
the Ministry of  Education. After that, the Minster of  education appointed the advisory group 
who should come up with the basic principles of  the reform” (6Fs*).  
“During the process, when they were drafting the law, they sent it to us and we were able to give 
comments. Then there was a hearing with part of  the parliament; there was a special committee 
for these issues, (…). Well, it’s always like this when there is a new law, it’s always sent to the 
stakeholders for comments, BUT this time [interviewee’s emphasis], each university was able to write 
their own statements” (1Fs).  
The interviewed Rectors also had a positive view on the process, as they feel part of  the process. 
Therefore, their argumentation naturally reflects (only) their side and the views of  those who made 
and/or have colaborated with the Law.   
“There was communication between the government and the Finnish Universities Council. There 
was no imposition because we [Rectors] could influence the law. (…) We made proposals, we 
were very active and we were highly trusted in our tasks” (1FUtm).  
In fact, Finnish university rectors showed clearly satisfaction with this new law once they had 
claimed for a reform that would confer universities more autonomy. In 2005, a joint-statement was 
elaborated that would be known as the Red Manifestum. As referred by most top-mamangemt 
interviewees, some aspects from that statement came into the law. Some system level actors as well 
as some top management interviewees believe that the latest University reform was spurred by this 
Manifestum of  Finnish University Rectors. Nevertheless, this would put too much weight in a 
document that, despite its relevance for drafting the Law 558/2009, does not take into account other 
important factors which were decisive for change. In this way, what from the Rectors’ point of  view 
is the starting point of  the reform, from other perspectives, it can be seen as an intermediary 
moment or an evolutionary stage of  a changing process that accompanies social and political change 
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trends in other sectors of  the world/Europe (Diogo 2014b). 
“We started the reform some years ago. There was also this initiative by the Finish Universities 
Rectors Council, and they were following the European discussion that had already started in 
the mid-1990s, emphasising universities’ institutional autonomy that ought to be increased. The 
key element in the initiative was that universities need to have legal personality of  their own, that 
they can’t continue to be state accounting offices in legal terms as they were at the time” (2Fs). 
This citation shows that, as much novelty that the process brought, the New Universities Act cannot 
be seen as a rupture with the past, but rather a continuity in Finnish HE policy.  
“What I want to stress is that, with time, the key players in the Ministry and the civil servants were 
very sensitive to international and national discussions and they were ready to reform the system 
on the lines of  what was expected from the HE community” (3Fs). 
Also the OECD (2009: 58), for example, as well as some interviewees, directly referred to the fact 
that both the Finnish Ministry of  Education and the Confederation of  the University Rectors 
supported enhanced autonomy. As Kallo (2009: 370) has pointed out, the Bill had a rather peculiar 
approach with regards to the OECD recommendation. Initially it states that the recommendation 
to reform the legal status of universities was “appropriate” (Government Bill 7/2009: 28), but later 
the tone changes when OECD considered the reform a “necessity” (Kallo 2009: 298; 370; 
Government Bill 7/2009: 29 in Kauko and Diogo 2011: 126). Additionally, (more) work was done 
by a two-member committee, which the OECD team was unaware of (OECD 2009: 110), but to 
whom the Government Bill for the new university law made reference to and noted that 
international comparisons did not support the universities’ old “accounting office” model (Kauko 
and Diogo 2011: 126). Also some system level interviewees as well as some institutional actors 
enthusiastically referred to this working force committee.  
So the process was started already with the previous government where we had working groups 
dealing with this issue and there was this two-men committee working on the possible new legal 
persons that could be given for universities, that was a very interesting piece of  work” (2Fs). 
This was so because one of  the members of  this restricted committee was a top-management actor 
working at the university of  this case study by that time. As such, it might be that this specific 
Finnish university might not be a paradigmatic example regarding the perceptions of  the academic 
community towards the reform process and flows of  information related to it.  
“We had internal information, periods when people could discuss and ask things. Of course that 
people don’t like changes, but we were happy because in our university people were less unhappy 
than in other universities” (2FUt). 
 
Institutional level interviewees accomodating different roles acknowledged that, compared to other 
universities in the country which were not represented in the legislative process, they were somehow 
privileged for having an insider of  their institution working in the task forces preparing and deciding 
the new legislation.   
“The two experts who were in the expert group writing the law were our ‘head master’ and the 
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other one was from another University. So we knew quite a lot about the process, all the time, 
because they talked with us about what was going on and what were the next steps. (…) We knew 
quite a lot of  what was happening, at least in this unit, but I don’t know if  people in the faculties 
and in the departments knew as much as we knew here” (4FUmm). 
It is possible to infer that despite uncertainty feelings towards the changes the law imposed and 
that were about to happen, most interviewees felt more confident in the decisions taken as they 
perceived that the interests of  the institution they work in would be contemplated. This definitely 
helped for a smoother implementation of  the New Universities Act in this university, when 
compared to the Portuguese university. Nevertheless, and as can be perceptible by the 
aforementioned quotation, some top and middle mamagement interviewees also believe that this 
flow of  information might not have been as efficient as it could be, considering that faculty members 
were not sufficiently aware of  what was going on. Opinions differed according to the actors’ roles 
while interviewees themselves acknowledged these differences of  perceptions and even of  
emotions. While system level and top-management actors expressed their contentment with the way 
the process was designed and implemented (as some of  those people made the Law), and referred 
to the close cooperation and closed environment that existed between the government and 
important stakeholders, the great majority of  middle-management actors and academics reported 
that people were not consulted. 
“Naturally, there were people against it and people for it but, anyway, the overall opinion was in 
favour of  these principles. (…) It was something that took time, the whole organisation was very 
positive, but still later on opponents were saying: ‘oh, there is a reform going on and nobody told 
us!’ And we really made an effort to communicate, to have people involved, there were even 
campus meetings about this! But by that time, people were not really interested to know what was 
going on and then there were people occupying the senate square and there were students’ 
protests. I think the Ministry really tried to get the university involved. It’s a pity that academics 
don’t recognise this (6Fs*).   
Vs. 
 
“I think this New University Law was created in a great hurry and there wasn’t enough time to 
have discussions. In this department, for example, I feel that we weren’t heard” (4FUa*). 
A common observation that was frequently raised by academics during the interviews referred to 
the fact that, to their eyes, the Law had been practically decided when it came for discussion at the 
faculty level, and therefore, opportunities for discussion were minimal and/or non-existent (Diogo 
2014b).  
“I think there has been some dialogue between the university’s leadership and the Ministry, but if  
you think about the faculty or the department, we were only informed or asked about things later 
on, and I don’t think we were really heard. Let’s say in this way: they heard us, but I don’t think 
they listened to us. (…) I think we didn’t get enough information, I mean we got information, but 
it was only little by little, too slowly. For example, last fall there were still certain things, from the 
administrative point of  view, that we were not sure how to deal with and that was complicated. 
The first year was really difficult, because we didn’t know enough about certain things. We asked 
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the Deans but because they weren’t aware on how to deal with things related to funding, for 
example, they had to ask to the administration. We were getting information only little by little, 
and that’s not good” (1FUa*).  
 
As analysed in the Portuguese case, Finnish academics’ perceptions do not differ much from their 
Portuguese counterparts. This is possibly explained by the specific characteristics of  the academic 
work and HEIs culture, and also by the logic of  appropriateness of  behaviour that the faculty 
members start to be embedded at the moment they initiate their practice in any HEI. Although with 
different with a different historical and cultural path, the Portuguese and Finnish institutional field 
share a very specific culture rooted in traditional academic practices and ethos. However, not every 
Finnish actor shared from the previous opinion: there was some disagreement among other actors 
that work in the same university, as well as among interviewees belonging to the same role. In line 
with what (some) system and institutional level actors referred, the importance of  being proactive, 
of  searching for information, to attend and participate in discussions were points approached during 
the interviews. Indeed, among middle management actors, different opinions and attitudes emerged 
towards the process of  policy formulation. Contrary to the perceptions of  some of  their colleagues 
and academics, there were some Deans who pointed out the fact that there were enough 
opportunities to be acquainted with the Law. Furthermore, this difference of  perceptions can be 
explained due to the fact that decision-making processes were for many years based in collective 
and collegial decision-making and the fact that academics are used to have autonomy in the decisions 
related with their work, make them to perceive their participation in the political decision-making 
process as lower than it was expected to be. This mismatch of  the academics’ perceptions can be 
confirmed by the different views of  other institutional actors. Again, this specific Dean was aware 
that opinions vary within academia. 
“I liked the preparation process, I personally had all the possibilities to get information in each 
earliest phase. Our Rector was very wise to have an open forum for us [Deans] to meet regularly 
and prepare ourselves for the new legislation and there were many public debates organised. I 
know that if  you ask the same question from the staff, or maybe to some other colleagues of  
mine, the answer is different. They feel that nobody listen them and that’s also true, but this is 
also a question of  self-activity. For example, in our university, several public discussions were 
organised and the auditoriums were very empty… so this is also a question of  staff ’s proactivity, 
because there is only one way to have your voice heard, which is to go somewhere and say 
something, criticising, supporting or asking questions” (2FUmm). 
Another difference between these two types of  actors [system level and top-management actors vs. 
middle management actors and academics] with respect to the implementation process relates with 
their perception on how long the reform efectively took place to happen. Whereas system level and 
top-management interviewees reported that the New Universities Act took a considerable amount 
of  time to be thought and implemented, with enough time for discussions, middle management 
actors and academics feel that everything happened too fast, that they did not have the right to 
 311 
express their opinion on the law. Moreover, despite the fact that there was an insider in the university 
who was active in the legislation process, faculty members did not have either enough information 
or time to deal with changes smoothly. This perspective is also congruent with media sources that 
described the New Universities Act as a critical law “and so it is likely to be passed quickly” 
(University World News 2009). Nevertheless, it was also acknowledged by some system level actors 
who have management and teaching roles that despite the discontentment expressed by the 
academia, this is probably the way policies should be designed and implemented in order to speed 
up change. 
“I think there was a dialogue, at least between the Ministry, the Rectors and the leadership of  
universities, but it might be that there wasn’t a real dialogue between all staff  members and 
students and the Ministry. But I don’t now if  it would be possible to organise it in a way that 
everybody could participate. It was relative well done in a way that quite many could participate 
and gave their opinion to this process. (…) The leadership of  universities, at least, was for it. But 
I know that among staff  members and students there were critical voices” (4Fs*). 
This duality of  opinions about whether faculty members participate enough on political processes, 
and/or any other activities besides teaching and research, brings our attention to other dimensions 
of  analysis, as for example changes in the academic profession and its management; changes in 
decision-making and in actors’ roles. Furthermore, it was also perceptible in both countries that 
interviewees doubt i) whether it is really possible to increase faculty participation in political life and 
ii) whether increased participation would, effectively, change the university core activities, e.g. 
working conditions, access to funding and more autonomy to perform tasks. 
“(…) I would like to see more participation also from the different levels of  working members. 
But, as I mentioned previously, the university people are mainly people who don’t like bureaucratic 
discussions that much, we are not so much interested in laws, in ministry guidelines, we are so 
devoted to research and training itself  that the rest tends to be forgotten or to be considered a 
burden…” (2FUmm).  
Before moving to the second dimension of  analysis, figure 13 revises the chronological time frame 
of  the New Universities Act as well as the main goals stipulated in the Law. 
Figure 13 - Temporal Context of  the New Universities Act and main changes brought by 
the Law 558/2009. 
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To 
sum up… 
 This first dimension analysed the political process of  design and implementation of  both 
the Bologna process and the RJIES/New Universities Act in Portugal and in Finland. It addresses 
the first research question – How these policy processes have been designed and implemented in both countries? 
Thus, what does the previous detailed analysis mean about the way Portugal and Finland approached 
change and on how they implemented the Bologna process and the RJIES / the New Universities 
Act?  
Generally speaking, and at a first glance, the initial dynamics towards the Bologna process did 
not differ much from country to country and even among HEIs in both countries. By other words, 
even if  at the beginning there were some reluctance and concerns with the process, faced with the 
national Ministerial decisions of  signing the Declaration, HEIs started to move in the direction of  
the Bologna reform, which was firstly seen as the implementation of  a comparable system of  
degrees, consisting of  a 3 years bachelor degree and a 2 years master degree for the majority of  
study fields. More or less consciously, and in a more or less positive view, HEIs were aware that 
change comes along with several challenges that also represent opportunities to reflect and improve 
HE and bring it closer to society. In this matter, one can say that more than coercive pressures by 
the national governments, HEIs felt the need to accept and implement Bologna based in normative 
and even cultural-cognitive assumptions. Professionals within HEIs acknowledged not only the need 
but also the obligation to be a participating part of  the process in order to assure that the upcoming 
changes would maintain the dominant norms and values in each specific country and not disturbing 
much the professionals’ routines and the subjects academics teach. Thus, in addition to the 
government’s imposition and different contexts, the main difference between countries regarding 
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the implementation of  the Bologna process lays in the rationale that led HEIs’ willingness to 
implement and deal with change.  
Faced, on one hand, with the lack and delays of  the several Ministries’ regulation, and, on the 
other hand, with the relaxation and lack of  organisation of  the curricula and degrees’ reformulation, 
Portuguese HEIs felt they were lagging behind their European counterparts. As such, they needed 
to move forward in the implementation process, and do it fast. Faced with the developments of  
other European countries and with the lack of  government guidance, HEIs tried to anticipate the 
reform without a deep reflection. The European context turned to be part of  the organisational 
field and in such context, it is possible to say that Portuguese HEIs were trying to avoid losing 
legitimacy in the field for not being at the forefront of  the proposed changes. The first stage of  the 
implementation process of  the Bologna Declaration happened thus in a more superficial way, a fact 
that led some interviewees to feel that the implementation process happened more “in form” rather 
“in substance” or, as some actors referred, it was mostly a “cosmetic change”.  
In turn, faced with the Ministry attitude of  presenting the reform as a solution for (some of) 
the problems of  the Finnish HE system, and its attempts of  adapting some national objectives to 
the Bologna process goals, Finnish HEIs, after a first moment of  reluctance towards the 
implementation process, saw this momentum as an opportunity for change while simultaneously trying 
to align institutional objectives with national guidelines.    
“(…) you can also think about positive things and we can also use it [the Bologna process] as a 
tool. Even some institutions had their own goals, so we have the European Bologna targets, then 
some national, for instance the shortening of  study times, that was a national project, and then 
some national HEIs had some institutional goals, and probably, even within different disciplines, 
you would find some changes” (5Fs*). 
It seems that contrary to the Portuguese perceptions, Finnish interviewees considered the national 
level more relevant in its organisational field than the European level. This difference is mostly 
explained in the way the initial phases of  the process were conducted, which, generally speaking, 
involved more discussions in a smoother way (also due to cultural reasons), with more actors 
participating in the discussions. One can say that the most optimistic retrospective of  the whole 
process of  implementing Bologna in the Finnish higher education scenario positions it as a win-win 
situation, although strictly led by the OKM and where HEIs, as well as the Finnish Councils of  
University Rectors and Polytechnic Rectors were more passive actors (Knutell 2002; Välimaa et al. 
2007: 51). These findings confirm that the Bologna framework is highly adaptable, not only at the 
international level, but also – and more specifically – it became an effective process for other national 
and institutional initiatives, whose objectives have grown among politicians, civil servants and the 
university leaders (Scott 2012).  
In turn, despite the Portuguese university analysed here had already been through a somehow 
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similar curricular reform to the Bologna process, where institutional actors had to join and rethink 
the way they organise their disciplines, the way they lecture and how all this should be governed, 
when the time came to implement Bologna, the challenges were not minimised as it would be 
expectable and even desired. One of  the reasons explaining these tensions at the institutional level 
lays in the emphasis put in the acquisition and development of  employability skills in the 1st cycle 
of  studies, exacerbating the hierarchical status of  some disciplines and professions, where the 
professional orders played a significant role in the negotiation of  the length of  the degree structure. 
Professional associations represented the interests of  their professions as they adapted their statutes 
to maintain and/or upgrade the necessary requirements for the practice of  different professions 
(Diogo 2014a). During the reorganisation of  curricula, the Portuguese interviewees highlighted the 
competition among academics which aimed at maintaining traditional concepts of  their disciplines 
in order to ensure the continuity of  their jobs and to make the new Bologna bachelors similar to 
the old ones in order to facilitate adaption. These aspects seem to reveal that the normative pressures 
for change were evidenced in the Portuguese process. 
Confirming the notion that academics work in ‘tribes and territories’ (Becher and Trowler 
2001). in both Portuguese and Finnish case studies, national, local and institutional internal support 
groups, usually grouped by disciplinary field, were set up to facilitate the implementation of the 
Bologna process. These groups have then worked in interaction with each other and across 
disciplinary networks and committees. The main differences between countries regarding this aspect 
is that the Finnish Ministry of Education provided funding for these groups during the years 2003-
2007, whereas in Portugal no funds at all were targeted for this.  
It seems plausible to state that in both universities analysed here, the central administration 
(top-management) and most of the university community have been involved in the process, 
although the majority of academics in both countries (especially in Portugal) pointed to the amount 
of information provided in a completely disorganised way. Nevertheless, it was also visible in both 
countries that academics and middle management actors engaged in a deep study of their disciplines 
in order to provide fundamental analysis of the main contents, teaching and working hours of the 
curricula and to adapt these to the new degree structure. Again, also due to the financial situation 
of the country, as well as due to its cultural and historical factors, Portuguese interviewees in both 
subsystems pointed to the internal quarrels among academics (and one should remember that 
“academics” is a group of interviewees that includes several roles in parallel with lecturing…) when 
it was time to plan and reorganise the curricula and the degrees according to the ECTS system and 
fit the old 5 and 4 years content in 3. Perhaps because top-management actors themselves did not 
have to go through this work of curricular reorganisation at the level of basic units, their visions on 
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this tend to be more positive and focused on the long run. Finnish system level interviewees as well 
as top-management actors believe that the Bologna process induces competition in the system, 
which is “good for quality of  teaching and research in the long run” (2FUtm). 
The different interactions and political organisations of the Bologna process in Finland and in 
Portugal are illustrated in Figures 11 and 1, respectively. Finnish actors (and literature) placed great 
importance in the national discipline-based coordination groups as one of the positive factors for 
the successful development of the process. In turn, Portuguese interviewees as well as literature and 
media sources highly criticise the rush and lack of coherence and even of communication among 
stakeholders in implementing the process. In Portugal, Bologna also meant the restructuration of 
the whole higher education system and this explains why the reform was more challenging in 
Portugal than in Finland. The analysis of  the political organisation of  the legislation reforming 
governance modes and practices in Portuguese and Finnish HEIs shows a common international 
sponsor and supporter of  NPM: the OECD. Both Portuguese and Finnish interviewees 
acknowledged the influence of  soft coercion as a successful pressure for change. This means that the 
supranational institutional field was the main driver for reforms that assumed mainly a mimetic and 
normative character. 
The Portuguese university analysed here portrayed a striking reality. Although most 
interviewees stated that, in fact, it was about time to change and rethink the legislation in order to 
update it and make it more useful for the reality of HEIs nowadays, the complaints about the RJIES 
were more than many. In parallel with the fact of being a long and complex document to understand 
(as most of the Portuguese legislation), the RJIES, in interviewees’ words, tries to foresee and 
labelling everything in the same way/according to the same measure. As a consequence, the RJIES 
became a kind of  corset for the academia and displayed differences among the various disciplinary 
fields, creating a stratification of  knowledge within HEIs. Especially middle management 
interviewees pointed to the impossibility of  predicting many situations in higher education and 
complained that the RJIES does not allow for the existence of  discretionary power, indispensable 
at various levels of  management. This somehow represents a contradiction, since the NPM reforms 
intend to promote an increase in institutional autonomy. As a matter of  fact, some authors have 
already pointed out how this type of  reform promotes a centralisation of  the decentralisation (Reed 
1999; Santiago and Carvalho 2008).  
Interviewees with management roles also accuse RJIES of  being such a regulative document 
that one ends juggling to comply with the law. Nevertheless, a curious aspect is the fact that although 
RJIES is such a regulative document, it still did not foresee some important and specific situations 
of  the system, namely the fact that there are universities which integrate polytechnics, and/or the 
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existence of  universities with a matrix structure, organised in departments rather than faculties. 
Again, the fact that the Law is so prescriptive, with no discretionary power, blocks the creativity to 
constitute governance bodies beyond the prescribed model, hindering the possibility of  innovation 
while simultaneously creating something better than what was imposed.  
With respect to the nature of  the policy implementation process, it is fair to say that in both 
countries, both the RJIES and the New Universities Act were imposed to HEIs, although with 
different intensity degrees. While the process was much more coercive in Portugal, Finland had a more 
smooth and collaborative process of  policy implementation, with more key players involved. One 
could picture an arena where every Finnish stakeholder (the OPM; UNIFI; HEIs; FINHEEC; 
ARENE; SYL and FU) has its part of  duties and rights in a more balanced way than in Portugal. 
Portuguese interviewees descried the opposite situation. With the RJIES, for example, it seems that 
the design and implementation process was much more sponsored by the charisma of  one person, 
the former Minister of  Education and Culture, who also had the support of  international 
organisations, whose popularity and importance has been historically recognised in the country. 
Similarly to what happens regarding to the Bologna process, also the different type of relationship 
maintained between the government and HEIs in both countries explains the different types of 
policy design and implementation. 
In this way it is possible to say that national responses vary according to cultural aspects and 
national policies. In fact, the economic downturn that Portugal has experienced in the last years did 
not help to a smooth implementation of  the RJIES – a fact that might explain differences in the 
engagement of  implementing the reform. Furthermore, by being a country with a strong social 
welfare state, where the law and rule are religiously followed, it would be expected that the Finnish 
government had a firm grip in regard to policy implementation. Portugal slightly distances itself  
from this governance model. Traditionally, as Portuguese HEIs had a high degree of  autonomy 
when compared to their Finnish counterparts, it would be expected that HEIs carry out these 
processes (and especially the Bologna declaration) without such a strong interference of  the Ministry 
of  Education. However, data tell us that, in practice, the Portuguese government has the ultimate 
word in reforming higher education, whereas the Finnish system went through a softer policy design 
and implementation process, but with the OKM always playing a central role.  
Historical and cultural dimensions might shed light on this. Also these case studies corroborate 
Czarniawska and Sevón (1996) ideas on law implementation and enforcement as a process of  
cultural translation more than adaptation of reform. This corroborates Ball (1998) view that policy 
formulation may differ then from policy implementation. 
HEIs behaviour should also be analysed according to the degree of  autonomy each type of  
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institution holds. In this sense, it is important to remember that while Portuguese public universities 
enjoyed full autonomy in the creation and delivery of  degree programmes (they only need to register 
these with the DGES), public polytechnics (and private institutions) until recently needed prior 
approval from government, through DGES, for the creation of  new degree programmes. Only very 
recently, with new accreditation procedures, and after the RJIES, this situation changed. Therefore, 
as public universities had more autonomy, and in the case of  the Bologna process, HEIs were able 
to change easily and rapidly their study programmes and start following international trends 
according to the Bologna paradigm. Finnish interviewees argued that strongly centralised HEIs (e.g. 
the University of  Helsinki) took ownership of  the implementation process, while in more loosely 
steered institutions, faculties and departments ended up following the coordination groups’ 
recommendations. Consequently, different results among groups were evidenced, with some going 
further in their reforms, and others not putting so much effort on the process. 
Another conclusion which comes out with the analysis of this first dimension is that although 
the processes approached during the interviews were the same, i.e. the Bologna process and the 
RJIES/New Universities Act, different subjects were related to them in both countries. For example, 
some Portuguese actors referred to the lack of  funding with respect to the implementation of  the 
Bologna process, but the majority of  them did not see this as an obstacle for implementation. 
Mergers were much more mentioned by Finnish interviewees than Portuguese ones, although this 
might have been different if  the interviews were carried out during the last trimester of  2013, 
considering the recent experience with the University of  Lisbon and the forthcoming plans of  the 
PMEC. However, Finnish data clearly shows an idea of  reform as continuity and based on 
sedimentation process, whereas Portuguese data reveals change as a rupture with the past, or at least 
a strong attempt at reforming the university governance structures.   
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II DIMENSION  
Change at the Institutional Level - Institutionalisation of  NPM ideology 
and practice. Stakeholder Guidance, Academic and Managerial 
Governance: Internal Governance 
 
After exploring how both countries implemented laws enforcing changes in the legal 
framework of  their HEIs, and how the Bologna process was interpreted and translated in Portugal 
and in Finland, the research follows to the internal or institutional level, investigating how did HEIs 
of  this study accommodate international and national pressures domestically. This dimension 
answers to the following research questions:  
R. Q. 2 - Which (major) changes happened within the organisational structure of  HEIs? What 
prompted such changes? How HEIs change their governance and management practices to cope 
with external pressures?  
R. Q. 3 - Is it possible to evidence changes in the way work is organised within HEIs and in the way 
academics participate in decision-making practices as consequence of  these external 
pressures/processes? How do they influence working conditions and academic careers? 
Empirical evidence was obtained through interviewees’ perceptions and document analysis, 
mainly the legislation on these themes and universities and polytechnics’ internal statutes in both 
countries. Table 16 revises the categories and themes of  discussion of  this section. 
 
Table 16 - Categories and themes that build up the second dimension 
II DIMENSION: Institutionalisation of NPM ideology and practice (Change at the 
Institutional Level) - Stakeholder Guidance, Academic and Managerial Governance: 
Internal Governance. 
I Category:  
Structures and Processes: Institutionalisation of NPM ideology and practice 
Themes Portugal and Finland 
1. Transformations in the organisational structure – The Portuguese Case 
          Public Foundations under Private Law 
2. Transformations in the organisational structure – The Finnish Case 
3. Changes in Portuguese Universities’ Governance Model 
          (Re)composition of Governing Bodies and Election procedures – The Portuguese Case  
4. Changes in Finnish Universities’ Governance Model 
5. Academic Careers and Working Conditions  
          The Finnish Case 
          The Portuguese Case 
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I Category – Structures and Processes: 
Institutionalisation of NPM ideology and practice 
 
The following themes of  analysis focus on changes in Portuguese and Finnish universities’ 
organisational structure such as the establishment of  universities foundation, mergers, increased 
technostructure in HEIs, etc. It draws attention also on shifts in governance forms of  Portuguese 
and Finnish HEIs, as well as changes in theirs governance bodies. Relying on interviewees’ 
perceptions, and on the literature review, the third and second research questions will be addressed. 
 
2.1 Transformations in the organisational structure - The Portuguese 
Case 
 
2.1.1 Public Foundations Under Private Law 
 
One of  the main changes introduced by Law 62/2007 is the possibility given to HEIs to opt 
for one of  the two possible institutional models: institutions may choose to remain a public institute 
or to become a public foundation under private law, which is something totally new in the history 
of  the system. By operating according to private sector rules with respect to financial and personnel 
management, university foundations assume a hybrid entity. Hybrid organisations relate differently 
with the state: instead of  the traditional hierarchical model, a university foundation uses (quasi-) 
market mechanisms, e.g. contracts to set objectives, target agreements and multi-annual budgets 
(Palandt, 2003). So far, only three HEIs in Portugal made this choice. 
Moreira (2008: 125-126) explains that a university foundation abandons the form of public 
institution to create a private law entity that owns the institution. The educational establishment 
stops to be state property and becomes property of a company or a foundation, holding its 
management. Usually, a change in the legal framework of HEIs follows, leaving partially or 
completely the legal regime of public law to be governed by private law norms. Institutions abandon 
the civil service scheme and adopt the labour contract regime through private procurement. 
Therefore, HEIs become institutions of private law, although they remain public with respect to 
their property and mission, replicating management methods from private sector in the public 
sector, as NPM commands. Civil law, labour law and commercial law replace then administrative 
law. There is a clear preference for management forms based on management autonomy, on 
managers’ responsibility and accountability, on remuneration according to performance assessment 
exercises and the use of working contracts, etc. Everything known about private sector management 
is tried to copy, as much as possible, to public administration (Vital Moreira, 2008). According to 
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the constitutionalist, the main idea of the foundational model is for universities to have an “owner” 
that is not the State itself. 
It was this greater degree of  financial and human resources management autonomy that 
university foundations seemed to enjoy that pushed universities to adopt this new institutional 
model. Additionally, the perspective of obtaining lump-sum funding through multi-annual contracts 
would enable greater financial predictability and stability appeared quite enticing for HEIs, especially 
during uncertainty moments. For such enthusiasm, it very much contributed the way the legislator 
promoted the foundational status: a kind of  ideal model, in line with the OECD’s proposal (Law 
62/2007, §129º, nº2) and which would outstand institutions which chose to become foundations. 
Curiously, five years later, in 2013, when the stipulated period to assess RJIES passed, the legislator’s 
mind changed significantly, as explained later on…    
The main advantages of  the foundational model, as presented by its proponents, were:  
i) Possibility of  getting additional financing, including from private sources; 
ii) Multi-annual state financing through contracts, enabling greater financial predictability and 
stability. With the RJIES, the university foundations signed a multi-annual contract with the 
government, which should last no less than 3 years nor more than 5 years, establishing the goals to 
be achieved and the penalty in terms of  financing in the event of  default by the institution (Law 
62/2007, §136º; Amaral 2007); 
iii) Flexibility in personnel recruitment and management (Law 62/2007, §134º, nº3); 
iv) University foundations get to avoid the public accounting regime, prior supervision by the Court 
of  Auditors and public tenders in public contracts;  
v) Efficiency and competitiveness gains in what concerns management (Vital. Moreira, 2011). 
However, taking into account the current moment of  economic crisis in which Portugal is emerged, 
and the successive changes determined by the Treasury that have already affected many of  the 
benefits that led these institutions to opt for the foundational model, this so-called (financial) 
autonomy that appealed so much to HEIs might be useless. Several institutional level interviewees, 
especially those working in the administrative services, frequently referred to this situation.  
“This [the foundational regime] impacts on everyday activities because there are those little things 
that one had always need to do, but now these activities carry ambiguities and, in some cases, there 
are no advantages that apparently would exist in managing according to private law” (3PUt). 
Nevertheless, as empirical data evidenced, being a university foundation became a hallmark, a kind 
of  quality and innovation label for universities, a sign of  progression and adaptation to the “new 
times” (Diogo and Bruckmann 2015: 36-37). It seems that these institutions saw in the 
transformation into a foundation the possibility to increase their legitimacy in the organisational 
field. Such perceptions are based on the requirements that (only) excellent and/or very good HEIs 
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fulfil, e.g. solid self-financing capacity which should be increased by raising institutions’ own 
revenues (university foundations need to obtain at least 50% of  external revenues) and scientific 
soundness which should be proved through the number of  accredited 3rd study cycles, the 
qualifications of  the faculty and development of  top-level research (Law 62/2007). However, and 
as aforementioned, the law came into force in an ungrateful moment for the country. According to 
top-management interviewees, the funding that was supposed to be provided by the state to 
university foundations, as agreed-upon in the multi-annual contracts, has not yet been allocated. 
Faced with this scenario, it is not surprising that the economic context in which the country finds 
itself  was constantly remembered by all interviewees: either by the RJIES supporters – who 
acknowledged that this was not the best time to assess the potentialities of  such a legislative 
instrument – and by the RJIES opponents – who questioned its value and legitimacy in general, but 
especially in the current environment of  economic crisis. Consequently, perceptions changed over 
time regarding the conception of  the foundation model, and therefore “those who were fierce 
opponents during the campaign period started to pay more attention and aimed at internally revising 
this process and vice-versa” (5PUa). In sum, those advocating the foundational model, evoke 
technical arguments, increased flexibility and streamlining management processes, i.e. managerialism 
par excellence.  
In parallel to the uncertainty moment – caused by economic and political instability – in which 
the RJIES arrived to HEIs, the term public foundation operating under private law is ambiguous in the 
light of  the Portuguese Constitution and the Education System Act of  1986, i.e. it is not clear what 
kind of  legal status is this, or what it implies. All institutional level actors, both at polytechnics and 
universities, expressed this feeling: 
“Even from the legal viewpoint, it was never well defined what is a public foundation operating 
under private law, and therefore one cannot understand clearly which influences and changes this 
might bring for institutional management, hiring processes, etc.” (3PPmm). 
Furthermore, whereas on one hand, granting independent legal status is one means of  giving greater 
autonomy to institutions, making HEIs legally responsible for their functioning does not exclude 
institutions from an indirect state administration. In fact, educational trade unions (e.g. FENPROF) 
argued that the intention of  the government in presenting the foundational status as the ideal 
governance model for HEIs has the objective of  increasing the control of  the state over HEIs by 
appointing the Board of  Trustees under Rectors or Polytechnics’ Presidents proposals 
(contradicting somehow the logic of  introducing quasi-markets and/or the principal-agent 
dilemma). According to interviewees, the label public foundation operating under private law is confusing, 
not only in terms of  legal and administrative procedures, but also on decisions and activities that 
are carried out. Related with this ambiguity, the majority of  institutional level respondents pointed 
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to the climate of  uncertainty and instability that creates anxiety to people working in academia.  
The fact that RJIES should be evaluated every five years was pointed as a two-edged sword 
situation. On one hand, this revision is seen as an opportunity to correct flaws and/or less positive 
aspects of  the legislation; on the other hand, it is perceived as contributing factor or a kind of  
confirmation of  the lack of  stability, considering that the new statutes and governance bodies need 
time to be accommodated and institutionalised. Even the most optimistic respondents, i.e. top-
management actors, showed their concerns with respect to the durability of  Law 62/2007: 
“The problem of  RJIES is that we don’t know if  it is to stay or not. Actually, this is always a 
problem in Portugal: how long it will last?” (1PUtm). 
These uncertainty feelings about the stability of  the system and the durability of  RJIES are certainly 
not unfounded. Shortly after the interviews were conducted in Portugal, the government elected in 
2011 announced the abolition of the foundational system and its replacement by a model of 
‘enhanced autonomy’ (Bill 275/201, 3rd July 2013). In fact, by just reading the first two pages of  this 
draft Law, it is immediately perceptible its contradictory nature. While it starts to declare that 
“A law of this kind should have a great stability over time. HEIs cannot, for example, mobilise 
internally every five years, with elections, committees and debates to review their internal 
organisational and operational model, in processes that can last one or two years. This would 
compromise the proper performance of institutions’ mission, especially in times of scarcity of 
resources. (…) Therefore, it would be unwise at the present moment to propose amendments to 
the governance model that entered into force, unless there was serious inadequacy and 
malfunction and widespread rejection, which is not the case” (PL 275/2013: 1)85,  
 
the same document proposed to discontinue the foundational status of  the three public HEIs – one 
of  the building blocks of  the 2007 RJIES, creating a new model of  enhanced or reinforced 
autonomy (§ 177º, PL 275/2013: 50-51), as stated above. Thus, if  the document starts by stating 
that it would be unwise to change the governance model that entered into force in 2007, and that a 
Law should be stable over time, why to change the core aspect of  RJIES with statutory bylaws of  
those HEIs that already changed their statues when they opted for the foundation regime? 
The Ministry decided that university foundations would have to decide to adapt (again) to this 
model of  enhanced autonomy until the end of  2013, although the 2013 Bill states that HEIs have 
9 months to adapt their statutes to the new regime. It is also referred that the multi-annual 
programme contracts agreed with the 3 university foundations are cancelled upon the conversion 
of  these HEIs into the new regime of  enhanced autonomy (§177º). Considering that until mid-2012 
(at least), and as mentioned above, the Portuguese university foundation of  this case study had not 
received the agreed-upon funding as stipulated in the multi-annual contract, and that this 
amendment to RJIES appeared in July 2013, it is understandable the discontentment reactions from 
                                                 
85 Researchers’ translation. 
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interviewees as well as other stakeholders. They accuse the Government and the Minister of  making 
up excuses to not fulfil their obligations and promises.   
“Both things [the law and the crisis] are inseparable, and therefore the interesting aspects that the 
law might have brought, were cancelled by the crisis because a number of  issues that are there 
involve money, like salaries’ increase, different ways for the state to connect with universities, etc. 
So, what happened was that this Law came, they told us that we had to do our part, but they 
wouldn’t comply with their part…” (1PUmm*). 
“What makes me sad at this moment is to see that, with the economic and financial crisis, is very 
likely that we won’t get what was signed one year ago… it won’t be accomplished” (1PUtm).  
However, it is also truth that, until the beginning of  2015, the Draft Bill never became more than 
that: a draft, and so far the RJIES has not been changed and it is very unlikely that the government 
elected in 2011 will make any amendments on this86. Again, such confusion and distrust and 
instability environment could be avoided whether politicians traditions in Portugal were more… 
coherent.  
It is important to understand that the RJIES appears in a moment of  change also for public 
administration, namely with respect to the rules of  hiring staff  (human resources management), 
funding issues, etc. In this way, in the last two years, university foundations have been increasingly 
more included in the state domain, such as other public institutions. Consequently, when it comes 
to financial and accountability issues, and almost 5 years passed, different institutional actors 
perceive that the university foundation never existed: 
“In practice, the foundational regime is suspended, with an exception for the aspects related with 
assets. This means that in terms of  financial management, university foundations are again in the 
perimeter of  the state budget and therefore have to check the rules, standards and all requirements 
such as any other university. So, according to what the Finance Ministry determined, from the 
viewpoint of  financial management, universities were left with very little difference in relation to 
other institutions” (4PUtm). 
“The differentiation that existed at the beginning seems to have been fading gradually away. At 
the present, I don’t feel that this is a legislation that impacts in terms of  hiring people, 
accountability, etc. We have to check constantly if  this applies or not to a foundation. (…) Thereby 
we have to constantly ask for clarification and ask if  we have autonomy or not” (3PUt).  
Somehow, these results confirm Powell and DiMaggio (1983) statement that in a process of  change 
institutions tend to become more similar than different. Formal (based on the impositions of  new 
rules due to the economic bailout) and informal mechanisms (related with the prevalence of  the 
existent cultural-cognitive framework) did not allow for universities that adopted the foundation 
model to change radically. This contributes to the existence of  hybrid forms and structures in the 
                                                 
86 In January 2015, a newspaper reported that the former Minister of  HE retreated from the idea of  cancelling the 
foundational status, and that university foundations are able to maintain this status and others that which to change 
their status from public institute to a public foundations under private law are allowed to do it. News retrieved 
from: http://www.publico.pt/sociedade/noticia/governo-recua-e-universidades-vao-poder-continuar-a-ser-
fundacao-1682229 
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system: the culture that already existed, remains, but there are new elements in the process of  
institutionalising change. 
Additionally, this overlapping between public administration institutions’ and foundations’ 
obligations raised complaints towards the fact that the specific nature of  HEIs was not taken into 
consideration when drafting the RJIES: 
Changes in public administration and instruments designed for public administration in general 
were brought into universities without taking into account that public institutions are different 
from General Directorates and these instruments do not work in HEIs and they never will! This 
wounds autonomy! Basically, there’s a fundamental disrespect towards the nature of  the institution 
and its autonomy (6Ps*). 
When one takes into account the cumbersome nature of  Law 62/2007, the changes in the public 
administration sector that impacted on HEIs, and the contradictory nature of  the Bill to amend 
RJIES, it is not surprising actors’ confusion and disillusionment with the foundational status. 
Furthermore, by reading the proposal to amend RJIES, it seems that also the government does not 
know exactly what it means for a University to be a public foundation operating under private law:  
“It is not, in fact, about foundations in a strict sense. The regime is defined in the RJIES itself  
and features, in practice, by greater autonomy and flexibility of  management. There was no 
foundational capital, only the possibility of  the asset registry of  real estate assigned to those HEIs 
and partial use of  private law, namely with regard to financial, asset and personnel management. 
(…) The ‘public foundations under private law’ of  the current RJIES are a legal construct that 
reflects a strengthening of  the autonomy of  certain public HEIs (…). According to the 
assessment of  the Ministry of  Education and Science, such a construction can be advantageously 
replaced by a regime of  enhanced autonomy, without changing its general legal nature, and that 
ceases the mandatory funding through multi-year contracts and possibility of  extension to 
individual organisational units” (PL 275/2013: 2-3)87.  
Thus, it was interesting to notice how the tone of  interviewees changed during the interview process. 
As earlier mentioned, the technostructure interviewees (as well as some other institutional level 
respondents) initially seemed a bit reluctant and afraid of  expressing their general views on their 
understanding of  RJIES. However, as interviews were progressing, and as more specific questions 
were addressed, interviewees’ enthusiasm decreased proportionally to the increase of  criticism. In 
fact, considering that the foundational status is the main difference and ‘originality’ of  RJIES, it 
seems problematic whether, within a university foundation, the academia members do not feel 
acquainted with the changes such status entails. This creates uncertainty and thereby hinders 
institutions’ possibilities and freedom of  manoeuvre – a feeling expressed by all institutional level 
                                                 
87 Researcher’s translation. Although the Bill to amend RJIES states that the amendments focus 
mainly on the situation of public HEIs in public administration and the foundational status for 
public HEIs and their organic units, the document goes beyond that. It reassures the binary 
organisation of the system; it repeals the specialist status of polytechnics; it revises the 
responsibilities of the Student’s Ombudsman (§25º); it stipulates more accurately the faculty’s 
requirements; and it explains the articulation conditions between social services. 
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actors in both subsystems. This context of  change, historically unique in the country, raises many 
questions regarding the foundational status, namely how university foundation operates in a context 
of  such economic crisis. Especially institutional level actors with management and teaching roles – 
middle management actors and academics – referred that they do not feel or know whether the 
foundational status is effectively in place.  
“I can tell you honestly that, at this point, I don’t have a good impression of  this. I know that I’m 
working in a university that has the foundational status, but if  someone asks me, I don’t know 
whether we work or not as a foundation. The only thing that I know is that we changed our 
organic. We have now a completely different organic” (4PUmm). 
This is a problematic discussion in Portuguese HE and leads to the debate of  other important issues, 
namely the question of  autonomy and mercantilisation of  the University, as well as the degree of  
State interference in HEIs’. Succinctly put, middle management actors and academics envision a 
situation where a supposed increase of  autonomy without the necessary resources will lead to 
greater state dependency or to whom will have the power to provide the necessary resources the 
University needs to operationalise its mission. In turn, there was a general feeling among institutional 
level actors, both from universities and polytechnics, that despite less state intervention and more 
financial autonomy, the institution is loosing its freedom of  manoeuvre. The main rationale for this, 
“(…) regardless of  RJIES, is this complete subversion to the financial system that apparently is 
forcing universities to lose much of  their autonomy” (1PPmm). Thus, if  on one hand, the 
experiment of  developing universities’ autonomy through the foundational status could be seen as 
a twofold beneficial process as it would relieve the state’s burden while simultaneously encouraging 
universities to develop different survival strategies through more diversified funding possibilities; on 
the other hand, the economic crisis swapped these premises:  
“We feel that there isn’t autonomy: there is autonomy when there is money, but when one speaks 
about funding it disappears” (4PUmm). 
In this scenario, it is also easy to predict a race for the commercialisation of  universities’ activities 
and consequently to resemble them, even more, to entrepreneurial organisations. It is believed that 
this possibility would be easier to achieve with a foundational university rather than a public institute. 
Data reveals different positions on this subject according to the interviewees’ roles. External 
members of  the university, namely those belonging to the Board of  Trustees do not hesitate to refer 
that 
“Universities should seek extra-ordinary income far beyond that the State guarantees to them. I 
like the MIT [Massachusetts Institute of  Technology] example, where a Professor has only 75% 
of  his/her salary assured, and he/she has to find the rest of  the income. This would force the 
university to open up to the world, to seek revenues and to have research that would show results 
and that would grant income to universities due to the sale of  patents and/or programmes they 
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would offer” (3PUtm*).88 
It is not difficult to imagine that these views do not encounter much support from other academics 
and middle management actors, especially from the soft disciplines, who do not agree and/or believe 
with such transformation. 
“Managing a university is not like managing a bank or a supermarket. Those who come here with 
ideas of, for example, discarding programmes in the University because there are few students, just 
like one discards a product from a supermarket shelf because it’s no longer sold, this can’t be done! 
I completely repudiate this! Completely! I think institutions need to have people with a social 
perspective on the value of knowledge, people with a humanised view of society, who can look at 
the role of universities not merely in a logic of costs and benefits, people who look at this house 
with a different perspective” (5PUa). 
 
This discrepancy of  opinions also illustrates the different viewpoints on the changes of  the 
institutional governance and management model and on how different actors look at the university 
and to the mission(s) it should aim at. Additionally, it can be concluded – or reinforced by some 
interviewees’ opinions, that the Law 62/2007 was not discussed or negotiated at level of  basic units. 
“The commercialisation of HE is a bubble that will burst sooner than later and I’m not sure if the 
commercialisation of its ‘supply’ is the raison d'être of a university. Maybe it’s just a momentary 
necessity due to the moment we are living, but if it’s globally positive or not, I have some doubts” 
(1PUt). 
 
It seems that the emergence of  ‘new actors’ in the governance structure of  the university brought 
new values and norms to its cultural-cognitive framework. External stakeholders, as they were 
mainly recruited from the entrepreneurial sector, seem to have introduced in the university the 
market language and logic. However, the debate on the commercialisation of  the University’s 
activities no longer is merely an ideological discussion: it became a topic of  paramount importance 
within Portuguese (and Finnish) academia, as it seems to be an inevitable scenario for HEIs. 
Whether, on one hand, it is seen as a way to solve and save universities from financial constraints, 
on the other hand, it confirms the end of  the Humboldtian and Newman models of  University 
governance. Consequently, and as most of  institutional level interviewees referred, both from soft 
and hard disciplinary fields, there are real fears that this strong shift towards academic capitalism in 
Portuguese HE will lead to a situation in which those areas of  knowledge without great possibilities 
for direct economical return will cease to exist, annihilating multidisciplinary basic research. 
Concurrently, another question surfaces: how can a tool like RJIES be useful if economically sound 
universities, like the one analysed in this study, lose financial autonomy and risk being treated 
similarly with other public institutions and universities that are not so careful with their finances? 
Furthermore, institutional interviewees also mentioned that such situation perverts or invalidates 
                                                 
88 One should remember that in order to acquire the foundational status, any Portuguese university needs to obtain 
at least 50% of  external revenues.  
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RJIES’ character of fairness, one of its major strengths – as all universities and polytechnics are 
treated the same way in terms of financial issues. This scenario clearly shows frustration and 
discontentment by interviewees, regardless of  their role and the type of  HEI where they work.  
“I think the RJIES has good intentions, but the truth is that we are overshadowed by the current 
reality, which I think it’s a legitimate concern of those who govern universities. (...) A practical 
question is how things will actually happen? (…) It’s not just the financial autonomy that worries 
me, although it’s painful to see universities like ours that, from the financial point of view have 
effectively accomplished their goals, and did not contribute to the deficit (...), how do they end 
up to be so highly penalised? This really shows that there are some issues that need revision. All 
universities are placed in the same bag when it comes to financial matters, and that is highly unfair. 
(…) I can’t see how a university will work properly by losing its autonomy” (1PPmm). 
 
This leads us to inquire whether it is possible to assess or to even talk about fairness criteria in a 
scenario involving the whole country and almost all sectors of activity. By other words, to what 
extent is it possible to fully understand and assess this new tool of  institutional governance and 
management, and its possibilities in such a controversial economic, social and political context? 
The loss of  autonomy appears as the main concern and critique for middle management 
interviewees and academics that feel tied up in their role, both as managers and/or academics 
(Diogo and Bruckmann 2015). Indeed, these findings corroborate the idea that more targeted 
funding has given governments increased steering power over universities, which in turn can hinder 
HEIs ability to act more autonomously (EUA 2011). 
If  institutional and financial autonomy are considered crucial prerequisites to overcome the 
crisis successfully by allowing universities the freedom to allocate their funds strategically, what 
happens when institutions are tied up by this blurred financial autonomy? Top-management 
interviewees, in a more optimistic tone, mentioned that the law is being put to test in extraordinary 
difficult situations. In this way,  
“Whether we want to talk in hypothetical terms, it’s very likely that within these same budget 
restrictions, if we didn’t have RJIES, the ability for HEIS to face these changes would be even 
more limited. I mean, faced with the same ‘budget breaker’ we now have, what would happen to 
universities if they’re still governed with the previous model?” (2PUtm*). 
 
Following this rationale, some top and middle management interviewees also mentioned that 
considering RJIES strengthens HEIs’ top and middle management, providing governance leaders 
with greater responsibility, the Law promoted more flexible institutions, capable of  easily adapting 
and coping with changes. In turn, it was also referred that as much challenging and troublesome the 
(economic) environment and the national circumstances are, more expectable is to have stronger 
leaderships in steering HEIs and their staff:  
“The new legislation introduced another role: the role of  leadership and strategic vision of  leaders 
in setting institutions’ path. There was a significant change with respect to this” (3PUmm). 
This change in the traditional organisational forms of  the university, e.g. the foundations status, 
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represents the political hybridism of  the country, or by other words, it is a clear example of  steering 
from a distance, where the government attempts to control public institutions by transforming them 
in foundations with an agency character. Reed (2002) also described this phenomenon as the 
“centralisation of  decentralisation”. To a great extent, this study seems to confirm that the NPM 
intents of  turning HEIs more autonomous, was only rhetorical. It can be seen as a way to legitimate 
the inclusion of  more management professionals as a way to change the cultural-cognitive pillar 
sustaining HEIs (Scott 2001), changing more deeply the culture of  the institution.   
 
2.2 Transformations in the organisational structure – The 
Finnish Case 
 
Differently form the Portuguese university that chose to become a foundation university, the 
Finnish university analysed here assumed its legal personality as a public corporation, i.e. an 
institution with independent legal personality – one of  the two options recommended by the 
working group appointed by the FMEC on the preparation of  the New Universities Act. As such, 
Finnish interviewees did not comment on changes in this type of  organisational form. Rather, the 
issue of  institutional mergers came out frequently, as well as changes in governance modes and 
management practices. However, and similarly to the Portuguese law, Finnish universities could also 
chose to reform their legal status to become private foundations, althouh the name does not follow 
exactly the same guidelines as Portuguese university foundations. The Foundations Act contains 
provisions on the functions and administration of  the foundation universities, the financing and 
steering of  operations, and university research and teaching, students and personnel (Mäkeläinen 
2010). The foundational status was created mainly for Aalto University (in Helsinki)89 as can be 
checked in the FMEC website.  
Under the new legislation universities will be separated from the state regardless the type of  
their legal status, although they still are primarily funded by the state and continue to perform the 
public duty assigned to them in legislation. The main differences between corporations under public 
law (public universities) and foundation universities lie in their governance bodies (Universities Act 
558/2008; Mäkeläinen 2010: 10), although these do not differ significantly. Also the distinction 
provided by the FMEC on these statutes is not particularly enlightening. A corporation under public 
law (public university) is defined as a “legal person under the Universities Act whose organs and 
                                                 
89 In Finland, only two universities became foundation universities under private law: Aalto University and Tampere 
University of  Technology. The Aalto University was established based on the merger of  the Helsinki University of  
Technology, Helsinki School of  Economics and University of  Art and Design with the objective to be the 
“innovation university”. Most universities, 14, became legal persons under public law. The reasons for this 
encompass a discussion which goes beyond the scope of  this study. 
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their functions are laid down in legislation”, and a foundation university as “a legal person under 
the Foundations Act which is assigned the university mission in the Universities Act and whose 
organs and functions are laid down in the Universities Act” (Turunen 2009). 
Similar to Portuguese HEIs, there are no major differences in the governance and management 
bodies of  universities with independent legal personality and foundation universities. These 
institutions share the main management bodies: the university Board, the Rector and “an overall 
multi-member administrative body” (Universities Act 558/2008). This will be further elaborated 
(section 2.3).  
In parallel, with the New Universities Act, another reform process started to gain shape and 
substance in Finnish higher education, namely the structural development of  the HE system, i.e. 
the redefinition of  Finnish HEIs’ network. Succintly put, this means a process of  mergers and cuts 
of  public expenditure. The data collected on this issue reflects merely system level views and 
therefore it is not possible to draw a valid comparative picture of  this process. Moreover, the topic 
of  institutional mergers is not the focus of  this study.  
 
 
2.3 Changes in Portuguese Universities’ Governance Model  
The RJIES changed significantly the governance system of  Portuguese HEIs, especially of  
those that adopted the foundational model. The more critical voices of  RJIES called it a technocratic 
and managerialist reform, which erodes democratic management under the grounds that collegiality 
does not fit the current complexity of  the HE system and it is seen as an obstacle to effective 
management (Crespo, 2003).  
The idea that universities lack solid authority and leadership, and have excessive democracy has 
been a recurrent discourse of  those who advocate a more efficient model, copied from the private 
sector, whose power would be more centralised. Nevertheless, it is important to clarify that there 
are different traditions of  collegiality (as mentioned in chapter II) and usually (interviewees’) 
discourses tend to blur and/or use the concepts of  collegiality and democracy interchangeably. By 
collegiality, we refer to the governance model usually called professional bureaucracy (Mintzberg 
1979) where decision-making is shared by equals – academics – who take management roles only 
temporarily and have relative autonomy in time, teaching and research management (cf. Tapper and 
Palfreyman 2010). Decision-making is based on consensus-building, egalitarian environment 
founded in mutual respect among scholars and good discourse where the best argument wins 
(Birnbaum, 1988). 
Portugal is a good example of  a country where the increasing demand for HE and attendance 
in HEIs led to the emergence of  new governance issues and demands related to financial and human 
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resources. This demographic shift in the national landscape of  HE, combined with international 
pressures for modernisation (professionalisation) of  HEIs, led some interviewees to report that 
traditional models of  HE governance seem to be “outdated”, i.e. the challenges that HEIs face 
today brought up different concerns and therefore demand new approaches.  
“(…) The governance model that existed in Europe was a collegial one, much dictated by what 
were academics’ primary concerns, namely research and teaching, rather than issues related to the 
management of  the necessary resources to do their work. So now we have different requirements, 
e.g. accountability. (…) I believe this created a kind of  questioning environment around HEIs, whether 
they are being well governed and managed, whether the resources are being well used” (6Ps*). 
From this excerpt, several points for analysis can be raised, which were also mentioned by other 
interviewees, with different roles. 
First, the rationale pointed out by this actor makes us wonder whether and how, in presence of  
the same similar scenario, i.e. more and different audiences attending HE, the strengthening of  
scientific research, etc., and in the absence of  Law 62/2007, how (and whether) would HEIs reform. 
Around the globe, concerns and attention to how HEIs use their resources has grown. In fact, and 
at least in mainland Europe, there has been a move towards an archetype where the environment 
works as a net within which HEIs must be integrated if  they want to survive as organisations 
(Tolbert 1985; Meyer and Rowan 1985; Oliver 1991). In this paradigm, the government should 
promote institutions’ openness to the environment. This was one aspect identified by interviewees, 
regardless of  their role, which justifies and legitimises a change in the governance model. 
“The new legislation introduced rules that open more the university to the outside. A key objective 
of  these rules is to bring into the university management models of  business type and therefore, 
which are seen as more efficient than the traditional models of  university management. However, 
these rules also diluted the traditional concept of  the university as a community of  scholars and 
students” (6PUa*). 
“RJIES was an effort made in a certain moment in order to create the necessary tools for a certain 
type of  management” (1Ps).  
Thus, it is without surprise that also in Portugal, especially in an environment of  resources’ scarcity, 
and at a moment that citizens feel increasingly more disappointed with the governmental 
(des)performance, pressures for more institutional accountability have grown, as well as attention 
to everything that includes taxpayers’ money. 
“I think that even before RJIES (…) there was already a consensus in shifting universities 
governance to a less rigid mode, while allowing for a greater diversity in terms of organisation 
modes” (3PUmm). 
 
It can be said that this growing concern to assure that public resources and taxpayers’ money is 
being properly used to meet HEIs increased needs and requirements, whereas simultaneously 
assuring that HEIs’ demands are effectively and efficiently managed, represents the main rationale 
for change. Therefore, it would be expectable, or desirable at least, that the new governance model 
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would include more accountable and responsible institutional leaders, able to take difficult (political) 
decisions: 
“I clearly think that universities, not only this one, will have to change their structure. By other 
words, universities will have to make robust changes to withstand the situation we are living now. 
And these changes do not merely concern to reduce the wage bill – there will be changes involving 
things that impact much more than this – decisions such as: should I keep this area of knowledge 
or not? Will I continue to support other sectors within the university besides teaching and/or 
research or not?” (1PUmm*). 
 
In fact, it seems that there is a need, a kind of pressure, that HEIs (through their leaders and staff) 
prove to the Ministry of  Education and other supervisory bodies and institutions that they are very 
well capable of  taking care of  their internal governance, to critically assess what is wrong and to do 
the necessary changes. Therefore, it was also acknowledged that in order for this to happen, there 
should be (some) changes in the way universities should be governed and in the way they relate with 
civil society. Nevertheless, institutional level actors still feel discomfort with the model chosen, 
mainly due to two main interlinked reasons. First, they feel that they barely had time to implement 
the new model and everything that it entails, e.g. the new governance bodies and performance 
assessment exercises. 
“I don’t know if  you can picture what happened, but at certain point we take office and we had 
to solve the situation in a very short time because the law requires us to have a model and we had 
to do it. And I think that was the best possible model within the short time we had. I don’t think 
we could have done better. Now, we still don’t have many results, but we have some feedback (...) 
and it is a highly complex system” (1PUmm*). 
However, it was also reported that considering the circumstances, namely the lack of  discussion on 
the RJIES and the short time given – according to the interviewees’ perceptions – to apply the 
legislation to this university, institutional actors feel that despite this not being a good model, it was 
the best they were able to put into practice: 
“There wasn’t much leeway in the way this process was conducted (...). I think we did the best we 
could but, in my opinion, this isn’t a good model and it can’t be a good model! I don’t think it’s 
sustainable… This institution just keeps moving forward because it has several people committed 
to the institution, who feel it, who like it, who live it and who give their best for it! But the reasons 
for giving the best are fewer and fewer! (…) We might have something good at the end of this 
process, but we will suffer to get there... I mean, it will be a very difficult transition process, even 
without looking to all these financial constraints” (6PUtm*). 
 
Indeed, institutional actors with different roles acknowledged the efforts of  top and middle 
management actors in the implementation process of  the new governance model, a process that, as 
it seems to be the tradition, was extremely bureaucratic and time-consuming. 
“If  you ask me about the weaknesses of  all this process… well the Rector had 57 meetings with 
the heads of  departments to make this model operational! (...) All these meetings plus the visits 
to the departments; it wasn’t mandatory, but still…. It took almost one year” (1PUtm). 
The way these changes in the governance model were implemented may be interpreted as an attempt 
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to avoid a radical rupture with the previous model. Since academics based their cultural-cognitive 
framework in a collegial model, the Rector designated a specific body and to try to maintain the idea 
of  collegial participation. 
One of  the possible explanations for the challenging organisation at the internal level relates 
with the rigidity of  the Law, which formats every national HEIs in the same way, not taking into 
account that there is structural and organisational diversity among national HEIs.   
“Here at the university we had some difficulties because the Law was designed for institutions 
organised by faculties or schools, not by departments. It would have made much more sense to 
me if  they said that institutions should have some bodies or those bodies, but then it would be 
up to the institutions the way they organise internally” (2PUa).  
The second main reason why some institutional actors feel discontent with the new governance 
model is due to its undemocratic and highly centralised nature. Interviewees justified these views 
with the separation that exists between the head of  the institution – the Rector, and the head of  the 
foundation, who is the head of  the Board of  Trustees, and with the possibility for the head of  the 
department to concentrate the scientific, pedagogical, administrative and executive power in only 
one person. In addition, it was reported that at the faculty/departmental level, the discussions of  
RJIES and the changes it would entail were confined to just a small group of  people, a similar 
argument to what Finnish academics and middle management interviewees referred. 
“I think it’s a system very much steered from the top. People are a bit scared about it because it’s 
so undemocratic and we are not used to this yet. Or maybe we think it’s undemocratic, but it’s just 
a different democracy, because in fact the departments had all the freedom to create the bodies 
we wanted within the limits of  the law. (…) I think people think they would like to work together, 
to think about the documents, about the future, about the strategy of  the department. I don’t 
know if  they would like to, but I would! And there was no opportunity for that and I believe that 
in other departments the situation was the same. (…) This is my feeling as a Professor, not as a 
Vice-Rector. It’s a pity because I think I have something to say, and now I feel I have no voice in 
what happens down there, from the bottom to the top, because from a top-down perspective, yes 
I have power…” (6PUtm*). 
Due to the nature of  this actor’s role, this discourse is quite alarming, especially when the interviewee 
goes on saying that there is a huge difference in the way the academia participated in decision-
making: 
“What I think it completely changed is the way we work. If  in the past we worked in a way that 
we thought it was collegial, now, in fact we feel voiceless” (6PUtm*). 
It was indeed one of  the main aspects focused during the interviews: the shift from a collegial model 
of  governance to a more managerial one, which is leading to a loss of  academics’ participation in 
decision-making processes, and therefore a loss of  collegiality in decision-making, combined with 
less democracy and more hierarchical decisions. The great majority of  middle-management actors, 
academics and administrative staff  in both countries shared this concern, as it is also perceived by 
this quotation of  a Finnish middle management actor: 
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“University governance has been shared by professors, other faculty staff  and students in earlier 
times, it worked in a collegial basis. Not now anymore. (…) It’s more the decision-making: it’s 
much more centralised these days, so there’s very little democracy in decision-making, unless 
obviously you want to have it. It’s mainly up to the head of  the department” (3FUmm). 
However, as explained later on, Finnish interpretations on the new law tend to be milder. It is true 
that until recently, Portuguese HEIs’ organisational structures were based on collegiality with widely 
participated management and governing boards. Now they are faced with a power concentration in 
three governing boards (instead of  the four to five they used to have) to which a restricted number 
of  representatives is elected from the several university bodies that constitute it (Kauko and Diogo 
2011). This is clearly a drift away from the managerial model that had characterised the governance 
archetype of  the Portuguese university. From a governance pattern ruled by professionals 
(academics), a new model emerges in which professionals have to share the power of  decision on 
university management issues with external stakeholders, coming from different realities and far 
from academic culture or ethos (Diogo and Bruckmann 2015: 29). It seems thus that collegiality 
principles might still exist in the academia life, as for example the academic Senate and 
faculty/department councils, but have been eroded in decision-making processes. The first impact 
of  both cultures, i.e. externals vs. internals, in the same arena might be challenging: 
“Now there must be a learning phase. There is mutual ignorance from people who come from 
the business world and from people who come from the academic world. (…). These are different 
cultures. On the one hand, the institutional culture of  the university doesn’t know well, doesn’t 
deal well with the business culture, but the opposite is also true: business man don’t know the 
difficulties and realities of  a university, which are very different from those that companies face” 
(3PPmm). 
A new institutional culture is in place. RJIES is thus perceived as a necessary tool for a particular 
type of  management. It remains to be known, as Tapper and Palfreyman (2010) ask, whether it 
makes sense to retain the idea of  collegiality in such context, as pressures for more efficiency and 
accountability much enforced by NPM, have overthrown collegiality. 
Another issue relates to the types of  leadership and power this new model brings to HEIs, an 
aspect that needs to be analysed alongside changes in the governance bodies. Most institutional 
actors perceived changes in power and leadership as dangerous for the healthy functioning of  the 
academia: 
“I think this [the loss of  democracy and collegial power] is quite clear. It has the advantage of  
streamlining decision-making processes, of  having decision-making processes in which those 
corporative pressures lose importance, are diluted. But, on the other hand, it also entails the risk 
of  modifying the type of  connection to the institution and promoting a certain alienation and/or 
detachment, e.g. from the academics to the proper functioning of  the institution. So now things 
are more hierarchical, are discussed in a narrower context, there’s less participation. Therefore, if  
there’s less participation, there’s the risk of  having a certain anaemia, sort to speak” (6PUa*). 
“I think we lost something because it [the department’s scientific commission] was a body that, 
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although it was relatively big in some departments, also due to their size, it was an opportunity to 
discuss things of  interest. I think we lost that panoramic view of  what was happening in the 
department” (4PUa). 
“Regarding decision-making processes, I believe that with the RJIES, it has become less 
participatory and more centralised and also more bureaucratic” (4PPmm). 
In turn, one should bear in mind that after 5 years passed since RJIES came into force, and even if  
the Bill to amend RJIES reports that no main problems were identified in HEIs, still, the Ministry 
of  HE wants to move back from what was so strongly advocated earlier. It is true that the Ministers 
were not the same: the former Portuguese Minister of  HE (Mariano Gago) was in power during 
four mandates of  the socialist party. In total, he was a Minister during 13 years, whereas the Minister 
that followed him (Nuno Crato) from the social democratic party came to the Ministry in 2011, and 
his latest policies and measures went in a contrary direction of  that of  continuity of  previous 
policies. In this case, it is possible to admit the hypothesis that the governance reform brought by 
RJIES and its unfolding did not happen in a common sedimentation/layering process. In other words, 
despite the change of  governments, it would be expectable some coherence and continuity in 
educational and research policies, not at least to assess exactly what and how it needs to be changed... 
 
2.3.1 (Re)composition of the Governing Bodies and Election - The 
Portuguese Case 
 
Although described as an overly prescriptive, complex and normative document, Law 62/2007 
allowed for some diversification with respect to HEIs’ governance bodies and their constitution. 
Differences in HEIs’ internal government and management structures can be measured by the 
possibility institutions have in choosing the total number of  members of  governing bodies; in the 
way faculty members, non-teaching staff, students and external members seats are 
distributed/allocated (Law 62/2007, §97º, §102º, etc.) and in the selecting procedures of  governing 
bodies, as well as their operationalisation and coordination /organisation. In addition, HEIs were 
left with the option of  having or not consultative or advisory governing bodies, such as an Academic 
Senate, a Council/Commission of  Ethics (and Deontology), a Cooperation Council and/or a 
Disciplinary Committee/Commission90. In fact, the most visible example of  differences among 
institutional models relates to the possibility HEIs have of  choosing to have or not a Senate or an 
                                                 
90 The Portuguese university studied here has a Council of  Ethics and Deontology, which works 
as an advisory body to the government bodies of  the university in matters of  ethics and 
deontology, e.g. contributing to the definition of  guidelines or the establishment and 
consolidation of  a policy of  compliance with ethical and deontological principles (Portuguese 
university statutes 2009, §31º). 
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Advisory Council (Law 62/2007, IV §77º). 
Both the documental and empirical data collected show that the classical bureaucratic way of  
organising public institutions has given way to a more rational one – also inspired by the OECD 
(2006) recommendations. Generally speaking, and as it has been argued here, the traditional model 
of  universities’ governance, traditionally represented by academics, collegial and consultative in 
nature, has shifted towards a model which places greater emphasis on executive and supervisory 
bodies, with participation of  external members. The presence of  external stakeholders in HEIs’ top 
governing bodies was made mandatory by the RJIES and optional for middle management 
structures (Law 62/2007).  
The strengthening of  executive and supervisory powers has been a trend in Portuguese (and 
Finnish) HEIs, as acknowledged by interviewees in both countries:  
“It is clear that every management model needs time to stand out. In the case of  this University, 
for example, time was needed before all RJIES bodies could enter into office and then see how 
they relate to each other. And there is clearly an effect that was expected and it’s becoming evident, 
which is the strengthening of  the executive capacity within this new model, with great emphasis 
on the Rector’s executive capacity and then on the directors of  the departments (...). But all this 
is part of  a shift that, for those who looked at it in a hostile manner, obviously they’re still not 
convinced, and those who saw it in a positive way, as it’s clearly my case, and considering the times 
we’re living now, I do think we need more dynamic management, with improved performance 
and implementation capacity, but also clearly accountable for its actions” (2PUtm*). 
Academics tend to be more straightforward about this shift in power distribution: I think now the 
Rector has more power, the Faculty Dean has more power, the heads of  the departments have more 
power and all is concentrated in one person (…)” (2FUa). 
Among the changes in HEIs’ governance bodies proposed by the RJIES, the elimination or the 
facultative character of  University Senates (Academic Boards) embodies one of the most symbolic 
innovations of the Law. Academic senates were the emblematic body of the truly decision-making 
collegial model, including representatives from all academic groups – teaching/research staff, 
students and non-teaching staff – and among all faculties/departments/schools of the institution. 
The importance of the Senate derived from its obligatory advisory role to the Rector’s academic 
decisions, considering that all groups had a word to say on academic matters (Carvalho & 
Bruckmann, 2014). Moreover, as the authors explain, its symbolic nature could be seen as a strategy 
to gather academics’ support to organisational change. However, with RJIES, the Senates lost 
deliberative power, having only advisory functions and in some cases disappeared – as it is the case 
of the Portuguese university of this study. At this point, it is important to refer that the organisational 
structure of HEIs’ governing bodies depends much on the history, culture and traditions of each 
institution. Thus, whereas in the University of Coimbra, founded in 1290, the oldest of Portugal and 
one of the oldest in Europe, “it would be unthinkable that the Senate ceased to exist!” (2Ps*), the 
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same does not hold true for the university analysed here. Being a more recent institution, founded 
in the 1970s – and therefore without such a traditional and symbolic weight, and which also 
integrates polytechnic schools, this institution distanced itself from a governance archetype 
connoted with antiquity, and used the possibilities for innovation allowed by Law 62/2007. 
According to the CRUP, the fact that the Senate disappears or that it assumes a merely advisory 
role was one of the major disagreements among Rectors, as the Rector is now the executive head 
of the university. Additionally, it was reported that quite often Deans complained about the 
impossibility of doing certain things because the Senate did not allow them. With this redefinition 
of powers, hardly these situations or excuses would come out. However, as the following academic 
explains, by solving this constraint, another problem was created with the blurring of functions 
between the Rector and the GC. 
“The truth is that much of  the power comes from the Rector: if  he didn’t do something, that’s 
his problem, that’s how things are. But then having a body to oversee him, the GC… It’s a kind 
of  a general body that on the one hand, it gives him more power, but on the other hand it regulates 
that power. So, I don’t think this left Rectors happy on the division of  powers” (2PUa). 
Interesting is that, by abolishing the compulsory existence of  the Senate, the RJIES took the 2006 
OECD recommendations even further, once that in the OECD report, the Senate is described as 
the seat of  academic governance. “While representative of  the academic community and elected it 
should not be a large body; perhaps its membership should not exceed 25” (OECD 2007: 68). These 
members would include different categories of  Professors and researchers, with an affiliation to 
research units and/or associated laboratories classified with excellent or very good, and a maximum 
of  three students (OECD 2007). Thus, at the present, Portuguese HEIs are faced with a power 
concentration in three governing boards instead of  the four to five they used to have: the Rector 
(and the Rector’s team), the University Assembly and the Administrative Council, in which case the 
University Assembly was replaced by a smaller General Council (GC) and to which a restricted 
number of  representatives is elected from the several university bodies that constitute it. However, 
there are no major differences between the two possible institutional governance models imposed 
by the RJIES, as can be seen in table 17. HEIs in the regime of  public institute and foundation 
universities share the main management bodies: the GC (Conselho Geral), the Rector and the 
Management Board (Conselho de Gestão). Foundation institutions have an extra governing body: they 
are to be governed by a government-appointed Board of  Trustees (Conselho de Curadores). 
Administrative councils have also been replaced by management boards that have identical 
functions, i.e. they are responsible for the administrative and financial management of  the 
institution, as well as human resources management (Law 62/2007, §95º).  
 
Table 17 - Governance Bodies of  Portuguese public HEIs before and after Law 62/2007  
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Autonomy Laws 1988 & 1990 
 
Law 62/2007 
 
 
Public 
Universiti
es 
Rector 
University Senate 
University Assembly 
Administrative Body 
 
Public 
Universities 
General Council 
Rector 
Management Board 
 
Foundation 
Universities 
Board of Trustees 
General Council 
Rector 
Management Board 
 
 
 
Polytechni
cs 
 
President 
General Council 
Scientific Council 
Administrative Council 
 
Polytechnics General Council 
President 
Administrative Council 
 
By changing their legal status from dependent state institutions to a self-administered public 
body, the function/authority of  the supervising state is transferred to the foundation (Palandt 2003: 
182). The Board of  Trustees is constituted by five external individuals appointed by the government 
on the proposal of  the institution for a five-year mandate, which may be renewed once only (and 
may not be dismissed by the government without due cause). In this way, the executive power is 
attributed to a single body, constituted exclusively by externals to the HEI, whose duties are not 
compatible with any other concurrent employment (simultaneous binding) relations of  the 
University (Law 62/2007 §131º; Portuguese university statutes 2009 §9º). By crosschecking the RJIES 
with the university internal statutes, namely the points referring to the administration of  a university 
foundation and the competences of  its governance bodies, it is possible to state that HEIs followed 
what was stipulated by the Law. As follows, the main responsibilities of  the Board of  Trustees are: 
i) to appoint and dismiss the Management Board on the recommendations of  the Rector, Director 
or President; and ii) ratifying decisions of  the GC on the appointment or dismissal of  the Rector, 
Director or President. In addition, the following powers/competences of  the Board of  Trustees are 
then similar to those of  the GC (Law 62/2007 §82º, 2). Examples of  these are the approval of  
medium-term strategic plans and the plan of  action for the four-year mandate of  the 
Rector/President; the approval of  general guidelines for the institution contained in the scientific, 
pedagogical, and financial or asset plan; the approval of  annual plans of  activities and assessing the 
annual report on institutional activities; the approval of  budget proposals and the approval of  the 
annual consolidated accounts, accompanied by the opinion of  the statutory auditor (fiscal único).  
The Board of  Trustees of  the Portuguese university is constituted by four men and one woman. 
The gender imbalance confirms the predominance of  man in top (and middle) management 
positions in Portuguese Universities (chapter V). Such disparity in the numbers of  man and women 
working in a university (public institution) in Portugal can be explained, among other factors, due 
to a lack of  equal opportunities in the legislation and even of  plans of  Affirmative Actions. Contrary 
to Finland, a country characterised by a tradition on equality measures, and where gender equality is 
 338 
regulated through the 1986 Act, Portugal has no specific legislation on this. Only general principles 
can be found in the 1976 Portuguese Constitution and some EU recommendations. The Finnish 
Constitution defined discrimination between men and women as placing women and men in 
different positions on the basis of  gender (Law 609/1986 §7º). Besides prohibiting sex 
discrimination, the Act also imposes on the employer duties to promote equality, like creating equal 
career opportunities, adjusting the working conditions suitable to both sexes, etc. (amendment 
232/2005, §6ºa).  
The second highest governance body of  foundation universities democratically constituted is 
the GC, as recommended by the OECD. For universities that remained public institutes, the GC is, 
at the present, the highest governance body and the highest democratic representation of  the 
university. It is constituted by 15-35 persons, depending on the size of  each institution and the 
number of  its schools and research units (Law 62/2007 §81º). In the initial version of  RJIES (Bill) 
this number varied between 10-25 members (Government of  Portugal 2007 §81º). The president 
of  the GC is an external member, as recommended by the OECD. At least 30% of  the GC members 
must be external. Nevertheless, academics still hold the majority of  seats (>50%), and students 
secure ≥15% of  seats. Under the terms of  the statutes, the GC may include members elected by 
non-academic and non-research staff. While external individuals are co-opted, all the other members 
are elected. After analysing the nature of  public Portuguese universities’ GCs, the study of  Pedrosa 
et al. (2012) and Bruckmann and Carvalho (2014), concluded that there is some diversity in the 
choices public universities made regarding the size and composition of  the GCs. Whereas the great 
majority of  institutions (15 universities) chose a GC with medium dimensions, i.e. 19 and 25 
elements, only one institution chose to have a GC with the minimum number of  elements allowed 
by the Law (15 people), and also only one institution chose to have the maximum number of  
elements (35 members). With respect to the GC’s composition, the authors also refer that a 
significant number of  institutions does not meet the minimum number of  external elements 
required by the Law, and a similar situation can be observed regarding the representation of  students 
(Pedrosa et al. 2012). Thus, a main change is that the actual/current GC has now fewer members 
than those belonging to the old Senate or the University Assembly (Assembleia Universitária) and they 
represent the different groups of  the academia. The interviewees’ perceptions are straightforward 
on the difference between the old Senate and this new governance body:  
“In short, I think the main change has to do with the overall governance of  the university: the 
GC which is a completely different body than a Senate or an Assembly of  a University, with a 
greater preponderance of  external elements to the university” (3PPmm). 
Taking this, one can say that the GC was the main structural change used to transform the dominant 
model of  bureau-professionalism in universities. In this sense, it is also a relevant element in the 
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transformation of  the dominant norms and values inside these institutions. 
The external members of  the GC should be, according to RJIES, “Individuals of  recognised 
merit who have the relevant knowledge and experience but who do not belong to the institution” 
(Law 62/2007 §81º, 2c). External members are co-opted by the representatives of  academics and 
researchers and the student representatives; by absolute majority, under the terms of  the statutes, 
based on justified proposals subscribed to by at least one third of  the members (ibidem, 5a). 
According to RJIES (§81º, 8), the mandate for elected or appointed members is 4 years, except in 
the case of  students for whom it is 2 years, and they may only be dismissed by the GC on the basis 
of  an absolute majority decision in the event of  grave lapses under the terms of  the regulations of  
the Council. However, although students have representation in the choice of  external members, 
they do not have right to vote in the meetings of  the Council (a main difference from the Finnish 
Universities Act, where students still hold this power)91. In addition, the Law stipulates that the 
members of  the GC neither represent groups nor sectarian interests and act independently (ibidem 
§81º, 9).  
The GC of  this Portuguese university is constituted by 19 members (5 women), of  which 5 are 
external individuals and 1 non-teaching/research staff  element. It should also be mentioned that, 
despite RJIES allows for some freedom in constituting HEIs’ governance bodies, due to the nature 
of  the Law, namely its excessive normative character, one of  the reasons why there is a single GC 
in the university is because the Law did not consider that there are Universities that integrate 
polytechnics and/or are not organised into faculties. For example, the university of  this case-study 
chose to set up a single set of  mandatory governance bodies as demanded by the law (namely a 
single GC) for both the university and the polytechnic schools (Diogo and Bruckmann 2015: 34). 
“The RJIES is so regulative that everyone gets stuck. Now we are all equal, but we are all tucked 
inside a straitjacket!” (2PUmm). 
The GC’s main powers are the election of  rectors/presidents, the approval of  planning, 
budgets and the creation and extinction of  basic units (ibidem §82º). The GC is thus a major and 
mixed body: it withholds the powers that belonged to the Senate and it elects the Rector. In this 
way, it became a government body/agency and simultaneously a body open to the external 
environment. According to some interviewees’ perceptions, the GC aims at governing for the 
outside and for within the University.  
“Universities have grown and evolved and this implies a new governance model. In some 
situations it became more difficult because we have decentralised more, but what’s most important 
                                                 
91 In their recent study Bruckmann and Carvalho (2014: 9) point out that the University of  Coimbra has one of  
the lowest participation of  students in the CG. Curiously, since its creation, students had a great power in the 
organisational structure of  this institution. “Throughout history students sometimes even played a decisive role in 
the Rectors election (Estanque 2008)”  
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for me is (…) to have a GC with a reasonable number of  people who provide a valuable 
contribution for seeing differently the university and its role in society” (4PUtm). 
The complexity of  the Law 62/2007 is also translated in the hybridity of  powers and responsibilities 
of  the GC, i.e. a mix of  electoral, strategic and supervision powers. 
“The law was made pending a bit to the right and tending a bit to the left... What happened, then? 
One couldn’t define what a GC is. Is it a strategic body to guide the university or a supervisory 
(inspection) body of  the Rector? There’s this ambiguity. If  it’s meant to be a strategic body, there 
are few external members; if  it is a supervisory body of  the Rector, they are too many. There 
shouldn’t be so many watchdogs for the Rector, right? In my opinion, knowing the leaders of  the 
country and knowing that many of  them don’t have time to be in the university to contribute, 
because they obviously have their jobs and their business, I think the GC should be a strategic 
body and then, it would be good to have a great number of  people contributing with their 
opinions so that they wouldn’t be demanded to attend many meetings. (…) There’s a lot of  
bureaucracy in GCs, which is not of  interest to them and so, they get wondering: ‘Am I useful 
here?’ And this is the worst that can happen” (5PUtm). 
At least for top-management interviewees, it was perceived that there is still the need to create 
conditions, namely a clear division of  functions and enhanced autonomy, for the GC better perform 
its role. Thus, in the same way interviewees see RJIES as an ambiguous law – although 
acknowledging the difficulty of  doing something new and useful, given the national context and 
culture – other institutional level actors criticised this grey zone or middle position of  the GC:  
“I can imagine how challenging it must be, trying to make a system that, without implementing 
major disruptions, requires external individuals in governance bodies. So, we stood midway 
between other models: in England boards are composed solely by externals, and here we have a 
mixed situation in the GC where the participation of  external members is not dominant, but 
allows for some openness”(3Ut). 
Generally speaking, views on this new governance body are positive, although the nature, size 
and composition of  the GCs are topics where it is challenging to reach consensus due to multiple 
interpretations and critics. However, the great majority of  interviewees, regardless of  their role and 
type of  subsystem they work in, expressed great consensus with the existence of  a decision-making 
body with fewer people than the old Senate, which was a body where all PhDs members of  the 
institution had a seat92. The rationale for being in favour of  a significantly smaller decision-making 
body relates with perceptions of  increased effectiveness, as already demonstrated in the study of  
Amaral (2003a). As the following citations show, some interviewees performing different roles feel 
that there were too many people in these forums, making the decision-making process more time-
consuming and more complicated to reach consensual decisions and solutions: 
“That [the Scientific Council] was a more democratic body as it allowed for the participation of  
                                                 
92 In those universities with a traditional organisation into faculties and departments, most of  them had a Senate – 
a governing body at the central level and then, at the faculty level, there were Scientific Councils. The Portuguese 
university of  this study does not follow a traditional faculty arrangement, basic units are organised around university 
departments and polytechnic schools in a matrix structure. Therefore it had Scientific Council for the whole 
institution, and not a Senate.  
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more people, all departments and scientific areas were represented there. But was it efficient? No. 
There were a lot of  people and nobody read the papers before the meetings. So what happened 
there, where there were all the Doctorates of  the university? Meetings with 600 people or even 
700 people! Can you imagine that? It was unthinkable! What happened was that 10%, at best, read 
the documents, others were talking and others were checking when they should or could leave. 
So, if  you ask me, no, they weren’t efficient bodies. What happened, eventually, was that if  
someone disagreed with something they could intervene, which is something that doesn’t happen 
now because the bodies are smaller and not all scientific areas participate. (…) I think smaller 
bodies tend to be more efficient. They lost representativeness and democracy but, on the other 
hand, they are more efficient (…) (3PPl). 
“I think that what people can complain about in some cases is that they are not listened so often, 
but the decision-making process is much more correct! And that was something that was absolutely 
stuck, it killed everything! We used to spend hours and hours in mandatory meetings! We had a 
Scientific Council with hundreds of people! Can you tell me how do you discuss something in a 
Council with hundreds of people? And then we had committees, commissions, “itchiness”93 as I 
used to call it. (…) I'll give you an example: there is nothing in the Law that obliges the Rector to 
meet with the Deans, but it would be stupid not to do it, right? Because there is a decision-making 
body that is the rectory, then we have the Deans or the Directors of Departments, and then it is 
necessary to have a place of consensus, of communication and of (more) coordinated management, 
so that decisions can be shared, appropriated and widespread. So the Rector meets with the 
Directors of the Departments monthly. It’s not mandatory, but there’s need to find places and 
time for strategic management. To make this mandatory is likely to create conflicts and an excessive 
number of meetings, so I think that the decision-making process is bureaucratically more correct 
now” (4PUtm). 
 
“There is clearly a certain distance to the central management, but not so much at the intermediate 
and departmental management. Now, the truth is that the CG is something distant from most of 
us, who are completely alienated, isn’t it? However, the GC is the highest decision body here at 
the university, right? But... I don’t notice a loss of democracy. What I see is a greater centralisation, 
but I think it was also inevitable, considering even the size of the department. I mean, even before 
the Bologna process we had to reorganise the department to have more restricted forums of 
discussion and deliberation because it was not possible with the number of faculty members the 
department has to be doing this in the Scientific Council or in a scientific committee” (6PUa *). 
 
In sum, due to their experience, interviewees feel that although the previous model allowed for more 
representativeness and democracy, it does not necessarily imply or equals more conscious and 
valuable participation of  all members. 
“The members of  this Academy have fewer forums to meet. I repeat: to meet [interviewee 
emphasis]. There was also in those forums the possibility of  decision-making, but the size of  the 
body did not allow for conscious decisions. For example, in the Scientific Council with 600 people, 
it’s impossible to take informed decisions. Especially because people went to those meetings, 
around 3 per year, doing other things. (…) When I started to be a member of  the Scientific 
Council, there were 60 people, but it has been growing and in recent years the Scientific Council 
had more than 600 people! (...) In a room of  60 people you can talk and discuss things, but not 
with 600! And because people were there many hours, they were doing other things. Therefore, a 
body of  this nature, with so many members, and where people are forced to be but which doesn’t 
allow for the participation of  each person, few are those who get really engaged. When one says 
that there are fewer opportunities for discussion, it is true, but I question about the value of  those 
                                                 
93 The interviewee uses originally the word “comichão” (=itching), which is a mixture of  words between 
commissions, and meetings in Portuguese. The word itching works with a double meaning here, reinforcing the 
satisfaction of  the interviewee of  having to get rid of  such types of  meetings. 
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bodies because, in fact, they did not represent any interventionist power” (5PUa). 
“I don’t know whether there’s less democracy because representation has much more to do with 
the commitment and efforts that people take to do their tasks rather than with the possibility they 
have or not to speak, because we all have the possibility of  talking (2Ps*). 
The rationale mentioned in favour of  this body is common to most interviewees: the fact that 
external people to the university can question the institution about what it does and how it does it, 
with different perspectives and viewpoints of  the same issues, can only be fruitful. The opening up 
of  the HEI to external individuals from various sectors of  society modified the institution’s modus 
operandi, as well as the collegial balance that existed in institutional management. “It caused, a small 
revolution within HEIs, especially in those that had never had external participation in their strategic 
definition, in their strategic decision-making bodies” (5Ps). Moreover, it was argued that too bigger 
bodies do not allow for streamlining processes and that decision-making is easier to achieve with 
fewer people. The most counterproductive aspect associated with this relates with the absence of  
intermediate structures. Interviewees with management and teaching positions and/or both 
complained of  “not having a connection point where all heads of  department have a seat” (3PPl), 
i.e. the lack of  a connection body between the central government level of  the university and the 
departmental/faculty level. However, institutional level interviewees also acknowledged the fact that 
the Rector of  the Portuguese university of  this case-study maintains frequent (informal) meetings 
with the heads of  departments and polytechnic schools, in order to fill this gap and allow for better 
and more flows of  communication among the key actors of  the institution. In fact, in order to start 
the operationalization of  the Law 62/2007, the interviewed Rector of  this institution referred that 
he had 57 meetings with the heads of  departments and polytechnic schools and conducted several 
visits to these units. In his own words, institutionalising the new governance model summarises the 
activities of  his first year as a Rector. Nevertheless, in parallel with these favourable views, it was 
possible to denote (again) in interviewees’ discourse some frustration when they put Portuguese 
politics and society in perspective with HEIs’ life. As it was already mentioned, there is a certain 
disappointment with the fact that the initial version of  RJIES did not go further, once it included a 
higher percentage of  external individuals in HEIs.  
Regardless of  interviewees’ role, there was a general feeling that the reduced number of  
external members in the GC might not allow for a fully exploitation of  all their potentialities, leading 
to a situation which can even pervert their mission at the institution.  
“I personally think that the participation of  external members in governance bodies is positive 
because they bring a different perspective, they have a different view. But the percentage is 
minuscule when compared with what happens in England, for example (…), academics here still 
have the majority of  seats (...), externals are the minority, they will never win when voting. (3PPl). 
As academics (still) have more than 50% of  seats, some interviewees believe that their role is not 
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particularly outstanding. As can be seen by interviewees’ identification, this is a recurrent idea among 
institutional actors from both HE systems performing teaching and management roles. At least in 
each group of  actors (middle management, academics and lecturers), we could find a common 
classification for external members and/or their role – “decorative”. 
“I’ll give you a generic answer regarding what seems to me to be the contribution of  the external 
members in general, either in the GC or in the Board of  Trustees and even on the Departments’ 
Boards: it’s useless! People rarely get involved. It’s basically a gravy train that sounds nice, that 
looks beautiful in the curriculum, but people do not engage. Well, I’m talking in general terms, 
I’m not referring specifically to this GC where I know that there are some people that get involved; 
but in general, external members do not care, they have their things, their lives which occupy their 
time and this is just a detail. Therefore, I don’t think that the participation of  external members 
is that important, or effective and so relevant. Also, the time does not allow for doing everything 
we would like to…” (1PUmm).  
This does not mean that respondents do not appreciate this change. For example, on the other side 
of  the spectrum, from top-management roles to administrative positions, interviewees quite 
welcome the presence of  external members and have a favourable view of  their role.  
“(…) There is a question that the new legislation introduced on university management and which 
I think is a healthy factor for universities: to open management bodies to the participation of  
external members. The value that a person such as our President of  the GC brings to this 
university is immeasurable due to his different experiences, his vision of  the world, the fact of  
being here and questioning about the processes and contributing with his own culture and 
experience accumulated over a lifetime, this is priceless and it didn’t exist in the previous 
legislation. Universities’ management before this legislation was closed over itself, it didn’t have 
this wealth” (3PUtm*). 
“One point that seems very positive is the integration of  people outside the university in the 
bodies of  government. Of  course that this university was always very open (and I’m already here 
for 28 years) to the business environment, to companies, to municipalities. But with the RJIES, 
these people, the outsiders came here and they are in various bodies of  the university, participating 
in the university life! They are people a bit controversial sometimes, but they have been intervening 
and bringing the university’s outside world to within the university. I think this is very positive” 
(4PUa). 
Somehow, these results confirm the conclusions of  previous studies claiming for the existence of  
hybridism in the way academics react to changes in HEIs (Carvalho and Santiago 2010b; Bruckmann 
and Carvalho 2014). 
These actors, who can be classified as more aligned with the managerial ideals, see the 
presence of  external members in such positive way that they tend to look at them as a kind of  
“saviours of  the university” or, at least, as someone who can help in solving some institutional 
problems, e.g. financial, enhancement of  their status and external visibility, etc. It was interesting to 
observe that some external members themselves perceive the vision they create about their presence 
on the academic community: 
“I would like to make it clear that the role of  external members is not a paternalistic role towards 
solving the problems of  the university. It should be clear that one thing is to contribute with our 
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experiences to help the institution to gain momentum and confidence in itself  to open up to the 
world and conquer markets and to be able to sell its skills and be useful to society. And in this way 
there is return of  our contribution here. Our contribution cannot be to solve this, but rather to 
propel/push this forward” (3PUtm). 
A similar view is also portrayed by a Finnish system level interviewee who acknowledges the possible 
role of  external stakeholders in contributing financially to the institution in which they are involved 
in. 
“I think the picture is also that outside stakeholders want to be more involved, they want to have 
their position in the board of  governance bodies of  HEIs, but in turn it is also expected in the 
future years that they also contribute financially to the university so, I think that’s a big ongoing 
change” (1Fs). 
 
There were other two aspects that interviewees tended to refer during interviews when the subject 
on the governance bodies and the presence of  external members was addressed. First, different 
interviewees reassured that the importance of the external members’ role depends much on the type 
of people chosen and their commitment with the institution. Although there were some interviewees 
who doubt of the efficiency and importance of external members, or that even showed some 
disagreement regarding a more corporate vision external members (might) have for the institution, 
among the 31 interviewed actors, no one expressed directly disagreement with their presence and/or 
their activity. 
“My opinion on the external members was very negative... because people were not showing up, 
or being motivated, except those who were academics external to the institution, because they are 
used to this generosity of  academics… I was really concerned with what would happen with the 
GCs. Fortunately, it was very different, because with the powers the GCs have, and I know several 
cases, institutions chose good presidents and people committed, they engaged (…), they require 
a lot from the institution and I think this is very important. There are even cases that they are 
clearly influencing the election of  the Rector, which is also positive for the Rector so that he won’t 
govern only oriented to within the institution. So, globally, I think it was positive” (5Ps*). 
 
This last aspect mentioned in this citation relates with the second aspect frequently mentioned by 
system level interviewees as well as top and middle management actors: the GC election process 
and timing of  its constitution. When the GC is constituted before the election of  the 
Rector/President (considering that the Rector/President is now elected by the GC), there might be 
a risk that the GC is associated with the process of  choice of  certain candidates. Thus, in the view 
of  some system level actors, when the GC precedes the Rector’s/President’s election, 
“(…) the GC is already marked by a kind of  primary election of  the Rector or the President. 
Therefore, the main problem of  RJIES with respect the GC is that this body doesn’t represent 
the best people of  the institution because it might be marked by a kind of  primary elections 
according to lists that are affected to this or that candidate. In this case, the choice of  external 
members will also be subject to that because one will choose externals that reflect the choice of  
the majority. For example, I know some institutions in which the difference of  the elements 
assigned to one or another application is relatively small, but as there is an election for the 
appointment of  external members, external members are then all assigned to that list, and this, in 
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my opinion, hijacks the Law. (…) ” (1Ps). 
Most system level actors expressed their concerns with respect to the process of  selecting the GC 
members. The fact that external members are co-opted by absolute majority of  representatives of  
teachers, researchers and students, “under the terms of the statutes, based on justified proposals 
subscribed to by at least one third of the members” (Law 62/2007 §81º, 5) creates doubts regarding 
the transparency and neutrality of  the process. Likewise, the process of  selecting the internal 
members through election by list also raises doubts on the eligibility of  unit directors, or holders of  
other governing bodies whose presence at the GC is likely to generate conflicts of  interest. 
“The original RJIES was well conceived because it allowed the designation, not the election. I still 
don’t know which system is better – the election or appointment. I possibly agree more with the 
election, but I think that those who drafted the RJIES didn’t know what the election means, 
because if  they did, they could, perhaps, have designed differently this issue of  the GC” (1Ps). 
 
Although not explicitly stated, interviewees fear the existence of  conflicts of  interest in case of  not 
being possible that GC members have a seat or direction roles in management functions in other 
bodies and/or HEIs. Therefore, the process of  electing the GC should not be bound to any specific 
candidate so that external members can be chosen by consensus, based on disinterest and neutrality 
towards individual agendas and/or vested interests of  the CG members. This is why some system level 
interviewees refer that a good and proper process of  the GC constitution and functioning is not 
uniform, depending much more on the situation and on “(…) the internal elements that were chosen 
because the external elements depend on the election of  the internal elements” (1Ps). A possible 
classification to describe this potential (mis)use of  external members in the GC and other 
governance bodies would be as “facilitators of  change” or “political friends”. Probably, Magalhaes 
and Amaral (2000) would have called them the “imaginary friend”. In fact, relating with the political 
interests in the constitution of  the GC, system level actors frequently referred to the importance 
the election of  the Rector/President had for this body.  
“The GC was much more seen, it was much more organised around the election of  the Rector 
and very little around the concern to manage, to govern the university. (...). And he [the President 
of  the GC] was quite angry with that, because he thinks that people in the Council intervene very 
little, and that’s actually true!” (2Ps*). 
The fact that the Rector is no longer elected by all members of  the University’s Assembly on 
the basis of  universal suffrage – as s/he is now appointed/selected by the GC, it is understandable 
the attention placed in this new mechanism. Candidates can be Professors or researchers from the 
institution itself  or from other institutions, national or international. The process to select the Rector 
is preceded by public notice of  the calls for proposals, the presentation of  each candidate, and the 
introduction of  the candidate’s action programme in a public hearing. Then, the Rector is chosen 
according to the number of  votes he/she gets, by secret ballot of  the GC. This means a significant 
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change in the selection of  the main representative of  the University.  
With respect to the division of  powers and allocation of  responsibilities, it is interesting to see 
that on this issue, and following the political scientist Rod Rhodes (1996; 1997, Chapter II) the 
OECD makes a distinction between governance and management, where it clearly states that the 
former should be left exclusively under the purview of  the Board/GC, whereas the latter should be 
Rector’s responsibility. 
 “Governance involves the responsibility for approving the mission and goals of  the institution; 
for approving its policies and procedures; for the appointment, review, and support of  its 
president; and for informed oversight of  its programmes, activities, and resources. Management, 
in contrast, involves the responsibility for the effective operation of  the institution and the 
achievement of  its goals, within the policies and procedures approved by the board; the effective 
use of  its resources; the creative support of  the highest standards for teaching, research, and 
service. The responsibility of  the board is to govern, not to manage” (OECD 2007: 154). 
 
 
2.4 Changes in Finnish Universities’ Governance Model  
The Finnish Bill (Draft Law) also applied the OECD recommendations and proposed a model 
which went on to reform universities’ management and decision-making processes, to change the 
tie of  university staff  to the State, i.e. civil-service employment relationships became contractual 
employment relationships, and, according to the FMEC, the new law enforces an administrative 
model for stronger autonomy. These were also the topics that key actors discussed more during 
interviews. 
The Law 558/2009 (§13º) stipulates that universities would have a Board (Hallitus), a Rector 
(Rehtori) and a University collegiate body – University Collegium (Yliopistokollegio). The University 
may also have a Chancellor and other bodies, according to each university regulations/statues, a fact 
that denotes universities’ increased “latitude” in their internal affairs. For example, the Finnish 
university analysed here has, in addition to these bodies, a Director of Administration, an Internal 
Auditor, who assists the Rector in university management, by supervising the instigation and 
enforcement of matters which fall under the jurisdiction of the Collegium and the Rector, and a 
General Counsil, which assists the University’s management in legal terms (Finnish university 
internal regulations 2013).  
The highest executive body of  public universities, the University Board, now consists of  7 or 
9-14 members, of  whom at least 40% are external stakeholders, the rest being comprised of  
Professors, other teaching and research staff  and other personnel, and students. The external 
members must represent a wide range of  expertise in the sciences or arts in the field of  operation 
of  the university (Law 558/2009, §15º).  
Figure 14 compares the governing bodies of  both Portuguese and Finnish universities after the 
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implementation of  the new laws. When compared to the GC of  Portuguese Universities, Finnish 
Boards are smaller bodies with a higher percentage of  external members. The composition of  the 
Board and its term of  office are decided by the collegiate body, which has a maximum of  50 
members and includes representatives of  the three groups. The group constituted by Professors, 
research staff  and students is elected by a University community group, as provided in the institution 
regulations. It is also responsibility of  the Board to elect one of the members of those 40% externals 
to the university as its chairperson and one member as its vice-chairperson (Universities Act 
558/2009 §15º, 7). 
One should notice that the new governing structure created new positions in the university, 
such as “vice-rectors, financial officers and a joint committee on financial matters, including outside 
experts from business, which is typical from the business world” (2FUtm) and represents a shift in 
the way Finnish HE is now steered, namely with a focus on more professional management. As the 
same top-management interviewee replied, 
“When there are more responsibilities/requirements, there should be more alternative ways to 
organise your processes and more possibilities to reward personnel when they succeed. I fear that 
this will be regulated also in the future, so micromanagerialism will remain” (2FUtm). 
 
This was the only interviewee among the top-management group of  actors that showed visible 
concerns with the new legislation and clearly admitted this strong shift in Finnish HE to a more 
competitive and business-like model of  governance.  
The University Board is the highest decision-making body of the institution and, in the case of  
this Finnish university, consists of  7 members who also have management functions. Succinctly put, 
it “(...) defines the university’s key operational and financial targets, strategy and management 
principles” (Finnish university statutes 2014). In order to facilitate its work, the Board may also 
appoint committees that need to report directly to the Board. This body meets the University 
Collegium at least twice a year (Finnish university statutes 2014).  
The Board of  a foundation university shall have 7 members, including the chairperson and the 
vice-chairperson, who must be external to the university.  
The multi-member administrative body of  a foundation university is rather similar to the 
collegiate body of  a public university and selects the rest of  the board after consulting the founding 
partners of  the foundation university. The chair and vice-chair of the 7-member board must be 
external to the university. The administrative body selects the rest of the board after consulting the 
founding partners. In addition, three members who are not state representatives must be selected 
among the appointees suggested by the founding partners. The Rector is elected by the Board and 
has approximately the same executive power as rectors in public universities (Law 558/2009, §25º, 
§26º). 
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The Rector is elected by the Board for a maximum term of  5 years and holds the main executive 
power (Law 558/2009), as it is also the case of  the Rector in the Portuguese RJIES. The re-
formulation of  the Rector’s position is in fact one of  the most significant changes brought up by 
the New Universities Act. Whereas earlier s/he was elected by the university community, now “the 
Rector is more like a chief  executive officer, like in private companies, responsible to the board” 
(2FUtm; Välimaa 2010).  
The University collegiate body or University Collegium shall include the representation of  all 
university community groupings (as in the Board). The number of  members from any of  the groups 
may not exceed half  of  the total number of  members in the university collegiate body. The number 
of  members and the term of  office of  the university collegiate body and the number of  persons 
belonging to each constituting group are laid in the university regulations. The university collegiate 
body shall elect a chairperson and a vice-chairperson from amongst its members. The collegiate 
body has competences on the creation, selection and dismissal of  members of  the Board as well as 
on the financial control of  the institution (Law 558/2009, §22º). A traditional example is the Finnish 
university of  this case-study where the Collegium has 30 members, “each of whom has a personal 
deputy. Of the members (and also of the deputy members), 10 represent the Professors, 10 the 
teaching and research staff as well as other staff, and 10 the students of the University” (Finnish 
university statutes). The Collegium’s term of office is 4 years, but the term of student members is 2 
years. These students are elected by the student union of the university. As explained earlier in 
chapter IV, the importance of students and student unions in Finland has no comparison with 
Portugal. Their role in HEIs life is still determinant and active in HE. Table 18 compares Finnish 
HEIs’ governance and management bodies during the Universities Act 645/1997 with the latest 
Universities Act.   
 
Table 18 - Governance Bodies of Finnish HEIs before and after the Yliopistolaki 558/2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Law 
645/199
7 
 
 
 
Universiti
es 
Management 
Body/ Board of 
Directors 
Executive Body Academic & 
Decision-making 
Body 
Rector (& Vice-Rectors) 
Elected for 5 years, by a 
university electoral 
college 
University Senate*  
Presided by the rector; + 
representatives of the 
following groups 
professors and associate 
professors (these shall 
constitute less than half of 
the total membership of 
the university senate; + 
other teaching and 
research staff and other 
personnel; students. 
Multi-member 
administrative bodies for 
the development of 
teaching and research; the 
assessment of study 
attainments and the 
nomination of candidates 
for professorships and 
associate professorships 
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Polytechni
cs 
Rector/Maintaining 
Organisation 
Rector Polytechnic Board 
/Maintaining Organisation 
 
Law 
558/200
9 
 
Public 
Universiti
es 
University Board Rector University collegiate body 
Foundatio
n 
Universiti
es 
University Board Rector Overall multi-member 
administrative body 
 
* Both the University of Helsinki and Åbo Akademi University had a Chancellor. Other 
universities could have a Chancellor, if they wished so, under provisions enacted by decree.  
 
Source: Universities Act 645/1997; Universities Act 558/2009; Eurydice 2008. 
 
Similarly to what happened in Portugal, one of  the reasons put forward by interviewees in 
favour of  the New Universities Act relates with the presence of  external stakeholders in universities’ 
governance bodies. This was a quite politicised aspect of  the law and gave room for much discussion 
during the preparation time. By applying the OECD recommendation(s), the Law 558/2009 
proposed a model in which governing bodies of  public universities should be composed essentially 
of  external members and that foundation universities should only have external members 
(Government Bill 7/2009). This suggestion became a contentious issue in the Parliament as it was 
considered unconstitutional and was overruled by the Parliamentary Committee for Constitutional 
Law, responsible for the ex ante constitutional evaluation of  laws. Four Deans of  Law Faculties 
pointed out that the Law was ‘technically problematic’. Deans were critical of  the lack of  a hearing 
from those drafting the new legislation and the apparent absence of  consultation with the Ministry 
of  Justice and/or Finland's Supreme Court. Generally speaking, the interviewees feel that the idea 
of  having external members in the university governance bodies changes the idea of  institutional 
leadership:  
“The idea of  how to lead a university has changed much, because there are these external 
members in the board and it is a big social debate in many ways” (4Fs*). 
“The four Deans of  Law departments formed a group and they were able to introduce some 
changes in the University Law. Because the main big change now in universities’ governance 
bodies is that there are less than 50% outsiders. But, in the Bill it was the other way around: the 
majority of  the University Board would composed of  outsiders and the minority would be 
academics. But actually, they were able to change it to the other way around (…). That was very 
interesting because they actually pointed to the basis of  the Constitution of  Finland that says that 
Arts and Research have academic freedom, freedom of  teaching and research. They said that if  
there will be a majority of  outsiders in the governance bodies, then academic freedom would be 
threatened. I don’t know if  that was a valid argument, but it was interesting. Some people were 
able to push through some changes. It was a democratic process yes, very much (…) There was 
compromise. In the end they were able to find a solution and implemented it” (1Fs). 
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At the system level, and at least with respect to the presence of  external members in universities the 
developments and outcomes of  these discussions were considered fruitful. Also academics 
belonging to other disciplinary fields than Humanities and/or Social Sciences believe that the Board 
should not be constituted by a majority of  externals: 
“I think almost half  of  the members are external. I have understood that they were actually able 
to bring something new, not being useless. But I think that we also need representatives of  the 
personnel of  university in the senate and if  you include students, then more than half  of  the 
senate members should be actually from inside of  the university. That’s my opinion, so I would 
never imagine this senate consisting of  all the people from outside the university” (4FUa). 
This positive attitude towards the external members, although keeping notice on the fact that 
governance and management of  the institution should not be left only to external members, also 
reflects the interviewees’ perceptions on how Finnish HE and HEIs’ governance is being changing. 
In fact, it was possible to denote some concerns regarding the actual governance model. One of the 
reasons or possible explanations for the importance attributed to the presence of  external members 
in Finnish universities’ bodies is the awarness actors have on the need and/or inevitablilty that 
universities are changing to more “business-like institutions”:  
“The Chair of  the Senate Board is an external member of  the academia, and I see that this can 
be a great opportunity also to prove the connection between external stakeholders and the 
universities, but it’s still too early to say if  it will work like this, or on the other hand, if  it will 
change universities to a more business-like management and so on. It’s one big change that we 
have – the impact of  external stakeholders is bigger” (5Fs*). 
Alongside with this, other aspects indicating changes in this direction were pointed, namely relating 
with funding issues, as a top-management actor listed:  
“We have a considerable smaller senate, where a fraction of  the board members are externals 
(typically from business); also more focus on finances of  the university with new positions (…). 
There is also an increasing emphasis on financial independence, which aims to increase financial 
buffers of  the university in the long run” (2FUtm). 
Other system level interviewees highlighted the importance of  having external participation. Their 
arguments are in line with the positive views of  the interviewees. 
“At the Ministry level, we think it’s very beneficial. (…) We required at least 40% of  the Board 
members to be external, they are appointed by the universities themselves and the Chair has to be 
one among external members. We think that now, when universities are responsible for their own 
finances, it’s absolute necessary to have these external experts. (…) Now, in theory, a university 
might go bankrupted. It’s difficult to imagine that, but it’s possible, both in theory and in legal 
terms. Universities’ leaders and managers have now very different roles” (2Fs). 
At the institutional level, and generally speaking, this change was particularly appreciated and well 
accepted by interviewees. The Finnish university of this case-study represents a quite unique 
situation, considering that, by the time interviews were conducted in Finland, the Rector of the 
institution had been in power for 18 years. In that year, 2011, it was the Rector’s last mandate, and 
the great majority of interviewees, regardless their role, did not show much sympathy with the 
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Rector’s “leadership style”.  
“It has been a good thing because the Rector was a very much alone governor and made decisions 
and everything was done according to the Rector’s ideas. But now the Board is above the Rector. 
In the past the Board was made of  the university people alone, and they would be a little bit 
reluctant to be against the Rector because they didn’t want to feel any effects, perhaps. I don’t 
know, this is just my feeling (…). But now this Board with independent people gather there to say 
their opinions, and internals can inform these outside people about what is going on at the 
university (…). In the beginning I thought they would oblige us to be more like an industry or 
something, but now it’s ok” (1FUmm). 
“External council members are more likely to present public ownership in a better way than fully 
internal councils, who are driven often by a desire for status quo (and thus inefficient performance 
over time)” (2FUtm).        
From these data extractions, if  we think about shifts in governance models and/or decision-making 
practices, it is possible to conclude that there was indeed a shift towards a more democratic and 
representative way of  governance. However, this is an interpretation based on actors’ views 
belonging to this same university, where it seems that the presence of  someone who governs along 
with the Rector was very appreciated. 
“I think it might be a good thing, at least in the way it has been carried out in this university: 3 
outside members of the university in our senate. It’s not too bad. (…) I think if you would have 
like half and half, I would say it’s too much; you would be giving too much power outside the 
university. But I think this ratio in our university is good. And from what I’ve been hearing from 
our new senate is that they are very keen and motivated to really develop this university, so, until 
this point, I have a good impression of the work of our senate. I think they’ve taken courageous 
steps and they have actually tried to implement change. What used to happen with the old senate, 
in my understanding, was that, even though they made decisions, the faculties didn’t always 
implement the decisions. But now I have a feeling that this new stricter senate may actually take 
a firm grip of the activities of the university and make faculties follow what they decided” 
(5FUmm). 
 
Another possible reason explaining these positive views relates with the associations interviewees 
apply, as they tend to link the presence of  external stakeholders in the institution to its increased 
connection and openness towards the civil society. Additionally, or consequently, they perceive an 
increase need for HEIs to be more accountable, considering that Finland invests highly in education. 
Again, this points to the change in looking at Finnish HE and the perceptions that some aspects 
needed to be rethought.  
“I kind of  understand the needs nowadays, that universities need to open more to society and 
for the whole country – especially in a country where there are no tuition fees and the state 
supports students so much. I understand that it’s a way to open up for the society and, on the 
other hand, to get more information about what’s happening outside the university, and what 
are basically the needs where we should invest and pay more attention” (1FUa). 
Interviewees from the polytechnic were even more enthusiastic towards this issue, especially 
lecturers, perhaps because they are more used to this presence in their institutions and believe that 
universities should follow the same trend. Another hypothesis would be that, even uncousciously, 
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by feeling the stigma of  belonging to a vocational HEI rather than to a classical university, 
polytechnic’s actors praise the fact that universities, in that respect, are resembling more to 
polytechnics and are following their organisational archetype:   
“I don’t believe in pure knowledge. Knowledge for the sake of  knowledge? No! Because there is 
no direction for research, because the reality keeps the direction of  what you should research! In 
that sense I’m very much in favour of  the presence of  external stakeholders in the governance 
bodies of  universities. And they have been able to collect money from businesses (…) and they 
are taking the first steps towards building this link to the reality. So I think this is good, but I don’t 
think it’s enough” (1FPl*). 
“I think it’s a positive change because to be quite franc, leaders of  the pedagogical units and 
researchers don’t have the time to really follow what is going on in real life and I (…) personally 
think that we are here to serve the real world. And how do we serve them if  we don’t have 
dialogue? And that’s why I think it’s definitely important, maybe not always pleasant, but very 
useful” (2FPl). 
Not surprisingly, their discourses are more managerial, even a bit extreme (e.g. 1FPl*), resembling 
private companies’ personal. 
It is worth to notice that, although Finnish universities tend to have a higher participation of  
externals than Portuguese universities (40% vs. 30%), according to the data collected and the 
document analysis on composition of  the Boards, namely the analysis of  external members’ profile 
(Pedrosa et al. 2012; Bruckmann and Carvalho 2014), the great majority of  Portuguese external 
members tend to have a managerial background: businessmen, politicians and academics… A search 
through Finnish HEIs’ websites on the composition of  the Universities’ Boards shows us a wider 
variety of  profiles, where we can even find external members belonging to the Church(es). This 
allows us to infer that the rationale of  the need to open more the University to the society and 
“outside world” is being put into practice in Finnish institutions probably more effectively and in a 
more disinterested way than in Portuguese HEIs. This also goes in line with the aforementioned 
argument on the reminiscences of  collegiality in Finnish institutions decision-making, which is 
higher when compared to Portuguese institutions. 
A comparison between Portuguese and Finnish universities’ governance bodies, after both the 
RJIES and the New Universities Act entered into force, is presented in Figure 14.  
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Figure 14 - Governance structures of  Portuguese and Finnish universities after the new legal 
framework for HEIs 
 
 
Source: Bruckmann and Diogo (2015). 
 
When analysing the Finnish legislation and university’s internal statutes, it is possible to say that 
the New Universities Act (still) retains collegiality principles regarding the process of  decision-
making in top governance and management bodies. As can be read in Law 558/2009 (§29º), “the 
multi-member administrative body shall decide matters by majority vote. The motion seconded by 
the chairperson shall win if  the votes are equally distributed. If  the votes are equally distributed in 
a vote on a disciplinary matter concerning a student, the more lenient opinion shall be the decision”. 
Similar processes of  decision-making are described in the Portuguese legislation, with respect to the 
GC, where decisions are approved by a simple majority, except in cases where the law or the statutes 
require an absolute or a more stringent majority vote.  
Also similarly to the Portuguese RJIES, the New Universities Act allows for each institution to 
decide on the governance and management bodies at the middle level structures. It is up to each 
institution the administration and management of  organisational units, in order “to enable 
universities to respond more flexibly and independently to the challenges arising from their new 
financial status” (FMEC website). In the Ministry’s view, reform consolidates academic decision-
making and the position of  the Rector. Nevertheless, this was the topic where perceptions among 
interviewees most varied according to their role. By other words, extreme visions on the distribution 
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of  Rector’s powers and decision-making processes emerged between system level and top-
management interviewees and the group of  middle management, academics and technostructure 
interviewees.  
“(…) so nowadays we have stakeholders in the administrative board and the chair is always an 
external men or lady and that is very different. And then the influence of  the staff  is less than 
before.  Of  course it can be regulated by the own regulations, but the law is much more influent 
to the Rector and to the administrative board. So, it is different than before. Before it was more 
cooperative” (4FUmm). 
“Decision-making is now much more Senate-based leadership, so in our Faculty we try to be as 
simple as possible. The Senate [Board] is the guard and the Rector tries to make the guards satisfied. 
The Rector is operating the university mission made by the Senate and then, because the Rector 
choses Deans, we try to implement these operations in the real life, at the Faculty level and then 
we invite the Department leaders so that they try to follow the Deans mission (2FUmm). 
Complementary to this, academics acknowledged the fact that the influence of  academic and 
administrative staff  is less than before and such concentration of  powers may be pernicious for the 
institution:  
“I think now the Rector has more power, Deans have more power, the heads of  the departments 
have more power and all is concentrated in one person. And in some countries they called these 
people dictators, so I think we need more work together before making decisions like this” (2FUa). 
System level actors with roles in the academic arena also acknowledged that 
 
“Because we had this tradition in universities, to have this kind of  collegium that it’s most about 
academic staff, academic staff  and students’ representatives. And they have less power today and 
less influence. It depends. Today some individuals have more management activities and more 
power, but maybe some have less then before because they don’t have to participate anymore 
every month in collegium meetings and so on, but those who have these functions, have more, 
yes” (5Fs*). 
With respect to the decrease of  membership in the institution’s governance bodies, more specifically, 
having less forums for collective decision-making, also middle management actors (besides 
academics) expressed their fears towards the possibility of  top-management actors, i.e. the Rector 
and the Board interfering too much or inaccurately in faculty/department’s academic affairs.  
“There is this danger that the university board and the director somehow want to orient research 
activities for some reasons or for specific purposes. It is possible for the rector to do that. But I 
think that in our case it is not a real danger because our department is very strong in research and 
very important for the university. (…) I don’t think they want to disturb our activities in that way, 
but of  course there are always some fears. For instance, the rector has said that we should 
somehow orient more towards industry. We don’t like that, we don’t want to do that, we want to 
do what we do nowadays. And nowadays they prefer to hire people who are not academically 
high-level only because they have some contact with industry or something like that and that’s 
against our principles, because we want to have the best” (1FUmm). 
The previous quotation sheds light or anticipates another type of  risky dynamics in HEIs’ life: the 
hierarchy or the prioritisation of  disciplinary fields, where it is easy to envisage a race where hard 
sciences achieve the podium faster and easier than soft disciplines…  
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Additionally, or concomitantly, and as portrayed by the following citation, visions on 
institutional autonomy tend to differ significantly between these two main groups of  actors. A 
possible reason explaining differences of  perceptions lays in the link that interviewees establish 
between autonomy, accountability and funding.   
“What this university law gave us was some freedom to arrange things here, internally, inside the 
university. But of  course, then we still have this pressure and we have to produce certain results 
that are measurable somehow, like master degrees and things like that to get the money from the 
Ministry” (4FUa*). 
“The Ministry is still very interested in the results, to know where we’ve been using the money, 
otherwise, we should have independence to use the money in the way we like it, etc. So, it gives 
us indicators, which we have to follow and report to the ministry. So, this is something which 
contradicts the idea of  the law, I think. But, whether this is a problem or not, I’m not sure. 
Because, on the other side, of  course the Ministry has to know something about that, about the 
universities, about how they work and how they use their money” (4FUmm). 
And one could also find some contradictory visions on this issue, especially from more enthusiastic 
top-management actors:  
 “The main advantage is that we are independent now, we are not anymore state dependents, we 
are state-related universities because the state remains the main money lender of  the university. 
(…) Now we own ourselves: nobody else owns us, we are independent and we have the 
responsibility to raise funds for the university. The responsibility and the possibility, because it’s 
our own responsibility, it’s anyone else’s responsibility. (…) Everything that is related to funding 
and how we deal with it: more freedom in all kind of  financial issues, (…) we can generate income 
to the university and this is a totally new idea because the money don’t just come from somewhere, 
and the state is not responsible for how the universities control their budget anymore” (1FUtm). 
However, the government continues to guarantee sufficient core funding tied to the rise in costs for 
the universities, and according to the number of  outputs universities produce. As also acknowledged 
by other top and middle management actors. 
“Actually we had certain degree of autonomy in the old system, because there was this freedom of 
research, freedom of teaching. This type of steering system started to develop already in the 1990s. 
We had a certain degree of freedom, already in the old legislation and now even though we are no 
longer government institutions and we can sort of control our own finances, there’s not that much 
degree of autonomy because we are still funded by the government and the terms for funding are 
very strict control, so you get certain part of your funding based on a certain number of students, 
bachelor degrees, master degrees, doctoral degrees, number of publications, so it’s a pretty similar 
system in that sense. So, we do have from certain aspects more autonomy, but from some other 
aspects, we don’t” (3FUtm). 
 
This is so a mitigated or fake autonomy, which comes attached with several strings… as for example 
more administrative work not only to justify where the funds have been used, but also to try to 
obtain more resources, either public or private. From the administrative staff, it was also reported 
communication problems in dealing with the law. The following situation explains why the 
Technostructure actors were reticent to fully express their views and expressed mostly positive views 
on the reform processes analysed here. 
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“How can I say this diplomatically? Because during the time the legislation was being prepared 
there was also a legislation about advertisement and how open we should be, and how to look at 
the information we should give to the people who ask us things. So, when the law has changed, 
many people thought that our university is not that much public and open anymore, that it has 
become more like a company and we can’t decide ourselves what information we want to give and 
how we will give it. Of course that is wrong, because we are still publicly funded, like 68% of the 
money comes from the state, so we are still public and we if someone ask us, we have to serve 
them and give them the information. This basic idea hasn’t changed, but now our lawyers are 
making our lives really difficult because they want to keep all information inside, and turning this 
into a more private institution. There is this supervision… but it’s not only in our university, I 
think this is happening in all universities and I think in all society too, in all sectors! And now our 
universities are seen like business, like companies” (2FUt). 
 
This view reflects not only changes in HE sector due to NPM reforms, but also in the whole public 
administration in general.  
In fact, also the middle management interviewees were quite cautions when approacing this 
increase in freedom and autonomy in HEIs. By other words, they were aware that more autonomy 
entails more accountability and that funding issues have clealrly assumed the main concern of  
academia. In turn, and although the economic situation in Finland is significantly better than in 
Portugal, Finnish interviewees acknowledged a “dependence” and/or awreness of  raising funds. 
“Maybe this sort of idea that universities have now more freedom to decide on their own matters 
and there is less government guidance… it’s not actually true in practice, because obviously most 
of the funding comes from the government anyway, and funding issues these days are connected 
to governance as well” (3FUmm). 
 
“One of the good things are that we are more independent now and we can have money easier 
than when we were under the government domain. But I don’t like when we have to beg (…). 
We are begging for external money, for business money, I don’t like this. I understand it’s 
important to get external money, but this is now like begging and I don’t like it” (2FUa*).  
 
These views go in line with the institutionalism perspective and the relationship between 
organisations and their environment. An unpredictable environment demands the development of  
more efficient management techniques and practices in order to support institutional planning and 
strategic thinking. Also stronger leadership is expected in moments of  uncertainty and constraints. 
What seems to be common in both Portuguese and Finnish organisational fields is the growing 
awareness of  the urgency to adapt and to reinvent HEIs as well as professionals’ behaviour to answer 
more efficiently to the demands of  the several environments where they operate 
 
Box 1 - Summary of the OECD (2007; 2009) recommendations that were institutionalised 
in both Portuguese and Finnish HE systems and HEIs  
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Both processes in both countries exemplify a most common dilemma in institutions’ life: how 
to combine top-down priorities with bottom-up concerns? How to listen all actors in a satisfactory 
way and take their words into actions in a profitable and effective way with the available resources? 
Is this actually ever possible in the HE arena? In sum, how to design and implement change 
involving the most possible actors, in the most effective way and which benefits the great majority 
of  stakeholders?  
It seems that, at least in this HEI, the academic university distances itself  from a collegial model 
of  governance to approach the private/business model of  decision-making where the power is 
concentrated in one person – the unit director or president – who can be appointed by the Rector. 
 
 
To sum up… 
The second dimension aimed at investigating how HEIs change their governance and 
management practices to cope with the external pressures analysed here. More specifically, it aims 
at analysing and contrasting changes at the institutional level posed by the RJIES in Portugal and 
the New Universities Act in Finland. It addressed then R.Q. 2: Which major changes happened within the 
organisational structure of  HEIs? How HEIs change their governance and management practices to cope with 
external pressures?  
It was possible to see that international organisations such as the OECD are powerful agents 
in spreading normative managerialist values, which are then enthusiastically absorbed by national 
Portugal (PT): Equal levels of institutional autonomy for public and private HEIs, polytechnics and 
universities  “Government should introduce comprehensive university and polytechnic legislation in which  
the autonomy of institutions is clearly defined. (…) This new legislation should be applied to all HE 
institutions” (PT 2007: 67). 
Finland (FI):  Change in the legal status of HEIs (e.g. foundational status; non-profit corporations, FI 2009: 
108). 
PT & FI:  Reduction in the number of governance and deliberative bodies /Fewer collegial bodies  
PT & FI:  Decrease in the number of academics on governance bodies  
PT & FI:  Strengthening individual leadership in units and subunits  
PT & FI:  Loss of influence by collegial bodies  
PT & FI: An increase in external members on institutions’ governing bodies  
PT & FI: Concentration of executive power in the Rector (or President)  
- Abolishment of the principle of parity in the representation of academics and students (except on the 
Pedagogic Council) (PT, Finland still retains academic and students’ power) 
PT & FI: External recruitment of the Head of the General Council  
PT & FI:  Appointment of Rectors/Presidents as well as faculty and department heads  
PT & FI: Loss of public servant status for both academic and non-academic staff non-applicability of public 
accountancy rules to the institutions  
PT: Increase of tuiton fees (Portugal 2007: 12; 120; 126) 
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governments and HEIs. While national circumstances were different and different problems were 
identified in both systems of  HE, the formula prescribed was similar: the legal status and 
governance of  universities had to be redefined in order to create more autonomous and 
entrepreneurial institutions (Kauko and Diogo 2011). HEIs could then choose to become (or not) 
public foundations operating under private law. As the recent study of  Pedrosa et al. (2012) 
concludes, changing the legal framework of  universities allowed institutions’ greater capacity of  self-
governance and freedom of  manoeuvre. This attests Neave (1998: 275) argument that self-
regulation can be seen as an exercise to accelerate HEIs’ adjustment to external change (Diogo 
2014b).  
Both the Bologna process and the Laws 62/2007 (Portugal) and 558/2009 (Finland) created 
changes within the organisational structure of  HEIs, impacting the way institutions are governed, 
on how and who takes decisions, on working conditions and on the way the organisation of  work 
is distributed, etc. Nevertheless, empirical data and institutionalism taught us that institutions do not 
always follow these impositions peacefully, and they develop strategies to better cope with the 
environmental forces surrounding them. Simultaneously, and especially in (highly) competitive 
environments, they seek for a sufficient flux of  resources which allow them to not depend 
excessively from other key-actors. The weight of  the supranational level of  governance gained more 
importance and evidenced different concerns, weaknesses and strengths of  these countries. Driven 
by the ambition of  enhancing their attractiveness and not lagging behind successful HE systems, 
both Portuguese and Finnish organisational fields pursued mimetic behaviours, mostly induced by 
coercive and normative pressures coming from national and international sources. 
The empirical data analysed in this section also suggests that collegial autonomy may not be 
contrary to managerial preferences, but in line with them, as also pointed out by Frostenson (2015). 
Although with fears of  losing the ex libris of  the academic profession, Finnish and Portuguese 
academics acknowledged that even in closer circles of  decision-making processes, there is room for 
individual freedom of  action and influence. Or, as Frostenson (2015: 24) explained, the 
decentralisation of  decision-making does not automatically imply decreased autonomy at the level 
of  practice, since collective forms of  work may require it.  
One of  the main critics that Portuguese interviewees referred about the RJIEs relates to the 
nature of  the document, as verified in the previous section. As a consequence of  this type of  
document, complex and ambiguous, it is possible to observe some hybridity of  functions and powers 
of  the governing bodies such as the GC. This means that a mix of  electoral, strategic and 
supervision powers, was criticised by some top-management interviewees, including external 
members, as it also denotes the ambiguity of  the law. Therefore, there was no room for the 
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emergence of  governance bodies with very well defined and clear missions, neither for a clear 
separation of  powers among other bodies, a fact that corroborates the interviewees’ views on the 
lack of  clarity of  Rectors’ powers. The outcome is a hybrid document which reflects the Portuguese 
society: afraid of  creating a total (and necessary) rupture with the past, legislators tried to find a 
balance which would please everyone, without causing that much discordance and/or insurgency. 
The RJIES is thus an attempt to maintain collegial elements while introducing and deepening (more) 
managerial options. This view somehow contradicts the idea of  the RJIES being a rupture with the 
past, considering that some interviewees wished or aimed for a complete reform of  the Portuguese 
HE system. This might also be explained by the fact that interviewees guide their interpretations 
and actions through different norms, values and belief  systems (archetypes). Such diversity is then 
translated in the way actors operationalise change. Additionally, interviewees referred that this 
legislation was a “lost opportunity” of  doing something simple but quite oriented and practical, 
which simultaneously would allow and demand HEIs to be more transparent and accountable. 
Consequently, one observes hybrid and ambiguous models of  governance, where old and new forms 
of  practices and principles are mixed (path dependencies) and therefore confirming the changing 
pattern in HEIs dynamics, where one finds a mix of old and new elements of governance models. 
This goes much in line with the historical and cumulative nature of institutions, making change 
slower but also more possible (Peters 2005). 
In fact, the study of  organisational change in HE using an archetypal approach is particularly 
interesting when HEIs’ governance models are taken as research focus. An interpretive scheme is 
the set of  ideas, values and beliefs shared by organisational actors in a given moment (Greenwood 
and Hinings 1993). Considering organisational change as the movement between archetypes, 
Greenwood and Hinings argue that there is archetypal change when there is change of  the 
underlying interpretive scheme. It is therefore necessary to consider these two dimensions while 
analysing an organisational change process, as one relates to the other, interacting with and 
influencing the other into change (Brock 2006). A reform process causing change to universities’ 
governance models provides for a very good case study of  archetypal change. Governance change 
has been enforced on Portuguese and Finnish public universities by legislation, resulting in a new 
and different set of  governing structures and processes. Governance change is implemented in 
universities by their internal actors, required therefore to reflect upon the reorganisation of  the 
governance structures and thus upon their own set of  ideas and values on what university 
governance is, which might cause a change of  the interpretive scheme they were committed to (see 
Figure 15). The role played by the interpretive scheme is of  major relevance in an organisational and 
archetypal change process, as it might determine its success. “Effective change requires the old 
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interpretive scheme to be delegitimised and a new interpretive scheme to be put in place (Brock 
2006), and this is not as easily achieved as a change of  structures and systems” (Bruckmann and 
Diogo 2015).  
 
Figure 15 – Factors that influence Higher Education reform 
 
 
Source: Bruckmann and Diogo (2015). 
 
The Finnish university of  this study exemplifies an attempt to have a balance of  powers in the 
governance bodies, whose composition changed in line with its strategic management responsibility. 
One on side, there is a strengthening of  the executive power, whereas academics’ participation needs 
to be assured in those governance bodies that steer educational and research matters, both at the 
central and faculty levels.  
Both Portuguese and Finnish academics and middle management actors showed somehow 
paradoxical feelings about these changes in institutional governance. Collegial decision-making has 
been reduced in both cases, as the presence of  external members has been greatly increased. 
Whether on one hand interviewees feel uncomfortable and fear a loss of  democracy and 
participation in academic and legal affairs, they also recognise the need of  change and the 
ineffectiveness of  the prior academics-centred university model. Overall, governance reforms seem 
to be positively perceived: the presence of  external members is generally welcome, and seen as a 
two-way opportunity as HEIs benefit from an outside view and external members get to better 
understand the challenges institutions face. However, with respect to the number and composition 
of  the Boards’ members in the institutions of  this study, several issues still remain to be answered, 
casting doubts towards the actual rationale and purpose of  such matters. The Portuguese GC and 
the Finnish University Board are comparable boards in that they are a very important decision-
making body, composed by internal and external stakeholders who get to select the Rector. However, 
the dimension of  these two boards is very different: between 15-35 members in Portugal and 7 or 
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9-14 members in Finland. From these, external members must account for at least 30% of  all 
members, in Portuguese universities, and 40% in Finnish universities. This leads us to infer that 
Finland has taken HE reform further into a managerialist-like model, although one should 
remember that Portuguese universities had enjoyed a greater and longer degree of  autonomy when 
compared to their Finnish counterparts. Both countries, however, have assured academics the 
majority of  seats, which indicates that academics are not willing to abdicate from decision-making 
power (Bruckmann and Diogo 2015). However, some interviewees also wondered from where does 
it stem the (democratic) legitimacy of  those 5 people belonging to the Portuguese university Board 
of  Trustees? And what guarantees an inalienable defence of  the institution by five individuals who 
are external to the university? What are the risks of  politicisation or connection to private interests? 
With what legitimacy and with what knowledge on the university do they have to ratify/approve 
strategic plans, budget proposals, annual planning, and other types of  instruments? How will this 
relation(ship) work between the Board of  Trustees (for the Foundation University) and the GC (for 
the ‘rest’ of  the University?) Would it be possible that, in the long run, this can create two different 
organisations in the same institution?  
Regardless of  the country of  study, similar perceptions among the same group of  actors can 
be observed. Increased power in single-person boards has been positively perceived as it streamlines 
decision-making processes. Nevertheless, and especially at middle management level, actors fear that 
this new governance model might lead to a loss of  democracy and participation rate among the 
academic community.   
 
 
2.5 Academic Careers and Working Conditions 
The data discussed in this section sheds light on changes related with the working conditions 
of  academics and their careers. In this way, it answers to the third research question of  the study, 
namely whether it possible to evidence changes in the way work is organised within HEIs and in 
the way decision-making processes are taken. Simultaneously, it is analysed how these external 
pressures influence the way academic work is carried and the way academics participate in decision-
making practices? The Finnish reality will be firstly addressed. 
 
2.5.1 The Finnish Case 
 
“University staff  will no longer be employed by the State. Civil-service employment relationships 
will become contractual employment relationships, and universities will negotiate in collective 
bargaining. The universities will be able to pursue independent human resources policies, improve 
their attractiveness as an employer and in this way strengthen their competitive advantage in order 
to recruit the best personnel” (Universities Act 558/2009, §4º, 32).  
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The loss of  the civil servant status, governed by the valtion virkamieslaki, Law 19.8.1994/750, 
was the point that most interviewees strikingly reported with respect to changes in academia working 
conditions and the redefinition of  faculty roles.   
“From my point of view, the main change was from the state office servants to contract employees. 
But for the institutions, I think it’s to give more power to those individuals who are leaders of the 
faculties and separate institutes or departments” (4FUtm). 
 
“I think that can be a little bit hard because for a long time staff at the university were civil servants 
(…) and I’m sure this creates a lot of stress and tensions for lots of people, because as a civil 
servant is very hard to be fired, it’s almost impossible. Altogether the civil servant status is very 
strong, very supportive. But now they are like any regular people working. (…) So now, if the 
university would like actually to fire some of the staff, it’s much easier than it was before. And 
some universities have already done that, because the career of a civil servant is very guaranteed, 
because it’s always the state the main core. But the university is not like that anymore” (1Fs). 
 
The reasons that led each group of  interviewees to refer to this change as one of  the most significant 
in the law differ according to their perceptions about the impact the law might have for them and/or 
for the Finnish HE system. For most interviewees, and as aforementioned, the end of  the civil 
servant status represents an ideological change, which reinforces or tries to introduce a cut in the 
links between HEIs and the state, a change in the relationship between the state and HEIs that 
Neave (2012) referred to as the rise of  the Evaluative State.  
“In the 1st of  January last year [2010], the whole ethos has changed. The whole way of  thinking 
has changed and that takes a long time for people, because really the whole university ideology 
concerning management, governance and economics has been changing so much” (2FUmm). 
 
Academics feel that more than changing structures the main aim of  the reforms was to change their 
subjectivities. Universities have now the right and the obligation to take care of  their staff  and of  
their own internal policies. At the eyes of  system level actors, this increased responsibility will 
evidence “(…) differences between the universities: some are better in their personnel policies and 
some are not doing so well” (2Fs). This in fact might lead to a stratification system among Finnish 
universities, where a kind of ranking system in terms of human resources policies and working 
conditions can emerge. However, interviewees also assumed that the change of  employment status 
does not affect the nature of  their work, or the way they perform their activities, at least in the short 
term. Therefore, it is more a “symbolic change” than an “actual change”. The following quotations 
of  actors performing different roles (system level and middle management actors) clarify on this 
seeming (at least) quietness of  interviewees regarding this change.  
“There might be fears and it is of course in the universities because one of the major changes is 
that each university can have their own human resources policies and it is upon to the university 
to decide what kind of people they want to hire. But my understanding is that if there will be 
adaptations or major changes in the universities’ human resources structures, it will take several 
years and it will be adapted to the retirement processes. So, it won’t be a total major change in the 
forthcoming years. As such, there is also flexibility in the universities due to the aging population, 
the great the number of universities professors will retire in the forthcoming years, because this is 
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the baby boom generation So, I’m not that much afraid because the retirement process” (3Fs).  
 
“In my perspective, this is only a symbolic name “civil servant”, but of course that for some people 
that is very important. They are not satisfied for not being civil servants anymore. But in my view 
that hasn’t changed at all my life. I like this, for the most part. Of course there’s no perfect system, 
but ideologically I’m supporting this, otherwise I wouldn’t be a Dean, of course” (2FUmm). 
 
Once again these results seem to reveal that academics perceptions about changes are not 
homogeneous and that more attention should be paid to the internal differences, i.e. to their “tribes 
and territories” (Becher and Trowler 2001). A similar view was reflected by other system level 
interviewees who also work in universities, and a middle management actor. Although these actors 
assume their positions did not change much, they acknowledged the shift in the relation between 
the state and universities as they see it as type of  steering at distance model. In parallel, they also prefer 
to look at this moment as an opportunity for HEIs comply easily with the environments surrounding 
them. This fact not only confirms the soft tradition of  Finns in reforming their HE system but also 
denotes some peacefulness in institutionalising changes. 
“I can’t see this change of  the status of  the staff  so important. But some people see it as a threat, 
that we are not anymore state officers, civil servants, but I don’t know if  that it’s too bad. Maybe 
I’m too old, so that it’s not a threat anymore to me. But, on the other hand, the reform also made, 
for instance, the recruitment of  people more fluent, easier. It can be a threat of  course, but it can 
also be an opportunity to answer to changes in the universities” (5Fs*) 
“I don’t feel our positions have changed that much. In principle, it’s mush easier now to get fired. 
Even if  you are a Professor, they can say: “Ok, you don’t teach anymore this topic, we don’t need 
it anymore, you are fired”. But in the old days, if  we were a Professor, it was almost impossible 
for you to get fired, only if  you’re misusing alcohol or did some bad thing related with money, 
those would be the only reasons, I think. But otherwise, if  there was no work, it wasn’t the 
Professors’ fault; it was university responsibility to find another job/occupation, because that was 
not a legal reason to fire people. That was a good thing of  the state when we were part of  it, but 
now people can be fired based on economical reasons or due to some reorientation activities of  
the department, or by any other motives” (1FUmm). 
As the New Universities Act no longer considers universities as part of  state administration, but 
mostly in terms of  their main mission of  education and research, universities have now autonomy 
to hire the personal they want. By other words, this increased administration and management 
autonomy which is translated in the concentration of  powers in top and middle management actors, 
allows for greater latitude in managing faculties/departments’ resources, either financial and/or 
human. This was a positive aspect focused by middle management actors and academics, as well as 
for those system level actors that perform some kind of  role in universities, who praise their freedom 
which now exists when recruiting people. 
“I have mixed feelings, definitely. There are some positive signs, at least this idea that there is 
more freedom to decide about how you want to recruit people and that kind of things, that’s the 
sort of ideal. But I don’t think it works that well, it’s still very bureaucratic and this idea that 
universities have now more freedom to decide on their own matters and that there is less 
government guidance. It’s not actually true in practice, because obviously most of the funding 
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comes from the government anyway, and funding these days it’s something that is connected to 
governance as well” (3FUmm). 
 
“We are able to develop more flexible recruitment procedures, we can recruit people very quickly 
and according to what we need. If we want to hire a Nobel Laureate we can say “you are hired”, 
which was impossible before, due to the very complicated procedures. And we are able to develop 
new track models for national and international researchers, we can promise “ok, you come here 
and we employ you from 4+4years and according to the evaluations until that stage, if we find 
you have performed according to the expectations than you will be made a Professor”. That would 
be impossible in the previous system. So yes, it has given us a lot of flexibility in recruitment and 
I think yes, it is a very important thing because research is not the Rector who does it, it is done 
by excellent teachers and researchers and it depends if you are good or bad in recruiting and it 
will help you in the future” (6Fs*). 
 
Also all top-management and middle management interviewees are quite supportive of  this change, 
mostly due to the rigidity and bureaucratic bottlenecks the previous Law demanded. According to 
the Law 19.8.1994/750 that regulates the civil service career, the procedure to open and fill a 
position to hire a Professor was highly strictly regulated and time-consuming. The following 
quotations prove that: 
“I think it’s a good idea if  it helps our teachers and researchers to concentrate on their work. So, 
it’s up to the administration to create as good conditions and environments as possible. (…). So 
we can conduct our own employment policies, and also control our salaries, we have more 
freedom for that, and we can also do more active recruitment than we used to do, for instance, 
head hunting. Prior to this legislation, the state controlled, for example, the qualifications of  our 
staff  members and positions, but not anymore… and actually some people have fears that in this 
new independent status the universities will lower the qualifications of  staff. But we have done 
the opposite, we have increased the qualifications of  our staff, not lower them and reach our 
strategic objectives and look to what we need more specifically to fulfil these objectives” (1FUtm). 
 “In terms of  recruiting we have more freedom in deciding upon our recruitment strategies. For 
example, in the old system when you had to choose a new teacher or a new professor (either 
he/she was a professor in sociology or history or whatever) you had to choose the most qualified 
person. The person could have an expertise that was very strange to that institution, but you 
couldn’t really create an institutional policy or sort of  build up your own profile. You had to hire 
the most qualified regardless of  his/her field of  expertise. But now, in this present system, in the 
department you can actually say that “well, in similar department they are concentrating on this 
and this issue, well now let’s decide one field in our discipline that is underrepresented in Finland, 
now we could actually build up our own profile in such a way that we would fulfil this vacuum”. 
Then you can start recruiting people that you feel they fit best that strategy profile. In the old 
system, that wouldn’t be possible”(3FUtm).  
Nevertheless, “not everything that glitters is gold”. As the previous middle management interviewee 
explained, Finland, and more specifically in Finnish HEIs, there are people who have a chain of  
short contracts, where in some cases they “could have been for 20 or 30 years with short contracts” 
(1FUmm). Such situation is not possible with the new legal framework of  Finnish universities’ 
autonomy. Thus, this is sort of  a “hit me with a child in my arms” argument, which means that if  
on one side, it became illegal to make short-term contracts’ chain; on the other hand, it becomes 
too risky to give a permanent contract to these employees who used to be employed through this 
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system of  chain contracts. Although this is a discussion that goes beyond this research, briefly put, 
the main reason for this to happen is because around 30% or 40% of  faculties and departments’ 
funding comes from outside sources and in the form of  funding contracts with these funding 
entities. However, it is not clear or certain that these outside sources will fund for periods of  4 or 5 
years. As such, for the people who get their salary from these sources, their contracts are arranged 
if  there is continuation of  the funding, which explains the reason for chaining. With the New 
Universities Act, this is not possible anymore, and interviewees tend to admit that  
“People that has been here for a long time should have a permanent contract. But that’s a risk for 
the department because if  the outside funding is ending, than we need to find the salary for that 
person from other sources. Of  course you can fire him/her and saying that there is no more 
funding, but this is something we shouldn’t do and it’s also a risky business to do because the 
person can take us to the court and say that these activities continue here and that the lack of  
outside research funding is no legal reason to fire him/her. That’s why we are now very careful…” 
(1FUmm). 
Somehow these concerns express the fear of  having an heterogeneous group in academia with some 
academics, belonging to the oldest generation, having better working conditions than other, mainly 
those who belong to the new generation (Santiago, Carvalho and Cardoso 2015). Therefore, internal 
and external environments of  uncertainty stimulate fears on academia staff, not affecting directly 
the nature of  their work and their duties, but mostly on the way they live their daily routines in the 
academia.  
“Of  course that there are certainly a number of  people who is afraid, frightened because the 
university is not willing in their case to take the risk of  attributing them a permanent position 
once the funding is not certain. And, if  their present contract ends, they might think they are not 
important anymore and then they still have to live. That happens for sure. There should be some 
cases like that because we can’t take that risk. So, that is what happens when so much salary comes 
from outside funding. If  this stops, we are in trouble because we don’t have the money to pay to 
this people. In these cases we can fire them but somehow we want to avoid this type of  panic 
situation and … smoothly take some people outside the university, gently” (1FUmm).     
With respect to academics’ view on this change, their answers go in line with the argument of  
“I can’t see any big changes in this” (2FUa).  
“It was a big issue for people working here but we didn’t talk about that very much, our position 
our function didn’t change. It’s a fact that we are not anymore employed by the government, but 
I think we were not that happy, but we didn’t argue about it, and that’s interesting because it was 
a big issue, but we didn’t discuss that very much, it was a bit surprising” (1FUa). 
In turn, technostructure elements seemed a bit afraid of  expressing their views… They mostly 
reproduced system level and top-management interviewees (especially the rector’s discourse), 
introducing the idea that the law is now fairer for everyone working in the system.  
“It’s now much easier to fire people, actually there have been quite some layoffs after this new law 
or like... some functions have been shut down and that’s one of  the goals of  this new legislation, 
because in the past it was impossible to fire anybody, even though he/she didn’t have any jobs or 
if  people wouldn’t come to the university at all, or if  they were here, but they wouldn’t do their 
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work well or not doing nothing at all. It was impossible for them to get fired because they were 
civil servants. So, in that sense I found the law fair, because it is possible now. It can create some 
fears, but on the other hand it brings more equity to the system” (2FUt). 
The administrative model for stronger university autonomy is also institutionalised at the middle 
management level through the redefinition of  the roles performed by Deans and Departments’ 
Heads, namely their enhanced (delegation) powers and leadership duties. This was clearly reported 
by system level actors and top-management interviewees.  
“We think that this larger framework of  autonomy clearly made efforts to strength the position 
of  academic leaders, of  deans and heads of  departments. They have clearly more powers now in 
relation to the faculty board than before, because they really want to have people who are really 
willing to take responsibility and to steer and lead the faculties and the departments and I think 
this is extremely good. Deans now have a much wider responsibility and larger powers than 
before” (6Fs*). 
“Because this new governance system it was meant that all decisions are made by individuals and 
colleagues and the main idea was to find a balance between that and the Deans and the leaders of  
departments, that decisions are made in a good way in the Faculty Council. The change was to 
give more power – power is not the right word here but let’s say to give more space to lead faculties 
and through this way, it was easier to do that. And when this autonomy was increased, it made 
more important for the university senate to do strategic guidelines, a kind of  process where 
leadership is more intensive than in the old days. For Deans and Rectors, I think it’s clear now” 
(4FUtm) 
“That’s a true cultural change because we still have this long tradition that professors, in particular, 
are free men and woman and they can govern their own work, they are very independent in their 
own work, even to such an extent that if they choose not to work there was sill much they could 
do in their old good days… But now the university has to perform well and it has to perform along 
the guidelines that our funding agency, the Ministry wants us to do. And that requires much more 
firm leadership than the old system had” (3FUtm). 
 
The majority of  middle management and academic interviewees could agree and highlighted the 
(positive) aspects of  such measures, which mostly refer to the need and importance of  having 
people full-time commiteed in the administrative and management of  the faculty/deartment, 
without being an imposition or some kind of  rotative position. Furthermore, in line with Portuguese 
interviwees, it was also argued the need to increasingly more, quick decisions need to be taken due 
to the changing nature of  higher eduction. Towards the uncertainty environement that surrounds 
HE, and especially in moments of  ither financial constraints, or changing practices or policies, 
stronger leadership is expected, which may reinforce the tendency for accepting a top-down 
management style. 
“(…) This delegation system has changed a lot. This can be a bit naive, but it should be like that, 
and of  course that now, all the time more rapid decisions need to be made and that that is, in my 
opinion, more related to our time. Our time nowadays it’s of  more turbulence in every sectors: 
policy, economics, HE, working life, that’s ten thousand times dedicate life and not very promising 
for the long term” (2FUmm). 
As clarified by some interviewees, stronger leadership is not synonym of  a dictatorship or 
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professional administrators and/or managers, but rather someone that has the time, the willingness 
and the ability to lead a complex organisation such an institution of  HE and its organisational units. 
The following middle management perception portrays the ideas of  most interviewees on the topic: 
“Stronger leadership because… it might sound very radical, but of  course when I say stronger 
leadership I don’t mean that we should get professional leadership outside, hiring people that 
don’t know anything about universities or their mission, or about the basic principles of  
universities. But what I’m really more after is the leadership of  people who actually is willing to 
be the person leading the position because… I used to be a department head for 7 years and so I 
knew a lot from other department heads (…). About half  of  them thought it was a kind of  
punishment that they had to be department heads. Like, ‘ok, this is something that we have to do 
for 3 or 4 years, then luckily I’ll get rid of  this position and someone else will be punished”. So, 
we still have this type of  attitude and it’s a kind of  task that someone has to do but they do it very, 
very reluctantly. So, I think we should find people who actually are willing to act in that position 
and try to enhance the unity and performance but also respecting the basic ideas of  a university” 
(3FUtm).   
One can see that from system level interviewees until middle management actors, opinions do not 
differ so much and they are usually supportive of  more “professional management” for HEIs, 
accepting soft managerialism for the sake of  institutional and academic survival. 
“But I think that at the faculty level is easier, but I am a bit worried about the department level, 
because the same learning must go through department leaders and I think they are also part-time 
leaders, much more part-time compared to the Deans. So these are so demanding processes for 
the leaders in every level that… and the responsibilities are much more than earlier, so that’s why 
we need to create gradually a system that the leaders are more professional in nature so that they 
can really devote time to, and they really get trained to that and so on. I like very much, for 
example, the fact that in some universities (…) Deans and the Rectors are full-time, but for 
instance in this university the Vice-Rector is not full-time Vice-Rector and that’s insane, crazy, 
because it is such a responsibility! So, we really need a system where the position to lead that kind 
of  demanding processes is full-time. I think that is a shared worried. Have you in Portugal a 
system where Deans are part-time Deans, I mean, do they have to do research and lecture? (…)” 
(2FUmm). 
Such enthusiasm with a concentration of  powers in one person, as well as stronger leadership relates 
with the complaints of  a constant increase of  administrative and bureaucratic workload, usually 
portrayed by academics.  
“(…) we would like to do more research, but nowadays it’s more to get funding for research, so 
you can’t do research yourself, not much anymore, because most of  the time goes to get funding 
for research and for administrative activities, so hopefully there should be some sense in that, until 
we learn how to manage and deal with this university law” (1FUa). 
“In principle, this law should have given us good opportunities to improve our working 
conditions. However, people are getting more tired: one of  the major working principles of  the 
new law was to give academics more time for research and teaching and this hasn’t been 
accomplished” (2FUa*). 
Academics’ views are then contrary to those system level actors identified above (e.g. 6Fs*), even if  
the ultimate goal of  this shift in the law should be equal for all institutional actors: to facilitate life 
and make activities and roles clear for each “group of  actors” in the institution. Again, system level 
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interviewees were aware and referred the mismatch of  perceptions between these two main groups 
of  actors: 
“I’ve heard complaints like that [more administrative and bureaucratic workload], but if  that is 
true it’s because they haven’t succeed in doing the reform well, because that was not the aim, much 
in the contrary. (…) And the idea was instead of  having a lot of  small departments, not really able 
to do the bureaucratic work, and having professors doing it, to create bigger units with specialised 
administration people, and professors don’t need to be involved in let’s say, more small scale 
administration (…) but still now it’s only the beginning, it’s typical from the beginning. If  
everything would be working perfectly and everyone’s happy at this stage, well, I probably would 
think that there was something wrong…” (6Fs*). 
This duality between (more) academic activities, i.e. teaching and research, vs. administrative and 
bureaucratic issues, was an aspect that came up frequently during the interviewees, both in Portugal 
and in Finland. It was one of  the most frequent complaints, especially from middle mamangement 
actors and academics. It seems that increasingly more, there is need to devote attention to 
administrative aspects and to obtain more knowledge on issues that go beyond the traditonal 
academic sphere. This perceived need clearly anguishes interviewees, even when they are optimistic 
towards the changes brought about the new law and even when they are enthusiastic with learning 
bout new subjects. Nevertheless, the time these “extra” activities demand, distress them and disperse 
their attention from their main functions – teaching and research. Furthermore, what happens in 
most institutions, is that all this “extra” time and activities are not taken adequately into account in 
performance assessment exercises. Simultaneously, there are risks that faculties and departments 
within the university progress and engage differently with the necessary changes. 
“At least so far it has been much more administration and bureaucratic work, so far it has been 
like this. But, as I told you before, I think that we are just in the way on how to learn to deal with 
certain things. I’m sure that at some point, it should be better and we will be done with the 
bureaucracy and with the administration, hopefully” (5FUmm). 
 
“From many points of view, I like it [the New Universities Act]. I like that we have more 
independence; I like the fact that we can make more decisions on our own. However, I don’t like 
how many new computer programmes we have to use and to learn now. It’s a nightmare! We are 
very much loaded with this new way to learn, to calculate and to make budgets… The budget and 
money processes have totally changed now, so we need to learn how to make budgets and how 
to follow these things, like they do in enterprises and in firms. This is very similar, and nobody 
got good education and training for that, and especially this budgeting programmes and the system 
itself, they don’t function very well. Today either. So, it takes time… it might end up to function 
better and better, but you can understand how last year, which was the first year, the follow-up 
system was very difficult because, we didn’t get any update figures like how much money was 
coming, how much was left, the programs just didn’t function. So, how to make credible decisions, 
how to use money? People didn’t know really well what was going on. Howevermthat doesn’t 
bother me that much because I’ve been built in this mental way that difficulties are challenges and 
they include risks and if something goes wrong that doesn’t stop the world or life. So, in that way, 
I like very much this process because it also stimulates for innovative ideas and new possibilities, 
although it’s a very loaded process” (2FUmm).  
 
A similar opinion was expressed by a Portuguese middle management actor. The interviewee refers 
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the need and the long time spent to cope with the increasing use of  technology and bureaucratic 
procedures to not lag behind in her profession.   
“I feel fine because I’m a person open knowledge and I’ve enjoyed a lot to learn what is a SWOT 
analysis, to learn how to work with statistics, budget tables, etc... I learned a lot and that’s fine 
with me. But this is not my field of expertise! I had to spent many, many hours to understand and 
use a variety of instruments that I was never prepared for! And my training is minimal, it’s 
pratically limited to information sessions. It’s also true, though that we have been having enough 
support, for example in terms of technical support, new technologies. But the fact is that we had 
to, because we don’t really have any specific training in this area, so the university has given us the 
opportunity to attend many sessions in a post-work schedule. I have attened those and I want to 
keep myself updated… but this does not happen with most of the people and then we start to 
have two, three speeds within the university and sometimes even within the department” 
(4PUmm*). 
 
A common aspect criticised by the great majority of  respondents in both countries and in both 
subsystems concerns to the immense administrative and bureaucratic workload that has increased, 
alongside with a number of  different electronic platforms and sheets to constantly update. 
Additionally, some academics complained on the lack of  organisation and inefficiency when it 
comes to arrange administrative issues. 
“It’s the main complain from the faculty: the increasing bureaucracy and workload… there’re so 
many things that a professor and a director of  a program is required to do. Everything needs to 
be computerized (…). In the end, a person spends hours and hours filling time-sheets (...). I think, 
in fact, it has to do with Bologna in the sense that it created this pressure to make things 
transparent. And this whole idea of  quality and that everything needs to be documented” 
(6PUtm*). 
 
“Certainly the main results seem to be, unfortunately, the increase of administrative work and let’s 
say, we have two vice directors now because there’s so much bureaucracy; but also for teachers 
and researchers there has been an increase in the administrative load” (3FUa). 
 
“And I think that bureaucracy has also increased and of course that it’s not good. They say that 
we have to reduce the number of people working in the administration services, but I think that 
it has increased the number of people there because the same paper is now in one secretary, then 
goes to another secretary, and then goes to the system and then they send an invoice to our faculty. 
There are many people working with the same papers. I see that in this department” (2FUa*).  
 
It is then visible the NPM paradox institutionalised at the level of  organisational units: despite all 
the claims, efforts (and promises) for less state regulation combined with more institutional and 
financial autonomy, interviewees complained on the increase of  administrative workload, namely 
reports and everything that justifies duties and responsibilities related to their work, which seems to 
not make much sense in a framework of  increased institutional autonomy. It seems that actors’ 
freedom of  manoeuvre decreases as accountability and pressures for more efficiency increase. This 
feeling is transversal to all Finnish interviewees, regardless their role. Thus, it seems that the direct 
effect of  the augment in accountability in public universities is the increase in academics bureaucratic 
workload.    
“There is some kind of  bureaucratisation that can be seen already, so much reporting and 
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documentation and so on… I don’t always see the essence of  these reports and documents, but 
it is also a trend today. It’s more accountability and I don’t know if  this really develops education 
and research or if  it makes it any better, but it’s happening in all sectors of  society, it’s not only 
here in HE, there’s more and more accountability” (5Fs*).  
“I think it is not the result of  the law, but we have had some other renewals in the university which 
have been making the working load higher than before. And it is the tendency to decrease the 
number of  auxiliary persons, those ICT people and secretary people, so the tendency is that the 
number of  researchers will come up and the number of  other staff  will come down. So this is 
something that has made the situation that professors have to stand behind their computers and 
coping the papers themselves, and writing reports and so on because they don’t have secretaries 
to do that. And this is something that it’s not very much welcomed and I think the people who 
are behind this have not thought the idea, the consequences to the end, so it is something that it 
has to be taken a little bit back” (4FUmm). 
 
 
2.5.2 The Portuguese Case 
The RJIES came into force in a moment for change in public administration. For the academia 
staff, this was translated in two main changes. The first one relates with the Law 62/2007 and the 
(same) requirements it established in terms of  teaching staff  qualifications in polytechnics and 
universities in both private and public subsystems. For example, polytechnics must have more 
professors who hold a PhD or have the title of specialist and they need to have a high-level of 
research capacity associated to them (Law 62/2007). Before RJIES, polytechnics did not require 
such a percentage of doctoral staff (only around 15% of the academic staff held a PhD). This means 
that there was a period when there was a need to first assimilate the Law before applying it, i.e. time 
to produce Doctors (and specialists) for the polytechnic subsystem94. 
The second change relates and applies to all civil servants due to Law 12A-2008 (27th February) 
which defines and regulates the job attachment, careers and remuneration regimes of staff fulfilling 
public functions, and complementarily, it defines the judicial and functional regime applicable to 
each form of the public employment legal relationship (Law 12A-2008). Thus, under this Law, the 
statute of  all public servants shifted to be defined as workers with public duties. In HE, the 
modernisation of  Portuguese HE was completed with the DL 205/2009 (31st of  August) for 
universities and the DL 207/2009 (of  31st of  August also) for polytechnics, which changed academic 
                                                 
94 A “specialist” is an expert with relevant and recognised experience and professional 
competence, but not necessarily holding a PhD (DL 107/08, 25/06, §71º-3). Some interviewees, 
mostly from the polytechnic subsystem, do not agree with this equivalence or comparison 
between a PhD holder and a specialist, as the former one is an academic degree and the specialist 
is just a title. A specialist comes from the “outside” of the institution, worked, and gained his 
experience through the practice of his/her profession, therefore there should not be need of 
going through more exams to train/lecture in the polytechnics. However, this is a discussion 
that goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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career structure that had been the same for about 30 years (DL 205/2009)95. In addition, and 
according to the legislator, this update in the academic career structure meets the new reality and 
the new challenges that HE needs to account for and, as such, the recruitment criteria, selection and 
promotion of  personal should be following international good practices. 
Briefly, the main changes in the new academic career structure created by this legislation concern 
to the entrance procedures, which are now based on holding a PhD and introduced the non-tenured 
worker. It maintains its hierarchical nature, with more or less the same career paths (Carvalho and 
Bruckmann 2014). 
Due to the emergence of  a non-tenured designation in the law, i.e. the emergence of  more 
“instability” in the academic career, it would be expectable that Portuguese interviewees focused on 
this theme or at least, referred to it; similarly to what their Finnish counterparts did with respect to 
the end of  the civil servant status in the universities. However, and curiously, Portuguese 
interviewees did not put emphasis or attention on this, preferring to focus on the rise of  
qualifications in the entrance of  the academic career. This may be due to the fact that insecurity and 
‘instability’ were already in place in academia (although in an informal way) since the law allowed for 
the invited (convidado) position which started to be used by HEIs in times of  more financial 
constraints. In fact, by assuming a non-tenured figure, RJIES only turned in formal rules what was 
already dominant in the informal side of  universities practices (Santiago and Carvalho 2008).    
 “The status of  the academic career is much better as it is now! I have no doubts about that, 
because it’s a much more open system, which obliges us to have, indeed, a less protective system 
for those who are already within it and for those who will come and therefore it’s a system that 
will seek to recruit the best. Regarding this, it may be that more positive developments will come, 
but I agree with the evolution that one has ben made so far” (1Ps). 
“(...) Therefore, the autonomy of  the institutions was practically nil. The RJIES came to solve this 
problem and to create new requirements for the establishment of  the faculty” (2Ps). 
In fact, to academics’ eyes, the RJIES’ greatest impact was in the academic career structure, and all 
the bureaucratic aspects related with it. This should not be a surprise considering that academics 
feel more committed, or, by other words, feel firstly committed to their discipline and only than to 
their institution (Clark 1983).  
“When we look at what are the careers of  academics, to what are the evaluation elements that 
determine the career progression, etc., these aspects that go far beyond the traditional roles of  
teaching and research, I think that is the main focus of  RJIES” (1PUa). 
“There are two aspects that I think the RJIES helped to improve a lot. One point is that we have 
an aging academic population and, if  it won’t be renewed, like any other system that is not 
renewed, it dies. Also because there is a certain minimum number of  critical mass which below 
that the system cannot produce results with quality. Therefore, this is a central issue: the 
mechanisms that can be used to rejuvenate our university/scientific research system because most 
                                                 
95 The university career was regulated by the DL 448/79 and the polytechnic career by the DL 185/81. 
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research institutions are connected to universities. So, there is an imperative need of  rejuvenation. 
The RJIES facilitated this and made it easier, for example, to hire people who have certain 
valences, young people who have good skills, although not that much teaching experience possibly, 
but who can get that easily and quickly. This apparent easing or flexibility, in my opinion, can 
allow this rejuvenation of  the system” (3PUa).  
Other reasons explaining this apparent disinterest in the non-tenured “figure” lays on the fact that the 
institutional interviewees work in a foundation university, and therefore the changes in public 
administration and for civil servants enacted by Law 12A-2008 do not completely apply to 
foundation universities as they work as private organisations in terms of  – among others – human 
resources. Another possible reason explaining why actors emphasises other consequences of  the 
Law relate (again) to the period of  financial constraint the country is emerged and which, 
consequently does not allow for fully exploiting the potentialities of  the Law. For example, following 
what the previous academic interviewee (3PUa) referred on the need and possibilities that RJIES 
brings to renew the faculty and/or other professionals within the academia, s/he then continues by 
stating that 
“Now, the fact is that we have witnessed in recent years, since the RJIES was born, to a brutal 
decrease in the number of  competitions and applications that HEIs open. Is this only due to 
budget constraints? Or is the system developing inertia to change? I don’t know, to be honest, but 
I do hope it’s not this last point, and it’s rather a question of  budget restrictions. Because we have 
in Portugal a set of  people who were funded by public money in the last decade, they are doing 
high quality work, they are doing internationally recognised research, who want to stay in Portugal, 
and it’s a pity that universities do not take these people in” (3PUa).  
“I believe that we are now here with a somehow lame position knowing that on one hand, one 
created assessment tools and, on the other hand, these same instruments that were created on the 
side of  the status of  the teaching career code for a given constitution of  the faculty were hindered 
by insufficient funding. So, it is required a certain percentage of  Full Professors, Associate 
Professors, etc., and at the same time, one is withdrawing the possibility to universities of  
achieving these objectives. This leaves us in a situation where I say the following: the established 
objectives are right, but the means to achieve these objectives are not given and this is a common 
fight of  most Portuguese universities” (2PUtm). 
These perceptions and scenarios somehow deconstruct or contradict the study of De Groot, 
McMahon and Volkwein (1991) who positioned autonomy as a political concept and quality as an 
economic concept. The Portuguese university of  this research shows that autonomy cannot be 
operationalised whether only one side fulfils its part… 
Also actors belonging to the polytechnic subsystem expressed similar anguishes and feel 
frustrated towards the new legal framework. Although polytechnic’s interviewees acknowledged the 
fact that the Law helped to improve this subsystem status by upgrading the requirements of  their 
teaching personal, they feel tied up by the financial constraints that do not allow using the Law as 
they would like to and they should. 
“The recent budget cuts dictate that we can’t respect RJIES. The RJIES says that the school should 
have 70% of  teachers in the career. We are below this value and, looking to what the situation has 
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been, we won’t achieve these values because we have no money. But what is in the law, to equip 
schools with a large percentage of  human resources of  quality and in a stable situation, is totally 
fine. And it would be desirable to happen in the short term, to have a stable group of  teachers, 
specifically trained to ensure our programmatic offer and then to have a more flexible margin of  
teachers that, depending on the students’ affluence and our needs, we could use” (2PPmm). 
However, not all interviewees agree with such (high) requirements with respect to the percentage 
of  PhD holders in all HEIs, mostly due to one of  the university’s main mission: train students to be 
academics and also due to the risk of  downgrade the prestige and paths of  obtaining a doctorate.  
“I think this is in fact harmful to universities… for a very simple reason: one of  the major 
functions of  the university is also to train academics, that is people who are predisposed to follow 
an academic career and this training is very dependent on, for example, the possibility of  hiring 
an assistant, who is studying, or doing a master, a PhD etc. From the moment that we are required 
to have an extremely high percentage of  doctorates, this part of  research might become devalued. 
And there’s also another detail, the growing importance attributed to mobility, the import of  the 
so-called talents, which is a word that deeply annoys me. What I mean with this is that, for 
example, we are thinking that this university has the capacity to attract the Nobel Prize for Physics 
to lecture here, and then everybody is happily talking about the need to recruit talents, to invite 
Guest Chairs, etc. So, there is a dynamic here that seems harmful to the university and in particular 
to the prospect of  training researchers, which I think is something that the university can’t lose, 
it’s logical” (1PUa). 
Another critic to the Law relates to the terms in which performance assessment exercises are 
developed, do not satisfy academics or even other actors at both top and middle management 
positions. The reasons for such discontent are several and pass through the fact of  the especial 
nature of  the academic profession not being properly assessed, to the increase of  bureaucracy in 
universities as well as administrative and bureaucratic workload in academics’ daily activities, the 
autonomy of  universities not being respected at all and HEIs being treated as any other public 
organisation or general directorate; brain drain and the aging of  the (academic) populations and the 
lack of  junior researchers and academics in the academia; etc. 
“(...) The question of  evaluation, for example, (...) because if  we like it or not, this is a very 
particular profession in terms of  what are its objectives, its operating mechanisms, etc. This means 
that it’s a profession that can’t be evaluated as, for example, the lady who’s there at the front desk, 
according to the spirit of  that thing kind of  public administration, SIADAP (Integrated 
Management System and Performance Evaluation), which is something that one is trying to really 
impose a bit in every university of  this country. And I think that means to bureaucratise even 
more the academic life on one hand, and on the other hand, to dismantle what was for a long 
time solid pieces of  the academic ethos” (1PUa).  
A somehow similar view on the specific nature of  the academic profession is given by a Finnish 
academic who believes that the shift from state employers to universities’ employers is not in 
accordance with the public mission demanded by being a Professor. 
“But, on the other hand, people, especially those people that are really interested in teaching and 
that would like to do high quality teaching, I think it wasn’t a good solution for most of them. Of 
course that, in the old days, before this Yliopistolaki, most of university teachers had public office 
and now we are just workers like everybody else, like in a company. Because when you do teaching, 
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when you evaluate students, when you manage these things, you actually use some public power, 
and from that point of view, I think the old system was more natural. Now, we are workers like in 
some other public company. And it’s not exactly like that, because Professors do still have a special 
position. What do you mean buy a special position? [Researcher’s question] My point of view is that we 
are still under the “protection” of the Ministry, quite strongly, and one reason for that is that most 
of the funding comes from there. What this university law gave us was some freedom to arrange 
things here, internally, inside the university. But of course, then we still have this pressure and we 
have to produce certain results that are measurable somehow, like master degrees and things like 
that to get the money from the Ministry” (4FUa*). 
 
In line with other academics’ arguments, the previous Portuguese actor (1PUa) criticised the 
emphasis and the criteria attributed to performance assessment exercises. As an example, he points 
to the erosion and devaluation of  basic academic values such as teamwork, considering that  
“(…) a paper written only by one author scores higher than if  it had been written by two or more 
people. This means to eliminate any attempt to develop what was for many years a common 
practice and even a tradition in terms of  HE, which is teamwork and research” (1PUa). 
It is natural that academics emphasise more the academic career structure and all the changes 
created by the RJIES related with it than changes in university’s governing structures. Although 
these concerns are in line with the nature of  their profession, they reflect, however, the detachment 
of  this group of  actors from the governance activities of  the institution where they belong. Thus, 
the changes introduced in the academic career structure, not only interfere in the composition and 
requirements of  professionals, but they also impact in decision-making dynamics, by decreasing 
professionals’ participation in strategic decisions for HEIs. Furthermore, professional regulation 
has introduced shifts in the way performance assessment exercises are interpreted, operationalised 
and valued. Another example can be founded in the assessment platform (or system) created at this 
Portuguese university for the faculty to progress in their salary level. It is based on the “profile 
system”, where staff  can define their profile according to their main activities. This is quite 
interesting situation because research is the component that grants more points – both to 
polytechnics’ and universities’ staff  – even if  the requirements for staff  in these subsystems are 
different because they are different types of  HEIs and, according to the legislation and international 
feedback (e.g. OECD) should be maintained different. However, when it comes to performance 
assessment exercises, it seems that the duality between both systems do no exist. Furthermore, due 
to the way the assessment system and the platform works, people end up to play with the regulations 
to have a very complete profile and progress in the academic hierarchy… 
“What happens now with the new status of the teaching profession code, I have to do research 
because when I’ll be evaluated to progress in the career, I’ll have to have articles published, book’s 
chapters in books, plus the 12 hours per week I have to lecture, while in the university t’s only 9, 
I think. So, on average I have 12 hours of classes and I still need to produce the ‘same’ research of 
those working at the university. I think this is doubly stupid and contradictory. (…) And then very 
funny things happen… I’ve always had several roles/duties in the schools that nobody wanted to 
perform. Why? Because they give a lot of work and I still have to teach the 12 hours. No one will 
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reduces my lecturing time for me to perform these activities. So I have these 12 hours and besides 
that I’m still an Erasmus Coordinator, a Course Director, a Coordinator of Internships and some 
other positions. And nobody wanted these roles, BUT, from the moment we have this platform, 
everyone started to want roles! It’s a funny phenomenon. Amazing! Because I have colleagues who 
never wanted anything besides their ‘basic duties’ and now they want roles. Everyone wants more 
activities. Why? Because it counts, it matters now. This is so typical, so Portuguese! We adapt to 
the system. Now is the roles’ hunting season!” (3PPl). 
 
After the analysis and study here presented, it is possible to infer that the higher emphasis that 
Portuguese interviewees put on performance assessment systems and evaluation mechanisms when 
compared to their Finnish counterparts is also related with cultural aspects, namely with trust and 
stability issues. As Finland is a country characterised by being a society of  trust where its population 
highly trust in their universities, research institutions and especially in the state (Sjöblom 2011; 
Finnish Science Barometer 2013;), they naturally emphasise and value other aspects in their working 
conditions and careers than Portuguese interviewees. Therefore, in Finns’ discourses the issue of  
performance assessment exercises did not came up as it did with Portuguese actors. 
“I value this autonomy of  the institutions because it is also a signal of  trust and we have this 
tradition. Traditionally Finland has been a country of  trust, of  mutual trust, like we give you the 
money and you are responsible for the degrees. Finland is not a control country, from tradition, 
and we should maintain this (5Fs*). 
As mentioned above, Portuguese institutional actors feel that they have met their compromises 
and goals but the Ministry did not fulfil its part. Consequently, “there is so much uncertainty and 
then fears and then the fear creates a really bad working environment because people are afraid of  
being fired” (3PPl).  
From Finnish interviews, it was possible to perceive a conflict of  tasks among the academia: 
whether on one hand one finds the expected roles each group of  actors has traditionally been doing, 
namely teaching and research; on the other hand, there is an increased need of  spending time in 
search for information and researching to perform these same duties, while simultaneously more 
knowledge is required to manage tasks that to go beyond the traditional academic role. In turn, it 
seems plausible to say that, although not in these terms, or referred like this, the third mission of  
the university, service to society and its engagement, has been part of  the Finnish HE system since 
its genesis. Being education the most appreciated public service in Finland, this is an area that the 
Finnish academia cannot afford to lose. However, the outcomes of  such hybridisation of  tasks both 
for Finnish and Portuguese academics and HEIs are still blurred, or, by other words, still remain to 
be known, although some findings are expectable. Among possible scenarios, it is not difficult to 
foresee an increasing pressure for versatility, and for academics to develop activities that generate 
earnings and even advertising (publicity) for their institution (and disciplinary field). In parallel, with 
such increase of  demands, it is also expectable that academia professionals will experience 
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exhaustion and even other types of  problems. Faced with this increasingly competitive and 
demanding environment, it seems understandable the feeling of  anaemia and/or decline of  interest 
for the institution governance and management issues that some interviewees mentioned. 
 
To sum up… 
When analysing changes in academia working conditions and in the academic careers in said 
Portuguese and Finnish HEIs systems, several aspects need to be bear in mind. First, and as it has 
ben highlighted throughout the whole study, the difference forces interpreting changes: the state 
and HEIs. Different perceptions and feelings emerge from actors with different roles. In both 
countries, for those who expected, designed and implement the reforms, i.e. system level actors and 
some top-management interviewees, the complaints found at other levels of  action are just temporary 
and necessary processes for a better end. The complaints from academics and middle management 
actors on the increased bureaucratic workload are just a kind of  (temporary) setback to make things 
happen. On the other hand, and regarding the information technology systems and platforms 
needed to be filled by institutional actors – especially academics – to be accountable for their work, 
and centralisation of  power, are consequence of  a combination of  factors. These pass by an 
ideological and professional change in which the academic profession is seen and how it should be 
assessed in order to perform more and better, which in turn culminated in the increasing 
professionalisation of  institutional management, and to a perceived need of  constantly legitimise their 
profession and their place at the institution. In this sense, one can say that it was not only the 
regulatory framework that changed but also the normative one. 
In fact, in line with what Aarrevaara and Hölttä (2007) wrote, in both countries’ case studies, 
the shifts in human resources’ performance assessment exercises and consequently in the 
remuneration scheme (pay system), interviewees raised discussions on the nature and purpose of  
academic work and values. Is it still seen as a public job? Is there any (possible) agreement on the 
specificity between the mission and responsibilities of  a Professor and the way he/she should be 
assessed? Whether, on one hand, some interviewees feel that this shift – i.e. the loss of  the civil 
servant status and the lack of  the tenure position is a serious coup in their HE systems and in the 
way academia operates, others reported that this represents a step further towards increased fairness 
criteria and a contribution inciting justice and merit.  
These shifts, both ideological and practical, also reflect the international and national economic 
crisis that seems to affect professions rights and juridical systems, contributing to a “general 
acceptance” of  a culture of  precarious working conditions and social inequalities under the threat 
of  being unemployed. Therefore, it is interesting to notice that regardless the country of  study; it is 
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possible to find more similar perceptions among the same group of  professionals (belonging to the 
same tribe) than among the different groups of  actors belonging to the same country (territory). By 
other words, perceptions vary more among different groups of  actors than between countries. 
However, further comparative research on this matter would be interesting and necessary in order 
to assess how such dynamics and even this hybridism that characterises Portuguese and Finnish 
university governance models imply on academic practices and in the organisations of  the academia 
work. For example, in terms of  performance assessment exercises and/or any mechanism to 
monitor academics’ outcomes of  their work challenge the teaching mission of  the university and in 
this sense the traditional academic ethos. As Frostenson (2015: 25) puts it, “the challenge to 
individual autonomy lies specifically in the use of  metrics (…) or other forms of  evaluation as 
decisive criteria for quality. The teacher becomes accountable rather than responsible, implying that 
the teacher loses the traditionally enjoyed mandate of  trust”. And, although this does not necessarily 
imply “infringements on individual autonomy with regard to content, frames and controls of  
professional practice”, as Frostenson (2015: 25) remembers, the Portuguese example denoted some 
attempts to juggle with the system (3PPl)…  
Other threats were identified by academics and middle management actors in both countries, 
namely: risks of  passivity and lack of  participation and interest which, in turn, can lead to the 
existence of  a mitigated autonomy or an autonomy which is not used in its full potential. As a result, 
HEIs and academics decided to follow trends set externally and proposed several ways to reorganise 
the system with varying success, depending on the level of  institutional autonomy and willingness 
of  the staff  (Diogo 2009; 2014a). 
Coercive isomorphism also from international organisations helps to understand why Finland 
and Portugal have followed similar paths in terms of  HE governance and management, despite 
being such different countries. Using the institutionalism theory, one can say that not only the 
regulatory framework was changed within universities but also the normative pillar, since there are 
relevant changes not only in academics working conditions but also in their values and professional 
norms. Nevertheless, these results point to relevant differences inside the group, which do not allow 
to keep treating them as a homogeneous group. Further studies are needed to explore these internal 
differences and hybridism.  
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III DIMENSION  
Understanding and Conceptualising Change 
 
This category is devoted to depict the level of  significance attributed to each political process, 
the Bologna process and the RJIES/New Universities Act in order to understand how policy change 
and reform is perceived by interviewees and the rationale they point for it. It underlies the whole 
research process. Table revises the themes and categories for this dimension of  analysis 
 
Table 19 - Categories and themes that build up the third dimension 
III DIMENSION: Understanding and Conceptualising Change 
I Category: Conceptualisation of Change  
Themes Portugal and Finland 
1. Significance attributed to the Bologna process and to the new legal framework for 
Portuguese and Finnish HEIs 
2. Different Cultures + Same Roles = Different Perceptions? 
 
 
3.1 Significance attributed to the Bologna process and to the new legal 
framework for Portuguese and Finnish HEIs  
 
To investigate how actors see change is particularly important in the case of  the Bologna 
process due to the time that has passed since the process was implemented until the interviews were 
conducted. In parallel, being universities institutions organised around knowledge, which have for 
centuries demonstrated persistence and path-dependency, there is a time gap since reform ideas are 
accepted and then implemented (Stensaker et al. 2012). Furthermore, as ideas are translated into 
practice, they might be subjected to (some) transformation (Ball 1990; Czarniawska and Sevón 
1996). Considering the differences in nature, contexts, rationales, goal ambition and targets of  the 
Bologna process and the governance reforms enacted by the RJIES and the New Universities Act, 
understanding actors’ positions towards the legislation allow us to depict how change was 
operationalised both at the national and institutional levels and which actions were prioritised. 
Both the Bologna process and the governance reforms initiated in the scope of NPM are 
(explicitly) designed to introduce change in the HE systems of the countries that implemented them. 
Whereas the Bologna process aims at establishing a common space of higher learning and therefore 
the main focus of change is national and institutional, the RJIES and the New Universities Act aim 
at changing institutional management and governance practices at the level of institutions of HE 
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and their basic units. Attempts to reform HEIs status quo are evidenced by the diverse legislation 
proposed and implemented in both Finnish and Portuguese HE systems. According to the different 
roles actors perform in their daily activities, their perceptions towards these processes and to the 
extent the events created change, also vary. Again, the Bologna process encapsulates several 
perspectives on change, not only from the perspective of (social and) organisational theories, but 
also from the interviewees involved in the process – their beliefs, expectations and perceptions – 
and the relationship actors maintain among them and their environments, as well as the level of  
analysis. Acknowledging these facts enable us to accept that different actors’ perceptions on the 
processes, their implementation and development are not linear and they blend with different time 
frames and different locations, and even with their own position within the institution. Moreover, 
as highlighted during chapter III, according to organisational theory, institutions interact and shape 
their cultural, social, political and historic environments and conditions. 
Earlier (chapter III), it was introduced a construct to frame the actors’ views of  change that 
the Bologna process created in HE (policy), which is now retrieved here (figure 16). That framework 
with the different metaphors of  change positions the countries studied here according to the 
perceptions Finnish and Portuguese interviewees have on the impact of  the Bologna process in their 
HE system and HEI. 
 
Figure 16 - Different metaphors of  change in HE policy: the case of  the Bologna process 
according to the perceptions of  Finnish and Portuguese interviewees 
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Source: Adapted from Taina  Saarinen and Välimaa (2012).  
 
Nevertheless, as it happens with Olsen’s (1988) models of  governance, this construct is important 
as it depicts a possible reality for other policies and allows for picturing relations and hierarchies of  
power in (higher) education reforms.  
Saarinen and Välimaa (2012) refer that the conflict theoretical metaphor of  revolution (lower 
left corner) does not fit easily into HE policy research. This is so because change in HE tends to 
happen gradually and not brusquely and shortly. This is also the perception of  most interviewees, 
regardless of  their country, type of  HEI and role played, that actually see universities’ conservatism as 
an unique advantage. 
“(…) universities are the most conservative institutions that exist in every country. Well... not the 
university because the university does not exist without people. Academics tend to be the most 
conservative, and this is understandable because they are those who have studied and deepened a 
field of knowledge, they are those holding more arguments to continue” (5PUa). 
 
“The academia is somewhat conservative and universities have to be conservative because they 
are institutions that have lived for hundreds and hundreds of years. Institutions such as 
universities can’t change like this: one touch with a magic wand and poof! It can’t be like that! 
Indeed, it is amidst this resistance that lays one of the greatest virtues of the universities. (...) It 
has to be a mix. There has to be this virtue of a certain conservatism, not just risking everything 
- because knowledge does not exist since yesterday, it took hundreds and hundreds of years to 
construct; but, at the same time, it needs a great deal of flexibility. This is the major conflict of a 
university” (2PUt). 
 
The attention given to the theme of  conceptualising and understanding emerges from the frequency, 
i.e. the groundedness96 of  which actors referred to change and to the extent they perceived how 
these processes generate(d) change. One possible reason explaining such groundedness is the fact 
                                                 
96 Groundedness refers to the number of quotations assigned to a given code. 
Portugal 
Finland 
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that researching change is usually linked to policy reforms, particularly in European HE studies 
(Taina  Saarinen & Välimaa, 2012). In addition, change has different interpretations according to the 
different roles interviewees have. As the authors refer, because change is seen in different ways, the 
effects and efforts on policy actions are also different. As such, the researcher ranges actors’ views 
according to their role, in order to ease comparison and to identify similarities and differences as 
well as patterns of behaviour. 
When analysing changes that have been happening in the last decade in the Portuguese HE 
system and institutions, attention was paid to the temporal proximity of  the events taking place in 
the system. It is thus challenging to assess where change comes from, and, to a certain extent, it is 
even difficult to separate changes coming from the Bologna process and changes coming from the 
RJIES and/or from other changes happening not only in the country, but also in the institution 
where interviewees work. The great majority of  Portuguese interviewees referred to this 
“confusion” in the course of  events: 
“It’s difficult for me to distinguish what Bologna has implied, in terms of administrative issues, 
from other changes that have been made at the same time, such as RJIES. It’s very difficult to 
separate things when everything happens exactly at the same time. At a given moment, we were 
completely overwhelmed by new things, management procedures that are done differently, and 
that happened at the same time. At a certain point, I didn’t know what came from Bologna, what 
was coming from RJIES, or what was coming from mandatory changes related to the institution’s 
evaluation and assessment! I just know that suddenly everything was happening at the same time 
and I must tell you that those were 2 years absolutely exhausting because this implied so many 
changes at the level of management” (2PUmm).  
 
In fact, these dynamics in Portuguese HE confirm what Scott (2012) referred about Bologna as a 
dynamic and open process with the capacity to transcend its original objectives. As such, it is difficult 
to distinguish between research on Bologna topics and research on (European) HE more broadly 
(2012: 2). Moreover, (or again), one must remember that the Bologna framework entails a complex 
network of  actors and levels of  action, and its implementation and consequences may be the result 
of  a large number of  different factors whose effects can prove difficult to isolate and interpret. One 
should keep in mind that some of  these visible changes were not necessarily due to the Bologna 
process itself, but were also caused by changes in funding mechanisms. Although this might be 
challenging to distinguish, interviewees in both countries adverted for the diversity of  scenarios 
explaining change (Diogo 2014a). 
Another aspect that needs to be distinguished when analysing policy change is the target-
audience and the goals these policies aim at. The policy processes analysed here are driven to 
different publics, and have different objectives. The way actors interpret and/or see change is 
interlinked with the degree of  novelty they attribute to the topic and also to its meaningfulness. 
Thus, it is challenging to separate these themes. By other words, the way interviewees conceptualise 
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change and/or reform – despite being different processes, interviewees tend to use both terms 
interchangeably – goes much in line with the meaningfulness attributed to the policy processes 
analysed here. Furthermore, when collecting the interviewees’ general views on the Bologna process, 
the RJIES and the New Universities Act, comparisons on the impact of  such reforms came up easily 
by interviewees in both countries. Thus, when asked about the degree of  change that the Bologna 
process introduced in the country, Portuguese system level interviewees agreed that, both for the 
students and for the civil society, Bologna had a bigger impact than RJIES.  
“Sometimes we say that the Bologna process was just this change from 5 to 3-years bachelors, 
but it’s not true: there has been some progress, some evolution (…). It was also very important 
for the requalification of the Portuguese population, because a qualification process as it was 
planned (5 years length) is good for a younger population, but it’s very bad for an aging population, 
for adults and the new publics, as it can bring some dismay due to the long time that people have 
to study. So, by far, for society and for students, the Bologna process was much more important. 
For people who are here internally, I think RJIES was more important. Because the teaching staff 
has adapted and learned the Bologna process and therefore they have the methodologies tuned. 
The issues that RJIES brought about, namely institutions’ autonomy, the status of the Teaching 
Profession Career Code, are crucial issues for the way professionals fit within the institution and 
these are things that will last for a long time, right?” (1Ps). 
 
“There is still great grudging when speaking about Bologna. There are many people who think 
that everything bad is Bologna’s fault; but for me, is the combination of a number of things that 
are happening at the same time and Bologna is there, in those things. In fact, RJIES includes 
Bologna somehow, but it is obvious that it is much more than that. For instance, the 
evaluation/assessment issue is also ssumed in Bologna” (2PUmm). 
 
Supporting this view, and while trying to assess the impact of  reform for HEIs, there is a clear 
consensus that RJIES and the New Universities Act are of  paramount importance for the 
modernisation, i.e. for the professionalisation of  HEIs – and also an European trend – in both 
countries. This was referred by all interviewees in both types of  subsystems: 
“In the short term, it has been the Bologna process [creating more change], but in the long term 
we will see that RJIES will impact more. With Bologna, we had almost immediate effects; the 
process was practically imposed and quite sudden because in 10 years we had to solve a problem. 
RJIES will have implications now and in future years; the Bologna process has practical effects on 
students and in teaching and learning paradigms. But in terms of institutional organisation, RJIES 
has certainly more effects” (1PUt). 
 
These views allow us to better grasp the focus and impact that both processes aim(ed) to target. As 
mentioned in the beginning of  this chapter, the Bologna process is explicitly conceived to generate 
change at the national and institutional levels, the RJIES and the New Universities Act goals are 
primarily at the institutional level.  
Generally speaking, Finnish system level interviewees point the New Universities Act as having 
a higher impact in the system than the Bologna process.  
“The university reform [Yliopistolaki 558/2009] was much more tense and difficult. It created 
many feelings, positive and negative. I think that, since the first moment, it was very smooth with 
the Bologna process. Of course there were different opinions, but I really can’t remember it as 
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being very difficult. It rather required lots of work and decision-making and so on, but basically 
it wasn’t a very difficult reform” (6Fs*). 
 
“But here in Finland we also had this discussion that nobody was quite happy or satisfied with the 
universities’ sector, so business and industry community said that the quality was not good enough 
and universities were saying that they were very unhappy with their legal status. So very different 
motivations for a change, but they all sort of converge in the need to reform the legislation 
completely, which was quite interesting actually, when you think it back” (2Fs). 
 
This different degree of  attention and/or enthusiasm demonstrated by most of  the Finnish 
interviewees when talking about both processes might be understood in the light of  two important 
factors. First, the time frame of  both events and the time the interviews were conducted. Whereas 
7 years have passed since the implementation process of  the Bologna declaration until the moment 
the interviews were conducted, the New Universities Act entered into force in the beginning of  
2010 and the interviews were carried out during the following year. As such, the interviewees tend 
to remember more accurately recent events and mature opinions as time passes by. This was also 
acknowledged by some interviewees, mostly academics:  
“I think the perception of any situation evolves over time. We don’t have a static perception of 
an event, i.e. we always look differently to something that happened 5 or 10 years later, whatever 
subject we think about. And so many things happened nationally and internationally that is 
impossible today to remind everything we felt by that time when we had so many things to do. 
(…) When you look at something that has already happened, we are looking in terms of the past, 
so we can never have the same look. (...) I have a hard time telling you if things have been 
accomplished or not. (…) This demonstrates that we have to look at things with an evolutionary 
look rather than with a static one. Nothing is today as it was yesterday; change today takes place 
in a dizzying way (…)” (5PUa). 
 
The second aspect explaining the different degree of  enthusiasm posed in the respondents’ 
discourse relates with the way the Bologna process is perceived in the country, i.e. the idea of  looking 
at it as an evolutionary reform, rather than a revolution within the Finnish HE system. 
“I think my attitude is kind of neutral (…). I don’t see any negative light, I don’t think it had very 
big or great positive consequences either; it’s a kind of neutral feeling, I think. It happened, it is 
ok, it didn’t affect our work in any negative way or in any huge positive way either” (3FUmm).  
 
An interesting opinion came from a former Portuguese Minister of  Education who sees change 
imposed by the “external environment” not as effective as “internal change”:  
“There were many changes that happened in the Portuguese university coming from inside. 
Changes coming from outside have a problem: they are coercive. And then, they aren’t real 
changes because people try to pick what was there before, what is most comfortable. I believe 
that is good to have stimuli from outside, but it should be stimuli that lead institutions and the 
people working there to feel the desire for change. (…) People working in HE do not oppose 
change. They resist doing things that they themselves don’t believe. Why there is such a resistance 
to change, if you want to label things as “resistance to change”… But why does this happen? And 
does it happen only in HE? What about basic and secondary teachers, and people working in 
companies? When processes of changed are introduced from the outside to the inside, and people 
and organisations are not adequately prepared to understand the changes and to be, somehow, 
owners of these changes, only little things will change, right?” (6Ps*). 
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This view goes much in line with some academics’ perceptions, who recognise their ‘difficulties’ in 
changing or ‘coping’ with change that is coercively imposed: 
“The RJIES shook the structure of the university because universities are the most conservative 
institutions that exist in every country. (…) Within the academy there are always those who defend 
what is already established. So, when the political power comes as an ‘outsider’ with new ideas, 
internally there are always those who disagree and say “this is not going to work because of this 
and that”. Internally there are always opponents, whatever the proposal is. I guess that publicly, 
the visibility of those advocating new ideas depends more on the media rather than universities 
themselves” (5PUa). 
 
An expressive interpretation of  change as a continuum rather than a rupture with the past came 
also from some Finnish system level interviewees, as well as from some Portuguese academics:  
“I think this is a very relevant process, especially if you started from the changes we made with 
the Bologna process and then try to evaluate whether this is a kind of continuum, and whether 
there are some underlying objectives or goals starting from the late 1990s that can be now 
illustrated in the latest legislation, the New Universities Act” (2Fs). 
“This is still an on-going process. And this is something I’d like to stress: the continuity; it’s not 
that this is the reform, this is the objective and now we are going to implement it. In a way, we 
are ‘stressing’ the universities because there is so much we have to change, that now universities 
really understand that they need some time to implement the legislation at the unit level, at the 
department level and that they need time to adapt to changes” (3Fs). 
 
What seems to be common among interviewees are the feelings of  scepticism and anxiety portrayed 
by actors who see change in a more continuous and evolutionary way, who also tend to express 
concerns towards the future of  the institution where they work and their own position. In fact, 
uncertainty and fears towards the future developments of  HEIs were perhaps the most noticeable 
feelings showed by interviewees in both countries. Simultaneously, and despite Portuguese 
respondents tend to talk about this more frequently, it seems to exist a correlation between 
apprehensiveness feelings and the concern of  high unemployment rates among young graduates. 
This was especially focused by senior interviewees as, for example, system level actors, external 
members, top-management actors and some senior academics. 
Also in the continuity and evolutionary line of  thought, some Finnish interviewees reported 
that, although there have been some important changes introduced by the Bologna process, its 
degree of  novelty is not that high. Some university top management actors and academics refereed 
that the ideas put forward by the 1999 Declaration have been around Europe in the past decades – 
a perception which goes much in line with Corbett’s (2006) views.  
“I guess the basic ideas were there already before people starting to talk about Bologna. I mean, 
how we talk about the knowledge society in the early 1990s, the EU talked a lot about information 
society. Even though different terms have been used, still the basic idea has always been there: 
that the stagnation of European societies as they see it, in social and economic terms, needs a 
much better educated population in Europe, capable of doing high level jobs, creating innovation 
and also being able to accomplish very demanding tasks. That was something that was discussed 
already in the 1990s, before no one ever talked about the Bologna process. So, from that 
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perspective, it is just only one way of trying to adapt the society to the changes that were already 
in place before this Bologna process. (…) I was very closely involved with the EU agenda when 
Finland joined the EU. So, when they started to talk about the Bologna process, for me it was just 
a new term. I mean, they had been talking about harmonising the European HE systems already 
before people starting using the term ‘Bologna process” (3FUtm). 
 
Opposing to this idea, some interviewees expressed a more fatalistic view of  change, which is not 
even related with positive or negative perceptions of  the process, but rather with the development 
of  events. Ultimately, this perception of  change might develop into some impotence or helplessness 
feelings towards the future course of  the process and/or future actions within the institution.  
“I think there are voices against Bologna, but that doesn’t mean anything, you can’t go back now, 
because one can’t ‘remove’ the changes that are already installed” (3FUmm).  
 
 
3.2 Different Cultures + Same Roles = Different Perceptions? 
 Actors’ interpretations (or even conjectures) about the future developments of  these 
political processes vary according to the role interviewees perform, and also according to the 
disciplinary area academics represent. With respect to the perceived impact the Bologna process 
might have had in terms of  organising knowledge, a Finnish Physics Professor referred that:  
“Actually I don’t think that it produced too much change. Physics has always been a very 
international field; we have essentially worked according to these principles during many years. 
(…) So the change has not been that big” (4FUa*). 
 
It is curious to notice that despite the changes brought by RJIES, still some top and middle 
management interviewees referred that they did not feel the necessary changes to happen and they 
even doubt whether the reform was perceptible to the academia.  
“The bodies that the RJIES stipulates to govern HEIs were created, the General Councils were 
established, the Presidents and Rectors were chosen, but I still haven’t seen deep and necessary 
changes happening in the operationalisation of  these new structures. I even doubt that people in 
general have understood the nature of  the change that was in question. I think one has to bring 
this topic again to the agenda and work on it” (6Ps*). 
Should one look at this “unawareness” as a natural outcome of  change in HE? As mentioned 
previously, unless change is seen as a revolution, a violent bottom-up development of  advocating 
or resisting a policy  (Saarinen and Välimaa 2012: 56), it takes time to happen, to be noticed, to be 
institutionalised. In this way, interviewees also reported that as time goes by, they hope RJIES can 
make life easier, by enhancing, de facto, administrative and financial autonomy in the University. 
Nevertheless, and despite change taking time to be installed, this perception shared by some system 
level actors and top-management interviewees towards the fact that some people inside the academia 
did not understand the changes that have been happening, other factors should be taken into 
account regarding this apparent “unawareness”. Cultural factors help to complete this analysis and 
may elucidate on how Portugal and Finland react to change within HE. 
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Graphic 1 - Finnish and Portuguese societies compared through the lens of the Hofstede 
Cultural Dimensions Model 
 PDI - Power Distance 
IDV - Individualism and 
Collectivism 
MAS - Masculinity vs. 
Femininity 
UAI - Uncertainty Avoidance 
LTO - Long-Term vs. Short-
Term Orientation 
 
Source: The Hofstede Centre website (2013).  
Finland scores low on the power-distance 
dimension whereas Portugal’s score is high. This characteristic points to autocratic governments 
based on co-option where change happens by revolution. Portugal, contrary to Finland, has a very 
high preference for avoiding uncertainty. According to Hofstede (2011), in these cultures there is an 
emotional need for rules even if  the rules never seem to work. This actually “explains” a lot of  the 
whole political machinery in Portugal, as analysed in Chapter IV (and as frequently experienced). It 
confirms the “cosmetic” implementation of  the process, as well as the “infernal bureaucracy” and 
“waste of  time” that participants felt when it came to the organisation and discussion of  the 
Bologna process. In the case of  Finland, this aspect relates to the fact that the country is seen as an 
individualistic society where tasks prevail over relationship. Portugal, in turn, is considered a 
“collectivist country”. This difference remits us to the pragmatism and even “originality” with which 
the Finnish Ministry of  Education organised the Bologna process, empowering the national 
coordinators to steer the process both at the national and institutional levels. On the other hand, 
one can argue that there are other forms of  coercion and, again, due to the period when the 
interviews have been conducted, perceptions have been softened by time and other events. Therefore, 
it should be remembered that “The Ministry of  Education offered a free lunch to each of  the 
participants in the seminars. Participation, however, was voluntary (and every participant knows well 
that there is ‘no such thing as a free lunch’)” (Välimaa et al. 2007: 53). 
It should be highlighted that the Hofstede’s model cannot justify or even legitimise national 
and institutional decisions. Furthermore, as it happens with the “Change model” and Olsen’s 
governance models presented in chapter II, these cultural dimensions are just tools which help us 
to interpret social phenomena. In fact, it is interesting to observe that both countries have very 
similar scores in the masculinity vs. femininity dimension, being considered feminine societies. In 
this sense, the following aspects – minimum emotional and social role differentiation between the 
genders and having many women in elected political positions – apply to Finnish culture, although 
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not to Portugal.  
Another aspect which needs to be taken into consideration and which was referred in the 
interviews relates to the way Finns tend to obey to authority. Maintaining a high trust on their 
politicians and in the government (although not in political parties), laws and rules are, generally 
speaking, accepted and respected without much contestation and/or fight. 
“We’re the kind of people of obeying here, we take regulations that come from the government 
and we just implement them. And there’s very little resistance in this country concerning things 
related to government. I think in many other European countries there are much more resistance 
and more demands and requirements for dialogue” (3FUmm).  
 
Thus, by being a country with a strong social welfare state, where the law and rule are religiously 
followed, it would be expected that the Finnish Government have a firm grip in regard to policy 
implementation and change. As such, and due to the Finnish academic tradition of being highly 
stated control institutions, it would be expected that HEIs would not have had such a freedom of 
manoeuvre. This situation represents the Finnish HEI studied, where self-governance dominated. 
Final decisions stood in the hands of academics and professional communities. Portugal distances 
itself a bit from this governance model. Traditionally, as Portuguese HEIs had a higher degree of 
autonomy when compared to their Finnish counterparts, it would be expected that HEIs would 
carry out the implementation process without such a strong ministerial interference. This would, in 
fact, have happened (at least at the stage of registering the new bachelor’s and master’s programmes) 
if there would not have been a rush to comply with the legislation. As a matter of fact, the whole 
administrative and bureaucratic change was then lived at the unit level with different degrees of 
despair due to different conflict groups/stakeholders…  
Also when comparing the implementation processes of the RJIES and the Yliopistolaki 
558/2009, it seems that, in practice, the Portuguese Government has the ultimate word in reforming 
HE, whereas the Finnish system went through more collaborative process of policy implementation. 
Cultural and historical dimensions shed light on this (chapter V). Although autonomous HEIs, the 
instability in Portugal combined with low trust in politicians and political parties (Teixeira and Freire 
2010) creates uncertainty among academia and allows for top-down implementation processes. In 
turn, Finnish political stability and continuity in educational policies allowed for smoother processes 
of policy design and implementation. 
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Table 20 - The main drivers of convergence and divergence in Portuguese and Finnish HE 
systems and institutions 
 
Drivers of Convergence Forces of Divergence 
-  Globalisation, Internationalisation & 
Europeanization: Bologna Process + Lisbon 
Strategy + OMC 
- International organisations 
- NPM 
- National specifics: historic, geographic, cultural, 
economic & political contexts; & role of the state 
 
- Policies’ character, goals and enforcement level 
 
Institutionalism & Policy Diffusion: Why some educational trends and reforms diffuse and others 
not? How do they travel, assuming that they do? 
 
To conclude, it is possible to say that the global discourse on the need for change due to the 
aforementioned motives was spread at the various levels and actors of HE systems and institutions 
in both countries. Nevertheless, according to their different history, culture, economical context and 
ambitions, and even according to different visions on these processes, Portuguese and Finnish 
governments responded differently in the way they envisaged and implemented both the Bologna 
declaration and governance reforms and in the way they drafted and implemented institutions’ 
legislation. In turn, different reactions and perceptions came out from interviewees in both 
countries, which vary according to the roles and positions they have. Table 20 quickly summarises 
the main drivers convergence and divergence in HE, and more specifically in Portuguese and 
Finnish HE systems and HEIs. 
Figure 17 illustrates how external pressures were translated by Portuguese and Finnish 
governments, and how national legislation is interpreted by HEIs. This process needs to be framed 
in a scenario of  increasing internationalisation of  HE, where the European layer of  governance has 
gained more power, accelerating the process of  European integration. This happens not only due 
to the creeping competence and influence of  international organisations, but also due to use of  the 
OMC. While leaving policy implementation in the hands of  national governments, the EU is 
responsible for controlling the progress of  the member states. By combining document analysis and 
the empirical findings, it is possible to observe that frequently, the application of  national legislation 
in HEIs is achieved through top-down processes (mainly in the Portuguese case) and a mix between 
top-down and bottom-up strategies (more in Finland). These strategies aim at changing institutions’ 
organisational structure, their governance bodies, decision-making processes and human resource 
practices. 
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Figure 17 - Institutional Change in a Global Setting 
 
 
VII  
Conclusions and Topics for a further Research Agenda 
 
By presenting two different national realities that, at the first sight, are unlikely to be compared 
and that have implemented somehow similar HE reforms, this study aims at interlinking both local 
and global representations capable of explaining convergence in Portuguese and Finnish HE 
governance dynamics. The following questions guided the researcher’s curiosity since the very 
beginning of the research process: what then explains potential convergence and divergence in HE, 
and more specifically in Portuguese and Finnish HE systems and institutions? And why there have 
been similar HE reforms in Portugal and Finland?  
Looking at the latest legislative reforms in both Portuguese and Finnish HE systems, it is 
possible to say that they are in consonance with international trends and absorbed NPM 
commandments quite well. Political convergence owes much to the globalisation, 
internationalisation and Europeanization of HE, of which the Bologna Process, the Lisbon Strategy 
and changes created by the Lisbonisation of Bologna (Harmsen 2013) are the most visible faces of 
• Changes	in	organisa, onal	structures	
• Changes	in	governance	bodies	
• Changes	in	decision-making	prac, ces	
• Changes	in	human	resources	management	
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these phenomena, speeding up change of European HE. Under the “Bologna shoulders” 
(Magalhães et al. 2013), national HE systems stocked reforms that would be more challenging to 
achieve without a framework sponsoring change. But other factors contributed to ease change at the 
system level. For example, Portugal is not an exceptional case of  reform in a context of  economic 
crisis. As a matter of  fact, other OECD countries used the crisis as an opportunity to reinvigorate 
reforms to HEIs and/or training policies in their HE systems (OECD 2009a). In this way, and such 
as it has happened with the implementation of  the Bologna process that paved the way for changes 
that are not directly related with the process, the weak social and economic context of  the country 
allowed for introducing changes in the way HEIs are steered and funded that otherwise would be 
troublesome to legitimate and/or to accept. System and institutional level actors acknowledged this, 
as well as the fact that such environment speeded up academic concerns. Furthermore, the 
similarities between the legislative changes in both countries leads to the conclusion that there is a 
coercive process promoted by these institutions’ recommendations.  
In fact the use of soft law through the OMC compelled the ‘laggards’ to catch up regarding 
education performance (beta-convergence). In turn, the influence of international organisations, 
especially the OECD and the EU seem to be powerful actors in spreading the message of 
neoliberalism which – although with different degrees of enthusiasm – Portugal and Finland 
accepted well. Also governmental pressures exerted on Public Administration due to the NPM 
reform, culminated in HEIs’ search for increased efficiency and competition. As argued by Ball 
(1998), education policy in the last years has been colonised by economic imperatives, unbalancing 
the social, cultural, and the economic functions of the university in favour of the latter. Such signs 
of change were translated in the Law 62/2007 (RJIES) in Portugal and the Yliopistolaki 558/2009 
(New Universities Act) in Finland. Both legal documents changed significantly HEIs’ governance 
and management traditions. Interesting is also the fact that while national circumstances were 
different and different problems were identified in both systems of HE, the formula prescribed was 
similar: the legal status and governance of universities had to be redefined in order to create more 
autonomous and entrepreneurial institutions. HEIs could then choose to become (or not) public 
foundations operating under private law. 
The Bologna documents also highlight the notion of HE as a public good and a public 
responsibility, creating then pressures for searching “good” governance in the HE sector (Zgaga 
2006). “Good” governance implies a growing concern from national governments to assure that 
public resources and taxpayers’ money is being properly used to meet HEIs increased needs and 
requirements, whereas simultaneously assuring that HEIs’ demands are effectively and efficiently 
managed.  
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This study confirms that in both HE systems the state holds a central position – a view already 
highlighted by Ball (1998). The state shapes institutional features, defines and enforces conditions 
of compliance, which in turn facilitate top-down policy implementation processes (Ball 1998). 
Nevertheless, this does not imply passivity from HEIs towards the state guidelines. As the empirical 
data confirmed, HEIs and their professionals have freedom of  interpretation and actions, and 
increasingly more institutions operate at different levels of  governance. Additionally, we learned 
from institutionalism and policy diffusion that some educational trends and reforms tend diffuse 
and travel quite easily and that “different roots lead to different routes and common rules lead to 
common routes” (Ramirez 2012: 437). 
Public sector organisations, like HEIs, can be responsible for symbolic and normative changes 
because they pass (with more or less success) images and references to other institutions, i.e. a kind 
of  institutional facade. Not only HEIs create pressures, but also they are highly vulnerable to the 
same pressures. According to Arnaboldi, Azzone and Palermo (2010: 79), institutional theory has 
been widely used to study the enactment of  NPM-inspired managerial innovations. The progress 
of  institutional analysis sheds light on diverse, even competing logics and factors, providing a multi-
perspective tool to explore and explain change processes. This study reinforces the argument that 
the normative basis of  policies sustains and legitimises a change in ideology and ultimately in 
practices, both at the system and institutional levels.  
To investigate how actors see change is particularly important in the case of  the Bologna 
process due to the time that has passed since the process was implemented until the interviews were 
conducted. In parallel, being universities institutions organised around knowledge, which have for 
centuries demonstrated persistence and path-dependency, there is a time gap since reform ideas are 
accepted and then implemented (Stensaker et al. 2012). Furthermore, as ideas are translated into 
practice, they might be subjected to some transformation (Ball 1990; Czarniawska and Sevón 1996). 
This study advances knowledge in the research of  HE policy as it combines a reflection on the 
differences in nature, contexts, rationales, goal ambition and targets of  the Bologna process, and the 
governance reforms enacted by the RJIES and the New Universities Act, while it elucidates on 
actors’ positions towards the legislation, allowing us to depict how change was operationalised both 
at the national and institutional levels and which actions were prioritised. 
The new governance and management model established by the RJIES represents an important 
step forward for managerialism and NPM assumptions and devices, particularly: concentration of  
power at the top in corporate governance bodies; transformation of  the position of  Rector into an 
executive role (Rectors used to be elected by the university assembly and are now elected by secret 
ballot by the GC); attempts to neutralise collegial power through its replacement by in-line 
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management mechanisms (election replaced by appointment of  middle structures). In this way, it is 
expected that this more unified model of  institutional governance favours institutions’ market 
orientation. Incentives to competition in student recruitment, fund raising for research, 
institutionalisation of  quality assessment and accountability are examples that illustrate this new 
orientation the Law tries to impose. RJIES is thus the expression of  governance for performance. 
The sole differences found between the foundational model and the public institute model are 
those defined by the law, meaning foundation universities have one extra governing body: the 
Council of  Trustees (with five external members). With respect to Portugal, the study of  
Bruckmann and Carvalho (2014) concludes that all other differences found do not relate to the 
institutional model, but to options taken in spite of  it. Even among the HEIs which chose the 
foundational status, it can be raised the hypothesis that these universities did not intend to make a 
radical break with the collegial model. It seems also that the New Universities Act is more hybrid 
than a truly NPM model, but it has not so many democratic elements. In turn, there are many 
collegial bodies at the Finnish university of  this case study, which seemed to try to maintain some 
elements of  a governance collegial model. Thus, regarding the theoretical framework discussed in 
the dissertation, we can affirm that there are relevant differences not only between countries but 
also within each country, with academics expressing a hybrid position concerning changes in their 
HEIs. Further studies are needed to better understand the real nature of  this hybridism and to 
identify what justifies the different positions of  academics. Also further comparative HE research, 
from other countries, would be interesting and necessary in order to assess if  the hybridism that 
characterises Portuguese and Finnish university governance models is becoming dominant at 
international level. 
Although the New Universities Act represents a major change in terms of  ideologies in Finnish 
HE, it seems that collegiality is still seen as a core aspect of  an academic institution, regardless of  
the level of  NPM interference. This reminiscence may also be an outcome of  a smooth transition 
model of  governing HEIs, as there are not so heavy ruptures with the past as there are in Portuguese 
HE. Thus, the political design and implementation of  the new legal framework for HEIs in Portugal 
can be framed in the evolutionary quadrant of  the scheme on different metaphors of  change in HE 
policy. This interpretation of  reform and change is possible by looking at the international and 
national contexts that led to the implementation of  Law 62/2007 and also due to the reform 
movement that the Bologna process sponsored in the country. However, this interpretation can be 
refuted if  we remember that all opposition parties and other stakeholders voted against the RJIES, 
and that the government in power by that time was elected with a parliamentary majority. In this 
way, a reform perspective can then be adopted. On the other hand, it is also interesting the fact that, 
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despite the stakeholders’ opposition towards RJIES, system level interviewees as well as most of  
top management actors, showed overall satisfaction with it.  
It is thus challenging to position the Finnish case in the framework of analysis of change in HE 
policy. It seems that the New Universities Act caused more fuss than the Bologna process, although 
this vision might be tolded by the proximity of the events. What seems to be common in both 
Portuguese and Finnish HE systems, although with different nuances, is the coercive isomorphism 
played by international organisations and their creeping influence.  
The arguments used in favour of  RJIES do not always explain its main objectives, i.e. the 
discourse legitimating change is the attainment of  enhanced efficiency and autonomy in institutional 
governance. This should be achieved through a progressive commodification of  knowledge, i.e. 
commercialisation of  institutional outputs, shifts in the institutional governance model based on the 
notion of  public service, employability relevance, etc., and an abandonment of  collegial and 
collaborative working conditions in exchange for a business and competitive ethos. Also the fact 
that the new governance model abolishes such collegial bodies as the Senate, as it also abolishes the 
election of  the Rector by the academic community, and restricts the rights of  academics and 
students to participate in the academia management was seen, at least initially, as a strong coup to 
HEIs democracy. Some feared that by reducing the representation of students and staff in 
management and governance bodies, the RJIES might foster inequalities in institutions that choose 
to become public foundations. Furthermore, by regulating HE according to values of knowledge 
privatisation and profit making, these actors foresee a significant reduction in academic endeavour 
as well as lower participation in democratic governance by researchers, students and staff. In fact, it 
would be interesting to have students’ views on these themes, considering the national diversity of 
this research. It would also be fruitful to understand how students influence HE policies as well as 
governance and management practices. It can be hypothesised that as the degree of participation is 
considerably different in both countries (higher in Finland than in Portugal), the outcomes are also 
different, with a stronger influence on the Finnish side than in the Portuguese system. However, 
not only the time available for the study did not allow for that, as their views were not specifically 
pertinent for the study object. 
Using Olsen’s framework on governance models, it is also possible to denote the developments 
in the governance relationships between the European university (as an institution) and the state. At 
least in the last two/three decades, and also using Clark’s triangle (1983), universities have been 
operating between the state corner and the market angle. And, as Gornitzka and Maassen (2007) 
stress, the universities’ national priorities have become less social and more economic. Thus, one of  
many unanswered questions is: can the university (here encompassing all types of  HEIs) operate as 
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a community of  scholars with academic freedom (free inquiry and critique) and, at the same time, 
be an instrument to effectively and efficiently serve national purposes in an increasingly competitive 
environment? 
This research also showed that the reasons that led these countries to change are not the same, 
neither the conditions to carry on the reforms. For instance, in terms of  the reorganisation of  the 
network of  HEIs, the reasons that led Finland to constitute the Aalto University are not the same 
that led to the merger in Lisbon. “Finland had in Helsinki a technical University, a University of  
Design and one Arts University, so it seems only natural that they want to make there a big 
multidisciplinary University! And then, they might want to do another university outside Helsinki” 
(6Ps). In line with this, some Portuguese system level interviewees as well as top-management actors 
believe on the possibility of  having multi-annual funding agreements between the Government and 
HEIs, instead of  budgets that are set annually and in an unstable way, would allow for HEIs to stick 
more faithfully to a strategic plan and to develop continuously. In fact, funding was an aspect 
constantly referred by most interviewees, in both countries, although due to very different reasons. 
In Portugal, the topic was mostly the lack of funding and how one needs to constantly re-invent 
their activities in order to not perish and maintain their work (e.g. disciplines, programmes, 
departments, research units, the institution). The reorganisation of the national network of HEIs – 
as well as the binary organisation of the system – was also mentioned although views differ 
substantially from each interviewee. In Finland funding concerns tend to be mostly related with the 
disparity of funds that the OKM provided to Aalto University when compared to the other 
institutions and also to the need of merging some HEIs when there is overlapping of programmatic 
supply, although always keeping in mind the benefits of having HEIs spread all over the country. 
Some actors showed preoccupation with the possibility of introducing tuition fees in the country 
for national and European students, but this is a discussion that goes much beyond this dissertation 
(cf. Weimer 2014). 
Generally speaking, Finns broad views on both processes do not differ much from their 
Portuguese counterparts. The problems are not so much in the law, but how processes are 
conducted, namely the lack of  participation, the uncertain environment it entails, and to the 
consequences it poses to the working environment and working conditions within the academia. 
Finnish interviewees also anticipated that as more challenging the economic and political 
environments are, the stronger the leadership is expected to become in steering HEIs. Changes in 
the ideas of how to govern Finnish HE and HEIs are legitimised in the change of the legal status; 
in the status of the personnel who are no longer civil servants, changes in the idea of how the 
university should be steered, by professional managers and external members; more focus on 
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finances and emphasis on financial independence new positions.  
It is evident that Finnish data reveals a story of  pragmatism that sometimes can be misunderstood 
with passivity or complete neutrality (or just lack of  enthusiasm). This analysis also allows us to 
conclude that despite global patterns impact national HE systems in similar ways, national 
governments have still the last word when it comes to the organisation and implementation of  
supranational policies (Diogo 2014a). On this, it is possible to assume that the idea of historical 
layers helped to install change at the institutional level, but the same does not hold true for 
implementing change at the system level. On the other hand, it can be argued that, not even the 
peculiar nature and complexity of the Bologna process was enough to change the (traditional) way of 
designing, organising, and implementing change at both levels of action. By other words, top-down 
implementation still prevails when it comes to implement change in Portuguese HE. 
Empirical data also challenged a prior assumption: interviewees’ perceptions differ more among 
the different groups of actors than between countries. It would be expectable that in such different 
countries, one would find as different perceptions as both cultures are. Nevertheless, the data 
presented here deconstructs this idea and positions similar views with similar working groups 
regardless the country of study. As a matter of fact, this conforms Clark (1983) teachings that 
academics feel firstly committed to their discipline and only than to their institution. 
HEIs behaviour should also be analysed according to the degree of  autonomy each type of  
institution holds. In this sense, it is important to remember that while Portuguese public universities 
enjoyed full autonomy in the creation and delivery of  degree programmes (they only need to register 
these with the DGES), public polytechnics (and private institutions) until recently needed prior 
approval from government, through DGES, for the creation of  new degree programmes. Only very 
recently, with new accreditation procedures, and after the RJIES, this situation changed. Therefore, 
as public universities had more autonomy, and in the case of  the Bologna process, HEIs were able 
to change easily and rapidly their study programmes and start following international trends 
according to the Bologna paradigm. Acting on their own initiative, many started to implement the 
Diploma Supplement and to make use of  ECTS even before the necessary legislation was passed. 
However, as system and institutional level interviewees also recognised, despite the level of  
autonomy universities have, there was a lack of  institutional initiative compounded by fears and 
uncertainty. Finnish interviewees argued that strongly centralised HEIs (e.g. the University of  
Helsinki) took ownership of  the implementation process, while in more loosely steered institutions, 
faculties and departments ended up following the coordination groups’ recommendations. As such, 
different results among groups were pointed out: some went further in their reforms, looking at the 
process as windows of  opportunity to enhance additional objectives apart from those demanded by 
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the Bologna declaration, but in other disciplinary fields only minimal efforts were made. Portuguese 
respondents highlighted similar conclusions: whereas some universities have, since the beginning of  
the process, gone further in the reform trying to achieve something more beyond the Declaration 
“borders” (generally young universities and polytechnics), others waited for exterior guidance. 
Briefly stated, one can say that despite the autonomy of  some HEIs, the instability in Portugal 
combined with mistrust in politicians and political parties creates uncertainty among academia and 
allows for a top-down implementation processes. In turn, it seems that the Finnish political stability 
allowed for continuity and smoother processes of  policy design and implementation. In fact, 
stability and continuity are typical Finnish characteristics and represent the country’s attitude 
towards politicians and therefore towards HE. Nevertheless, it is also true that in both countries, it 
was visible a common rhetoric and a cognitive-cultural framework that emphasise decentralisation 
practices and decision-making processes with the objective to legitimise a more professional 
management, a typical NPM element.  
When asked about the meaningfulness of  the Bologna process today, the vast majority of  
interviewees agreed in referring how, fortunately or unfortunately, it is still an issue prevalent in the 
institutions’ daily life. Professionals did not react in a homogeneous way. The progress and success 
of  Bologna tend to be relative according to the analytical perspective employed, i.e. according to the 
different roles interviewees have. For example, it was also stated that Bologna lost its political 
momentum once more and more objectives had been added to the agenda, giving the impression 
that the process could never be concluded. In parallel, the nature of  the process also changed when 
so many countries with different HE agendas were included in the Declaration: “some of  them do 
not even share the European ideals and challenge the vision of  what is meant by being European” 
(4Fs), whatever that means in the present European context. At the institutional level, the challenge 
still seems to be to find a balance in the relationship between top-down priorities and bottom-ups 
needs and aspirations. 
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Annexes  
 
Annex 1. Institutional Change: Five Types of  Gradual Transformation 
 
 Displacement Layering Drift Conversion Exhaustion 
Definition Slowly rising 
salience of 
subordinate 
relative to 
dominant 
institutions 
New elements 
attached to 
existing 
institutions slowly 
change their status 
and structure 
Neglect of 
institutional 
maintenance in spite 
of external change 
resulting in slippage in 
institutional practice 
on the ground 
Redeployment of 
old institutions to 
new 
Gradual 
breakdown  
(withering away) 
of institutions over 
time 
Mechanism Defection Differential 
growth 
Deliberate neglect Redirection, 
reinterpretation 
Depletion 
Elaboration Institutional 
incoherence 
opening space 
for deviant 
behaviour 
Active 
cultivation for a 
new “logic” of 
action inside an 
existing 
institutional 
setting 
Rediscovery and 
activation of 
Faster growth of 
new institutions 
created on the 
edge of new ones 
New fringe eats 
into old core 
New institutional 
layer siphons off 
support for old 
layer 
Presumed “fix” 
destabilising 
existing 
institutions  
Change in institutional 
outcomes effected by 
(strategically) 
neglecting adaptation 
to changing 
circumstances 
Enactment of 
institution changed, 
not by reform or rules, 
but by rules remaining 
unchanged in the face 
of evolving external 
conditions 
Gaps between 
rules and 
enactment due to: 
i) Lack of 
foresight: limits to 
(unintended 
consequences of) 
institutional design 
ii) Intended 
ambiguity of 
institutional rules: 
institutions are 
compromises 
Self-consumption: 
the normal 
working of an 
institution 
undermines its 
external 
preconditions 
Decreasing 
returns: 
generalisation 
changes cost-
benefit relations 
Overextension: 
limits to growth 
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dormant or 
latent 
institutional 
resources 
“Invasion” and 
assimilation of 
foreign practices 
Compromise 
between old and 
new slowly turning 
into defeat of the 
old 
iii) Subversion: 
rules reinterpreted 
from below 
iv) Time: changing 
contextual 
conditions and 
conditions open 
up space for 
redeployment 
 
Source: Streeck and Thelen (2005: 31). 
 
Annex 2. Examples of  news collected for the press dossier  
 
1. “Yliopistolaki sai eduskunnan siunauksen” [The Universities Act received the Parliamentary 
blessing] Retrieved on December 2010 from 
[http://yle.fi/uutiset/yliopistolaki_sai_eduskunnan_siunauksen/5266524] 
 
2. “University employees cancel strike action” Retrieved on February 2011 from 
[http://yle.fi/uutiset/university_employees_cancel_strike_action/5524691] 
 
3. “The Bologna process was catastrophic for the credibility of  Portuguese universities” 
Retrieved on January 2013 from [http://www.publico.pt/portugal/jornal/processo-de-
bolonha-foi-catastrofico-para-credibilidade-das-universidades-24863151].  
 
1  
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Annex 3. Interviews’ Guideline 
 
Interview to the Position, Institution, Name, Date 
 
Introduction - Presentation 
- Explain who I am, my work, the objectives and the use of interviews.  
- Ask if taping (and taking notes) is o.k. and ask for permission to quote.  
- Guarantee complete anonymity 
 
I – Policy Process of the Bologna Process (BP) - Relationship between the State and Higher 
Education Institutions (HEIs) 
 
1. In your view, what lies at the heart of the BP? In essence, what is it all about?  
2. What has been your position concerning the implementation of the BP? Has this view/perception changed 
over time?  
3. How do you describe the overall process of policy formulation concerning the implementation of the BP 
in Finland?  
4. What challenges did the BP create to governance and management of this institution? Do you consider 
that these challenges/difficulties still exist today? 
5. In your opinion, which organisations and actors have shaped the implementation of the BP in Finland? 
Has this changed over time?  
Do you expect more significant changes in the future? Could you bring them into a rank order with 
respect to their influence? Which of these organisations/actors have similar ideas to the views of your 
institution? Which have a notably different position? Has this changed over time? 
6. What role does the European Union and their initiatives (guidelines) play in the governance of this 
institution/faculty/department? 
7. Do you think the impact of these changes is more intense in polytechnics or universities? By other words, 
what type of higher education subsystem has changed more under these reforms?  
8. What kind of differences are there in governing a university/polytechnic? Have these changed over time?  
9. Do you consider that the BP helps HEIs to easily pursue their institutional mission, or it can create a 
“competition”/”tension” climate between both subsystems? 
10. How important are these topics today in this institution/office? Did this importance change over time? 
 
II – Yliopistolaki 558/2009: NPM influence – Changes in institutional governance and 
management  
 
1. What has been your position concerning the drafting of Yliopistolaki 558/2009 legislation? 
2. How would you describe the overall process of policy design and implementation concerning this 
legislation? 
3. What changes have these reforms created to your institution? (academics’ autonomy; the way the perform their work? Do 
you consider that the foundational regime provides a more flexible and autonomous management environment?) 
4. Is it possible to infer (some) influence of the BP in the latest reforms of this institution?  
5. In your opinion, which organisations and actors have shaped the implementation of this law in Finland? 
Has this changed over time?  
6. In your perception, is there a “European model” of HEIs governance and management? If so, how does 
it look like?  
7. How do you see the process of merging HEIs? In your view, what are the main benefits and disadvantages 
of this process?  
8. Do you consider that in Finland/Portugal the roles performed by both academics and 
administrators with management functions include now a stronger component of management 
and administrative activities in their work than they had 5/10/15/ years ago? 
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9. Do you believe that those academics with management functions continue to be seen, by 
other academics, as the academic community representatives (primus inter pares), or, on the other 
way, they are seen as professional managers? 
10. What is your opinion concerning the participation of external members in the governance bodies of your 
institution?  
11. With respect to funding, which major changes can you notice in your institution in financial terms? Do 
you notice (or fear) a greater competition for resources (human and/or material)?  
12. In your opinion, since you are in this position, which major changes occurred in terms of human resources 
practices?  
13. How do you see the current processes of institutional accountability? What changes/challenges does this pose 
to the governance of your institution/HEIs? 
14. In your view, in which areas of HE should the government interfere more/less? 
 
III – Perceptions on the results:  
1. Do you consider that the objectives of the Bologna declaration, the Lisbon agenda, and of the national 
legislation, are actually being achieved? 
2. In a general way, throughout the process of the implementation of the BP and the (latest legislative reforms), there is a 
current discourse about opportunities and challenges. In your personal view, which major advantages can you envisage? 
2.1 And which are the risks you fear most?  
3. What would you like to have happened in the Finnish HE system, but so far it was not possible/ it 
did not happen yet? 
  
Conclusion: 
- Is there anything else you would like to add or emphasise with respect to the topics here discussed? 
- Can you give me some feedback on this interview? Was it easy to understand? Do you think the topic 
is interesting? Would you like to provide me with other suggestions/critics in order to improve this 
research?  
- Thank you very much for your availability and your contribution 
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Annex 4: Conceptual and Data Driven Content Analysis Themes 
 
Change 
 Context and Background/Rationale for Change 
- Pressures from international organisations (e.g. EU, OECD) 
- Increase internationalisation of  HE 
- Increase importance attributed to HE/Research 
- Need to be more competitive 
- Need to create links with industry 
 
 Conceptualisation of  Change and Reactions to it 
 
Bologna Process 
 Conceptualisation of  the Bologna Process: 
- Political rationale; 
- Economical rationale; 
- Pedagogical rationale 
- Curricular rationale  
- Instrumental rationale 
 
 Actors involved in Bologna 
- European; National; Institutional Level 
 
 Implementation of  the Bologna Process at the National Level 
- Political organisation of  the process. Relationship between HEIs and the government 
 
 Implementation of  the Bologna Process at the Institutional Level 
 
 Positive Aspects of  the Bologna Process 
- Increase of  mobility 
- Increase of  joint-degrees and partnerships among HEIs 
- Increased cooperation and dialogue among HEIs 
- It simplified the organisation of  curricula and modularisation of  studies 
- Concerns of  employability, which relate more with changes in society 
 
 Relevance of  the Bologna process for the development of  the system 
- Clarification of  the binary divide  
- More competition 
- Opportunities to reflect on the national HE system 
 
 Negative Aspects/Flaws of  the Bologna Process 
- Academics (and students) are still stuck to the old teaching-learning paradigm – “Lack of mentality”  
- The “new” Masters are so different from the pre-Bologna Masters and required new and different 
administrative procedures. 
- Blurring of the institutional mission of universities and polytechnics 
- In order to save resources, the (good) objectives of Bologna (e. g. smaller classes) were distorted. 
- Fear from academics to loose their disciplines/jobs 
- Misconception and loss of prestige of the Portuguese HE degrees 
  
 Evolution of  the Bologna process/Importance of  Bologna (at the present) 
 
 Adjustment/Acceptance to the Bologna process by type of  HEI 
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 Other issues:  
- The use of  a “common grammar”. It still does not exist. Exp: the word “equivalência” in Portuguese 
is still used to describe the “reconhecimento e acreditação de competências” 
 
RJIES 
 Conceptualisation of  RJIES: NPM per excellence 
 
 Actors involved in the legislation 
 
 Context and political Implementation of  RJIES at the National Level: top-down vs. 
bottom-up – Relationship between HEIs 
- Influence of  the BP/Influences in the new legislation 
- Pressures for change HEIs’ governance & management (EU and OECD) 
- Competition; 
- Pressures for more efficiency   
 
 Implementation of  the RJIES at the Institutional Level 
- How have HEIs organised the process internally? 
 
 Influence of  OECD in RJIES: 
- The appointment of Rectors or Presidents,    
- The appointment of faculty and department heads,  
- An increase in external members on institutions’ highest governing body, 
- Loss of public servant status for both academic and non-academic staff;  
- Non-applicability of public accountancy rules to the institutions. 
- Loss of influence by collegial bodies, which mostly took on an advisory role;  
- Rejection of the principle of parity in the representation of academics and students (except on the 
Pedagogic Council);  
- Concentration of executive power in the Rector or President;  
- External recruitment of the Chair of the General Council;  
- Strengthening individual leadership in units and subunits;  
- A reduction in the number of governance and deliberative bodies;  
- A decrease in the number of academics on governance bodies.  
 
 Creation of  a New Institutional Culture – NPM 
 
 Changes in the Organisational Structure: 
- Establishment of  Mergers (why? advantages and disadvantages. Reasons for merging in Finland 
are certainly different from those in Portugal) 
- Profiling HEIs 
- Changes in the universities’ legal status (foundations) 
- (Increased) technostructure  
 
 Changes in Institutional Governance: 
- Shift in the governance model 
- Recomposition/changes of the governance bodies: Reconfiguration of powers;  
- Redefinition/change of actors’ roles and tasks/duties (Rector; academics); Blurring of the faculty 
roles and duties 
- Links between the University and society - Presence of external stakeholders; 
- Professionalisation of Management (Academics vs. Managers Performance); 
- (Shifts in) Decision-making Logics; 
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-  Division of Work/Labour; delegation of powers and responsibilities 
 
 Control Mechanisms/Managerialism: 
- Autonomy 
- (Increase of) Bureaucracy 
- Accountability 
- Funding (pressures to raise funds) 
- Emphasis on Results 
- Performance Assessment Exercises 
- Competition 
- Academic Capitalism:  
 
 Human Resources Management / Working Conditions 
- Recruitment, selection and hiring procedures 
- Civil Servant Status; non-tenure positions 
- Competition 
- Relationship between different groups of  professionals  
- Working conditions (Increase amount of  workload; pressures to publish) 
- Performance Assessment  
 
 Governance models of  both types of  HEIs 
 
 Adjustment/Acceptance to the RJIES by type of  HEI 
 
 The Third Mission of  the University 
- Commercialisation of  Knowledge 
- Focus on employability 
 
 Relevance of  RJIES for the development of  Portuguese Higher Education 
- Clarification of  the Binary divide; 
- Equal institutional autonomy for all types of  HEIs, public and private; 
- Update of  the Teaching Career Code 
 
 Negative Aspects of  RJIES 
 Positive Aspects of  RJIES 
 
 System organisation – the Binary Divide 
- Conceptualisation of both types of HEIs 
- Degree of change induced by the Bologna Process/RJIES in each type of subsystem 
- Different governance model for universities and polytechnics 
- Possible tensions between both subsystems 
 
 Other topics 
- Cultural aspects/differences/explanations – high (FI) and low (PT) context culture 
- Policy tools  
- (Limits) of State Interference – Institutional Autonomy 
- Wishes of Interviewees for their HE system 
- Performance agreement  
 
 
